Holding

The single judge’s direction to refer the appeal to the Supreme Court for final determination was without jurisdiction and void; no contempt proceedings could be initiated, and the appeal must be remanded to another High Court judge.

Summary

Chetak Construction Ltd. alleged that Justice R.D. Vyas of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had bought a flat from the respondent and therefore should recuse himself from hearing an appeal. The judge refused, made disparaging remarks, suggested contempt proceedings against the appellant and its lawyers, and unilaterally directed that the appeal be referred to the Supreme Court for a final decision, barring any remand to a High Court judge. The Supreme Court held that the judge’s direction was beyond his jurisdiction, that his comments were uncalled for and not based on objective criteria, and that no contempt of court case existed. It set aside the direction and ordered the appeal to be remanded to a different judge of the Jabalpur Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court for disposal on its merits.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court judge can direct an appeal pending before him to be decided by the Supreme Court finally, without remand.
Whether the judge’s suggestion to initiate contempt proceedings against the appellant and its counsel was justified.
Whether the judge’s remarks constitute contempt of court or an abuse of judicial power.
Whether the alleged purchase of a flat by the judge creates a conflict of interest requiring recusal.
Scope and proper exercise of contempt jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 129, s. Article 215
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. Section 2, s. Section 3, s. Section 5

Subjects

Judicial recusalContempt of courtJurisdiction of High Court judgesForum shoppingJudicial impartialityConflict of interestSupreme Court jurisdictionContempt of Courts ActJudicial discipline

Judgment

A CHETAK CONSTRUCTION LTD.
v.
OM PRAKASH AND ORS.

APPIL 20, 1998

B [DR. A.S. ANAND AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950 :

Articles 215 and 129-Contempt of court-Jurisdiction-Exercise of-
C Appellant filed an affidavit before the Single Judge of the High Court that
he had learnt that the Single Judge purchased a flat fi'om the respondent and
let it out-Appellant requested the single Judge lo decide whether or not to
hear the appeal-Respondent did not deny the said allegation in his counter
affidavit-Appellant filed a further application making the same a/legation
D supported by documentary evidence requesting the Judge to recuse or relieve
himselfji-0111 hearing the appeal and transfer the same to any other Judge of
the High Court-Single Judge di.•::onlinued hearing the appeal but made ~
certain remarks reflecting his feelings against the appellant and his la»yers-
Single Judge also suggested initiating of contempt proceedings by Supreme
Court 011 reference to it against the appellant and certain lawyers-Held: in
E the circumstances of the case, although the Single Judge rightly discontinued
hearing the appeal, his remarks which are not based on objective
considerations and contain general observations and irrelevant matters are
conjectural in na/llre and were disapproved-No case for contempt made out
by Single Judge-Hence, suggestion for initiating contempt proceedings by
Supreme Court on reference to it by Single Judge, rejected-Practice and
F Procedure-Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Articles 215 and l 29-Contempt of court-Jurisdiction-Exercise a/-
General principles-Held: lawyers and litigants cannot "terrorise" or
"intimidate" Judges to "secure" orders which they want-Attempt on their
G part at 'forum shopping'' not permissible-At the same time judicial powers
niust be exercised impartially and within bounds of law by impersonal
application by the Judge of recognised objective principles and not by
resorting to subjective moods, preailections, emotions and prejudices- \,..
Contempt of court jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction-It has to be exercised
cautiously and sparingly and only for upholding the dignity of courts and
H the majesty of law and to keep the administration of justice unpolluted-It
1016
CHET AK CONSTRUCTION LTD. v. OM PRAKASH AND ORS. 1017

should be exercised only when justified by the facts and circumstances. A
Article I 29-Direction to refer a matter to Supreme Court-By Single
Judge of High Court-To initiate contempt of court proceedings-Propriety
of-Based on docummtmy evidence, appellant alleged that the Single Judge
of Indore Bench of MP High Court had purchased flat from respondent and
requested the Single Judge to refuse or release himself from the appeal- B
~
Single Judge discontinued hearing the appeal but directed the appeal "to

.. be referred" to Supreme Court for deciding it ''finally" and not to "remand"
it to him or any other judge of any High Court-Held : The Single Judge's
"direction" is without jurisdiction and subversive of judicial discipline-
Hence set aside-Appeal directed to be decided by a Judge of Jabalpur
Bench of the High Court.
c
The appellant filed an affidavit before the Single Judge of the High
Court, who was hearing an appeal filed by the appellant, that the appellant
had learnt that the Single Judge purchased a flat from the respondent and
let it out to the State Bank of India. The appellant, therefore, requested the D
,: Single Judge to decide whether or not to hear the appeal. The respondent
filed a counter affidavit not denying the said allegation. The appellant filed
a further application supported by documentary evidence and requested the
Single Judge to refuse to release himself from hearing that appeal and
transfer the same to any other Judge of the High Court.
E
The Single Judge took exception to the appellant's application and
observed that attempt was being made to malign him and the proceedings and
that he was under no obligation to clarify the appellant's misrepresentation
and that there could be no apprehension, much less a great or genuine
apprehension, about his purchase of the flat. The Single Judge suspected F
that it was the appellant who had tried to influence him in the name of a
lawyer from Ahmedabad on STD. Referring to certain "pamphlets" the
Single Judge observed that there was a group of persons including possibly
some lawyers who were out to malign or browbeat the Judges to act to their
tune. The Single Judge suggested that these persons be dealt with strictly.
The Single Judge felt that it was the fittest case to be referred to this Court G
for taking appropriate actions against the appellant and certain lawyers
r including contempt of court proceedings. The Single Judge, thereafter, did
'
not continue to hear the appeal but passed an order directing the appeal to
"be referred to" this court for deciding it "finally" and not to "remand" it
to him or to any other Judge of any High Court. Hence this appeal. H
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] 2 S.C.R.

A Remanding the appeal, this Court

HELD : I. Lawyers and litigants cannot be permitted to browbeat the
court or malign the Presiding Officer with a view to getting a favourable
order. Lawyers and litigant~ cannot be allowed to "terrorise" or "intimidate"
Judges with a view to "secure" orders, which they want. A litigant cannot
B be permitted 'choice' of the 'forum' and every attempt at "forum shopping"
must be crushed with a heavy hand. 11026-F-GJ

Jaswant Singh v. Virender Singh, 11995) Supp. I SCC 384, relied on.

2.1. At the same time, it is of utmost importance to remember that
C Judges must act as impartial referees and decide cases objectively,
uninfluenced by any personal bias or prejudice. Judicial powers must be
exercised impartially and within the bounds of law. Public confidence in the
judiciary rests on legitimacy of judicial process. Sources of legitim.acy are
in the impersonal application by the Judge of recognised objective principles,
which owe their existence to a system as distinguished from subjective
D moods, predilections, emotions and prejudices. Judges must always ensure
that they do not allow the credibility of the institution to be eroded. One must
always remember that justice must not only be done but it must also be seen
to be done.11026-H; 1027-A-BJ
2.2. In the facts and circumstances of the present case there is no
E justification for initiating contempt proceedings as suggested by the Single
Judge either against the lawyers or the appellant for their "action" in
making request to the Single Judge to recuse himself from the case.
[1030-E[
Barada Kanta Mishra v. Registrar o/Orissa High Court, 11974) I SCC
F 374, relied on.
Queen v. Grey, (1900) 2 QB 36, referred to.
3. In the instant case the Single Judge, having been apprised of the
facts and circumstances of the case, rightly did not continue to hear the
appeal and in doing so he acted in a manner expected of the Judge. However,
G while technically recusing himself, the Single Judge appears to have given
vent to his feelings and made comments which were uncalled for and
unwarranted-those betray objective consideration and to an extent
demonstrates subjective predilections. It is subversive of judicial sobriety.
[1027-C-DJ
H 4. There could be no reasons for the 'general' observations made by
CHET AK CONSTRUCTION LTD. v. OM PRAKASH AND ORS. 1019

the Single Judge. Generalisations are best avoided. There is no necessity for A
referring to certain "pamphlets" unconnected with the case and to make one
of those pamphlets concerning a sitting Judge of this Court (since retired)
a part of the judicial record when it had no relevance to the instant case.
Reference made is totally out of context. [1027-E-F[

5. In the absence of any other material on record the appellant's B
submission that the observation of the Single Judge that "now I am sure that

. it (telephone call) must be on behalf of the appellant alone, that l was tried
to be influenced in the name of a lawyer from Ahmedabad" and again "l feel
that the STD call must have been at the behest of the applicant" were
conjectural in nature and are not backed by any proof of factual accuracy C
cannot be dismissed as wholly untenable. [1028-B)

6. In the course of the impugned "reference" the Single Judge has
also suggested that contempt proceedings be initiated against some of the
lawyers who appeared before him besides the appellant. But there is no cause
made out to institute contempt proceedings, as suggested. Contempt of court D
jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction. It has to be used cautiously and exercised
sparingly. It must be used to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty
of law and to keep the administration of justice unpolluted, where the facts
and circumstances so justify. (1029-F-H]

7. The direction in question is without any jurisdictional authority or E
legal sanction. The Single Judge innovated a procedure unknown to law. It
is improper for a Judge of the High Court to "direct" that an appeal pending
before him be decided by •he Supreme Court itself"finally" and to further
suggest that this Court should not "remand the appeal" to the Single Judge
or to any other Judge of any High Court. The reference/" direction" is F
untenable and the order devoid of any legal sanction. The same is, therefore,
set aside. [1028-F; 1029-El
8. It is directed that the record of the case shall be sent to the High
Court for being placed before the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur for assigning the appeal to a Judge sitting at Jabalpur
(not at Indore or Gwalior) for its disposal in accordance with law expeditiously. G
[1030-G)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2140 of
1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.5.97 of the Madhya Pradesh H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A High Court in Misc. A. No 143/94 read with I.A. No. 6079 of 1996.

D.D. Thakur, S.C. Bagadia, Ms. Indira Jaisingh, Vivek Gambhir and S.K.
Gambhir for th~ Appellants in C. A. No. 2140/98 and 13021/96.

J.M. Khatna for the Appellant in C. A. No. 7460/95.
B
Pradeep Aggarwal and Sushi! Kumar Jain for the Respondents.

K.L. Taneja and Niraj Sharma for the Respondents in C.A. No. 7460/95. •

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c DR. ANAND, J. Special leave granted.

This judgment will dispose of the appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.
13190of1997 and an 'order' made by a learned single Judge (Mr. Justice R.D.
Vyas) of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench) in Miscellaneous
D Appeal 143 of 1994 directing the appeal to "be referred to" this Court for
deciding it "finally" since both matters arise out of the same order.

Notice of some salient facts is necessary for disposal of the matter
before us.

E Dispute between the parties relates to land bearing No.8/1 and 8/2, M.G.
Road, Indore. According to the appellant, the suit land belongs to various
members of Hindu Undivided Family, who had entered into an agreement with
it to sell that land. An agreement containing various stipulations is stated to
have been executed between the parties. According to the appellant, it had
paid certain amounts, out of the total sale price and had got registered a sale
F deed executed for 13 out of 28 portions of the suit land the execution of sale
deeds, in respect of remaining portions of the suit land, however, remained
pending. According to the appellant, there was interference, by the
respondents, with the appellant's possession of the suit land and it therefore
filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in the Trial Court. The
G suit was resisted by the contesting respondents on various grounds. Initially,
the Trial Court granted an ex parte temporary injunction to the appellant but
the same came to be vacated after heanng both sides by an order dated
15.3.1994. Against, the order of the Trial Court dated 15.3.1994, the appellant
filed Misc. Appeal No. 143 of 1994. That appeal was decided by a learned
single Judge (Mr. Justice R.D. Vyas) on 20.2.1995. Against, the order of the '
H learned single Judge, Civil Appeal No.7460of1995 arising out of S.L.P. (C)
CHET AK CONSTRUCTION LTD v. OM PRAKASH AND ORS. [DR. ANAND, J.] J02'1

No. 8590of1995 was tiled in this Court. The order of the learned single Judge A
dated 20.2.95 was set aside on 21.8.1995 and Misc. Appeal No. 143/1994 was
remanded for its fresh disposal. After the order of remand, the appeal was
again listed before the learned single Judge (Mr. Justice R.D.Vyas). It appears
that due to the absence of Shri Andhayarujina, Senior Advocate, who had
partly argued the appeal on behalf of the appellants but could not appear to
continue with the arguments as his wife had to undergo some urgent surgery, B
the part-heard appeal was dismissed on 25.6.1996. (We are refraining from
-<:
dealing with various proceedings which took place before the learned single
• Judge after order of remand dated 21.8.1995 or the merits of the order dismissing
the appeal on 25 .6.1996 as the same are not relevant for the purpose of this
order). Aggrieved, by the order of the learned single Judge dated 25.6.1996, c
dismissing Misc. Appeal No. 143 of 1994, after remand, the appellant once
again approached this Court by filing SLP (C) No. 15262 of 1996. It was inter
alia pleaded that failure of Shri Andhyarujina to continue with the arguments,
on account of the illness of his wife, was bonafide and that instead of
dismissing the appeal, the learned single Judge could have adjourned it. Civil
Appeal No. 13201/96 arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 15262 of 1996 was allowed D
by this Court on 11th October, 1996, on a concession made by learned counsel
>-' for the respondents and the case was once again remanded to the learned
single Judge for hearing arguments of the parties and deciding the appeal on
merits. While disposing ofC.A. No.13201/96, this Court inter alia observed:-

"In view of the concession made by learned counsel for the
E
respondents the Order dated 25.6.96 in M.A. No. 143 of 1994 is hereby
set aside. The case is remanded to the learned Judge for hearing
arguments of the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant is directed
to appear before the learned Judge of the High Court who was hearing
the arguments and who made the impugned order, either personally F
or through his counsel, on 4th of November 1996. We request the
..... learned Judge to take up the matter on that date and if that date is
not convenient to the Bench, to fix some other date for continuation
of the arguments. The appellant shall not seek any further adjournment
while the arguments are being heard on the date fixed by the learned
Judge. The learned Judge shall after hearing the arguments make a G
fresh order in accordance with law."
,.. After remand the appeal was listed for continuation of arguments before
the learned single Judge.

It transpires from the record that on 2.11. 96, an affidavit was filed by H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998] 2 S.C.R.

A the Company Secretary of the appellant, before the learned single Judge (Mr.
Justice R.D. Vyas) stating therein that respondent No.3 in the appeal had been
residing in flat No. 101 of Nikita Apts. and that the appellant had now learnt
that said flat had been purchased by the learned single Judge and had been
let out by him to The State Bank of Indore. It was stated that this information
was not available with the appellant earlier and had not been disclosed by
B respondent No.3 either. The learned single Judge was, therefore, requested to
take an appropriate decision whether to hear the appeal or not. To the said
affidavit, Respondent No.3 filed a counter affidavit on 4.11.1996 stating therein
that he had shifted from the flat in question. It was, however, not disclosed
in the counter affidavit as to in which capacity Respondent No.3 had been
C living in the flat which had been purchased by the learned single Judge. In
the counter filed by respondent No.3, there was also no denial of the fact that
the flat in question had in fact been purchased by the learned single Judge,
during the pendency of the appeal. Proceedings of the court reveal that after
the counter was filed by respondent No.3, the appeal was, adjourned by the
court "to enable the parties to reach at some settlement". On the next date,
D however, it was reported to the court that no settlement could take place and
the learned single Judge thereupon directed the hearing of the appeal on
merits.

On 30.11.1996, the company secretary of the appellant filed an
E application, I.A. No. 6079196 in Misc. Appeal No. I43/94.

In paragraph I of the application it was averred:

"That on the last date of hearing i.e. on 4.11.1996 the present
appellant had respectfully drawn your Lordship's kind attention to the
F fact that the flat No.IOI, situated in Nikita Apartments, at 3, R.K.
Puram Color.y, near Amaltas Hotel on A.B. Road, Indore, was occupied
by the respondent No.3 Shri Vijay Khandelwal and appear to have
been purchased by your Lordship and that this transaction had not
been disclosed by the respondent No.3 at any time during the pendency
of the present appeal. On this the appellant had requested your
G Lordship to decide appropriately in the matter whether your Lordship
would hear the matter. With the said application the appellant had also
submitted a copy of the documents evidencing service of summons
of the suit in the trial court on the respondent No.3 on 24.4.1993 at
the flat in question. The appellant had also submitted a copy of the
voters list showing the responclent No.3 to be the resident of the said
H building. The appellant had also submitted copy of the letter written
CHET AK CONSTRUCTION LTD. 1· OM PRAKASH AND ORS [DR ANAND J I ] 023

by your Lordship to the State Bank of India offering this flat on rent A
and the appellant had mentioned that Shri A.N.Borkar, an officer of
the Bank was residing in this flat as your Lordship's tenant."

In paragraph 5 of the application, it was stated:-

"That on 22.11.1996 the appellant has obtained a certified copy of B
the sale deed by which your Lordship has purchased this flat. The
sale was made by an attorney in favour of your Lordship giving the
.. purchaser's address as 5, High Court Judges Bungalows, Vastrapur,
Ahmedabad, Gujarat. Para 2 page 4 of the sale deed states that the
apartment was in a incomplete condition having been constructed C
only upon the stage of column, beam, and roof slab and that all the
balance construction work of the flat was yet to be done. The sale
consideration as mentioned in para 3 is Rs. 1,93,009, out of which Rs.
l 0,000 is stated to have been received cash while Rs. 1,83,009 is stated
to have been received on various dates by various modes. It is
significant that it is not stated whether the aggregate amount of Rs. D
1,83,009 was paid by cheque/cash. Para 4 of the sale deed also mentions
that the possession of the Flat had been handed over to your Lordship
on" 1994".

In paragraph 7 of the application it was stated that receipt of
consideration mentioned in the sale deed was "vague" and that though the E
total sale consideration was stated to be Rs. ! .93 lakhs, the learned single
Judge had "obtained a loan of Rs.3.25 lakhs on this flat from the Housing
Development Finance Corporation Limited, Indore."

In paragraph 8 it was stated:-
F
"That the sale deed mentions that the possession of the flat was
delivered to your Lordship in ! 994. Hence, the payment of Rs. 1.83
lakhs must have been made before this date. On the other hand it
appears from the record that the respondent No.3 was living in this
flat upto two months prior to 4.9.1995." G

It was thus, implied that respondent No.3 was li~ing in the flat in
question even after the flat was purchased by the learned single Judge and
possession delivered to him.

The application ended with the following prayer: H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A "In view of the above facts and circumstances, the appellant humbly
requests your Lordship to recuse or relieve yourself from hearing this case
and to direct that the matter may be listed before any other Hon'ble Judge
of this Court for hearing."

Ms. Indira Jaisingh, senior advocate argued this application and drew
B the attention of the learned single Judge to the facts contained therein. Copy
of the sale deed evidencing purchase of Flat No. I 0 I, Nikita Apartments, at
3, R.K. Puram Colony, by the learned single Judge along with a copy of the r
letter written by the learned single Judge to the State Bank of Indore, offering ..
that flat on rent as well as report of the process server with regard to service
of summons in the suit on respondent no. 3 on 24.4.1993 at the address of
c
the flat in question and certain other documents were relied upon and referred
to in the court with a view to support the averments contained in the
application. Ms. Jaisingh, learned senior advocate for the appellant therefore,
requested the learned single Judge to recuse himself from the appeal and let
the appeal be heard by some other Judge "in the interest of Justice". The
D learned single Judge, seems to have taken an exception to the request of the
learned counsel, the existt:nce of various documents etc., notwithstanding. It
was at this stage that the learned single Judge (Vyas, J.), made the order, ~
impugned in SLP (c) No. 13190 of 1997.

In the course of the impugned order, the learned single Judge observed
E in paragraph 9:-

"Certain things were tried to be argued in the said application,
which has no concern with this case, only to twist the matter and
malign me & proceedings. But I did not make that as an issue of
prestige, since I am in no obligation to the appellant to clarify his
F misrepresentations. I have pointed out to Miss Jaisingh that no
reasonable person would have any apprehension much less great or
genuine apprehension about my purchase of the flat after my
clarification in the open court as aforesaid, she would still persist on
my recusing the matter and direct it to be placed before some other
G judge.

Again in paragraph 12 of the impugned order it was observed:-

"Prior to the filing of affidavit dated 1.11.96 by Shri Sharad Kabra .
for the appellant, and around that time, now I am sure that it must be
H on behalf of the appellant alone tha; I was tried to be influenced in
CHET AK CONSTRUCTION LTD. v. OM PRAKASH AND ORS. [DR. ANAND, J J J025

the name of lawyer from Ahmedabad, one H.D. Vasavada on S.T.D. A
Phone. Since I declined, perhaps the application for recusing the
matter came to be filed by the appellant. It is only after this
application l.A.No.6079/96 has been filed. I feel that the S.T.D. call
must have been at the behest of the appellant.''

Paragraph 14 of the order reads:- B

'-.:' "14. However, looking to the controversy as it has developed
.. as also from the fact that in Indore and elsewhere there is a group
persons (including possibly some lawyers since there are genuine
reasons for me and my other brothers Judges to feel so) who are
out to malign or browbeat the judges to act to their tune. Few of c
the Pamphlets were circulated with respect to some of the Honorable
Judges including of the Judges sitting in the apex court, which are
kept in file to appreciate the whole position. It is in the wake of such
circumstances, I felt that time has come that the courts put a very
heavy foot on those who are indulging in the dirty tricks by trying
D
to manipulate the proceedings, choosing or avoiding the forums,
~ through the lawyers, who cannot argue, but for their active interest
indulgence in such activities.

In paragraph 15 of the order, it is observed:

15. In some of the instances in M.P. & Other High Courts, the E
High Courts had to sentence the Advocates and litigants for
contempt of the court in such circumstances and the orders of
sentence are confirmed by the Honorable the Supreme Court. I feel
that this is the fitte~t case to refer to the Supreme Court for taking
appropriate actions including contempt of court proceedings and F
demarcate the lines for conduct by the lawyers and the litigants in
..(
the courts."

Dealing with the conduct of lawyers and litigants in the court, this
Court in Jaswant Singh v. Virender Singh, (1995] supp. I SCC 384, observed:
G
"It is most unbefitting for an advocate to make imputations against
the Judge only because he does not get the expected result, which
according to him is the fair and reasonable result available to him.
Judges cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. Only
because a lawyer appears as a party in person he does not get a
licence thereby to commit contempt of the court by intimidating the H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) 2 S.C.R.

A Judge or scandalising the courts. He cannot use language, either in
the pleadings or during arguments, which is either intemperate or
unparliamentary. These safeguards are not for the protection of any
Judge individually but are essential for maintaining the dignity and
decorum of the courts and for touchy to fair and reasonable criticism
of their judgments. Fair comments, even if, outspoken, but made
B without any malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice
and made in good faith, in proper language, do not attract any
punishment for contempt of court. However, when from the criticism
deliberate, motivated and calculated attempt is discernible to bring
down the image of judiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair
c the administration of justice or tend to bring the administration of
justice into disrepute the courts must bestir themselves to uphold
their dignity and the majesty of law. The appellant, has, undoubtedly
committed contempt of court by the use of objectionable and
intemperate language. No system of justice can tolerate such unbridled
licence on the part of a person, be he a lawyer, to permit himself the
D liberty of scandalising a court by casting unwarranted, uncalled for
and unjustified aspersions on the integrity, ability, impartiality or
fairness of a Judge in the discharge of his judicial functions as it
amounts to an interference with the due course of administration of
justice."
E
Indeed, no lawyer or litigant can be permitted to brow beat the court
or malign the presiding officer with a view to get a favourable order. Judges
shall not be able to perform their duties freely and fairly if such activities were
·permitted and in the result administration of justice would become a casualty
and Rule of Law would receive a set back. The Judges are obliged to decide
F cases impartially and without any fear or favour. Lawyers and litigants cannot,
be allowed to "terrorize" or "intimidate" judges with a view to "secure" orders
which they want. This is basic and fundamental and no civilised system of
administration of justice can permit it. We certainly, cannot approve of any
attempt on the part of any litigant to go "forum shopping". A litigant cannot
G be permitted 'choice' of the 'forum' and every attempt at "forum shopping"
must be crushed with a heavy hand.

At the same time, it is of utmost importance to remember that Judges
must act as impartial referees and decide cases objectively, uninfluenced by
any personal bias or prejudice. A Judge should not allow his judicial position
H to be compromised at any cost. This is essential for maintaining the integrity
CHET AK CONSTRUCTION LTD. v. OM PRAKASH AND ORS. [DR. ANAND, J.] 1027

of the institution and public confidence in it. The credibility of this institution A
rests on the fairness and impartiality of the Judges at all levels. It is the
principle of highest importance, for the proper administration of justice, that
judicial powers must be exercised impartially and within the bounds of law.
Public confidence in the judiciary rests on legitimacy of judicial process.
Sources of legitimacy are in the impersonal application by the Judge of
recognised objective principles which owe their existence to a system as B
distinguished from subjective moods, predilections, emotions and prejudices.
y
Judges must always ensure that they do not allow the credibility of the
., institution to be eroded. We must always remember that justice must not only
be done but it must also be seen to be done.
c
Jn the instant case, the learned single Judge, having been apprised of
the facts and circumstances of the case, rightly did not continue to hear the
appeal and in doing so he acted in a manner expected of the Judge. However,
while technically recusing himself, the learned Judge appears to have given
vent to his feelings and made comments, which we say with respect to the
learned Judge, wefe uncalled for and unwarranted - those betray objective D
consideration and to an extent demonstrates subjective predilections. It is
.,.: subversive of judicial sobriety. The order of the learned single Judge radiates
more heat than light.

We are unable to appreciate or fathom the reasons for the 'general'
E
observations made by the learned Judge in paragraphs 14 and I 5 of the
impugned order (supra). Generalisations are best avoided. We are at a loss
to understand the necessity to refer to certain "pamphlets", unconnected with
the case and to make one of those pamphlets concerning a sitting Judge of
this Court (since retired) a part of the judicial record when it had no relevance
to the instant case. In doing so, there appears to be something more than F
what meets the eye. Reference made is totally out of context. Again what
some lawyer had been doing in the past, was hardly of any consequence for
deciding the merits of the application - IA No. 6079/96 - which was being
heard by the learned single Judge and was disposed of by the impugned
order. The only question before the learned single Judge was : whether on
G
the facts, as disclosed in the application and supported by documentary
evidence, the learned single Judge should have continued to hear the appeal
,... or recused himself?
.;

We have also not been able to appreciate the object of the "disclosure"
made in paragraph 12 of the order (supra). Did the learned Judge verify the H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998] 2 S.C.R.

A correct position 9 Was the appellant put on notice or taken to task, if what
is attributed to the appellant is correct 9 Was any record of the STD call
maintained? Why all of a sudden this disclosure was made and that too with
the emphasis that "now 1 om sure that it (telephone call) must be on behalf
of the appellant alone, that I was tried to be influenced in the name of lawyer
B from Ahmedabad" and again "I feel that the STD call must have been at the
behest of the applicant". Without any other material on the record, the
submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the observations are
conjectural in nature and are not backed by any proof of factual accuracy
cannot be dismissed as wholly untenable. It was open to the learned Judge
to have enquired into the matter and take appropriate action. He did not do
C so. He let the matter rest. Why then was it suddenly made a part of the
impugned order? Paragraph 12 of the order in our opinion conceals more than
what it reveals. We do not wish to carry this aspect any further and say
nomore.

The learned single .Judge completely faultered when he "referred" this
D appeal (Misc. Appeal No. 143/1994) to this Court for 'final hearing'. The
"unusual" direction contained in paragraph 17 of the order reads:

"It is therefore directed that the appeal No. 143/94 be referred to
Honorable Supreme Court for deciding it with a suggestion that
rather than remand to me or any other judges of any High Court to
E save judiciary from that maligning and malignant activities; the same
be decided there only finally."

(emphasis ouPS)

We are, to say the least, surprised at this direction. It is without any
F jurisdictional authority or legal sanction. The learned Judge innovated a
procedure unknown to law. It is improper for a Judge of the High Court to
"direct" that an appeal pending before him be decided by the Supreme Court
itself "finally" and to further suggest that this Court should not "remand the
appeal" to the learned single Judge or to any other Judge of any High
G Court". We are unable to find the existence of any authority or power in a
single Judge of the High Court to make such an order of "remand" to the
Supreme Court ! ! The direction, to say the least, is subversive of proper
judicial discipline. By asking this Court to "finaliy" decide the appeal and not
to "remand" it to any Judge in the country, the learned single Judge appears
to have arrogated to himself a power which he does not possess. The learned
H single Judge should have, in the facts and circumstances of the case, referred
CHET AK CONSTRUCTION LTD. v. OM PRAKASH AND ORS. [DR. ANAND, J.] 1029
the appeal to the Chief Justice of the High Court with a request to assign the A
same to any other Judge in that High Court. That would have been the proper
course to follow. If the learned single Judge by making the "direction" (supra)
was exhibiting his annoyance over the two earlier remand orders made by
different benches of this Court in the same appeal setting aside the orders
made by the learned single Judge against the same appellant, it was wholly B
unjustified and uncalled for. Much ink and paper has been used, besides
spending judicial time, to make the order impugned before us when it was
otherwise a simple matter. The facts contained in the application (I.A. No.
6079/96) to which reference has been made above supported by documentary
evidence, should have made the learned Judge to himself, decline to hear the
appeal by a simple order irrespective of the question whether the disclosed C
facts could have made any difference in the ultimate order to be made by him
in the appeal. It would bear repetition to emphasis that justice must not only
be done but also be seen to be done. In the established facts and circumstances
of the case, it cannot be said that the request of the appellant to the learned
single Judge to recuse himself from hearing the appeal on merits was a wholly
unjustified request. Even if it be assumed and we have no reason not to so D
assume, that there was no such connection between respondent No.3 and the
learned single Judge as to influence his ultimate judgment in the appeal
pending before him but when certain facts were brought to his notice, which
could give rise to a reasonable and not fanciful apprehension that the trial
may not be fair, the learned single Judge should have recused himself from E
the appeal in keeping with the highest traditions of the judiciary. Discretion,
after all, is better part of valor. We find the reference/ 'direction' untenable
and the order devoid of any legal sanctity. We, accordingly set aside the
same.

In the course of the impugned "reference", the learned single Judge has F
also suggested that contempt proceedings be initiated against some of the
lawyers who appeared before him besides the appellant. On the basis of what
we have noticed above, we find no cause to have been made out to institute
contempt proceedings, as suggested. We may notice here that even on an
earlier occasion, the learned single Judge (Vyas, J.) had in the same appeal G
(Misc. Appeal No. 143 of 1994) made a reference to this Court for taking
action against Shri Girish Desai, senior advocate, representing the appellant
besides his instructing counsel and the company secretary of the appellant
under the Contempt of Courts Act. On 12.2.96, this Court declined to proceed
against them for contempt of court. Contempt of court jurisdiction is a special
jurisdiction. It has to be used cautiously and exercised sparingly. It must be H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A used to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty of law and to keep
the administration of justice unpolluted, where the facts and circumstances
so justify. "The comer stone of the contempt law is the accommodation of
two constitutional values - the right of free speech and the right to independent
justice. The ignition of contempt action should be - substantial and malafide
B interference with fearless judicial action, not fair comment or trivial reflections
on the judicial process and' personnel," (See [ 1974] l SCC 374. Long long ago
in Queen v. Grey (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 at 40) it was said that 'judges and courts
are alike open to criticism and if reasonable argument is offered against any
judicial act as contrary to law or to the public good, no court could or would
. ,.
treat it as contempt of court.' Therefore, contempt jurisdiction has to be
C exercised with scrupulous care and caution, restraint and circumspection.
Recourse to this jurisdiction, must be had whenever it is found that something
has been done which tends to effect the administration of justice or which
tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the majesty
of law and to preserve and maintain the dignity of the court and the like
situations. 'The respect for judiciary must rest on a more surer foundation
D than recourse to contempt jurisdiction.' We have given our careful
consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case but are not persuaded
to initiate contempt proceeding as suggested by the learned single Judge
either against the lawyers or the appellant for their "action" in making request
to the learned Judge to recuse himself from the case. The reference to that
E extent is also declined.

On the basis of what we have said above, we set aside the impugned
order/direction/reference.

Misc. Appeal No. 143 of 1994 has already been remanded by us twice
F to the High Court for its disposal on merits in accordance with law. After the
second remand order made in C.A. No. 13201of1996, the appeal has not been
heard and the case has been "sent back" to this Court for 'final' 'hearing'.
In the facts and circumstances of this case, we consider it appropriate, to
once again remand Misc. Appeal No. 143 of 1994 to the High Court for its
G fresh disposal in accordance with law. The record of the case shall be sent
to the High Court for being placed before the learned Chief Justice of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. We request the learned Chief Justice
of the High Court to assign the appeal to a learned Judge sitting at Jabalpur
(not at Indore or Gwalior) for its disposal in accordance with law expeditiously.

H The learned Judge at Jabalpur, to whom the appeal shall be assigned
CHETAK CONSTRUCTION l TD "·OM PRAKASH AND ORS. [DR. ANAND. J] JQJJ

by the learned Chief Justice, shall decide the appeal on its own merits A
uninfluenced by any observations made by the learned single Judge (Mr.
Justice R.D. Vyas) in the impugned order.

Nothing said hereinabove shall also be construed as any expression of
opinion on the merits of the appeal.
B
The appeal and the reference are disposed of in the terms indicated
above with no orders as to cost.

V.S.S. Appeal and the reference disposed of.