Holding

When the accused act in concert with a pre‑arranged common intention, they can be convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC even if the charge was originally framed under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.

Summary

The appellants Chittarmal and Moti were charged with murder and attempted murder for assaulting two sleeping men, resulting in their deaths, and grievously injuring a third witness, Lal Chand. The trial court convicted them under Sections 302 and 307 IPC and sentenced them to death, which was later commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the reliability of the injured witness's testimony, the presence of artificial light, and the applicability of Sections 34 and 149 IPC. It held that the witness's evidence was credible despite later improvements, and that the lack of an electric light in the FIR was not fatal to the prosecution. The Court clarified that when the accused share a pre‑arranged common intention, conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is permissible even if the charge was framed under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Consequently, the appellants' conviction was altered to Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and the life sentence was upheld, with the appeals dismissed.

Issues considered

The credibility of the injured eyewitness's testimony despite later improvements.
Whether the absence of mention of artificial light in the FIR defeats the prosecution.
The applicability of Section 34 IPC versus Section 149 IPC when the charge was framed under the latter.
Whether a conviction under Section 302 IPC can stand without a specific charge being framed under that section.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 319
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 307, s. 34, s. 447

Subjects

murderattempt to murdercommon intentionSection 34 IPCSection 149 IPCconstructive liabilitycharge framingdeath penaltylife imprisonment

Judgment

CHITTARMAL A
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN

JANUARY 8, 2003

[N. SANTOSH '.-IEGDE AND B.P. SINGH, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860: Ss.302134, 307134-Murder and attempt to murder-
Prosecution of 7 accused-Charge u/s 3021149 and 3071149-0ccurrence
seen by injured eye witness-Conviction by trial court under sections 302 and C
307 of 2 accused and conviction of others u/ss. 3021149 and 3071149-High
Court upheld conviction of 2 accused and acquitted the other accused-On
appeal, held-On the facts of the case conviction of the 2 accused justified -
Other accused having been acquitted, the member of the participants being
less than 5 charge u/s 3021149 cannot stand-Since common intention of the
two accused proved, their conviction altered to one u/ss. 302134 and 307134. D
Sections 34 and / 49-Common object and common intention-
1pp/icability of and distinction between.

Accused-appellants and 5 other accused were prosecuted u/ss. 302/
149 and 307/149. Prosecution case was that accused assaulted two persons E
and PWI at night while they were sleeping in a room on adjoining cots.
The assault resulted in the death of the two and grievous injuries to PWI
24 in number. FIR was lodged by PWS who claimed to be eyewitness. PW-
1, the injured eye witness, PWS and some other witnesses were examined
during trial who deposed to have seen the accused. PWS, in the FIR had
not named one of the accused-appellants. In the site inspection, it was F
found that on the gate of the house there was an electric bulb. PW-I in
his evidence improved upon his police statement by naming othe.r 5
accused. Trial court convicted the accused-appellants u/ss 302, 307 and
148 !PC and other accused u/ss 302/149 and 307/149 and 148 !PC and
sentenced the appellants to death. G
High Court declining the death reference and partly allowing the
appeal, convicted the appellants u/ss 302 and 307 !PC and acquitted the
other accused of all the charges. It disbelieved the claim of PWS of being
an eyewitness and found inconsistency in the testimony of the witnesses.
49 H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that there was no
mention of artificial light at the time of occurrence; that PWI though
stated that he woke up at the sound of "thali", he had not said so in police
statement; that appellants having been charged u/ss 302/149 IPC could
not have been convicted u/s 302 IPC without a specific charge having been
framed.
B
Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1. On the testimony of PW.I the participation of the
appellants in the commission of the crime must be held to have been
C proved. Even though he sought to make an improvement in the course of
his deposition by naming the other accused persons, for that reason his
entire evidence cannot be rejected. Though he stated that he woke up on
hearing sound of 'thali', he had not said so in his police statement is not )- -

of much significance because he was sleeping next to the deceased per~ JDS
in a same room on a separate cot. When the appellants attacked t.tle
D deceased that would have awakened him from his sleep because in normal
course the two persons sleeping next to him on being attacked must have
resisted the attack and in that process there must have been some noise
enough to awaken the witness. It is too much to assume that two persons
sleeping on two separate cots nearby in the same room would be assaulted
E and killed and the sleep of the third person sleeping in the same room will
not be disturbed. (56-D-G]

1.2. Failure to mention about existence of electric light in the FIR
was not of much consequence and was not fatal to the case of the
prosecution particularly when on site inspection such an electric bulb was
F found in front of the gate of the house. Moreover, the assailants belong to
the same village and were known to PWl. They had caused numerous
injuries to him with swords and, therefore, he had abundant opportunity
to identify them even if there was no light. Moreover, the testimony of
PWl was corroborated by the medical evidence on record. (56-B-D]

G 1.3. Overt act and active participation is indicative of common
intention of the persons perpetrating the crime, and in the facts and
circumstances of this case the appellants shared the common intention to
commit the murders of the deceased and acting in concert they executed
their pre-arranged plan to eliminate them. Accordingly the conviction of
H the appellants is altered to one under Section 302 read with Section 34
I
l
GllTTARMAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 51

!PC instead of one under Section 302 !PC. [58-G-H; 59-AJ A
t.4. Appellants can be convicted under Section 302 read with Section
34 !PC, even though the charge framed was one under Section 302 read
with Seotion 149 !PC. On the facts proved, it must be held that the
appellants came together armed with lethal weapons and simultaneously
started the assault on the deceased persons who succumbed to their B
. ;.·
injuries. When PW. I woke up, he was also mercilessly assaulted by both
of them inflicting as many as 24 injuries. The remaining accused, apart
from the appellants, have been acquitted on a finding that they did not
come with the appellants duly armed, they did not share the common
object, nor did they take part in the assault on the two deceased or PW.I. C
Thus the charge under Section 302 read with Section 149 could not stand,
the number of participants in the crime being less than five. [58-D-F[

2. Section 34 as well as Section 149 deal with liability for constructive
criminality i.e. vicarious liability of a person for acts of others. Both the
Sections deal with combinations of persons who become punishable as D
sharers in an offence. Thus they have a certain resemblance and may to
some extent overlap. But a clear distinction is made out between common
intention and common object in that common intention denotes action in
concert and necessarily postulates the existence of a pre-arranged plan
implying a prior meeting of the minds, while common object does not E
necessarily require proof of prior meeting of minds or pre-concert. Though
there is substantial difference between the two Sections, they also to some
extent overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each
case whether the charge under Section 149 overlap the ground covered
by Section 34. Thus if several persons numbering five or more, do an act
and intend to do it, both Sections 34 and Section 149 may apply. If the F
1 common object does not necessarily involve a common intention, then the
substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 might result in prejudice to the

.. accused and ought not, therefore, to be permitted. But if it does involve a
common intention then the substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 must
be held to be a formal matter. Whether such recourse can be had or not
must depend on the facts of each case. The non applicability of Section G
149 is, therefore, no bar in convicting the appellants under Section 302
read with Section 34 IPC, if the evidence discloses commission of an offence
in furtherance of the common intention of them all. [57-F-H; 58-A-C)

Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR (1925) PC I; Mannam H

•
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 1 S.C.R.

A Venkatadari and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1971) SC 1467;
Nethala Pothuraju and Ors. v. State ofAndhra Pradesh, AIR (1991) SC 2214;
Ram Taha! and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR (1972) SC 254; Subran @
Subramanian and Ors. v. State of Kera/a, 11993) 3 SCC 32; Willie (William)
Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1956) SC 116 and State of Andhra
B Pradesh v. Thakkdiaram Reddy and Ors., JT (1998) 5 SC 398, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
1150-115112001 of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.9.2000 of the High Court of
C Rajasthan in DBCRA No. 1/98 and 563/97.
M.L. Lahoty, Sushi! Kumar Jain, Ms. Anjali Doshi, L.P. Singh, Deepak
Mundra, Pawan Shrma, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Ms. Kumud Lata Dass, Ms. Sandhya
Goswami, Ms. Bharathi Upadhyay and Javed Mahmud Rao for the appeari"g
parties.
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B.P. SINGH, J. These appeals by special leave have been preferred by
Chittarmal and Moti who have impugned the judgment and order of the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in DB Cr!. Appeal
E No.563 of 1997 and DB Cr. (Jail) Appeal No. I of 1998 dated 5th September,
2000. The High Court while acquitting the other accused of the charges
levelled against them, found the appellants guilty of the offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 307 IPC. The appellants who had been sentenced to
death by the trial court for committing the offence punishable under Section
302 IPC, were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life declining
F the death reference. The trial court had also sentenced the appellants to undergo i
A
five years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000 for the
offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, in default of payment of fine, six
months simple imprisonment, which was upheld by the High Court. The
conviction of the appellants under Section 148 IPC was, however, set aside. •·'

G The case of the prosecution is that on the night intervening 27th-28th
April, 1989 deceased Bhura and Ram Narain and Lal Chand, PW. I were
sleeping in their house in village Joshian Ki Dhani when the appellants
herein alongwith five other persons entered the house at about 10 or 11 p.m.
and brutally assaulted Bhura and Ram Narain as also Lal Chand, PW. I.
H Bhura and Ram Narain succumbed to their injuries but Lal Chand, PW.I,

•
CHITTARMAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [B.P. SINGH, J.] 53

who suffered as many as 24 injuries survived the assault. Bhura was the A
father of Ram Narain and the father-in-law of Lal Chand, PW. I. The first
infonnation report Ex.P. I was lodged by Bhenru, PW.5 another son of Bhura
(deceased) alleging that on the night ofoccurrence Moti (appellant) alongwith
Ramsi, Ratan, Lala, Chhagan, Jaggu and 2-3 others anned with axes, farsies
and swords entered the house of Bhura and mounted a murderous assault as
a result of which Bhura and Ram Narain lost their lives while Lal Chand, B

·"' PW. I was severely injured. It may be noticed at this stage that Chittannal
was not named as one of the accused in the first information report. On the
basis of the first information report a case was registered under Sections 147,
148, 302, 307 and 447 IPC at P.S. Sanganer. In the course of investigation
blood stained clothes and the weapons of offence are said to have been C
recovered at the instance of accused persons. The post-mortem examination
of the bodies of Bhura and Ram Narain was conducted by Dr. Nirmal Kumar
Sharma, PW.IS and Dr. H.C. Bairwa, PW.14. Lal Chand, PW.I was examined
by Dr. B.C. Temani, PW.15, who prepared the injury report Ext.P.26. The
report discloses that Lal Chand, PW. I had suffered as many as 24 injuries, D
most of them incised wounds which, in the opinion of the doctor, could have
been caused by a heavy long sharp edged weapon. Injuries No. 9 and 17 were
of grievous nature, which were described as follows in the report :-

"(9) Traumatic amputation in an area of 12 cm x 4 cm x cut bones
(metacarpols rounded clear cut) chopping from 2cm above wrist E
joint, little and ring finger missing out of the left hand with
incised wound 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep on postero-medial
part of middle finger.
(17) Incised wound ( V shaped ) 4 and half cm x half cm x muscle
bone deep on postero-medial and lateral aspect of proximal and F
- .... J tenninal phalynx covering anterior aspect of thumb. "
r

After investigation charge sheet was submitted only against the appellants
herein since the investigating agency found no case against the other accused
persons. After the trial commenced before the Sessions Court and 7 witness
had been examined, the public prosecutor moved an application for summoning G
the remaining accused for trial under Section 319 Cr. P.C. The said application
was allowed by the Sessions Judge by his order dated 30th March, 1992 and
the remaining five accused namely, - Ramsi, Rattan, Chhagan, Jaggu and
Lala were also summoned for trial.

Initially when the appellants were put up for trial charges were framed H
(

54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) I S.C.R.

A against them under Sections 307 and 302 IPC and in the alternative under
Sections 307/149 lPC and 302/149 IPC. However, after the remaining accused
were summoned for trial the charges were re-framed and they were all charged
under Sections 148, 302/149 and 307/149 IPC. At the trial the informant
Bhenru, PW.5 claiming to be an eye witness stated that at about I 0 or 11
p.m. he was at the house of Ramjiwan where they were enjoying a smoke.
B He heard noise from the side of his house and, therefore, rushed to his house
followed by his cousin Bhanwar. When he reached his house, he saw the
appellants Moti and Chittar inflicting injuries to Lal Chand while the remaining
accused namely, Chhagan, Jaggu, Ramsi, Ratan and Lala were surrounding
him. The accused also caused injuries to his father Bhura and brother Ram
C Narain. He cried for help which attracted Ramjeewan, Hanuman, Kesra and
Chittar to the place of occurrence, but by that time the accused had fled. The
prosecution also examined Bhanwar Lal, PW.2, Chittar, PW.3, Ramjiwan~
PW.4, Kesra, PW.6 and Hanuman, PW.7 to support the version given by the
informant. Lal Chand (PW.I), an injured witness, was also examined to prove
D the case of the prosecution. Accepting the testimony of the witnesses the trial
court found all the accused guilty of the offence under Sections 148 IPC. It
convicted the appellants Moti and Chittannal of the offences under Sections
302 and 307 IPC while finding the remaining accused guilty of the offences
under Sections 302 read with Section 149 IPC and 307 read with Section 149
IPC. The trial court sentenced the appellants herein to death for the offence
E under Section 302 IPC and made a reference to the High Court for confinnation
of the death sentence.

The appellants as well as the other accused preferred appeals before the
High Court which were heard alongwith the death reference. The High Court
while declining the death reference allowed the appeals in part in as much as
F the accused, other than the appellants herein, were acquitted of all the charges . i ~
levelled against them while the appellants herein were found guilty of the
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance
G we have perused the evidence on record.

The High Court did not accept the claim of Bhenru, PW.5 of being. an
eye witness. In a detailed judgment the High Court has recorded its clear
finding and given good and cogent reasons for disbelieving ~e claim of the
an
informant of being. eye witness. The High Court noticed the evidence of
H the other witnesses and finding considerable inconsistency in the testimony
CHITTARMAL v. STATE OF RAJAS THAN (B.P. SINGH, l.] 55
of the witnesses came to the conclusion that neither Bhenru nor those witnesses A
. " had witnessed the occurrence. In all likelihood they had reached the place of
occurrence after the assailants had made good their escape. After perusing
the evidence on record we find ourselves in complete agreement with the
High Court on this aspect of the matter. Moreover the acquittal of the remaining
accused is not the subject matter of challenge before us in these appeals, nor
B
has the State preferred an appeal against acquittal of the remaining accused.
)( It is, therefore, not necessary for us to consider in detail the evidence pertaining
-.)
to the complicity of the accused who have been acquitted by the High Court.

The High Court, however, found that so far as Lal Chand, PW. I was
concerned, his presence at the place of occurrence could not be disputed. He c
was subjected to merciless assault and had suffered as many as 24 injuries.
According to Lal Chand, PW. I on the night of occurrence he was sleeping
-< in the house of his father-in-law Bhura. His brother-in-law Ram Narain was
also sleeping there on a separate cot. At night he heard the sound of 'thali'
and woke up. He saw Moti assaulting his brother-in-law Ram Narain with a
D
sword while Chittar was assaulting his father-in-law Bhura with a sword.
When he got up he was also assaulted by both of them with swords and he
suffered a large number of injuries on his head, hands and legs. At the trial,

.. this witness no doubt implicated Chhagan, Jaggu, Ramsi, Ratan and Lala as
well stating that they were with the appellants with axes and farsies and that
E
all of them had caused injuries to him. This part of the evidence of Lal Chand
has not been accepted by the High Court and for good reasons. Lal Chand
in his statement before the police had no-. stated that the remaining accused,
apart from the appellants, had come armed with the appellants and had
assaulted him. His statement before the police was to the effect that when the
appellants were going away from the place of occurrence he had seen Chhagan, F
Ramsi and Lala standing by the side of the wall near the babool tree. The
J.
other two accused were not even named by him. The babool tree was at a
distance of about 60 yards from the place of occurrence. The High Court,
therefore, rightly held that this part of his evidence was clearly an improvement
and ought to be ignored. However, the rest of the evidence of Lal Chand was
accepted by the High Court as truthful and on the basis of his evidence the
G
High Court recorded the conviction of the appellants herein.

We have carefully read the evidence of Lal Chand and we are in
agreement with the High Court that his "evidence cannot be discarded on the
grounds urged by the defence. It was sought to be urged before us that there H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) 1 S.C.R.

A is no mention of any artificial light at the time of occurrence. The High Court "'-
has discussed the evidence on record and come to the conclusion that there
was an electric bulb in front of the gate of the house. It was so found by the
investigating officer'who had prepared the site inspection memo Ext.P.2 on
28th April, 1989. He was not cross-examined on this aspect of the matter
B even though he had asserted that he had seen the site and had prepared the
site inspection memo correctly. Moreover the failure to mention about existence
of electric light in the FIR was not of much consequence and was not fatal
to the case of the prosecution particularly when on site inspection such an
electric bulb was found in front of the gate of ~he house. Moreover, as
noticed by the High Court, the assailants belong to the same village and were
C known to Lal Chand. They had caused numerous injuries to Lal Chand with
swords and, therefore, Lal Chand had abundant opportunity to identify them
eveh if there was no light. Moreover the testimony of Lal Chand was >- -
corroborated by the medical evidence on record. It was also sought to be
urged that though Lal Chand stated that he woke up on hearing sound of
D 'thali', he .had not said so in his police statement. That also to our mind is
not of much significance because he was sleeping next to his father:--in-law
and brother-in-law in a same room on a separate cot. When the appellants
attacked his father-in-law and brother-in-law, that would have awakened Lal
Chand from his sleep because in normal course the two persons sleeping next
E to him on being attacked must have resisted the attack and in that process
there must have been some noise enough to awaken the witness. It is too
much to assume that two persons sleeping on two separate cots nearby in the
same room would be assaulted and killed and the sleep of the third person
sleeping in the same room will not be disturbed.

p Having considered all aspects of the matter and perused the evidence
on record, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the High Court that --l.._
on the testimony of Lal Chand, PW. I the participation of the appellants in the
commission of the crime must be held to have been proved. Both the courts
have concurrently found Lal Chand, PW. I to be a reliable witness and even
though he sought to make an improvement in the course of his deposition by
G naming the other accused persons, for that reason his entire evidence cannot
be rejected. The High Court has rightly ignored that part of his evidence
which appears to be in the nature of embellishment.

It was then urged by counsel for the appellants that the High Court was
H in error in convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC in
CHITTARMAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [B.P. SINGH, l.] 57

ihe absence of any specific charge framed under that section. It was contended, A
relying upon several decisions of this Court including Subran @Subramanian
;, and Ors. v. State of Kera/a, (1993) 3 SCC 32 that a person charged of an
offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 !PC cannot be convicted of
the substantive offence under Section 302 !PC without a specific charge
having been framed against him as envisaged by law. It was submitted that
Section 149 creates a specific and distinct offence and, therefore, a specific B
charge under Section 302 !PC is a mandatory requirement of law before one
~ can be found guilty of the offence under Section 302 !PC. The fact that a
charge under Section 302 read with Section 149 !PC is framed, is not sufficient.

On the other hand counsel for the State submitted, relying upon the C
decision of this Court in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
AIR (1956) SC 116 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkdiaram Reddy and
Ors., JT (1998) 5 SC 398 that in all cases of constructive liability the absence
" of specific charge under one or other head of criminal liability by itself is not
fatal and no conviction can be set aside unless prejudice is shown by such
defective charge. The true test is whether the error, .omission or irregularity D
in the proceedings has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. In the facts of
this case, she submitted no prejudice was caused to the appellants and no
failure of justice was occasioned by convicting the appellants under Section
302 !PC even in the absence of a specific charge under Section 302 !PC.

We do not consider it necessary, in the facts and circumstances of this E
case, to consider the aforesaid submissions, because we are clearly of the
view that in any event the conviction of the appellants can be sustained under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

_, It is well settled by a catena of decisions that Section 34 as well as
Section 149 deal with liability for constructive criminality i.e. vicarious liability
of a person for acts of others. Both the sections deal with combinations of
persons who become punishable as sharers in an offence. Thus they have a
F

certain resemblance and may to some extent overlap. But a clear distinction
is made out between common intention and common object in that common
intention denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates the existence of G
a pre-arranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds, while common
object does not necessarily require proof of prior meeting of minds or pre-
concert. Though there is substantial difference between the two sections, they
also to some extent overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts
of each case whether the charge under Section 149 overlaps the ground H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A covered by section 34. Thus, if several person.s numbering five or more~ do
an act and intend to do it, both Sections 34 and Section 149 inay apply. If
the common object does not necessarily involve a common intention, then :4:-
the substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 might result in prejudice to the
accused and ought not, therefore, to be permitted. But if it does involve a
common intention then the substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 must
B be held to be a formal matter. Whether such recourse can be had or not must
depend on the facts of each case. The non applicability of Section 149 is,
therefore, no bar in convicting the appellants under Section 302 read with
Section 34 IPC, if the evidence discloses commission of an offence in
furtherance of the common intention of them all. (See Barendra Kumar Ghosh
C v. King Emperor, AIR (1925) PC 1; Mannam Venkatadari and Ors. v. State
of Andhra Pradesh : AIR (1971) SC 1467; Nethala Pothuraju and Ors. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1991) SC 2214 and Ram Taha/ and Ors. v.
State of UP., AIR (1972) SC 254).

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we find no difficulty
D in convicting the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC,
even though the charge framed was one under Section 302 read with Section
149 IPC. On the facts proved, it must be held that the appellants came
together armed with lethal weapons and simultaneously started the assault on
Ram Narain and Bhura, who succumbed to their injuries. When Lal Chand,
E PW.I woke up, he was also mercilessly assaulted by both of them inflicting
as many as 24 injuries. The remaining accused, apart from the appellants,
have been acquitted on a finding that they did not come with the appellants
duly armed, they did not share the common object, nor did they take part in
the assault on the two deceased or PW. I. Thus the charge under Section 302
read with Section 149 could not stand, the number of participants in the
F crime being less than five.

But so far as the appellants are concerned, it cannot be doubted on the
findings recorded that they shared a common intention and had acted pursuant
thereto. Overt act and active participation is indicative of common intention
G of the persons perpetrating the crime, and in the facts and circumstances of
this case we have no doubt that the appellants shared the common intention
to commit the murders of the deceased and acting in concert they executed
their pre-arranged plan to eliminate them. Their conviction under Section 302
read with Section 34 can be safely recorded.

H
l

CHITTARMAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [B.P. SINGH, J.] 59

Accordingly the conviction of the appellants is altered to one under A
Section 302 read with Section 34 lf'C instead of one under Section 302 !PC
and the sentence of life impriscmment is maintained. Subject to the above, the
appeals are dismissed.

K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.
B