Holding

The appellant is entitled to bail; the High Court's denial of bail is set aside.

Summary

Chenna Boyanna Krishna Yadav, a former minister and advocate, was charged under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA) for allegedly abetting Abdul Karim Telgi's counterfeit stamp syndicate. The High Court rejected his bail applications, relying on a recorded conversation between Yadav and Telgi as prima facie evidence of his involvement. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the bail provisions of MCOCA, particularly Section 21(4), which requires the court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit further offences. The Court held that the conversation merely indicated acquaintance and did not establish a direct role in the organised crime, and that reasonable grounds existed to believe Yadav was not guilty of the offences under Sections 3(2) and 24. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order, and directed that Yadav be enlarged on bail with appropriate conditions.

Issues considered

Whether bail can be granted to an accused under MCOCA when the evidence consists only of an alleged conversation with the alleged mastermind.
Whether the conditions of Section 21(4) of MCOCA – reasonable grounds of belief of non‑guilt and likelihood of re‑offending – are satisfied in the present case.
Whether the appellant’s alleged conduct falls within the ambit of Section 3(2) (abetment) or merely Section 24 of MCOCA.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 439
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 255, s. 256, s. 257, s. 258, s. 259, s. 263(A), s. 34, s. 420, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471, s. 472, s. 473, s. 474, s. 475, s. 476
Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999s. 21(4), s. 24, s. 3(2)
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(i)(d), s. 7

Subjects

bailMCOCAorganized crimeabetmentcounterfeit stampspolitical influencereasonable groundsnon‑obstante clause

Judgment

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CHENNA BOYANNA KRISHNA YADAV A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.

DECEMBER 8, 2006

[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] B

Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999-Sections 3(2),
21 (4) & 2 4-Printing of counterfeit stamps and stamp papers by Organised
Crime Syndicate-Appellant is Advocate by profession and had been a Minister
in the State Government-Allegation that the counterfeit stamps were being
c
sold under his protection-Charges under s.3(2) & 24-Judicial custody-
Entitlement ofAppellant to bail-Held, entitled-Alleged conversation between
-
!!!!!Po
Appellant and Kingpin of the Syndicate may show acquaintance but may not
per se be sufficient to prove direct role of Appellant.
D
A case was registered against the appellant under Sections 3 and 24
of the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crimes Act, 1999 (MCOCA)
as also under the provisions of IPC and Bombay Stamps Act, 1958. It was
alleged that the appellant received huge amounts of money from time to
time from an Organised Crime Syndicate relating to printing of counterfeit
stamps, headed by one 'Telgi', and in return, being an influential political E
person, provided a protective umbrella to the Syndicate, and thus,
knowingly facilitated and abetted the commission of organised crime by
it.

The appellant was arrested and at present he is in judicial custody.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that on the basis of the material F
on record, no inference can be drawn that the appellant was a party to
conspiracy or had abetted commission or facilitation of the crime with
which Telgi or other co-accused were associated; that even if prosecution
-1
version is taken on its face value, the appellant's alleged association with
Telgi would not bring his case within the ambit of Section 3(2) and at best G
only Section 24 of MCOCA may be attracted and that the maximum
punishment provided under Section 24 of MCOCA being three years
rigorous imprisonment and the appellant having already been in judicial
custody for more than three years Is entitled to be enlarged on bail.

381 H
-'
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. IO S.C.R.

A Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: l. It is plain from a bare reading of the non-obstante clause
in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of MCOCA that the power to grant bail
by the High Court or Court of Sessions is not only subject to the limitations
imposed by Section 439, CrPC but is also Silbject to the limitations placed
B by Section 21(4) of MCOCA. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the
Public Prosecutor,· the other twin conditions are: the satisfaction of the
Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is
not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and not alternative.
C The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused being not guilty has
to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression "reasonable grounds"
means something more than primafacie grounds. It contemplates substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provisions requires
existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
D justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Thus,
recording of findings under the said provision is a sine qua non for granting
bail under MCOCA; 1387-E-GI

Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.,
12005] 5 sec 294, relied on.
E
State v. Capt. Jagjit Singh, 11962] 3 SCR 622; Gurcharan Singh v. State
(Delhi Admn.), [1978) l SCC 118 and Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State
o/Tamil Nadu, [2005) 2 SCC 13, referred to.

2.1. At this stage, it is.neither necessary nor desirable to weigh the
F evidence meticulously to arrive at a positive finding as to whether or not
the appellant has committed offences under Section 3(2) or Section 24 of
MCOCA. What is to be seen is whether there is a reasonable ground for
believing that the appellant is not guilty of the two offences, he has been
charged with, and further that he is not likely to commit an offence under
G MCOCA while on bail. The circumstance which has weighed with the High
Court to conclude that the appel_lant had the knowledge of Organised
Crime Syndicate of Telgi, printing fake stamps etc. and these were being
sold under the protection of the appellant and hence he had abetted an
organised crime, is the alleged conversation between him and Telgi. The
alleged conversation may show appellant's acquaintance with Telgi but
H
CHENNABOYANNAKRISHNA YADAVv. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[D.K.JAIN,J.J 383

may not per se be sufficient to prove appellant's direct role with the A
commission of an organized crime by Telgi, to bring home an offence of
abetment in the commission of organized crime falling within the ambit
of Section 3(2) of MCOCA and/or that he had rendered any help or
support in the commission of an organized crime whether before or after
the commission of such offence by a member of an organized crime B
syndicate or had abstained from taking lawful measures under MCOCA,
thus, falling within the purview of Section 24 of MCOCA. It is true that
when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe, mere period of
incarceration or the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the
near future either by itself or conjointly may not entitle the accused to be
enlarged on bail. Nevertheless, both these factors may also be taken into C
consideration while deciding the question of grant of bail. [389-C-G)

2.2. Having regard to the afore-mentioned circumstances,
particularly the role attributed to the appellant in the charge-sheet, it is a
lit case for grant of bail to the appellant. f389-H)
D
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1286
of 2006.

From the final Judgment and Order dated 19-9-2005 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Cr!. A. No. 4853 of 2004.
E
U.U. Lalit, A.V. Savant, Sanjay Sen, Rana S. Biswas, M. Roopender,
Manish P.S. Chouhan, Vishal Anand, Ruchika Rathi, Sarla Chandra, Chinmoy
Khaladkar, S.K. Nandy, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Himanshu Gupta, Brij Kishor
Sah and Rahul Joshi for the Appellant.

Sushi! Kumar, Sandhya Goswami, P. Parmeswaran, D.S. Mahra, S.S. F
Shinde, Aniruddha P. Mayee and V.N. Raghupathy for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.K. JAIN, J. Leave granted.
G
2. The challenge in this appeal is to Order dated 19.9.2005 passed by
a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, rejecting
the second bail application preferred by the appellant under Section 439 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code').
H
3. The appellant is an Advocate by profession. In the year 1994 he was
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. IO S.C.R. ,,.'
A elected as a Member of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra
Pradesh. Till the year 1998 he was a Minister in the Andhra Pradesh
Government. In the year 1999 he was again elected as a Member of the
Legislative Assembly. Between the period from October, 1999 to November,
2001 he was again a Minister holding various portfolios.

B 4. One Abdul Karim Ladsab Telgi (hereinafter referred to as 'Telgi')
was arrested and proceeded against for alleged commission of offences of
printing and distributing counterfeit stamps/papers on a very large scale.
During investigations, stamps/papers worth Rs.2, 128 crores were seized. A
second search on l l. l.2003 at one of the premises occupied by Telgi,
C conducted by the Special Investigating Team, resulted in the recovery of a
micro audio cassette. The said cassette contained recording of alleged
conversation between the appellant and Telgi. The date mentioned on the
said cassette is 16.1.1998. On an analysis of the voice samples of the appellant,
the Forensic Laboratory opined that the voice recorded in the said cassette
was that of the appellant.
D
5. The case of the prosecution, based on the cassette, is that in the year
1998 the appellant was involved in the kidnapping of two employees of
Telgi, namely, Abdul Wahid and Sadashiva. He demanded a ransom of Rs.2
crores from Telgi for their release. A deal materialised and as a result thereof
E the appellant came closer to Telgi. The friendship between the appellant and
Telgi blossomed and as a result wherefor, the appellant rendered active support
and help to Telgi in his alleged unlawful activities of Organised Crime
Syndicate in the State of Andhra Pradesh relating to printing of counterfeit
stamps and other documents and sale thereof. The allegation, in short, is that
the appe!lant received huge amounts of money from time to time from the
F Organised Crime Syndicate, headed by Telgi, and in return, being an influential
political person, provided a protective umbrella to the Organised Crime
Syndicate in carrying out unlawful activities in the State of Andhra Pradesh,
and thus, knowingly facilitated and abetted the commission of an Organised
Crime by the Syndicate of Telgi.
G 6. Investigations were initiated by a Special Investigation Team of the
Mumbai Police but later on investigation of the case, along with other 47
cases, was transferred by this Court to the Central Bureau of lnvestigat'ion.
As a result of the investigations, a case was registered against the appellant
under Sections 120(B), 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 263(A), 420, 467, 468, 471,
H 472, 473, 474, 475, 476 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. A case was also
CHENNA BOYANNA KRISHNA YADA V v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.K. JAIN, J.) 385

registered under the provisions of Section 63(a) and 63(b) of the Bombay A
Stamps Act, 1958. Subsequently, Sections 3 and 24 of the Maharashtra Control
of Organized Crimes Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'MCOCA') were
also invoked. Against some of the accused, including the appellant, commission
of offences under Sections 7 and 13(i)(d} of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 were also alleged.
B
7. The appellant was arrested on 6.9.2003 and was remanded to police
custody. Since 26.9 .2003 he is in judicial custody. The charge-sheet came to
be filed on 29.12.2003. Subsequently some more charge-sheets were filed
and finally a supplementary charge-sheet was filed by the CBI on 26.7.2005.
All these charge-sheets were consolidated into one.
c
8. Appellant's first application for bail was rejected by the High Court
on 6.8.2004. As noted above his second bail application has been rejected by
the impugned order. Taking into consideration statements of some of the
witnesses and the said tape recorded conversation between the appellant and
Telgi, the learned Judge has come to the conclusion that, prima facie, there D
is material on record to show that the appellant had knowledge about the
continuing organised crime of printing and selling of fake stamps; and he
provided protection to continuing activities of sale of the fake stamps with
the knowledge or having reason to believe that he was engaged in assisting
Organised Crime Syndicate of Telgi. Thus, the learned Jadge has come to the
conclusion that the appellant abetted the commission of organised crimes. E
/

9. Mr. Umesh U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,
has submitted that on the basis of the material on record, including the
statements of the four witnesses, referred to in the impugned order, no inference
can be drawn that the appellant was a party to conspiracy or had abetted F
commission or facilitation of the crime with which Telgi or other co-accused
were associated. It is urged that the allegation of demand of ransom of Rs.2
crores by the appellant from Telgi has no nexus with the principal offence
alleged under MCOCA. Drawing support from the decision of this Court in
Raryitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 1, wherein
various provisions of MCOCA, particularly the definition of the word "abet" G
contained in Section 2(1)(a) have been considered, learned counsel has
contended that even if prosecution version is taken on its face value, the
appellant's alleged association with Telgi would not bring his case within the
ambit of Section 3(2) and at best only Section 24 of MCOCA may be attracted.
1. [2oos1 s sec 294. H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A It is urged that the maximum punishment provided under Section 24 ofMCOCA
being three years' rigorous imprisonment and the appellant having already
been in judicial custody for more than three years, he is entitled to be
enlarged on bail. Learned counsel has also pointed out that at least three co-
accused, namely, R.S. Sharma, Mohammad Chand Mulani and Babanrao
B Tukaram Ranjane, against whom much more evidence is available, have
already been enlarged on bail by this Court .

. 10. Mr. Sushi! Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents, while opposing the bail to the appellant, has submitted that there
is enough evidence on record to show that the appellant had abetted the said
C organised activity. Learned counsel has contended that the allegation regarding
kidnapping of two men belonging to Telgi and demanding ransom cannot be
termed as anti-thesis to the prosecution case and in fact the said act on the
part of the appellant was the beginning of his association with Telgi which
ultimately blossomed into close relationship with Telgi, which led the appellant
to actively support the Organised Crime Syndicate of Telgi and in return he
D received large amounts from him.

11. The considerntioils which normally weigh with the court in granting
bail in non-bailable offences have been explained by this Court in State v.
Capt. Jagjit Singh 2 and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)3 and recently
in Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of Tamil Nadu 4, which are:
E
" .... .the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the
evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable
possibility of the presence of the a_c;,cused not being secured at the
trial; r~asonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the
larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors
F which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case."

12. However, as the provisions of MCOCA have been invoked in the
instant case in addition to the afore-mentioned broad principles, the limitations
imposed in the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of
G MCOCA cannot be lost sight of while dealing with the application for grant
of bail. The relevant provision reads as under:

2. [1962) 3 SCR 622 : AIR (1962) SC 253.

3. [1978] 1sec118.

4. [2005J 2 sec 13.
H
- CHENNA BOYANNA KRISHNA YAPAVv. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.K.JAIN,J.] 387

"(I) ... A
(2) .. .
(3)
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person
accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall, if in B
custody, be released on bail or on his own bond, unless.

(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose
the application of such release; and

(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he C
is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail.

(S)
(6) D
(7) "
\
13. It is plain from a bare reading of the non-obstante clause in the sub-
section that the power to grant bail by the High Court or Court of Sessions
is not only subject to the limitations imposed by Section 439 of the Code but E
is also subject to the limitations placed by Section 21(4) of MCOCA. Apart
from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions
are: the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not likely
to commit any offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and not
alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused being not F
guilty has to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression "reasonable
grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates
substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the
alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provisions requires
existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to G
justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Thus,
recording of findings under the said provision is a sine qua non for granting
bail under MCOCA.

14. In R.B. Sharma's case (supra), construing the said provision
. H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A somewhat liberally, S.B. Sinha, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench observed
thus:-

"43. Section 21(4) of MCOCA does not make any distinction between
an offence which entails punishment of life imprisonment and an
imprisonment for a year or two. It does not provide that even in case
B a person remains behind the bars for a period exceeding three years,
although his involvement may be in terms of Section 24 of the Act,
the court is prohibited to enlarge him on bail. Each case, therefore,
must be considered on its own facts. The question as to whether he
is involved in the commission of organised crime or abetment thereof
C must be judged objectively ... "

"44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to
the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that the
applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such
a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive
D at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In
such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a
judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention
of the legislature. Section 21(4) of MCOCA, therefore, must be
construed reasonably. It must be so construed that the court is able
E to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and
conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of
trial. Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the
possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However,
such an offence in future must be an offence under the Act and not I
J

any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of
F
an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the
matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities
and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed
the offence."

G "46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence
meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad
probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA
having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section .
·of
21 the Act, the court may have to probe into .the matter deeper so
as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against
H
- CHENNA BOYANNA KRISHNA YADAV v. STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA (D.K. JAIN, J.) 3 89

the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of A
conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or
refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not
have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would,
thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at
the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby."
B
15. Bearing in mind the above broad principles, we may now consider
the merits of the appeal.

16. At this stage, it is neither necessary nor desir:tble to weigh the
evidence meticulously to arrive at a positive finding as to whether or not the C
appellant has committed offences under Section 3(2) or Section 24 ofMCOCA.
What is to be seen is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that
the appellant is not guilty of the two offences, he has been charged with, and
further that he is not likely to commit an offence under MCOCA while on
bail. As noted above, the circumstance which has weighed with the High
Court to conclude that the appellant had the knowledge of Organised Crime D
Syndicate of Telgi, printing fake stamps etc. and these were being sold under
the protection of the appellant and hence he had abetted an organised crime,
is the alleged conversation between him and Telgi in January, 1998, after the
kidnapping incident. In our view, the alleged conversation may show
appellant's acquaintance with Telgi but may not per se be sufficient to prove E
appellant's direct role with the commission of an organized crime by Telgi,
to bring home an offence of abetment in the commission of organized crime
falling within the ambit of Section 3(2) ofMCOCA and/or that he had rendered
any help or support in the commission of an organized crime whether before
or after the commission of such offence by a member of an organized crime p
syndicate or had abstained from taking lawful measures under MCOCA,
thus, falling within the purview of Section 24 of MCOCA. It is true that
when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe, mere period of incarceration
or the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either
by itself or conjointly may not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail.
Nevertheless, both these factors may also be taken into consideration while G
deciding the question of grant of bail.

17. Having regard to the afore-mentioned circumstances, particularly
the role attributed to the appellant in the charge-sheet, we are of the view that
it is a fit case for grant of bail to the appellant. H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A 18. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the
High·Court is set aside. lt is directed that the appellant shall be enlarged on
bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.5 lakhs with two
sureties, each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Special Court,
Pune. He shall also remain bound by all the conditions as stipulated in Section
B 438(2) of the Code. The appellant shall also surrender his passport, if any,
before the Special Court, Pune.

19. It goes without saying that aforenoted observations on the merits
of the material collected by the prosecution are tentative, only for the purpose
of this appeal, and shall not be taken as an expression of final opinion on the
C merits of the case.

B.B.B. Appeal allowed.

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