Holding

The detention order under COFEPOSA is invalid because the authority did not apply its mind to the material facts and could not reasonably infer that the petitioner was likely to repeat smuggling activities.

Summary

The petitioner was detained under Section 3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 after customs seized a large quantity of dutiable cell‑phones from his baggage at Chennai Airport. He claimed the goods were not his, that the customs statement was made under coercion, and that the baggages had no tags linking them to him. The detaining authority, relying on his admission of prior visits to Singapore as a tourist, ordered his preventive detention despite pending criminal proceedings and rejected bail applications. The Supreme Court examined whether a single incident, without evidence of organized smuggling or a reasonable prognosis of future wrongdoing, could justify detention and whether the authority had applied its mind to the material facts. It held that the authority failed to consider crucial evidence, could not reasonably infer future smuggling, and thus the detention order was unlawful. The writ petition was allowed, the detention order quashed and the petitioner released.

Issues considered

Whether a single incident of alleged smuggling, without evidence of organized activity, can justify preventive detention under COFEPOSA.
Whether the detaining authority applied its mind to all relevant material facts before issuing the detention order.
Whether the petitioner’s prior visits to Singapore as a tourist can be used to infer a likelihood of future smuggling.
Whether the detention order violates the petitioner’s fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974s. 3(1)(i)
Constitution of Indias. Article 21, s. Article 32
Customs Act, 1962s. 111(d)(i)(1), s. 111(m)
Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992

Subjects

preventive detentionCOFEPOSApersonal libertycustoms seizuresmugglingnon‑application of mindsingle incident inferenceArticle 21Article 32bail

Judgment

A CHOWDARAPU RAGHUNANDAN
v.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS.

MARCH 15, 2002

B [M.B. SHAH AND DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ.]

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling }--

Activities Act, I974-Section 3(J)(i)-Detention-Dutiable goods recovered
t..
from detenu-Ownership of baggages, containing the goods doubtful-
c Investigation inconclusive-No other a/legation-Denial of bail in criminal
~

proceedings for the offence-Detention challenged-Plea that single incident
not sufficient to warrant detention order-Held, detention can be ordered
even for single incident if from the nature of the incident it can be inferred
that person is likely to repeat such acts so as to warrant his detention-In the
D instant case, inference of detenu 's involvement in smuggling activities could
not be drawn-Hence, detention not justified-Constitution of India, I950-
Article 2 I-Customs Act, I 962-Sections I I I (d)(i)(i) and (m), I 32 and I 35-
k..
Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992. -<

Customs authority seized baggages, containing dutiable goods, of
E petitioner-detenu, while he was returning from Singapore. It was alleged that
the detenu made statement before the customs authority admitting that he
was carrying the dutiable goods and that he had earlier visited Singapore twice
-:-
as a tourist
).._
In criminal proceedings for the alleged offences, detenu had made bail
F applications narrating the facts that the statements before the customs
authority were made under coercion. The bail applications were rejected. ~
Detenu made representation to customs department stating that the
baggages seized, did not belong to him as there were no tags on them so as to
G connect him with the same, and he specifically stated that the same belonged
to someone else bearing his ticket numbers and address, against whom no l.
action could be taken, and investigation in this regard had not concluded.

Thereafter detention order was passed against the petitioner-detenu
under Section (3)(l)(i) of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention
H 486 A

,.
•
CHOWDARAPU RAGHUNANDAN v. STA TE OF TAMIL NADU 487
;
of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA). Petitioner challenged the A
detention order by filing writ petition in this Court.

Petitioner contended that detention order was passed without
application of mind as the detaining authority did not consider the fact that
it was his case throughout that he had not brought the goods; that relevant
records were not placed before the detaining authority; that even if presumed B
that seized goods were of the detenu, the solitary act could not be a ground
for detaining him under COFEPOSA; and that there was no necessity of
detaining him, since criminal proceedings with regard to the alleged offence
were pending and his bail applications in that case were rejected.

Respondents contended that order of detaining authority was not
c
arbitrary as the same was passed on !ts subjective satisfactions; and that in
view of detenu's admission that he had previously visited Singapore twice as
a tourist, it could be inferred that the petitioner might have indulged and was
likely to indulge in activities of smuggling.
D
Allowing the appea~ the Court

HELD:

Per Shah, J.
E
I. From the facts-that there was no other allegation as to detenu's
involvement in any anti-social activities; that he had alleged that he made
statement before customs authority under coercion; and that there were no
tags on the baggages so as to connect him with the baggages and the crime -
it is totally unreasonable to arrive at a prognosis that the petitioner is likely
to indulge in any prejudicial activities of smuggling. From the fact that a F
person had visited Singapore twice earlier as a 'tourist', inference cannot be
drawn that he was involved in smuggling activities or is likely to indulge in
such activities in future. (494-E; 495-A)

2.1. In appropriate case, an inference could legitimately be drawn even G
from a single incident of smuggling that the person may indulge in smuggling
activity but for that purpose antecedents and nature of the activities carried
out by a person are required to be taken into consideration for reaching
justifiable satisfaction that the person was engaged in smuggling and that with
a view to prevent, it was necessary to detain him; It is also settled law that an
order of preventive detention is founded on a reasonable prognosis of the H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R. ~

A future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct judged in the ligbt of "?---
surrounding circumstances. Such past conduct may consist of one single act I

or of a series of acts. It must be of such a nature that an inference can
reasonably be drawn from it that the person concerned would be likely to
repeat such acts so as to warrant his detention. If there is non-application of
mind by the authority on this aspect, then the Court is required and is bound
B to protect the citizen's personal liberty which is guaranteed under the
Constitution. Subjective satisfaction of the authority under the law is not
absolute and should not be unreasonable. [494-A-D]
;- ~

Mohd Subrati alias Modh. Karim v. State of West Bengal, [1973) 3 SCC
(
I
c 250; Anil Dey v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 SCC 514; Debu Mahato v. State
of West Bengal, [1974] 4 SCC 135; Attorney General for India and Ors. v.
..J,

Amratlal Prajivandas and Ors., (1994) 5 SCC 54 and V.C. Mohan v. Union of
India and Ors.,· JT (2002) 2 SC 365, referred to.

2.2. Preventive Detention is not a punitive Act and it is not alternative
D to criminal trial under the law. It does not empower the authority to punish
a person without trial. Its purpose is to prevent a person from indulging in
activities, such as smuggling and or such other anti social activities as provided
.>-..
under the Preventive Detention Law. (490-E-F) ~

Per Raju, J. (Concurring)
E
1. Though, Courts exercising powers of judicial review do not consider
the challenge to an order of detention, as if on an appeal re-appreciating the
materials, yet since an order of detention in prison involves the fundamental
rights of citizen, freedom of movement and pursuit of normal life and liberty, _J._
no absolute immunity cim be claimed by the respondents as to the decision
F arrived and.it is open to the Courts to see whether there has been due and
proper application of mind and that all the relevant, and vital materials for r
the purpose have been noticed, adverted to and considered. [498-D-E] · r
,-
2. The impugned order suffers the vice of total non-application or mind
to relevant and vital materials touching question of the culpability as well as
G
the necessity to order the detention of the petitioner. The seriously doubtful L
position about the elementary and basic fact regarding the ownership of the
baggages and the admitted inconclusive stage of the investigation in this regard
could not legitimately help the authorities to pass any order of detention
against the petitioner on the perfunctory and inchoate materials relied upon.
H [499-B-C; 498-H; 499-A]

t~
CHOWDARAPU RAGHUNANDAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [SHAH, J.) 489
V.C. Mohanv. Union ofIndia and Ors., JT (2002) 2 SC 365 andAnorney · A
Genera/for India and Ors. v. Amratlal Prajivandas and Ors., [1994) S SCC 54,
referred to.

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Crl.) No.
2I8 of 2001.
B
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).

V. Balaji and A.T.M. Sampath for the petitioner.

Mukul Rohtagi, Additional Solicitor General, S. Balakrishnan, Ashok
Bhan, B. Krishna Prasad and Revathy Raghvan for the Respondents. C
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by

SHAH, J. Petitioner has challenged the detention order dated 28th
May, 2001 passed under Section 3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter D
referred to as "COFEPOSA") with a view to prevent him from smuggling
goods in future. The allegations against the petitioner in the grounds of
detention are th_at he was holding an Indian Passport dated 26th October,
1994 and he arrived from Singapore on 30th March 200 I at Chennai
Airport. After completing migration formalities, he collected his baggages E
and was proceeding to exit gate where he was intercepted by Customs
Intelligence Officer on suspicion that he might be carrying any dutiable
goods. From his possession. Panasonic GD 92 Cellphones with accessories
100 Nos., Nokia 3310 Cellphones with accessories 50 Nos. Siemens C35
Cellphones with accessories 50 Nos. Nokia cellphone adapter 100 Nos.
Nokia 5110 cellphone batteries I 00 No. were recovered. According to the F
grounds of detention, the value of the seized goods was Rs. 13,90,000.
His Boarding Pass and Customs Declaration Card were also seized. It is
alleged that in his voluntary statement he admitted that he had visited
Singapore twice earlier as a tourist he had gone to Singapore on 29th
March, 2001 and that his friend helped him in procuring cellphones to G
market them in India for monetary consideration.

Petitioner was arrested on 31st March 200 I and his bail application
was rejected by the trial court. Thereafter, he sent a representation dated
24th April, 200 I to the Commissioner of Customs, Chennai through the
Superintendent, Central Prison, Chennai, stating that the seized goods did H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

. A· not belong to him. Thereafter, on 28th May, 2001, the impugned detention
order was passed.

At the time of hearing of the matter, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that there was total non-application of mind by the detaining
authority before passing the impugned order, relevant record was not
B placed before the detaining authority and that there was delay in considering
the representations. For the first ground, it has been contended that the
petitioner was not involved in any smuggling activities and for the time
being presumjtig that goods seized were of the petitioner it would hardly
be a ground for detaining him under the COFEPOSA. The detaining authority
C has not considered the fact that it was the contention of the petitioner all
throughout that he had not brought the said cellphones. For that purpose,
he submitted that the boarding card was his but the baggages having no
'tags were not belonging to him. In any set of circumstances for the alleged
incident, criminal prosecution was pending against him and his bail applications
were rejected, therefore, there was no necessity of detaining the petitioner.
D
As against this, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that
even though it is a solitary incident, goods worth Rs. 13 lakhs and above
were found from the possession of the petitioner and that it has been
admitted by him that previously also he had gone twice to Singapore,
E therefore, subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be said
to be, in any way, arbitrary.

Before deciding the contention raised by the petitioner, it is to be
reiterated that the Preventive Detention is not a punitive Act and it is not
F alternative to criminal trial under the law. It does not empower the authority
to punish a person without trial. Its purpose is to prevent a person from
indulging in activities,. such as smuggling and or such other anti social
activities as provided under the Preventive Detention Law.

In Mohd. Subrati alias Mohd. Karim v. State of West Bengal, [1973]
G 3 sec 250, 256 this Court observed thus :-

"It must be remembered that the personal liberty of an individual
has been given an honoured place in the fundamental rights which
our Constitution has jealously protected against illegal and arbitrary·
deprivation, and that this Court has been entrusted with a duty and
H invested with a power to enforce that fundamental right."
CHOWDARAPU RAGHUNANDAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [SHAH, J.] 491

Dealing with solitary act in a preventive detention matter, Krishna Iyer A
J. in Ani/ Dey v: State of West Bengal, (1974] 4 SCC 514 observed as under:-

"A swalfow cannot make a summer ordinarily, and a solitary
fugitive act of criminality may not normally form the foundation for
subjective satisfaction about the futuristic judgment that the delinquent
was likely to repeat his offence and thereby prejudicially affect the B
maintenance of supplies and services essential to community".

The Court finally dismissed the matter after considering grounds of detention
but observed thus :-

"But to jail a man on subjective satisfaction of possible prejudicial C
activity and to forget about him after the statutory formalities have
been performed is not fair to the constitutional guarantees. It is
appropriate for a democratic government not merely to confine
preventive detention to serious cases but also to review periodically
the need for the continuance of incarceration."
D
It appears that the aforesaid aspect to review periodically the need for
the continuance of incarceration is forgotten.

Similarly, in Debu Mahato v. State of West Bengal, [1974] 4 SCC 135
at page 138 this Court observed as under :-
E
"We fail to see how one solitary isolated act of wagon breaking
committed by the petitioner could possibly persuade any reasonable
person to reach the satisfaction that unless the petitioner was detained
he would in all probability indulge in further acts of wagon breaking.
No criminal propensities for wagon breaking could reasonably be
inferred from a single solitary act of wagon breaking committed by F
the petitioner in the circumstances of the present case. We must of
course make it clear that it is not our view that in no case can a single
solitary act attributed to a person form the basis for reaching a
satisfaction that he might repeat such acts in future and in order to
prevent him from doing so, it is necessary to detain him. The nature G
of the act and the attendant circumstances may in a given case be
such as to reasonably justifY an inference that the person concerned,
if not detained, would be likely to indulge in commission ofsuch acts
in fature. The order of detention is essentially a precautionary measure
and it is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of
a person based on his past conduct judged in the light of the H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A surrounding circumstances. Such past conduct may consist of one
single act or of a series of acts. But whatever it be, it must be of such
a nature that an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that person
concerned would be likely to repeat such acts io as to warrant his
detention. It may be easier to draw such an inference where there is
a series of acts evincing a course of conduct but even if there is a
B single act, such an inference may justifiably be drawn in a given case.
Here, however, that is not possible. We do not think that one single
act of wagon breaking attributed to the petitioner was of such a
character that any reasonable man could be satisfied, merely on the
basis of the commission of such a solitary isolated act, that the
c petitioner would be likely to indulge in further acts of ~agon breaking
in future and in order to prevent him from doing so, he must be
detained."

The aforesaid judgment was considered by the Constitution Bench in
Attorney Genera/for India and Ors. v. Amratlal Prajivandas and Ors., (1994)
D s sec 54 and it was held thus :-
"Though ordinarily one act may not be held sufficient to sustain
an order of detention, one act may sustain an order of detention if the
act is of such a nature as to indicate that it is an organised act or a
manifestation of organised activity. The gravity and nature of the act
E is also relevant. The test is whether the act is such that it gives rise
to an inference that the person would continue to indulge in similar
prejudicial activity."

The Court further observed (in para 53) ·thus :-

F "In matters touching liberty, greater care is called for on the part
of the authorities exercising powers of detention."

Recently, this Court in V.C. Mohan v. Union of India and Ors., JT
(2002) 2 SC 365 held as under :-

"The accepted methodology of governmental working should
G
always be in tune with the concept of fairness and not de hors the
same - a person is being placed under detention without trial and
there is neither any scope for overzealous nor acting in a manner
without due and proper application ofmind - in either of the situation
law Courts should be able to protect the individual from the
H administrative ipse dixit. The draconian concept of law has had its
CHOWDARAPU RAGHUNANDAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [SHAH, J.] 493

departure quite some time back and rule of law is the order of the A
~
day. It is this rule of law which should prompt the law Courts to act
in a manner fair and reasonable having due regard to the nature of the
offences and vis-a-vis the liberty of the citizens."

The Court further observed thus :-
B
"Preventive detention admittedly is an 'invasion of personal liberty'
and it is a duty cast on the law Courts to satisfy itself in regard to the
circumstances under which such a preventive detention has been
.. ordered-in the event, however, the same does not conform to the
requirements of the concept of justice as is available in the justice
,'> delivery system of the country, the law Courts would not shirk of its c
responsibility to provide relief to the person concerned. The guardian-
angel of the Constitution stands poised with a 'responsibility to
zealously act as a watchdog so that injustice does not occur : Let us
not be understood to mean however that there ought to be any over
zealousness since the same may lend assistance to a situation which
D
is otherwise not compatible with social good and benefit."

In the present case, it has been pointed out that the petitioner specifically
made representatiQn o~ 24.4.2001 to the Commissioner of Customs that the
baggages without tags were not belonging to him. Same thing was contended
in the bail applications which were rejected. It was submitted that other E
passenger travelling with the petitioner who arrived in the same flight and
whose baggages were mixed up with that of the petitioner, was served with
the summons by the authorities but thereafter nothing is known about him.
In representation to the Commissioner, it was pointed out that he was Managing
Director of Padmaja Infotech limited, a public limited company, having office
at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh and that he had gone to Singapore regarding F
his company's business. He only purchased some toys and clothes for his
children. As he was not having any dutiable item, he decided to go by green
channel. To the officer who checked him, he informed that baggages were
not belonging to him but the officer told him that he was pushing the trolley
and, therefore, he without listening him opened the baggages without tags. It
G
was also pointed out that the officer arrested him for no fault and locked him
with unclaimed baggages without tags under some mistake. Hence, it is
>
"" submitted that the State Government without applying its mind to the aforesaid
facts and alleged solitary incident erroneously arrived at the conclusion that
there was likelihood of petitioner indulging in such prejudicial activities again
while on bail, even though the bail application of the petitioner was rejected. H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A It is true that in appropriate case, an inference could legitimately be
drawn even from a single incident of smuggling that the person may indulge
in smuggling activity but for that purpose antecedents and nature of the
activities carried out by a person are required to be taken into consideration
for reaching justifiable satisfaction that the person was engaged in smuggling
and that with a view to prevent, it was necessary to detain him. It is also
B settled law that an order of preventive detention is founded on a reasonable
prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct
judged in the light of the" surrounding circumstances. Such past conduct may
consist of one single act or of a series of acts. It must be of such a nature that ;-
I
an inference can reasonably be drawn from it that the person concerned
C would be likely to repeat such acts so as to warrant his· detention. If there is
non-application of mind by the authority on this aspect, then the Court is
required and is bound to protect the citizen's personal liberty which is
guaranteed under the Constitution. Subjective satisfaction of the authority
under the law is not absolute and should not be unreasonable. The question,
therefore, would be from the past conduct of the petitioner as set out in the
D grounds of detention or other circumstances, whether reasonable inference
could be drawn that he is likely to repeat such acts in the future. In the
present case, past conduct of petitioner is that he is Engineering graduate and
at the relevant time he was managing director of a public limited company.
There is no other allegation that he was involved in any other anti-social
E activities. Only allegation is that he visited Singapore twice as a 'tourist'.
Admittedly, the petitioner has filed bail application in a criminal prosecution
for the alleged offence narrating the fact that his so-called statement was not
voluntary and was recorded under coercion. The baggages were not belonging
to him and there were no tags on the same so as to connect him with the said
baggages and the crime. At the time of hearing of this matter also, it is
F admitted that the baggages were without any tags. It is also an admitted fact
that there is nothing on record to hold that the petitioner was involved in any
smuggling activity. However, the learned Additional Solicitor General
submitted that in th'e statement recorded by the Customs Department petitioner
had admitted that previously he had visited Singapore twice as a 'tourist',
G and, therefore, it can be inferred that the petitioner might have indulged and
was likely to indulge in such activities. This submission is far fetched and
without any foundation. From the fact that a person had visited Singapore
twice earlier as a 'tourist', inference cannot be drawn that he was involved
in smuggling activities or is likely to indulge in such activities in future.
-
Hence, from the facts stated above it is totally unreasonable to arrive at a
H prognosis that the petitioner is likely to indulge in any such prejudical activities.
CHOWDARAPU RAGHUNANDAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [RAJU, J.] 495
In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned detention order A .
'-'---1 is quashed and set aside. The petitioner be released forthwith if not required
in any other case.

RAJU, J. I am in respectful agreement with the judgment of my
esteemed and learned brother that the impugned order of detention in this B
case need be quashed and the Writ Petition be allowed by releasing the
detenu. But, I would like to confine the ground for the same on the question
of non-application of mind to all the relevant facts then make any observations
on the general principles of law, which, in my view, are well and firmly
settled.
c
The petitioner has been ordered to be detained by the orders of the
Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O. No. SR.I/531-7/2001 Public (SC) Dept.
dated 28.5.200 I in exercise of the powers under Section 3( I )(i) of the
, Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities
Act, 1974 [hereinafter referred to as "The Act"] and kept in custody in the
Central Prison, Chennai. From the grounds on which the said order came to D
be made, it could be seen that the incident said to have occurred on 30.3.2001
when the petitioner arrived from Singapore by IC 556 at Chennai Anna
International Airport was the main basis. The allegation against the petitioner
is that though he brought in his baggage (a) Panasonic GD92 Cell phones
with accessories 100 Nos; (b) Nokia 3310 Cell phone with accessories 50 E
Nos; (c) Siemens C35 Cell phones with accessories 50 Nos; (d) Nokia Cell
phone adapter 100 Nos; (e) Nokia 5110 Cell phone batteries 100 Nos without
having any valid document for their lawful import, not only he grossly mis-
declared the value of the goods in his possession, but after completing
_..!.
immigration formalities and collection of his baggage and moving towards
the Exit Gate when intercepted by Customs Intelligence Officer and asked, F
the petitioner gave a negative reply as if he is not in possession of any
dutiable goods in trade quantity. After opening the baggage, the above-referred
goods were said to have been found in his baggage and seized after following
the required procedure. Beside the same, he was also arrested on 31.3.200 I
and lodged in prison after following the procedure therefor. On the above G
materials, the petitioner was considered to have committed violations justifying
action under Section 111 (d) (i) (1), & (m) of the Customs Act, 1962 read
with Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 in addition to
rendering himself to be proceeded against for committing an offence punishable
under Sections 132 and 135 of the Customs Act. The Clf value of the goods
seized was said to be Rs. 13,90,000 and the market value of the same was H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A Rs. 20,85,000 on the date of the seizure.

It is on the above materials, in addition to the adjudication proceedings
and prosecution to be pursued further against the petitioner, the Detaining
Authority was said to have been satisfied that it was necessary to detain the
B petitioner under the Act with a view to prevent the petitioner from indulging
in smuggling goods in future. On that view of the matter, the impugned
detention order came to be passed and the same is challenged by means of
the above Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, for the
alleged violation of his fundamental rights.

C Heard Shri A. T.M. Sampath, learned counsel for the petitioner, and
Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned Additional Solicitor General for respondents
No. 2 & 3 and Shri S. Balakrishnan, Senior Advocate for the State of Tamil
"
Nadu. The extreme stand taken for the petitioner as a ground based on law
'

that a solitary incident, even if it be true, though the involvement of the
petitioner in the occurrence is seriously questioned, cannot be the basis for
D invoking the powers of detention necessarily obligated the learned Additional
Solicitor General also to take a contra stand to the other extreme. Though,
several decided cases have been brought to our notice, including the latest
decision since reported in VC Mohan v. Union of India and Ors., JT (2002)
2 SC 365, I consider it unnecessary to deal with every one of them.
E
The decision rendered in Attorney General for India and Ors. v. Amratlal
Prajivandas and Ors. by a Constitution Bench of9 Judges reported in [1994)
5 sec 54, has laid down the law on the said aspect succinctly and conclusively
in the following terms:

F "48. Now, it is beyond dispute that an order of detention can be based
upon one single ground. Several decisions of this Court have held
that even one prejudicial act can be treated as sufficient for forming
the requisite satisfaction for detaining the person. In Debu Mahato v.
State of WB. It was observed that while ordinarily speaking one act
may not be sufficient to form the requisite satisfaction, there is no
G
such invariable rule and that in a given case one act may suffice. That
was a case of wagon-breaking and having regard to the nature of the
Act, it was held that one act is sufficient. The same principle was
reiterated in Anil Dey v. State of W.B. It was a case of theft ofrailway ·
signal material. Here too one act was held to be sufficient. Similarly,
in lsrai/ SK v. District Magistrate of West Dinajpur and Dharua
CHOWDARAPU RAGHUNANDAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [RAJU, J.] 497
Kanu v. State of W.B. single act of theft of telegraph copper wires in A
· huge quantity and removal of railway fish-plates respectively was
held sufficient to sustain the order of detention. In Saraswathi Seshagiri
v. State ofKera/a, a case arising under COFEPOSA, a single act, viz.,
attempt to export a huge amount of Indian currency was held sufficient.
In short, the principle appears to be this: Thougb ordinarily one act B
may not be held sufficient to sustain an order of detention, one act
may sustain an order of detention if the act is of such a nature as to
indicate that it is an organized act or a manifestation of organized
activity. The gravity and nature of the act is also relevant. The test
is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the
person would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. That C
is the reason why single acts of wagon-breaking, theft of signal
material, theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal
of railway fish-plates were held sufficient. Similarly, where the person

- tried to export huge amount of Indian currency to a foreign country
in a planned and premeditated manner, it was held that such single
D
act warrants an inference that he will repeat his activity in future and,
therefore, his detention is necessary to prevent him from indulging in
such prejudicial activity. If one looks at the acts the COFEPOSA is
designed to prevent, they are all either acts of smuggling or of foreign
exchange manipulation. These acts are indulged in by persons, who
act in concert with other persons and quite often such activity has E
international ramifications. These acts are preceded by a good amount
of planning and organization. They are not like ordinary law and
order crimes. If, however, in any given case a single act is found to
be not sufficient to sustain the order of detention that may well be
quashed but it cannot be stated as a principle that one single act
cannot constitute the basis for detention. On the contrary, it does. In F
other words, it is not necessary that there should be multiplicity of
grounds for making or sustaining an order of detention."

Jn the above context, what is required to be seen is as to whether on
the materials placed on record, it could reasonably be said to indicate any G
organized act or manifestation of organized activity or give room for. an
inference that the petitioner would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial
activity warranting or necessitating the detention of the person to ensure that
he does not repeat his activity in future. So far as the facts on record in this
case are concerned, it is seen that a stand has been taken for the petitioner,
at any rate, from the time of filing the bail application on 18.4.2001, that the H
1
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

- A baggage iri question did not belong to him, that the earlier statement obtained '
was under threat, coercion and undue influence and that those baggage did
not contain any tag also to connect the same with him. That apart the specific
stand taken for the petitioner is also that the baggage containing the goods
in question were in the name of one Babu with his ticket number and address
B and no action could be taken against him before recording a finding properly
and deciding on the basis of any concrete material the ownership of the
disputed baggage. All the more so when the Department itself has been after
the said person also and the matter has not reached to any final conclusion.
As for the grievance that these relevant materials have not been adverted to
or considered by the Detaining Authority before ordering the detention of the
C petitioner, in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the l~t respondent
Detaining Authority, it is admitted that investigation is still pending to ascertain
the involvement and role of the other person but that may not have any
significance or relevance in the teeth of the admission contained in the
confessional statement of the petitioner and that at any rate the Detaining
Authority was very much aware of those facts when the order of detention
D came to be passed.

Though, no doubt Courts exercising powers of judicial review do not
consider the challenge to an order of detention, as if on an appeal re-
appreciating the materials, yet since an order of detention in prison involves
E the fundamental rights of citizen, freedom of movement and pursuit of normal
life and liberty, no absolute immunity can be claimed by the respondents as
to the decision arrived and it is open to the Courts to see whethe.r there has
been due and proper application of mind and that all the relevant and vital
materials for the purpose have been noticed, adverted to and considered. So
far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the plea on behalf of the
F petitioner is not that someone else also is concerned with the offending act
but that he has nothing to do with it and that the baggage containing the
contraband really belonged to such other person. Such plea cannot be also
brushed aside in this case as one merely invented in the air but seem to have
necessary basis from the fact that baggage ticket Nos. 0021777 and 0021771
G were registered in the name of one Babu and that concedingly action and
investigation in this regard is still pending and has not conCluded so far. If
the baggage really belonged to another person as was stated to have been
registered, it necessarily follows that the petitioner cannot be the owner of
the very same baggage. The seriously doubtful position about the elementary -~
and basic fact regarding the ownership of the baggage and the admitted
H inconclusive stage of the investigation in this regard could not legitimately
CHOWDARAPU RAGHUNANDAN v. STATE OFTAMILNADU [RAJU, J.] 499
. help the authorities to pass any order of detention against the petitioner on A
the perfunctory and inchoate materials relied upon. Apart from the absence
of any positive or concrete materials to connect the baggage in question with
the petitioner, the nature of stand disclosed in the counter affidavit filed on
behalf of the 1st respondent on this aspect does not really help the Authority
to prove that the said material and such vitally relevant aspect was either
adverted to or really considered before passing the order of detention. B
Consequently, the impugned order suffers the vice of total non-application of
mind to a relevant and vital material touching question of the culpability as
well as the necessity to order the detention of the petitioner. The impugned
order of detention, therefore, has been rightly quashed and the writ petitioner
ordered to be released from detention in prison. C
K.K.T. Petition allowed.

'