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Supreme Court of India

CHUNNI LALversusSTATE OF U.P.

Citation
2010 INSC 346
Decided
5 July 2010
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution proved a motive, the eyewitness testimony of interested witnesses was reliable, the delay in FIR filing was justified, and therefore the conviction under Section 302 IPC stands.

Summary

Chunni Lal was convicted of murdering his uncle Heera Lal by firing a gun, and the Supreme Court upheld the life sentence. The appellant argued there was no motive, that only interested witnesses were examined, and that the delay in lodging the FIR and commencing investigation tainted the case. The Court found a clear motive, as the uncle's recent marriage to the mother of his illegitimate sons extinguished the appellant's hope of inheriting the property. The testimony of the deceased's sons, who were eyewitnesses, was deemed reliable and not discredited despite being interested witnesses. The Court also accepted the explanation for the FIR and investigation delay, noting it arose from factual circumstances in a dacoit‑infested area. Consequently, the conviction under Section 302 IPC was affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

  • The existence of a motive for the appellant to murder his uncle
  • The admissibility and reliability of testimony from interested witnesses (the deceased's sons)
  • The effect of the delay in lodging the FIR and commencing investigation on the prosecution case
  • Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC is sustainable in view of the alleged procedural deficiencies

Legislation cited

Subjects

murdermotiveeyewitness testimonyinterested witnessesdelay in FIRSection 302 IPClife imprisonmentcriminal law

Judgment

                          [2010] 7 S.C.R. 410


A                             CHUNNI LAL
                                  v.
                             STATE OF U.P.
                  (Criminal Appeal No. 669 of 2.006)

                              JULY 5, 2010
B
      [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.]

         Penal Code, 1860:

c         s.302 - Accused firing at his uncle causing his death -
     Conviction by trial court - Affirmed by High Court - Pleas of
     absence of motive for the crime, evidence of interested
     witnesses only and delay in filing FIR and starting
     investigation - HELD: Are not tenable - Motive for the crime
,0   has been established because of the development of the
     events which entirely defeated the chances of the accused to
     inherit the property of his deceased uncle - The eye-
     witnesses being the sons of the deceased, their presence at
     the place of occurrence at the relevant time was usual and
E    expected - They have given a vivid account of the incident
     and the manner in which it occurred - Their evidence rould
     not be shaken by defence in cross-examination - The ocular
     evidence fully corroborates the medical evidence - The delay
     causecf due to reasonable factual situation cannot destroy
     prosecution case nor would it create any suspicion on
F    prosecution case - In the instant case, the entire area being
     dacoits infested area, the police station being far away from
     the place of occurrence, the Investigating Officer having been
     required to attend the court at the relevant time, the court being
     at a distance from the police station, there is well reasoned
G    and proper explanation for the delay both in lodging the FIR
     and starting the investigation - Accused has been rightly
     convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life u/s 302 -
     Criminal law - Motive - Evidence - Testimony of related
     witnesses - Delay in lodging FIR and starting investigation.
H                                   410
           CHUNN! LAL v. STATE OF U.P.                    411


     The appellant-accused was prosecuted for                    A
committing the murder of his uncle by gun shots. The trial
court convicted and sentenced him to imprisonment for
life u/s 302 IPC. The High Court affirmed the conviction
and the sentence.
                                                                 8
     In the instant appeal filed by the accused, it was, inter
alia, contended for the appellant that there was no mQtive
for him to commit the crime; that the prosecution, in order
to prove its case, examined only the interested witnesses
who were closely related to the deceased and the                 C
independent witness, namely, PW-5, having turned
hostile, conviction could not be recorded; and that there
was ,delay in lodging the FIR and initiating the
investigation.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                             D

     HELD: 1. As regards the motive for the crime, in the
instant case, it is established from the records that PWs
1 and 2 were born out of the relationship between the
deceased and their mother who earlier was kept as a              E
mistress or concubine by the deceased for about 25-26
years. It is also established from the evidence adduced
that about three months prior to the incident the
deceased performed marriage with the said lady and a
document was executed in that regard on 15.2.1978
                                                                 F
before the Marriage Officer. It is to be noted that the
incident took place only a few months thereafter, that is,
on 7 .5.1978. In the circumstances, there was no
possibility at all Qf the appellant inheriting the property
of his t.lncle and, therefore, the plea taken by him that he
being the nephell'.'. and as such, the natural heir of the       G
deceased, there was no motive for him to commit the
crime, is without any merit. [Para 8-9] [417-A-D; 417-F-G]

   Raghubir Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab (1996) 3
SCR 389 = (1996) 9 SCC 233, relied on.                           H
    412      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A      2.1. It is no doubt true that PWs 1 and 2 are the sons
  of the deceased and they are brothers. They have been
  examined in the trial as eye-witnesses to the occurrence.
  Their evidence also indicates that besides them there
  was another independent witness, namely, the Pradhan
B who was also present at the place of occurrence when
  the incident occurred. It has also come in evidence that
  the said Pradhan died during the trial and before his '
  evidence could be recorded. PWs 1 and 2 were cross-
  examined at length by the defence but not even a single
c question was put in their cross-examination that they
  were not present at the place of occurrence. They are
  natural witnesses as their presence at the place of
  occurrence at the relevant time was usual and expected.
  [para 12) [418-H; 419-A-B]
D      2.2. Both PWs 1 and 2 have given a vivid account of
  the incident and the manner in which the incident had
  occurred. It is proved from the records that when their
  father was doing the cleaning work of the mustard at
  about 8.00 p.m. on the fateful day, the accused came
E there and immediately picked up the DBBL gun
  belonging to the deceased, loaded both the barrels with
  cartridges and fired twice at their father as a
  consequence of which, he died. Two bullets were fired
  which resulted in two injuries which are established from
F the medical evidence available on record. The ocular
  evidence, therefore, fully corroborates the medical
  evidence. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that
  the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 should be discarded as they
  are interested witnesses, particularly, when their evidence
G adduced could not be shaken by the defence in the
  cross-examination. [para 13 and 16) [419-C-D; 420-C-D]

        Jayabalan    vs.   U. T.  of Pondicherry (2009)
    15 SCR 736= (2010) 1 sec 199 - relied on.

H         3.1. Although the incident had happened at 8.00 p.m.
           CHUNNI LAL v. STATE OF U.P.                 413


on 7.5.1978, PWs 1 and 2 clearly stated that they did not     A
dare to go out of the place of occurrence due to fear. It
has also come in evidence that the entire area was dacoits
infested area and police station was also about 8 km.
away from the place of occurrence and, therefore, it was
quite possible that PWs 1 and 2 who were the eye-             B
witnesses and the sons of the deceased thought it fit to
travel out of the place of occurrence at about 4.00 a.m.
in the morning to lodge the FIR which was accordingly
lodged at the police station at 6.30 a.m. [para 17] [420-H;
~1-~                                                          c
     3.2. Although it was stated in the evidence that the
investigating officer, namely, the Sub-Inspector, was
present at the police station in the morning hours when
the prosecution witnesses reached the police station but
it has also come in evidence that he was required to go D
to court which was functioning from 6 a.m. in the
morning. Therefore, the constable took the statement of·
the informant and carried the records to the court to
apprise the Investigating Officer of the case. The
Investigating Officer clearly stated in his deposition that E
he came back from the court at about 1 '0 clock. The
court was located at quite a distance from the police
station and after going back to the police station and
doing the needful he went to the village in the evening
for carrying out the investigation. It is, therefore, F
established that there is well reasoned e:.nd proper
explanation for the delay both in lodging the t=IR as also
in starting the investigation. [para 18] [421-D-G]

   Silak Ram & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka 2007 (8)           G
SCR 849 = 2007 (10) sec 464, relied on.

     3.3. The delay which was caused due to reasonable
factual situation cannot destroy the prosecution case nor
create any suspicion with regard to the prosecution case.
It also. cannot be said under any circumstance and            H
    414      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010) 7 S.C.R.


A particularly because of the explanation available on
  record that the FIR is ante-timed. [para 18] [422-D]

       4. There is another very vital and important factor in
  the instant case, which is the fact of the accused
  absconding immediately after the occurrence. The fact
8
  that the accused ran away from the place of occurrence
  and was not traceable thereafter in the village and the fact
  that he surrendered only on 20.5.1978 although the
  incident had occurred on 7.5.1978 also clearly indicate
  that the appellant-accused was guilty of the offence
C alleged against him. He has been rightly convicted and
  sentenced to imprisonment for life u/s 302 IPC. [para 20-
  21] [423-A-B; 422-E; G-H]

                         Case Law Reference:
D
          (1996) 3 SCR 389        relied on             para 10
          (2009) 15 SCR 736       relied on             para 16
          2007 (8) SCR 849        relied on             para 18

E       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 669 of 2006.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 10.2.2006 of the High
  Court of .Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 3151
F of 1981.
         Siddhartha Dave, Vibha Datta Makhija, Jentiben AO for
    the Appellant.

      Ratnakar Dash, T.N. Singh, Rajeev K. Dubey, Kamlendra
G Mishra for the Respondent.

          The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA 1. The present appellant
  has preferred this appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and
H order dated 10.02.2006 passed by the Allahabad High Court
            CHUNN! LAL v. STATE OF U.P.                       415
          [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
upholding the order of conviction and sentence passed by the          A
Second Additional Sessions Judge, Banda against the
appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code [for short
'IPC'] and sentencing him to life imprisonment.

    2. The aforesaid Sessions Trial case was registered for           B
an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC for allegedly
committing murder by the present appellant Chunni Lal of his
uncle Heera Lal at about 8.00 p.m. on 07.05.1978 in village
Baramafi, Police Station Pahari, District Banda.

     3. The First Information Report [for short 'FIR'] was lodged     C
by Juggi Lal [PW-1] who is allegedly an eyewitness to the
occurrence· and the same was lodged at 08.05.1978 at 6.30
a.m. The deceased Heera Lal was the uncle of the accused
Chunni Lal inasmuch as both Ramdeo and Heera Lal were sons
of Ram Ratan. Heera Lal was unmarried but was keeping one             D
Kainya alias Chandrakaliya as his mistress or concubine for
the last about 25-26 years preceding the incident. She was
earlier married to one Jagannath Kalar but sometime prior to
the incident Heera Lal performed marriage with her and a
document in that regard was executed on 15.02.1978 before             E
the Marriage Officer. In view of the aforesaid position the
appellant Chunni Lal who was hoping to succeed to the estate
of the deceased Heera Lal thought that his hopes of succeeding
to this estate would be lost and, therefore, it is alleged that the
accused had committed the aforesaid offence by going to the           F
agricultural field of deceased Heera Lal when deceased was
processing the harvest of mustard crop in his field. It is alleged
that after going there the accused fired two rounds of bullets
from the DBBL gun of the deceased in the presence of Juggi
Lal [PW-1] and Ram Sakh [PW-2]. The incident happened at              G
8.00 p.m. on 07.05.1978 and the FIR was lodged on
08.05.1978 at 6.30 a.rn. The investigating officer who is the
Sub-Inspector of the Police Station went to the village at 7.15
p.m. for investigation. During the course of investigation he took
a DBBL gun and other material exhibits into his custody and
                                                                      H
    416     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010) 7 S.C.R.


A recorded the statements of the witnesses and thereafter
  submitted a chargesheet against the appellant herein.

        4 . During the trial seven witnesses were examined on
  behalf of the prosecution whereas none was examined on
B behalf of the defence. The appellant was also examined under
  Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thereafter
  the Second Additional Sessions Jud~e. Banda, who was the
  trial Judge, passed a judgment and order of conviction against
  the appellant finding him guilty of committing an offence under
  Section 302 IPC. By a separate order dated 21.12.1981 the
C learned trial Court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment.

        5. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order the
  appellant filed an appeal before the Allahabad High Court which
  was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division
D Bench of the High Court by its judgment and order dated
  10.02..2006 upheld the order of conviction and sentence and
  dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. Appellant therefore
  filed the present appeal on which we have heard the learned
  counsel appearing for the parties.                     •
E
        6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant took
  up several pleas during the course of his arguments in support
  of his stand that the appellant is innocent. We propose to deal
  with each of the submissions made by the counsel appearing
F for the appellant.

        7. The first submission which was made by the counsel
  appearing for the appellant was with regard to the motive for
  the crime alleged against the appellant. The appellant
  contended through his counsel that there was absolutely no
G moti\,e for the appellant to commit the crime as he was a natural
  heir being the nephew of the deceased as both PWs 1 & 2 are
  illegitimate sons of the deceased and therefore there was a
  motive for the PWs 1 & 2 to implicate the accused in the
  offence.
H
              CHUNNI LAL v. STATE OF U.P.                       417
            [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
       8. In the instant case it is established from the records that   A
  PWs 1 & 2 were born out of the relationship between the
  deceased and their mother Chandrakaliya who earlier was kept
  as a mistress or concubine by the deceased Heera Lal for
  about 25-26 years. PW-1 at the time of deposition was 20 years
  of age whereas PW-2 was aged about 25 years. It is                    B
  established from the aforesaid fact that both of them were born
  out of the relationship between the deceased Heera Lal and
. Chandrakaliya as their relationship started about 25-26 years
  preceding the incident. It is also established from the evidence
  adduced that about three months prior to the .incident Heera          c
  Lal performed marriage with the said lady and a document was
  executed in that regard on 15.02.1978 before the Marriage
  Officer. It is to be noted tt;iat incident took place occurred only
  a few months thereafter that is on 07 .05.1978. On having found
  that his chance of inheriting the estate of the deceased was
                                                                        0
  practically lost due to the aforesaid marriage, the accused
  might have thought of taking revenge on his uncle for depriving
  him of his right to inherit his estate and therefore immediately
  went to the place of occurrence on the night of 07.05.1978
  picked up the DBBL gun, loaded the same and fired upon the            E
  deceased twice.

      9. This, in our estimation is the reason and motive for the
 crime and not the one which was advanced by the counsel
 appearing for the appellant, for by the time the incident had
 taken place, the deceased had legalized his relationship and           F
 married said Chandrakaliya thereby giving legal status to PWs
 1 & 2 as his sons. In that situation there was no possibility at
 all_of the appellant inheriting the property of his uncle and
 therefore the plea taken by the appellant regarding motive
 appears to be without any merit. Rather on the other hand, we          G
 find a clear motive on the part of the appellant- accused for
 committing the murder of his uncle.

     10. In this regard we wish to refer to the deCision of this
 Court in the case of Raghubir Singh & Others v. State of H
 Punjab reported in [1996] 9 SCC 233 which is as follows: -
     418       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2010) 7 S.C.R.

 A         "7 ........................ The motives may be minor but
           nonetheless they did provide an occasion for attack on the
           deceased by the appellants. That apart, even in the
           absence of motive, the guilt of the culprits can be
           established in a given case if the other evidence on the
 B         record is trustworthy and the absence of proof of motive
           has never been considered as fatal to the prosecution case
           where the ocular evidence is found reliable ..................... .
           •

          11. The same is also corroborated by the fact that after
  C the death of the deceased the family of the accused including
    the accused himself took several steps to get the land of the
    deceased transferred and mutated in their names instead of
    PWs 1 & 2 and their brothers. Even in the cross-examination
    of the prosecution witnesses examined in the present criminal
  D case of murder, an effort was being made to dislodge the claim
    of PWs 1 & 2 to inherit the property of the deceased. Both PWs
    1 & 2 have been extensively cross-examined in that regard but
    their evidence in support of their claim of inheritance could not
    be shaken. The submission of the appellant therefore that there
· E was no motive to kill his uncle cannot be accepted in view of
    the aforesaid extensively discussed clear facts and
    circumstance of the case.

         12. The second submission which was advanced by the
 F counsel appearing for the appellant was that the prosecution
   had examined only the interested witnesses who were closely
   related to the deceased. It was contended by the appellant that
   the only independent witness who was examined was PW 5,
   and PWS having turned hostile, the conviction and sentence
 G passed against the appellant is required to be set aside and
   quashed. It is no doubt true that PWs 1 & 2 are the sons of the·
   deceased and they are brothers. They have been examined in
   the trial as the eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The evidence
   adduced by PWs 1 & 2 also indicate that besides them there
   was another witness namely Jagdeo Pradhan who was also
 H
             CHUNN! LAL v. STATE OF U.P.                      419
           [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SkfARMA, J.]
present at the place of occurrep~e when the incident had              A
occurred. It has also come in ~~idence that said Jagdeo
Pradhan who otherwise would have been an independent
witness died during the trial ancfbefore his evidence could be
                                '             .
recorded. Both PWs 1 & 2 were ,cross-exam1hed at length by
the defence but not even a single question was put in such            B
cross-examination that said PWs 1 & 2 were not present at the
place of occurrence. They are natural witnesses as their
presence at the place of oscurrence at the relevant time was
usual and expected.

      13. Both PWs 1 & 21 have given a vivid account of the           C
  incident and the manner in which the incident had occurred. It
  is proved from the records that when there father was doing
  the cleaning work of the mustard at about 8.00 p.m. on the
  fateful day, accused Chunni Lal came there and immediately
. picked up the DBBL gun belonging to the deceased, loaded            D
  both the barrels with cartridge and fired twice at Heera Lal, as
  a consequence of which, Heera Lal died. PW-2 has also given
  a vivid description of the incident including the fact that when
  he chased Chunni Lal and caught his leg after 6-7 feet he even
  managed to snatch the gun from the hand of the accused. It is       E
  also disclosed from evidence recorded that despite falling down
  the accused stood up immediately and ran away with the belt
  of cartridges towards the South. There was another
  independent witness Sri Keshan [PW-5] who was present at
  the time of the occurrence. He, however, turned hostile in the      F
  trial during his examination-in-chief.

      14. Having considered the evidence of PWs 1 & 2 who
 were the eye-witnesses to the occurrence we are satisfied that
 they were present at the place of occurrence in a usual and          G
 natural manner when the incident had taken place and they had
 actually seen the occurrence. The incident had happened at
 8.00 p.m. in the night in the field of the deceased which was
 not only an agricultural field but also a dacoit infested area and
 therefore it is reasonable to assume that even the deceased          H
    420      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A kept a gun with him with a belt of bullets in open for secarity
  reasons. The accused knew that a gun is always kept in the
  field and at the place of work, for he used to visit them at the
  field occasionally and even at night. That was also the reason
  why he did not carry any weapon with him, so as to avoid a
s suspicion in the mind of the deceased.

       15. The accused used the weapon of the deceased
  himself for firing upon him. Two bullets were fired which resulted
  in two injuries which are established from the medical evidence
  available on record. The ocular evidence, therefore, fully
C corroborates the medical evidence. In that view of the matter it
  cannot be said that the evidence of PWs 1 & 2 should be
  discarded as they are interested witnesses particularly when
  their evidence adduced could not be shaken by the defence in
  the Gross-examination.
D
        16. In Jayaba/an Vs. U. T. of Pondicherry reported in 2010
  (1) SCC 199, this Court while dealing with the evidence of the
  interested witnesses held as under:-

          "................. We are of the considered view that in cases
E
          where the Court is called upon to deal with the evidence
          of the interested witnesses, the approach of the Court,
          while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must
          not be pedantic. The Court must be cautious in
          appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the
F         interested witnesses but the Court must not be suspicious
          of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the Court
          must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness
          cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes
          from the. mouth of a person who is closely related to the
G         victim."

       17. Another submission which was made by the counsljll
  appearing for the appellant was that there was a delay in both
  lodging the FIR as also in initiating the investigation by the
H police. It was submitted that although the incident had taken
              CHUNNI LAL v. STATE OF U.P.                         421
            [OR, MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

 place on 07.05.1978 at about 8(00 p.m., the FIR was lodged               A
 on 08.05.1978 at 6.30 a.m. only:whereas the investigation was
 started by the police only in the'evening.

          18. On proper appreciation of the evidence we find that
    although the incident had happened at 8.00 p.m. on 8
    07 .05.1978 PWs 1 & 2 have clearly stated that they did not dare
    to go out of the place of occurrence due to fear. It has also
    come in evidence that the entire area was dacoit infested area
    and police station was also about eight kilometers away from
    the place of occurrence and therefore it was quite possible that
    PWs 1 & 2 who were the eye-witnesses and the sons of the · C
    deceased thought it fit to travel out of the place of occurrence
    at about 4.00 a.m. in the morning to lodge the FIR which was
    accordingly lodged at the police station at 6.30 a".m. Although
. i.t was stated in the evidence that the investigating officer
    namely the Sub-Inspector was present at the 'police station in D
    the morning hours when the informant reached the police station
    but it has also come in evidence that he was required to go to
    the Court which was functioning from 6 a.m'. in the morning .
 .. Therefore the constable took the statement of the informant and
                                             .•.;   :

 · carried the records to the Court to apprise· about the case to E
    the Sub-Inspector, the Investigating Officer. The Investigating
    Officer had clearly stated in his deposition that he came back
    from the Court at about 1'o clock. The Court was located at
    quite a distance from the police station and after going back
    to the police station and after doing the needful he went .to the F
    village in the evening for carrying out his investigation .. It is,
    therefore, established that there is well reasoned and proper
    explanation for the delay both in the lodging of the FIR as aiso
    in starting of the investigation by the Investigating Officer. In this
    regard we would like to refer to a decision of this Court in the G
    case of Silak Ram & Another v. State of Karnataka reported
    in [2007) 10 sec 464 relevant portion of which is as follows: -

      "12 ... ; .............. Delay in lodging FIR by itself would not
      be sufficient to discard the prosecution version unless it          H
    422        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A         is unexplained and such delay coupled with the likelihood
          of concoction of evidence. There is no hard-and-fast rule
          that delay in filing FIR in each and every case is fatal and
          on account of such delay the prosecution version should
          be discarded. The factum of delay requires the court to
B         scrutinise the evidence adduced with greater degree of
          care and caution. In this case the eyewitnesses have given
          a vivid description of the events. The evidence of PW 11
          as noted above, is cogent and consistent and the version
          given by this witness fits with medical evidence.
c         ............... ."
        The aforesaid delay which was caused due to reasonable
  factual situation cannot destroy the prosecution case nor
  creates any suspicion with regard to the prosecution case. It
  also cannot be said under any circumstance and particularly
D because of the aforesaid explanation available on record that
  the FIR is ante-timed as submitted by the counsel appearing
  for the appellant.

          19. There is another very vital and important factor in this
E   case, which is the fact of the accused absconding immediately
    after the occurrence. PWs 1 & 2 stated that immediately after
    the accused opened fire on the deceased through the gun and
    after PW-2 was able to snatch away the rifle from the accused
    the accused got up and ran away from the place of occurrence
F   and thereafter he was not available either at the place of
    occurrence or in the village. It is established from the evidence
    of the Investigating Officer that on 20.05.1978 he received an
    information that the accused surrendered in the Court of Chief
    Judicial Magistrate. The said information received by him was
G   noted in the case diary. The fact that the accused ran away from
    the place of occurrence and was not traceable thereafter in the
    village and the fact that he surrendered only on 20.05.1978
    although the incident had occurred on 07.05.1978 clearly
    indic:ate that the appellant was guilty of the offence alleged
H   against him.
            CHUNN! LAL v. STATE OF U.P.                      423
          [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
     20. All the aforesaid discussions and facts, therefore, lead    A
to one and the only conclusion that the appellant is guilty of the
offence alleged against him.                    -

     21. In our considered opinion, the accused has been rightly
convicted ofthe offence under Section 302 IPC. This appeal,
                                                                     8
therefore, has no merit and is dismissed accordingly.

R.P.                                         Appeal dismissed.


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