Supreme Court of India
CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRAversusSTATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 1040
- Decided
- 10 August 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- D K JAIN
Holding
The trial court correctly inferred that the appellant instigated the deceased to commit suicide, and the High Court was justified in dismissing the revision, so the charge‑framing order stands.
Summary
The appellant, Chitresh Kumar Chopra, was charged under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the IPC for allegedly abetting the suicide of his business partner, Jitendra Sharma, by mental harassment over a profit dispute. The trial court framed charges, finding sufficient material to presume that the appellant had instigated the deceased to commit suicide, a decision upheld by the High Court on revision. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the legal requirements of abetment under Sections 306 and 107 IPC, focusing on the meaning of "instigate" and the necessity of mens rea. It held that the prosecution had shown that the appellant's conduct created circumstances leaving the deceased with no option but suicide, satisfying the first limb of Section 107. Consequently, the trial court’s inference and the High Court’s refusal to interfere were affirmed. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the charge framing order intact.
Issues considered
- The prosecution must establish that the accused instigated the deceased to commit suicide under Section 107 IPC.
- Whether the material on record suffices to presume abetment of suicide at the charge‑framing stage.
- Scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the CrPC.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 397, s. 401, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 306, s. 34
Subjects
Abetment of suicideSection 306 IPCSection 107 IPCInstigationFraming of chargeRevisional jurisdictionMens reaCommon intention
Judgment
[2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 230
A CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRA
v.
STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)
(Criminal Appeal No. 1473 of 2009)
AUGUST 10, 2009
B
[D.K. JAIN AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.]
-i
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Ss. 3971401 and
482 - Prosecution u/s. 306 read with 34 /PC - Trial court
c framing charges - In revision, High Court not interfering with ,.__
the order - On appeal, held: Trial court rightly drew an
inference thf)t the accused had instigated the deceased to
commit suicide - There was ground for presuming that the
accused had committed the offence - Scope of revisional )--
D powers being limited, High Court justified in not interfering
with the order.
Penal Code, 1860: -
s. 306 and 107 - Abetment of suicide - What constitutes
E the offence - Discussed.
)---
s. 107 - Parameters of abetment - Discussed
;.-
Words and Phrases - 'Instigate' - Meaning of, in the
context of ss. 306 and 107 /PC. ).
F
App~llant-accused alongwith two accused was
prosecuted u/s. 306 r/w s. 34 IPC. The three accused an~
the deceased were the business partners. Some dispute,
regarding sharing of profits arose between them. It was
G alleged that the accused mentally harassed and
pressurised the deceased, as a result whereof, the -t
deceased committed suicide. Deceased had left behind
a suicide note. Trial court framed the charges. Appellant-
accused preferred Revision. High Court declined to
H 230
CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF 231
NCT OF DELHI)
interfere with the framing of charge. Hence the present A
appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. To constitute an offence u/s 306 IPC, the
prosecution has to establish: (i) that a person committed 8
suicide, and (ii) that such suicide was abetted by the
accused. Thus, an offence u/s 306 would stand only if
there is an "abetment" for the commission of the crime.
[Para 11] [238-F-G]
c
2. As per Section 107 IPC a person can be said to
, have abetted in doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any
person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one
or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for
the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes D
place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the
doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any
act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation to Section 107 states that any wilful
misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material fact
E
which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the
contours of "abetment". It is manifest that under all the
three situations, direct involvement of the person or
persons concerned in the commission of offence of
suicide is essential to bring home the offence u/s 306 IPC.
[Paras 12] [239-D-F] F
3. The word "instigate" is not defined in the IPC.
instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of
"instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words G
must be used to that effect or what constitutes
"instigation" must necessarily and specifically be
suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable
certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of
being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A omission or by a continued course of conduct, created
such circumstances that the deceased was left with no
other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an
"instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in
a fit of anger or emotion without intending the
B consequences to actually folloW', cannot be said ·to be
instigation. [Paras 14 and 15] [239-H; 240-A-D]
Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh 2001 (9) SCC
618, relied on.
c Concise Oxford English Dictionary; Oxford Advanced
Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edition, referred to.
4. In order to prove that the accused abetted
commission of suicide by a pe·rson, it has to be
established that: (i) the accused kept on Irritating or ~
D
annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful
omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence
until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the
deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or
conduct to make the deceased move forward more
E
quickly in a forward direction; and (ii) that the accused
had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the
deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner
noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the ~
necessar}t concomitant of instigation. [Para 15] [240-H;
F 241-A-C]
5. It is trite that words uttered on the spur of the
moment or in a quarrel, without something more, ·cannot
be taken to have been uttered with mens rea. The onus
G is on the prosecution to show the circ_umstances which
compelled the deceased to take an extreme step to bring
an end to his life. [Para 17] [241-F-G]
6. In the present case, apart from the suicide note,
statements recorded by the police during the course of
H
CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF 233
NCT OF DELHI)
investigation, tend to show that on account of business A
transactions with the accused, including the appellant,
the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do
something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima
facie, it appears that the conduct of the appellant and his
accomplices was such that the deceased was left with no B
other option except to end his life and, therefore, clause
firstly of Section 107 IPC was attracted. [Para 17] (241-F-
H; 242-AMB]
7. The trial court was not in error in drawing an C
inference that the appellant had "instigated" the
deceased to commit suicide and, therefore, there was
ground for presuming that the appellant has committed
an offen~e punishable u/s 306 r/w Section 34 IPC. It is trite
that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on D
record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging
therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court
may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at E
the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the
prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to
consider the material only with a view to find out if there
is ground for "presuming" that the accused has
committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving F
at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a
conviction. [Para 18] [242-H; 243-A-D]
. Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi and Ors. vs.
Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja and Ors. 1990 (4) SCC 76, relied on. G
~ Shri Ram vs. The State of U.P. 1975 (3) SCC 495; State
of Maharashtra and Ors. vs. Som Nath Thapa and Ors. 1996
(4) SCC 659; State of Maharashtra vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj
1997 (4) sec 393, referred to.
H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 8. The trial court was correct in law in coming to the
conclusion that a case fqr framing charge against the
-appellant had been made out. Similarly, the scope of
revisional powers of the High Court under Section 401
of the Code being limited, the High Court was justified in
B dismissing the Revision Petition, preferred by the
appellant. [Para 20] (244-A-B]
Case Law Reference: ~
975 (3) sec 495 referred to. Para 19
c 1997 (4) sec 393 referred to. Para 19
2001 (9) sec 618 relied on. Para 14
1990 (4) sec 76 relied on. Para 18
D 1996 (4) sec 659 referred to. Para 19
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1473 of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 01.02.2007 of the High
E Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No.
62 of 2004.
Ranjit Kumar, Mohit Mathur, Jasneet Kaur, Subramonium
Prasad, Atul Guleria for the Appellant.
F
Mohan Jain ASG, Ashok Bhan, Kiran Bhardwaj, Anil
Katiyar, D.S. Mahra for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G D.K. JAIN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against final ~
judgment and order dated 1st February, 2007 rendered by the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition
No. 62 of 2004. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has
H
CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF 235
NCT OF DELHI) [D.K. JAIN, J.]
dismissed the Revision Petition filed by the appellant herein A
under Section 397 read with Sections 401 and 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "the Code"), upholding
the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi,
dated 8th January, 2004, framing charge against the appellant
for commission of offence under Section 306 read with Section B
34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short "the IPC") arising
out of FIR No. 329 of 2002 dated 4th July, 2002 registered at
Police Station Mehrauli.
3. On 4th July, 2002, one Rahul Kaushik lodged the said
First Information Report (FIR) with Police Station, Mehrauli
c
stating that his father Jitendra Sharma (hereinafter referred to
as "the deceased") had committed suicide on 3rd July, 2002
by shooting himself with his licensed revolver. It was alleged
that the deceased was a partner with the appellant in this appeal
along with two other persons viz., Jahuruddin and Mahavir D
Prasad and they were all engaged in the real estate business;
he committed suicide on account of the problems created by
these three persons; the deceased left behind a suicide note
which mentioned that there were some money transactions
between them and thus, these three persons had abetted the E
deceased to commit suicide. For the sake of ready reference,
relevant portion of the suicide note is extracted below:
"The money of Shri Bansi Dhar and Shri Grewal is with Ram
Pashre. The money of Shri Puri and Rajendra has been F
given to Ramjan, Mehrauli by Jahur and Jahur has become
dishonest. Th~ money of B.C. Malik and K.S. Yadav is with
Mahesh, who has written the same and given. The rest, the
ex-SOE, Pamer Singh and had taken and did not do Puri's
work.
G
My children known nothing about this matter. C.K.
j..
Chopra's money has been given by Jahur, Jahur and
Chopra are saying things against me and are thereby
troubling me. Kartar etc., money was taken by Jahur and
Mahavir. They had taken it. The reason for the scandal are H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 61oDL.) S.C.R.
A Chopra and his friends. They are troubling me and are
pressurizing me to write all this. I am stressed and
therefore, going away."
4. On completion of investigation, the police filed charge-
s sheet against the said three persons including:the appellant for
allegedly·committing offence punishable under Section 306
read with Section 34 of the IPC. As per the charge-sheet, the
case of the prosecution in short is that there appeared to be a
dispute between the deceased and the appellant regarding
share of profits from the sale of the lands; prior to the incident,
C the deceased was asked to sign a settlement paper, according
to which, the share of the deceased was reduced from 25% to
10% in favour of one Tegh Singh Chabbra and the appellant,
who were otherwise having 45% share each in the profits from
sale proceeds of lands and that due to this dispute, the
D deceased was mentally harassed and pressurized by the
appellant and the other two accused, as a result whereof, the
deceased committed suicide.
5. On being charge-sheeted, all the three accused were
E put up for trial before the court of the Additional Sessions Judge.
The trial court felt satisfied that there was sufficient material on
record for framing of charge against all the three accused.
Accordingly, on 8th January, 2004, the following charge was
framed:
F " .... That you all on 3.7.2002 at about 3.10 p.m. at house
No. 108, village Saidulajake, New Delhi in furtherance 'of
common intention, mentally tortured Jitender Sharma and
abetted him to commit suicide by your said act of mental
· torture and thus you thereby committed an offence
G punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC
and within cognizance of this Court ..... "
6. Aggrieved by the framing of the charge, the appellant
preferred a Revision Petition before the High Court. As already
H noted, the High Court declined to interfere with the order framing
CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF 237
NCT OF DELHI) [D.K. JAIN, J.]
charge. Being dissatisfied with the said order, the appellant A
-1' (accused No.1) is before us in this appeal.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on
B
behalf of the appellant, submitted that even if the case of the
prosecution is accepted on its face value, still on the basis of
the material brought on record by the prosecution, offence under
1 Section 306, IPC is not made out against the appellant.
Referring to the undated suicide note (Annexure P-1) and the
document recording some final settlement (Annexure P-3), c
learned senior counsel was at pains to explain that even
assuming for the sake of argument, that there was some
'settlement' between the deceased, the appellant and the said
Tegh Singh Chabbra, whereunder the deceased was allegedly
forced to forego his share of profits in favour of the said Tegh D
Singh Chabbra, the settlement neither shows any instigation on
the part of the appellant to the deceased to do something, nor
any role of the appellant in any conspiracy which ultimately
resulted in the commission of suicide by the deceased, and
- therefore, the appellant cannot be said to have abetted E
commission of suicide by the deceased. It was also argued that
since as per the suicide note, the deceased owed some money
to the appellant, he would not encourage or provoke his debtor
~ to commit suicide so as to lose his money. In support of the
proposition that to attract the offence of abetment under F
Section 107 of the IPC, an intentional aiding and active
complicity is an essential ingredient of said provision, learned
counsel relied on the decision of this Court in Shri Ram vs. The
State of U.P. 1· Reliance was also placed on the decisions of
this Court in State of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. Som Nath Thapa
G
& Ors. 2 and State of Maharashtra vs. Priya Sharan Maha rap
~
to contend that the trial court had failed to apply its mind to the
....
1. (1975) 3 sec 495.
2. (1996) 4 sec 659.
3. (1997) 4 sec 393. 'H
-
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A question whether or not there was any ground for presuming .,._
that the appellant had committed the alleged offence.
9. Per contra, Mr. Mohan Jain, learned Additional Solicitor
General, appearing on behalf of the State, supported the
B decision of the High Court. He submitted that the suicide note
cannot be read de hors the other material, including the
statements of some of the persons recorded during the course
of investigations. It was contended that there is ample material
on record for presuming that the accused, including the
appellant, have abetted the commission of suicide by the
c deceased. The learned counsel thus, submitted that the trial
court has not committed any illegality in framing charge against
the appellant and, therefore, the High Court was justified in
dismissing the Revision Petition filed by the appellant,
particularly when the scope of revision is very limited.
D ~·
10. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:
"306. Abetment of suicide
If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the
E commission of such suicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
11. From a bare reading of the provision, it is clear that to
F constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC, the prosecution
has to establish: (i) that a person committed suicide, and (ii)
that such suicide was abetted by the accused. In other words,
an. offence under Section 306 would stand only if there is an
"abetment" for the commission of the crime. The parameters
G of "abetment" have been stated in Section 107 of the IPC, which
defines abetment of a thing as follows:
~-
"107. Abetment of a thing ,..
A person abets the doing of a thing, who -
H
-
CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF 239
NCT OF DELHI) [D.K. JAIN, J.]
First- Instigates any person to do that thing; or A
Secondly- Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an
act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that
conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
B
Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1- A person who by wilful misrepresentation,
or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is c
bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or
attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said
to instigate the doing of that thing."
1. 12. As per the Section, a person can be said to have
D
;, abetted in doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to
do that thing; or secondly, e_ngages with one or more other
person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing,
if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that
conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly,
intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of E
that thing. Explanation to Section 107 states that any wilful
misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material fact which
he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of
"abetment". It is manifest that under all the three situations,
direct involvement of the person or persons concerned in the F
commission of offence of suicide is essential to bring home the
offence under Section 306 of the IPC.
13. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the
allegations levelled against the appellant in the FIR and the G
,,.._ material collected during the course of investigations, would
attract any one of the ingredients of Section 107 IPC?
14. As per clause firstly in the said Section, a person can
be said to have abetted in doing of a thing, who "instigates"
any person to do that thing. The word "instigate" is not defined H
._~
~
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A in the IPC. The meaning of the said word was considered by
this Court in Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh 4 •
Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His
Lordship then was) said that instigation is to goad, urge forward,
provoke, incite.or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the
B requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that
actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes
"instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of
the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the
consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the
c accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued
course of conduct, created such circumstances that the
deceased was left with no other option except to commit
suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be
inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without
intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said ~
D ....
to be instigation.
15. Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who instigates
another has-19 provoke, incite, urge or encourage doing of an
act by the other by "goading" or "urging forward". The dictionary
E meaning oflhe worct"goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone
into action: pro'12!St3,to action or reaction" (See: Concise Oxford
English DictionC)ry)~ ~t~eep irritating or annoying somebody
until he reacts'v(S?e:..G'xford Advanced Learner's Dictionary -
7th Edition). Simif~fty, "urge" means to advise or try hard to
F persuade somebody to do something or to make a person to
move more quickly and or in a particular direction, especially
by pushing or forcing such person. Therefore, a person who
instigates another has to "goad" or "urge forward" the latter with
intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act
G by the latter. As observed in Ramesh Kumar's case (supra),
where the accused by his acts or by a continued course of
conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left -+-
with no other option except to commit suicide, an "instigation"
may be inferred. In other words, in order to prove that the
H 4. (2001) g sec 618.
,_
CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF 241
NCT OF DELHI) [D.K. JAIN, J.]
accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to A
be established that: (i) the accused kept on irrita~ing or annoying
the deceased 'by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct
which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted
or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful
omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more B
quickly in a forward direction; and (11] that the accused had the
intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to
commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above.
Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary
concomitant of instigation. c
16. In the background of this legal position, we may advert
to the case at hand. The question as to what is the cause of a
suicide has no easy answers because suicidal ideation and
-t. behaviours in human beings are complex and multifaceted.
Different individuals in the same situation react and behave D
differently because of the personal meaning they add to each
event, thus accounting for individual vulnerability to suicide.
Each individual's suicidability pattern depends on his inner
subjective experience of mental pain, fear and loss of self-
respect. Each of these factors are crucial and exacerbating E
'" contributor to an individual's vulnerability to end his own life,
which may either be an attempt tor self-protection or an
escapism from intolerable self.
17. In the present case, the charge against the appellant F
is that he along with other two accused "in furtherance of
common intention", mentally tortured Jitendra Sharma (the
deceased) and abetted him to commit suicide by the said act
of mental torture. It is trite that words uttered on the spur of the
moment or in a quarrel, without something more cannot be
G
taken to have been uttered with mens rea. The onus is on the
~ prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the
deceased to take an extreme step to bring an end to his life.
In the present case, apart from the suicide note, extracted
above, statements recorded by the police during the course of
H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A investigation, tend to show that on account of business .,..
transactions with the accused, including the appellant herein,
the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do
something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima facie,
it appears that the conduct of the appellant and his accomplices
B was such that the deceased was left with no other option except
to end his life and, therefore, clause firstly of Section 107 of
the IPC was attracted. Briefly dealing with the material available
on record, in the order directing framing of charge against the
.,.
appellant, the learned trial court has observed as under:
c "In the present case the evidence shows threatening given
to the deceased. One witness called Kartar Singh says that
CK Chopra was heard saying to the deceased that the
deceased had become dishonest because he was
refusing to sign a paper in which the share in some joint l
D property was shown to be 10%. On another occasion
Chopra was heard by this witness to say that Chopra
would ruin the deceased if he did not give up his claim for
25% and did not agree to accept 10%. Witness Padam
Bahadur has stated inter alia that he overheard Jahoor and -'
E Mahavir telling the deceased that Chopra had asked them .,
to say that this was the last opportunity to sign the
document and that if he wanted to live in the society he
should sign the agreement or should die by taking poison. ,,.
Soon thereafter the deceased committed suicide.
F
Thus the evidence is not of a mere quarrel in which one
person told the other go and die without actually suggesting
that the opponent should commit suicide. In the present
case the evidence collected by the investigation suggest
that the deceased had been actually pushed to the wall and
G
the escape by committing suicide was suggested by the
accused persons." ~'
18. In the light of the material on record, in our judgment,
it cannot be said that the trial court was in error in drawing an
H inference that the appellant had "instigated" the deceased to
CHITRESH KUMAR CHOPRA v. STATE (GOVT. OF 243
NCT OF DELHI) [D.K. JAIN, J.]
commit suicide and, therefore, there was ground for presuming A
that the appellant has committed an offence punishable under
Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC. It is trite that at the stage
of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the
material and documents on record with a view to finding out if
the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose B
the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift
the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage
to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this
stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view c
to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused
has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving
at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction.
(See: Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi & Ors. vs. Jitendra
Bhimraj Bijja & Ors5).
D
19. In Som Nath Thapa & Ors. (supra), a three-Judge
Bench of this Court explained the meaning of the word
"presume". Referring to dictionary meanings of the said word,
the Court observed thus:
E
" ... if on the basis of materials on record, a court could
come to the conclusion that commission of the offence
is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge
exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that
the accused might have committed the offence it can F
frame the charge, though for .conviction the conclusion is
required to be that the accused has commuted the offence.
It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge,
probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone
into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution G
has to be accepted as true at that stage".
(emphasis supplied)
s. (1990) 4 sec 76. H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 20. In view of the settled legal position, noted above, we ..,.
are convinced that the trial court was correct in law in coming
to the conclusion that a -case for framing charge against the J
appElllant had been made out. Similarly, the scope of revisional
powers of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code being
B limited, the High Court was justified in dismissing the Revision
Petition, preferred by the appellant.
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any
merit in this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly. It goes
without saying that nothing said by the High Court or by us r-
~
c hereinabove shall be construed as expression of any opinion
on the merits of the case pending trial. I-
I
i
K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.
t
..
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