Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal under s.302 IPC, upheld the conviction under s.326 r.w. s.149 IPC (with a reduced sentence), and affirmed that the trial court’s acquittal was not perverse while the High Court’s conviction was justified.

Summary

The case arose from a long‑standing land dispute in which the deceased and his brother were assaulted, and subsequently PW‑6, an injured witness, was chased and assaulted by eight accused, sustaining grievous injuries. The trial court acquitted the accused of both the murder charge (s.302 IPC) and the grievous hurt charge (s.326 r.w. s.149 IPC). The Karnataka High Court set aside the acquittal on the grievous hurt charge, convicting the eight accused, but upheld the acquittal on the murder charge. On special leave, the Supreme Court examined whether the trial court’s findings could be disturbed and whether the evidence of PW‑6 and PW‑2 sufficiently established a common object to cause grievous injury. It held that the trial court’s acquittal on s.302 was not perverse and could not be interfered with, but the High Court was correct in convicting the accused under s.326 r.w. s.149, rejecting the trial court’s erroneous reasoning about the witness’s statements. The Court upheld the conviction, reduced the sentence to two years, dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal, and ordered the accused to surrender for the remaining term.

Issues considered

The trial court's acquittal under Section 302 IPC – whether it can be set aside on appeal.
The adequacy of PW‑6’s testimony and its corroboration by PW‑2 to sustain a conviction under Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC.
Whether the trial court erred in requiring the injured witness to name each accused before a doctor and in discounting his statements.
The standard of review for appellate courts in interference with acquittals.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 120, s. 313, s. 378, s. 386
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 149, s. 302, s. 326

Subjects

land disputegrievous hurtcommon objects.326 IPCs.149 IPCacquittalappealevidence appraisalpresumption of innocence

Judgment

[2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1182

A CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. +-
• v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 634 of 2002)
-:
SEPTEMBER 2, 2009
B
[DALVEER BHANDARI AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.] -+
Penal Code, 1860:
c
s.326 rlw s.149 - 8 persons allegedly chased and
assaulted PW-6 - PW-6 was grievously injured with fractures

D
and bed-ridden for 15 days at Hospital - Acquittal of accused
by trial court- But conviction by High Court - On appeal, held:
PW6 implicated the accused at the earliest opportunity when
he made statement to police on the very next day and
It- -
- testified in Court to that effect - No reason to discard and
disbelieve his evidence which was corroborated by PW2 -
Common object of all accused was to cause grievous injury
to PW-6 - Conviction under s. 326 rlw s. 149 upheld.
E
s.302 - Offence under- Concurrent finding of acquittal
by Courts below - Held: Did not suffer from any infinnity - t·
Interference by Supreme Court ·not warranted in the facts and
circumstances of the case - Constitution of India, 1950 -
F Article 136- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- ss.378 and
386 - Evidence - Re-appreciation of - Scope.

There was land dispute between PW1 and his
brother on one side and the accused persons on the
G other side. According to the prosecution, the accused
persons came armed with clubs and chopper and brutall.y ~-
assaulted PW1 's brother indiscriminately and later on the I

same day, chased and assaulted PW-6 with a view to

H 1182
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1183
KARNATAKA

-+ prevent him from informing about the incident of assault A
on PW1 's brother to his son. PW1 's brother died while
PW6 was grievously injured.

Case was registered against the accused persons
inter alia u/ss.302 and 326 r/w s.149 IPC. The trial Court B
acquitted the accused of all the charges. The High Court,
however, partly allowed the appeal filed by State by
f.-
convicting the accused persons for offence u/s.326 r/w
---l s.149 of IPC while maintaining the order of acquittal u/
s.302 IPC passed by the trial court. Hence, the present
eross-appeals.
c
Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. It is well settled that while hearing an appeal
under Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court will D
normally not enter into reappraisal or review of evidence
unless the trial court or the High Court is shown to have
committed an error of law or procedure and the
conclusions arrived at are perverse. The Court may
interfere where on proved facts wrong inference of law E
is shown to h~ve b~en drawn. ~Para 19] [1193-F-H]

t- 1.2. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case, there is no reason to interfere with the concurring
order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court as affirmed
F
by the High Court for the offence under s.302 IPC. [Para
29] [1202-C-D]

K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kera/a, (1999) 3
SCC 309; Harl Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 9 SCC 136;
State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561; Rajender G
.. _, $ingh v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 298 and Ghurey Lal
v. St{Jt~ 9f U.P. (2008) 10 SCC 450 referred to.

2.1. An accused i$ P.res1Jm~~ to be innocent unless
H
1184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A such a presumption is rebutted by the prosecution by
establishing guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt by producing the evidence to show him to be guilty
of the offence with which he is charged. Further if two
views are possible on the evidence produced in the case,
B one indicating to the guilt of the accused and the other
to his innocence, the view favourable to the accused is
to be accepted. In cases where the court entertains
reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused the
benefit of such doubt should go In favour of the accused.
c However, at the same time, the court must not reject the
evidence of the prosecution taking It as false,
untrustworthy or unreliable on fanclful or purely
Imaginary grounds or on the basis of conjectures and
surmises. The case of the prosecution must be judged
D as a whole ·having regard to the totality of the evidence.
In reaching a conclusion about the guilt of the accused,
the court has to appreciate, analyse and assess the
evidence placed before it by the yardstick of probabilities,
its intrinsic value and the animus of witnesses. Ultimately
E and finally the decision in every case depends upon the
facts of each case. [Para 30] (1202-E-H; 1203-A-B]
2.2. PW-6 is an injured witness who had suffered
-;·
grievous injuries and was examined by the Police though
not at the time of inquest but immediately after the inquest
F on the next day of the occurrence. No contradictions or
omissions have been elicited from PW-6 in his evidence
by the defence with respect to the identification of the
accused. There is no reason to disbelieve and discard the
evidence of PW-6, who though did not speak about the
G main incident with respect to the assault on the deceased
but clearly stated that while he was going to the bus stop ~·
he was assaulted by 8 accused namely A-3, A-12, A-11, ...
A-13, A-10, A-1, A-9 and A-21 •. [Paras 35 and 36) [1205-D-
H]
H
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1185
KARNATAKA

',. + 2.3. PW6 was an educated person. If he wanted to A
implicate the accused with respect to the attack on the
deceased, he could have stated falsely that he witnessed
the occurrence with respect to the deceased. Being an
injured person his evidence would have been a great
value with respect to the attack on the deceased to the B
prosecution. He truthfully says that he came to the scene
~·
.
immediately after the occurrence and on his way to the
bus stop he was chased and assaulted by the aforesaid
8 accused. [Para 32] [1204-D-E]

2.4. The trlal Court gave the benefit of doubt to the
c
accused, since PW-6 did not give the names of each of
the accused individually before the Doctors (PW-~ 3 ·and
PW-14). However, it failed to consider the fact that it was
-1- not possible for PW-6 to give the name of each·' of the
D
accused individually since he had clearly mentioned A·
... 3, A-13 and "others". The word "others" clearly indicate
that he knew their identity that is why when he was
examined by the Police after the occurrence on the very
next day he gave the names of all the 8 accused which
E
was supported by his evidence in the Court. [Para 37]
[1206-A-C]
f
2.5. The reasoning of the trial Court that the
,, implication of the accused was an afterthought at Hospital
does not stand to reason, since he implicated 8 accused, F
who assaulted him, at the earliest opportunity when he
made a statement to the Police on the very next day and
testified in Court to that effect. The trial Court found fault
with PW-6 for not filing a separate complaint with
reference to the occurrence. The trial Court also found G
, i fault with the prosecution for not recording the statement
of PW-6 when he was at Hospital. However, that
reasoning of the trial Court is legally untenable. The trial
Court proceeded on the erroneous assumption that all
the names of the accused should have been mentioned H
1186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2069] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A before the Doctor. It is neither the job nor ca" it b@ ·
expected from a DoctQr to recon:I a detailed stat@Jmmte +
The Doctor can only relate in brief what the witness aaid
with respect to the ·alleged timings of the assault and the
alleged assailants. [Para 38) [1206-C-G]
B
2.6. Another reason given by the trial Court for
acquitting the accused with respect to the assault on PW-
6 was that PW-6 di~ n<.?~ ~~!'t~9'1 ~~o~t thrqwirig @' th~
stones at the earl~~st ay~i,laf2~~· 2RP9rt~mlt¥: M@WQVtF, the
Hig~ g9yrt to.()k th~ view that thfs is a frivolous point for
c t'1~ r~@~Qn ~h@t PW-~ rn~otloned before the Doctor (PW-
14) th@i h@ W@~ @$~~lJI!@~ ~y stic:ks ~f!d. §lubs. The m@f!t
fact that PW-6 omitted the word "Stones" ~~fgr~ ~W!"14
cannot i1.1 any maoo.er ~ffect tile ~e$~imony of PW·G,
.D
Further, one can nQ~ IQ§@· §ight gf the f@Gt that the
.
evidence of PW-2 a~sa corroborates the evidence of PW-
- '

6. In his evidence PW-2 has clearly mentioned that the 8
accused.assaulted PW-6 while PW-6 was aboutto ta~!§
bus to Bangalore. (Para 39) (1206:-G,":~;
~ ~ ~ •
s.1'='·.,,,;, .-.,...-
... • '"' ·•
~iii':A::D)
... t. ..

E 2.7... The
""· , .. -:
manner
·.'
in which all the 8 accused chased
" ~ ~ '

and ~~~*~~ ~W:§ wsula s;J~~UIY make out a Gase f9r ~q
offence under s.326 read with s.149 IPC. T~~ s@m!llgn
object of all the accused ~~!i tg §§U§@ grt@V@"$ h,jyry to. .,
PW-6. The end result of the attack W@§ thl'.t 9W!"Q Wi§
F grievously injured with fr~ctur~$ an{I VI~$ b'-d!"ridden for
15 days at Hospimlz [PiU~ 40) [1207-1:>-El
3. The. appeal filed by the State against the acquittal
of accused is dismissed. So far as appeal filed by the
G accused, the conviction of the accused under s.326 read
with s.149 IPC is .upheld, but the ends of justice '!'9\1\~
be met by reducing the punishment ~f ~ ~~!f! SJfflf'~~
~ ...
by the High Court to 2 ¥ears~ (P.~f~ •~I (1i@'f:f=::Mi 1111:
A]
H
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1187
KARNATAKA

Case Law Reference: A
(1999) 3 sec aos referred to Para 16
(2000) 9 sec 136 referred to Para 16
(1998) 3 sec 561 referred to Para 16 B
(2000) 4 SCG 298 referred to Para 16
(2ooa) 1o sec 450 referred to Para 22

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 634 of 2002. ,C

From the Judgment & Order dated 28.1.2002 of the High 1

Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 594
of 1996.
D
WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 635 of 2002.
K. Rajendra Chowdhary, N.R. Chaudhari, Dr. R. Prakash,
Rakesh K. Sharma, Anil Kum~r Mishra and A. Rohen Singh (for 'E
Sanjay R. Hegde) for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. These appeals by
special leave are fited against the judgment and order passed F
by the High Court of Kamataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal
No. 594 of 1996; wherein the High Court partly allowed the
appeal filed by the State by convicting accused Chikkarangaiah
(A-1), Gopala (A-3), Gavisiddaiah (A-9), Ramakrishna
@Ramachandra (A-10), Nanjundiah (A-11), Javaraiah (A-12), G
Shivalingaiah (A-13) and Puttaswamy (A-21) for an offence
under Section 326 of the 11ndian Penal Code (for short "the IPC")
read with Section 149 of IPC and sentencing them to undergo
imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of
H
I

1188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C,R.

A Rs. 5,000/- each, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment
for three months while maintaining the order of acquittal under +
section 302 IPC. Earlier the trial court acquitted all the accused
persons by judgment and order dated 22.04.1996 in S.C. No.
13 of 1990. Since these appeals arise out of the same facts
8 and common judgment, we heard the appeals together and
propose to dispose of the same by this common judgment.

2. In order to appreciate the rival contentions advanced by
the parties and issues involved, it is necessary to set out brief
C facts of the case which gave rise to the present criminal
appeals.

The prosecution case in brief is that A-1 to A-6, A-9 to A-
13 and A-16 to A-21 were residents of Jodihosahalli, Kunigal
Taluk whereas Kodakana 8oraiah (A-7) was a resident of
D Seeyepalya, which was hardly one kilometer from ~-
Jodihosahalli. Kodakana 8oralingaiah (A-8) was a resident of
Puranipalya, which was about 1 1/2 kilometers from
Jodihosahalli whereas Veerabhadraiah (A-14) and Shivanna
(A-15) were residents of Hanumanapalya, which was about 1
E 1/2 kilometres from Jodihosahalli.

· 3. The deceased H. 8. 8oralingaiah was a resident of
Jodihosahalli. He was a School Teacher. H. 8. 8oraiah (PW-1
as well as the complainant) was the younger brother of the
F deceased and was living in Jodihosahalli with his wife and
children. The residential houses of PW-1 and the 'deceased
were situated facing each other with a street in the middle
running East to West. H. 8. Lingaiah (A-5)'was living in a-·house
situated adjacent to the house of PW~1'on the western side.
!
G 4. The deceased 8oralingaiah,and his brother (PW-1) on
one side and H. 8.1 Lingaiah (A-5) and some villagers including
A-1, A-2 and A-11 '.on the other side were having a land dispute
since 1974. Even though there-was a decree in favour of PW-
1, A-5 with the support and aid of other accused persons were
H
--f
' CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1189
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNOAKAM SHARMA, J.]

A
.. interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
said land namely Sy. No. 108 re-survey No. 152. A-21, a Zilla
Parishad Member obviously having political influence was
bringing pressure on PW-1 and his brother deceased to give
up their rights to the said land in favour of A-5. A-1 also had
joined tiands with A-21 to coerce PW-1 and the deceased to B
give up their rights in respect of said land. It was also the case
of the pr.osecution that there were many cases involving theft,
mischief, assault, concerning the property pending between
PW-1 and his brother on one sid~ and A-5 and A-21 on the
other side and a number of criminal cases were also pending ,c
in this connection.

5. On 15-9-1989 at about 9.00 a.m. decea$ed
Boralingaiah was proceeding from his house towards the
house of Bettaswamy (PW-7), when he was waylaid by all the
D
-+ accused persons by surrounding him from three sides armed
with clubs and chopper and they brutally assaulted the
deceased indiscriminately. The injured Boralingaiah was shifted
to his residence by his wife Chikkamma (PW-5), Ningamma
(PW-3) Wife of PW-1 and other two witnesses Narasamma
(PW-4) and Kambaiah (PW-6).
e
6. In the meanwhile PW-1 being scared to go near the
scene of occurrence went to a nearby village Santhepete after
walking the distance and from there he got into a lorry and
traveled to Kunigal and lodged his comp!§_int at about 12.45 F
p.m. iii Crime No. 253/89 for offences under Section 307 of
IPC.

7. At about 11.00 a.m. on the same day, at the request of
PW-3 and PW-5 to send a message to the son of the G
deceased, PW-6 was proceeding towards the bus-stop to go
--t to Bangalore, at that time A-1, A-21, A-9, A-3, A-12, A-11, A-
·* 13 and A-10 armed with clubs chased him and assaulted him
with clubs and stones with a view to prevent him from informing
about the incident with respect to the assault on the deceased H
1190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A to his son at Bangalore and thereby caused injuries to PW-6.
~
8. Thereafter the deceased and PW-6 were shifted to
Kunigal Hospital by a Police Constable Lakshmanappa (PW-
21) in a car which was provided for by the complainant (PW-
B 1). At Kunigal Hospital on the advice of Dr. Doddathimmaiah
(PW-14) the deceased was shifted to Victoria Hospital,
Bangalore, but the deceased expired on the way to Bangalore.
Subsequently, on receiving the death report as per Ex. P-51
the second FIR for the offence under Section 302 was
submitted to the Court as per Ex. P-52.
c
9. PW-1 got down at the bus stand at Kunigal and went to
the Police Station to lodge a complaint. At the Police Station
the Circle Inspector and the Sub-Inspector were not available.
Only the Head Constable was there. The Head Constable (PW-
D 23) asked PW-1 to give a written complaint. PW-1 went to the
bus stop and got a typed complaint and signed the complaint.
However, it would be relevant to mention at this stage that PW-
23, however, said in his evidence that a written complaint was
brought by PW-1 and that PW-23 did not ask PW-1 to bring a
E prepared complaint as stated by PW-1.

10. Then the PW-23 registered a case in crime No. 253/
1989 for the offences under sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 341,
324, 326, 506 and 307 read with section 114 of the IPC and
F submitted the FIR to the court.
11. The Investigating Officer T. C. M. Shariff (PW-29) after
completinQ the investigation filed the charge sheet against the
accused A-1to21on01.01.1990. Thereafter, he received the
serologist report as per Ex. P-80 and Chemical Examiner's
G report as per Ex. P-81 and other reports. The prosecution filed
the charge sheet against A-1 to A-21 for the offences under
sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 341, 324, 32.6, 506, 307 and 302
read with 120 IPC. A-1 to A-21 pleaded not guilty and claimed
to be tried and accordingly the case was posted for trial.
H
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1191
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

12. During trial, the prosecution in support of its case A
examined as many as 30 witnesses and exhibited 89
documents. Thereafter, the accused were examined under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the
purposes of enabling them to explain the circumstances existing
against them. The defence of the accused A-1 to 21 was one B
of total denial.

-1- 13. On completion of the trial, the trial court passed a
Judgment and order acquitting all the accused. Aggrieved by
the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the trial court, the C
-( State of Karnataka filed an appeal in the High Court of
~ Karnataka, which was registered as Criminal Appeal No. 594
of 1996.

14. After screening the evidence on record and hearing
-I the rival contentions of the parties the High Court partiy allowed D
the appeal by convicting A-1, A-3, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-12, A-
13 and A-21 for an offence under Section 326 read with 149
IPC'and sentenced the accused for a period of three years and
also sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each in default
to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. The High E
Court further directed that on payment of fine, the trial court shall
disburse the amount to PW-6 as compensation.

15. State of Karnataka and A-1, A-3, A-9, A-10, A-12, A-
13 and A-21 being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the F
High Court of Karnataka preferred two special leave petitions
on which notice was issued and leave was granted by this
Court. The Criminal Appeal No. 634 of 2002 has been filed by
the accused challenging their conviction under Section 326 read
with 149 IPC; whereas Criminal Appeal 635 of 2002 has been G
preferred by the State of Karnataka challenging the order of
~ acquittal under Section 302 IPC. On 8th July, 2002 this Court
granted bail to the accused persons to the satisfaction of the
trial Judge. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the
parties when the appeals were listed for final hearing, who had H
I \

1192 SUPREMECOURT REPORTS (2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A painstakingly taken us through the evidence o~ record.
16. The learned senior counsel appearing for the accused
*
very forcefully submitted that the view taken by the trial court
was just and proper and the High Court should not have
interfered with an order of acquittal. Learned counsel also · ~
B I
submitted that the trial court in its judgment has given plausible
and cogent reasons for disbelieving the story of PW-6 and the
prosecution for acquitting the accused/appellants of the charge -'I- ~
under Section 326 read with 149 IPC with regard to the alleged
c assault on PW-6. It was contended that the High Court
disagreed with the view of the trial court and gave its own
reasons for convicting the accused under Section 326 IPC and
that those reasons cannot be sustained because admittedly
PW- 6 knew all the 8 names on the day of assault yet he failed
")-
to give all the names at the earliest opportunity and that since
D PW-6 did not give the names of all the assailants, the doctor )-

quite rightly did not record details, as the same were not
narrated to him. He also submitted that the reasons given by t
the trial court for acquitting the appellant/accused are very
cogent and acceptable on the facts of the case and the reasons
E given by the High Court to discard the reasoning of the trial court
cannot be sustained. It was further submitted that the High Court
didn't appreciate that the prosecution failed to record the
_,
statement of PW-6 when he was at Kunigal Hospital and it was
a glaring omission on the part of prosecution and therefore
F assault on PW-6 cannot be relied to sustain the conviction of
'~
the appellants/accused. Learned counsel for the accused further
~
submitted that if this Court approves the view taken by the High
. Court, in that case the accused should be awarded sentence
to the period already undergone by them. In support of aforesaid
'c
G contentions, he has relied upon the decision of this Court in K.
·s
Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kera/a, ( 1999) 3 SCC
309; Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 9 SCC 136; State ~
.. t-
)-

of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561; and Rajender
r
Singh v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 298.
H
,.
)-
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1193
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

,i..
17. The learned counsel appearing for the State on the A-
other hand submitted before us that the judgment of the High
Court in confirming the order of acquittal of all the accused for
~ the charges under Section 302 read with 149 IPC, 120-B and
148 IPC was not proper as there are number of circumstances,
which prove the guilt of the accused under the aforesaid B
provisions. It was submitted that the High Court found fault with
PW-1 in preparing a typed FIR for the purpose of convicting
~·
the accused for offence under Section 302 IPC while the same
FIR 'was held to be good for the purpose of convicting the
accused who assaulted PW-6 who assisted in shifting the c
deceased from the spot to his house. It was further submitted
that the two offences are so proximately connected that they
have been committed during the course of same transaction. It
was further submitted that the courts below failed to take into
consideration the recovery evidence and the Serological report D
~·
produced to the Court.

18. In the backdrop of aforesaid arguments advanced by
the parties, we wilhpow examine the case in terms of well
established legal p~ition. First, we will examine the
E
contentions advanced ·i>y the parties with regard to the
concurrent finding of acquittal for the offence under Section 302
IPC. Then, we will examine the order of conviction recorded by
• the High Court for the offences under Section 326 read with
Section 149 IPC.
F
19. With regard to the concurrent finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial Court as well as the High Court for the
offence under Section 302 IPC is concerned, it is well settled
that while hearing an appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution, this Court will normally not enter into reappraisal G
or review of evidence unless the trial court or the High Court is
~~
i shown to have committed an error of law or procedure and the
conclusions arrived at are perverse. The Court may interfere
where on proved facts wrong inference of law is shown to have
been drawn. H
1194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 20. In the case of State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3
SCC 561, at page 568, this Court observed· as follows : .;,

"21. The principle with regard to interference ii\'the
appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC are well
>---
B established. While dealing with the power of the High Court
to reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, Lord
Russell of Killowen, speaking for the Privy Council, in Sheo
Swarup v. King Emperor- observed thus:

"There is in their opinion no foundation for the view,
"
c apparently supported by the judgments of some Courts in
India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to
reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in
cases in which the lower court has 'obstinately blundered',
or. has 'through incompetence, stupidity or perversity'
D reached such 'distorted conclusions as to produce a
positive miscarriage of justice', or has in some other way
so conducted itself as to produce a glaring miscarriage
of justice, or has been tricked by the defence so as to
produce a similar result.
E
Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the
High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the

F
conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal
should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon
that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code.
'
'
But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and
before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court
should and will always give proper weight and
G consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial
Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
~
presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has ~.

been acquitted at his trial; .(3) the right of the accused to
-the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an
H
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF ·1195
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
~ appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by A
a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
To state this however is only to say that the High Court in
its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance
with rules and principles well known and recognised in the
administration of justice. n B

-J·
These principles have been approved and followed in
numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. To mention a
few, see Prandas v. State!; Sanwat Singh v. State of
Rajasthan§..
c
22. In State of U.P. v. Krishna GopaP M.N. Venkatachaliah,
J. (as he then was) summarised the principle as follows:
(SCC Headnote)
"The plenitude of the power of the appellate-court to D
review and reappreciate the evidence cannot be limited
under the supposed rule that unless there are 'substantial'
or 'compelling' reasons or 'very substantial reasons' or
'strong reasons', the findings in a judgment of acquittal
should not be interfered with. There is thus no immunity to E
an erroneous order from a strict appellate scrutiny. But the
appellate court wherever it finds justification to reverse, an
;
acquittal must record reasons why it finds the lower court
wrong."
F
In Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of KarnatakaI the
abovenoted principles have been approved and restated.

23. If on reassessment of the evidence, the appellate court
comes to the conclusion that the guilt of the accused is
established, the fact that the appeal is against the acquittal G
i will be immaterial. However, if two views are possible, the
court, having regard to the basic principle that presumption
of innocence of the accused gets strengthened by the fact
of his acquittal by court, should take the view that supports
the acquittal of the accused." H
1196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 21. Further, in the case of K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. ~

State of Kera/a, (1999) 3 SCC 309, at page 314, this Court
observed:
"5. The plenitude of power available to the court
hearing an appeal against acquittal is the same as that
B
available to a court hearing an appeal against an order of
conviction. But however the court will not interfere solely
because a different plausible view may arise on the
- evidence. In a case of murder, if the reasons given by the
trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses
c are not sound, then there should be no hesitation on the
part of the High Court in interfering with an order of
acquittal. If the judgment of the trial Judge was absolutely
perverse, legally erroneous and based on wrong
testimony, it would be proper for the High Court to interfere
D
and reverse an order of acquittal. Having examined the
judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions
Judge and the impugned judgment of the High Court,
reversing the said judgment of acquittal and on scrutinizing
the evidence of the three eyewitnesses, though we find
E some substance in the grievance of Mr Lalit, appearing for
the appellant that the High Court has not adverted to all
the reasons given by the trial Judge for recording an order
of acquittal, but it is difficult for us to come to hold that the
High Court exceeded its jurisdiction and the parameters
"'
F fixed for interference with an order of acquittal. We find the
approach of the learned Sessions Judge in recording an
order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion
arrived at by the Sessions Judge on several aspects is
unsustainable. Even though the eyewitnesses appear to
G have exaggerated their version and improved upon their
version in giving a role to Accused 2 for which an order of ~
acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge has been affirmed
by the High Court, but to bring home the charge of murder
against the appellant on the ground thaf he gave a stabbing
H blow on the deceased on a vital part by means of a knife
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1197
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

~
while he came out of his house has been consistently A
narrated by the three eyewitnesses. There has been no
embellishment or exaggeration by these eyewitnesses so
far as the role ascribed to the appellant from their previous
version to the police is concerned. Thus the basic
prosecution case as unfolded through the testimony of the B
aforesaid three witnesses is fully corroborated by the
medical evidence of the two doctors and, therefore, the
learned Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding this
part of the prosecution case and in acquitting the appellant
and the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to c
reappreciate the evidence of these witnesses and record
its own conclusion on the question whether the evidence·
of the eyewitnesses that the appellant gave the stabbing
blow on the deceased can at all be sustained or not. We
...... ...,. have ourselves scrutinized the evidence of the three D
eyewitnesses and we are of the considered opinion that
the reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding their
testimony were not at all sound. On the other hand, the
evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was
manifestly erroneous and, therefore, it was the duty of the E
High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed
by the learned Sessions Judge. In this view of the matter,
we are unable to accept the ultimate submission of Mr Lalit
that the High Court exceeded its limit in interfering with an
order or acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge." F
-.
'' 22. One of us (Dalveer Bhandari J.) in Ghurey Lal v. State
of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450, at page 476 has after an elaborate
discussion of the case law on the subject succinctly observed
...-r.
as follows:
G
"69. The following principles emerge from the cases
....
~
above:

1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals
against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the
H
1198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Crim.inal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing
A
evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate
the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's
conclusion ~ith respect to both facts and law.

B 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
The accused possessed this presumption when he was
before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the
presumption that he is innocent. ~

3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given
.c to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a
witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High
Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must
also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that
the trial court was wrong.
D _)...
70. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate
courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallised
by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or
otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal:
E 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise
disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial
and compelling reasons" for doing so.
~
A number of instances arise in which the appellate court
F would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to
discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and

~
compelling reasons" exist when:
(1) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is
G palpably wrong;
(ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous
r
view of law;

(iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave
H
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1199
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM Sbt-ARMA, J.]

miscarriage of justice"; A

(iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with
the evidence was patently illegal;

(v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and
B
unreasonable;
(v1) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the
material evidence or has ignored material documents like
dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.
c
(vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and
consideration to the findings of the trial court.
3. If two reasonable views can be reached-one that leads 0
to acquittal, the other to conviction-the High Courts/
appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused."
23. Though the legal position is quite clear still we have
gone through the evidence on record in order to examine E
whether the findings with regard to the order of acquittal by the
Courts below suffer from any infirmity.
;..-
24. The deceased was examined at the Kunigal hospital
at 2.10 p.m. PW-14 in his cross-examination had clearly stated
that the deceased was in a position to talk and was talking When F
he first examined him. He said till the deceased left the hospital

' to go to Bangalore he was in the same condition. PW-14 did
not record the statement of the deceased because he was
under the impression that the police recorded the statement of
the deceased before he was brought to the hospital as the G
deceased was accompanied by the police. According to PW-
23 who was the Head Constable at Kunigal police, PW-1 came
at about 12.45 p.m. and gave a prepared complaint. On the
basis of the aforesaid complaint PW-23 _registered a case
H
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A undet Section 307 read with Section 114, IPC and other
offences. He deputed Police Constable (PW-21) to bring the
deceased. He went to the Kunigal hospital and saw the
deceased bandaged and the deceased was advised by the
doctor to be shifted to Bangalore. PW-23 did not record any
B statement from the deceased although the doctor stated that
the deceased was In a position to talk and was talking. He
instead sent the deceased to Bangalore for treatment. PW-23
also stated that the Inspector of Police (PW-29) did not appear
to have perused the complaint given by PW-1 nor did he take
C a statement from the deceased who was conscious according
to the doctor (PW-14). He didn't take up further investigation.
On perusal of PW-23's evidence it appears that the initial
investigation was done by the Head Constable (PW-23). PW-
23 visited the scene of occurrence, seized the incriminating
o articles, recorded the statements from the witnesses and after
the initial investigation returned to the police station at about
9.30or10 p.m. Then he found that the FIR was not dispatched
· to the Magistrate. These are all steps taken in and also in
-furtherance of investigation.
E 25. PW-23 also categorically stated that the FIR was
dispatched from the police station at about 1.45 p.m. through
the Writer Nagaraj (not examined). After PW-23 came back,
according to PW-23, he realised that Nagaraj had not
dispatched the FIR to the Magistrate. Nagaraj searched for the
F FIR and it was still on the desk till 10.00 p.m. The reason given
by PW-23 was that Nagaraj accompanied PW-23 for the
purpose of examining witnesses and therefore he was not in a
position to hand over the FIR to the Magistrate. '
G 26. In his cross-examination, PW-23 stated that on his way
to the village where the occurrence took place, he had to pass
through the JMFC Court, Kunigal. He also stated that he was
in a great hurry and therefore neither he nor Nagaraj handed
over the FIR to the Magistrate. He also stated that he was with
H the deceased for about 20 minutes but he did not record the
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1201
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

statement from the deceased. He volunteered and stated that A
the deceased was not in position to talk. This is quite contrary
to the evidence of the Doctor (PW-14). PW-14 clearly stated
that the deceased was in a position to talk and was talking when
he was examined. PW-14 also stated that the deceased was
in a fit condition when he left the hospital to go to Bangalore. B
Further, PW-14 clearly stated that he did not record any
statement from the deceased because he was under the
impression that the Police had already recorded the statement
from the deceased. This is particularly so since the deceased
was brought to the Hospital from his place to Kunigal Hospital c
by PW-21.
27. In his evidence PW-29 stated that he received
information at 1 p.m. from the Police Station. He visited the ·
Police Station and rushed to the scene of occurrence. By the
0
time he went and reached the scene, the deceased and PW-
6 were shifted in a car to the Hospital to Kunigal by PW-21.
He further stated in his evidence that the deceased was in an
unconscious state. He also claimed to be busy in search of the
accused. On receiving the intimation of death he went to E
Bangalore and held inquest over the dead body of the
deceased. He examined PW-3 at the inquest. Subsequently at
Victoria Hospital at Bangalore, he recorded the statement of
PW-6. As stated earlier PW-6 was injured in a different incident.
He stated that he did not record any statement from PW-1 till
05-10-1989 nearly 20 days after the occurrence. He also stated F
that he did not record the statement of the deceased since he
was in an unconscious state, contrary to the statement of the
doctor (PW-14). He further stated that the FIR reached the
jurisdiction Magistrate only at 10 am. The reason given by PW-
29 was that the offence did not constitute a serious offence. G

28. On the questions whether there was delay in
transmitting the FIR and its reaching the Magistrate belatedly
we find no reason to take a different view than what has been
H
,
1202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A concurrently taken by the trial Court as well as the High Court.
The explanation given by the prosecution that the complaint was
left on the table by mistake cannot be accepted in.absence of
the evidence of Nagaraj and Shetter. It is true that in all cases
the delay in transmitting the FIR and its reaching the Magistrate
B late is not fatal to the prosecution. However, when there is
some doubt with respect to the genesis of the .complaint, the
surest safeguard would be for the complaint to be received by ~
the Magistrate expeditiously especially in a case as grave as
this. When there is considerable doubt on the whereabouts of
c PW-1 during a stay at Kunigal, the delay in the FIR reaching
the Magistrate would have bearing on the veracity of the
prosecution case.

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no reason
to interfere with the concurring order of acquittal recorded by ~
D
the trial Court as affirmed by the High Court for the offence
under Section 302 IPC.

30. With regard to the conviction of accused persons under
Section 326 read with Section 149 IPC is concerned, before
.Edwelling into the evidences, we would like to reiterate the well
established legal position. In our criminal law jurisprudence
which is based on the adversarial model, an accused is
presumed to be innocent unless such a presumption is rebutted
by the prosecution by establishing guilt of the accused beyond
F reasonable doubt by producing the evidence to show him to
be guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Further if two
views are possible on the evidence produced in the case, one
indicating to the guilt of the accused and the other to his
innocence, the view favourable to the accused is to be
G accepted. In ca$es where the court entertains reasonable doubt
regarding the guilt of the accused the benefit of such doubt
should go in favour of the accused. However, at the same time,
the court must not reject the evidence of the prosecution taking
it as false, untrustworthy or unreliable on fancifl!I or purely
H imaginary grounds or on the basis of conjectures and surmises.
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1203
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

The case of the prosecution must be judged as a whole having A
A
regard to the totality of the evidence. In reaching a conclusion
about the guilt of the accused, the court has to appreciate,
analyse and assess the evidence placed before it by the
yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic value and the animus of
witnesses. It must be noted that ultimately and finally the B
decision in every case depends upon the facts of each case.

+ 31. We now proceed to deal with the factual position of
the present case. With regard to the second incident i.e. attack
on PW-6, PW-6 who is the injured witness has clearly stated c
in his evidence that he had gone to Jodihosahalli on the night
of 13-09-1989 for the purpose of agricultural work. He had gone
to his garden and was getting his work done by his servants. It
was at about 9 or 9.30 a.m. that the son of the deceased came
to him stating that his father was injured and that he wanted 0
-.1- some money. Since PW-6 had no money at that time he came
to his house and asked his mother to give him some money to
be given to the son of the deceased. Then he went to the scene
of occurrence and he saw PWs. 3, 5 and 4 sitting and wseping
in front of the padasala of the shop. The deceased was also in E
the same padasala. He saw the deceased with injuries. PW-5
(wife of the deceased) asked him to shift the deceased to his
house. He along with others shifted the deceased to his house.
-t- He was asked to inform the children of the deceased about the
incident at Bangalore. PW-6 left the scene of occurrence and F
went to the bus stop. Near the bus stop about 15 people were
standing armed with clubs. He was over taken by the accused.
The accused were angry that he was going to Bangalore to
inform the son of the deceased about the assault. At that time
A-3 and A-12 assaulted him and threw stones, which fell on his
legs. Thereafter clubs were used. The persons who assaulted G
him by clubs were A-11 and his son A-12 and others are A-
i 13, A-10, A-1 and A-3 and he was also chased by A-9 and A-
21. PW-6 fell down and he was not able to identify the oth~J _
accused. PW-2 witnessed this occurrence. With great difficulty
H
1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 13 {ADDL.} S.C.R.

A PW-6 reached his house with bleeding injuries on his head. He
A
suffered fracture on the right h and there was also a fracture
on the left leg. "''i

32. The Police came to his house at 1 p.m. He was taken
B along with the deceased and PW-3 to the Kunigal Government
Hospital. He reached the hospital at about 1.30 or 2 p.m. He
was in Kunigal Hospital till the evening and after that he left to
Bangalore for further treatment. He was in Bangalore at about +
9 p.m. He was admitted at Victoria Hospital and was in-patient
for about 15 days. He learnt at the Bangalore hospital that the
c deceased was dead. The Police on 16-9-1989 recorded his
statement. He fairly admits that he was able to identify only 8
accused and they were A-3, A-12, A-11, A-13, A-10, A-1, A-9
and A-21. He clearly implicates the following accused as having
chased and assaulted him i.e. A-1, A-3, A-9, A-11, A-12, A-
D .\..
13 and A-21. PW- 6 was an Assistant Marketing Officer and
was an educated person. If PW-6 wanted to implicate the
accused with respect to the attack on the deceased, he could
have stated falsely that he witnessed the occurrence with
respect to the deceased. Being an injured person his evidence
E would have been a great value with respect to the attack on
the deceased to the prosecution. He truthfully says that he came
to the scene immediately after the occurrence and on his way
to the bus stop he was chased and assaulted by the aforesaid
8 accused.
F
33. PW-6 was examined at Kunigal Hospital for his injuries
by PW~14 (Doctor) at about 2.30 p.m. PW-6 was discharged
in the evening to enable him to get better treatment at
Bangalore. Injury Nos. 1 and 2 according to the Doctor could
G have been caused by sticks and Injury Nos. 3 to 7 could have
been caused by throwing stones. He was also .treated at
Bangalore by PW-13 (Doctor). PW-13 in his evidence stated r-
that the patient gave the history of assault said to have taken
place on 15-9-1989 at 11.00 a.m. his village Hosahalli with
H sticks and stones by A-3, A-13 and others. PW-13 has also
CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1205
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

stated that injury Nos. 1 and 2 are grievous in nature and injuries A
"-
Nos. 3 to 6 are simple in nature. According to Pw-13, these
injuries could have been caused by blunt object. PW-13 further
stated that the act of throwing stones could have caused some
injuries to PW-6.
B
34. It is quite clear that when PW-6 was first seen at
Kunigal Hospital at 2.30 p.m. almost immediately after the
+ occurrence as stated earlier, PW-14 who examined PW-6
.states that PW-6 gave him the history of assault. He was again
examined by the Doctor (PW-13) at Victoria Hospital on
15.09.1989 at 8.15 pm in which PW-6 gave the history of
c
assault with sticks and also by throwing stones by A-3, A-13
and others. Therefore, even at the earliest point of time PW-6
did mention about the accused who assaulted him by the words
"A-3, A-13 and others."
..I- D
35. It is to be noted that PW-6 had no opportunity to give
a complaint to the Police, since the earlier complaint by PW-1
had covered the second incident as well. PW-6 is an injured
witness who had suffered grievous injuries and was examined
by the Police though not at the time of inquest but immediately E
after the inquest on the next day of the occurrence. He could
not have been examined at the time of inquest since he was
bed ridden at Victoria hospital. No contradictions or omissions
have been elicited from PW-6 in his evidence by the defence
. with respect to the identification of the accused. F

36. That being the position, we find no reason why an
injured witness instead of giving the name of real assailants
would unnecessarily implicate other people falsely who was not
the real assailants. There is no reason to disbelieve and
G
discard the evidence of PW-6 who though did not speak about
...,. the main incident with respect to the assault on the deceased
...
but clearly stated that while he was going to the bus stop he
was assaulted by 8 accused namely A-3, A-12, A-11, A-13, A-
10, A-1, A-9 and A-21.
H
1-
I-

1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 13 (ADDL.).S.C.R.

A 37. The trial Court acquitted these 8 accused on the > I.,
ground that the presence of PW-6 at the scene of occurrence \•

immediately after the occurrence is doubtful. The trial Court
gave the benefit of doubt to the accused, since PW-6 did not
give the names of each of the accused individually before the
B Doctors (PW-13 and PW-14). However, it failed to consider the
fact that it was not possible for PW.-6 to give the name of the
each of the accused individually since he had clearly mentioned
-+
A-3, A-13 and "others". The word "others" clearly indicate that
he knew their identity that is why when he was examined by the
c Police after the occurrence on the very next day he gave the
names of all the 8 accused which was supported by his
evidence in the Court.

38 .. The reasoning of the trial Court that the implication of
the accused was an afterthought at Victoria Hospital does not
D
stand to reason, since he implicated 8 accused, who assaulted
' '
him, at the earliest opportunity when he made a statement to
the Police on the very next day and testified in Court to that
effect. The trial Court found fault with PW-6 for not filing a
separate complaint with reference to the occurrence: The trial
E Court also found fault with the prosecutioritor not recording the
statemerit of PW-6 wh.en he was at Kunigal Hospital. However,
in our view that reasoning of the trial Court is legally untenable. .,_
The High Court was right in setting aside the judgment and order
of the trial Court which acquitted the 8 accused who assaulted
F PW-6 since PW-6 had clearly mentioned the name of A-3, A-
13 and others. It is neither the job nor can it be expected from
a Doctor to record a detailed statement. The Doctor can only
relate in brief what the witness said with respect to the alleged
timings of the assault and the alleged assailants. We agree with
G the reasoning of the High Court that the trial Court proceeded
on the erroneous assumption that all the names of t,he accused
should have been mentioned before the Doctor.
t- ..
39. Another reason given by the trial Court for acquitting
H the accused with respect to the assault on PW-6 was that PW-
' CHIKKARANGAIAH & ORS. v. STATE OF 1207
KARNATAKA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

6 did not mention about throwing of the stones at the earliest A
'""' available opportunity. However, the High Court took the view
that this is a frivolous point for the reason that PW-6 mentioned
before the Doctor (PW-14) that he was assaulted by sticks and
clubs. The mere fact that PW-6 omitted the word "Stonesn
before PW-14 cannot in any manner affect the testimony of 8
PW-6. It is the case of the accused that the trial Court was right
in recording the finding that PW-6 improved his case at every
-+
stage. However, after careful perusal of the evidence of PW-6
we do not find any such case of improvement which has been
established by the defence to show that the testimony of PW- c
6 cannot be relied upon. The High Court was right and justified
in rejecting the aforesaid submission. Further, one can not lose
sight of the fact that the evidence of PW-2 also corroborates
'.- ·the evidence of PW-6. In his evidence PW-2 has clearly
~ mentioned that the 8 accused assaulted PW-6 while PW-6 was D
about to take a bus to Bangalore.
40. The aforesaid discussion reveals that the manner in
which all the 8 accused chased and attacked PW-6 would
clearly make out a case for an offence under Section 326 read
with 149 IPC. The common object of all the accused was to E
cause grievous injury to PW-6. The end result of the attack was
that PW-6 was grievously injured with fractures and was bed-
f
ridden for 15 days at Victoria Hospital.

41. In view of the aforesaid discussion and also in view of F
entire facts and circumstances of the case, we order that -

(i) The appeal filed by the State i.e. Criminal Appeal
No. 635 of 2002 against the acquittal of accused
is hereby dismissed by upholding the grounds G
given by the High Court in its judgment;
-i.
)'
(ii) So far as appeal filed by the accused i.e. Criminal
Appeal No. 634 of 2002 is concerned, we uphold
the conviction of the accused under Section 326
H
'
1208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A read with 149 IPC, but we feel the ends of justice
would' be met by reducing the punishment of 3 years
granted by the High Court to 2 years. We maintain
the order of fine imposed by the High Court and
that on deposit of payment of fine, the trial court
B shall disburse the amount to PW-6 as
compensation;

(iii) Bail bonds of the accused shall be cancelled;

(iv) All the accused are directed to surrender before the
c trial Court to undergo the remaining period of
sentence, if any. If they do not su'rrender, the trial
Court is directed to take appropriate action in the
matter in accordance with law.

D 42. The appeals are disposed of in terms of aforesaid 4

order.

B.B.B. Appeals disposed.