Holding

Current profits cannot be included in "accumulated profits" for the purpose of section 2(6A)(e), and the Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to refer the second question, making that reference void.

Summary

The Managing Director of R.K.V. Motors & Timber Ltd withdrew sums which the Income Tax Officer treated as dividend under section 2(6A)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The dispute centered on whether "accumulated profits" for dividend liability includes the company's current year profits and whether tax and dividend provisions can be deducted in computing accumulated profits. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that accumulated profits exclude current profits but rejected the deduction of the provisions, and referred both questions to the Kerala High Court. The High Court affirmed the first view and rejected the second. The Supreme Court held that current profits cannot be part of accumulated profits and that the Tribunal was not competent to refer the second question, rendering that reference void. Consequently, the High Court’s decision on the second question was set aside while the first question was upheld.

Issues considered

Whether "accumulated profits" under section 2(6A)(e) of the Income Tax Act includes current year profits.
Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was competent to refer the question of deducting tax and dividend provisions from accumulated profits to the High Court.

Legislation cited

Income Tax Act, 1922s. 2(6A)(e)
Income Tax Act, 1961s. 147, s. 254, s. 256(1)

Subjects

dividendaccumulated profitscurrent profitsIncome Tax Actsection 2(6A)(e)appellate tribunal jurisdictionreference to High Courttax provisions

Judgment

944

A COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
KERALA, ERNAKULAM ••
v.
V.DAMODARAN,TRIVANDRUM

B
October 15, 1979
[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R, $. PATHAK, JJ.]
.
Indian Jncome ' Tax Act, 1922-Sections 2(6A) (e)-lnterpretation of h
"accumulated profits" if include current profits-Section 256(i)-Scope of.

The assessee was the Managing Director of -a Company ~rigin~lly ass-essed
C on a total income of Rs. 43407/- for the assessment year 1959-60. Thereafter
the Income-Tax Officer came to know that th.e assessee had been withdrawing
moneys from the Company and that those amounts were liable to be treated.
as dividend under section 2(6A)(e) of the Act, hoe re-opened the assessment.
In the assessment proceedings that followed, the assessee claimed that the
accumulated profits of the Company amounted to Rs. 1050 only and that •
amount alone could be considered as dividend und~ section 2 (6A )( e) of the
D Act. The figure was worked out on the basi& that Rs. 11,000 as a provision.
· for tax and Rs. 6,900 as a provision for dividend had to be adjusted against
the balance of Rs. 18,950 in the Profit and Loss Account. The Income Tax
Officer rejected the contention of the assessee. The Appellate Assistant Com-
missioner dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The Income Tax Appel-
late Tribunal in second appeal, upheld th~ claim of the assessee that the words.
"accumulated profits" in section 2(6A)(e) of the Act could not be construed
E as including current profit but it reje<cted the contention that the two suma
of Rs. 11,000 and Rs. 6,900 had to be taken into accouot in determining the
figure of the ''accumulated! profits". It determined the "accumulated profits"
at Rs. 18,950. The Revenue obtained a reference to the High Court on the·
question : ''Whether the Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in holding that ..)...-
the accumulated profit will not iQ.Clude "current profits" for the purpose of
section 2(6A) of the Act."

A second question was referred to the High Court at the instance \if the·
8880Ssee : "Whether the Tribunal was right in holding thot Rs. 18,95() consti-
mted accumulated profits for the purpose of section 2(6A) of the Act." The
High Court answered both the questions in favour of the assessee, the firs~
question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative.

On appeal to this Court,
G
HELD: !. "Current profits" that is to say, profits earned by the Com-
pany during the Year in which the loans were advanced to the assessee cannot
be regarded as included within the "accumulated profits" of a C-Ompany with- «
in the meaning of section 2(6A) (e) of the Act. (947G-948E]
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras v. M. V. Murugappan & Ors. (1970)-
H 77 I.T.R. 818. followed. /
2. The Appellate Tribunal was not competent to refer the second question,
and the 1reference to that Ol<tent must be considered void. .section 256(1) of
C.l.T. v. V, DAMODARAN (Pathak, !.) 945

the Jacome Tax: Act, 1961 entitles the assessee or the Commissioner, as the A
case may ·be, to apply to the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court
any qnestion of law arising out of the order made by the Appellate Tribunal
under section 254. It is clear that the statute expressly contemplates an appli-
cation in that behalf by ai party desiring a reference to the High Court. The
application has to be filed within a prescribed period of limitation. lf t~·- ,,--fe'·
application is reje-,;;ted by the Appellate Tribunal, it is the applicant thus re-
fused who is entitled to apply to the High Court. The form of.: reference
application prescribed by rule 48 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 specifically
reqtiires the app1ic['jnt to state the questions of law which he desires- to be
referred to the High Cour!. Jn every .case, .it .is only the party applying for
a ·reference .\vbo· is entitled to· s,pecify .the questions of la\v \Vhich should be
referred. No~here rlOOs ·the st<:lti.te confer ·a.
right in the flon~a"ppliCali.t ca:
phrase used here for conveniem:e) 't~ ask for a 'refC'ren'ce of questions Of law·
on the application made by the applicant. [950 A, C-D •E, F,G and 952 E] .
The party who is aggrieved and \\'ho desires a refei·ence to the H{gh C6urt
must file a reference application for that purpose: ·Ji is not open to him to.
n1akC a refcr'eli:ce 'iipf,l!citiori ·file'd, by the other party the· ba~i.s of .his clciim that,
a l'juestion ·of· !aW sought by him should be referred. But ~011..:L r~ft;rcni;,e,
application- filed by the .aggrieved party_ it is ,,0pen to th.e no_;i:aJJPlic~a.nt .w~10 is
not aggri.eved" by the' result of the app,eaI, to ask for a r~ference of those
questions of Ja\V which arise on its subn1issions negatived fn ippccll · bY the.
Appellate Tribun-11. [951 A-B, CJ

CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2099 of 1972.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18-1-1972 of the Kerala
High Court in I.T.R. No. 88/1969.
B. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.
Nemo for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, J.-This is an appeal by certificate under section 261 of
the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the judgment of the High Court 1'
of Kcrala interpreting the words "accumulated profits" in section
2(6A)(e) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.
The assessee is the Managing Director of a private limited com-
pany called R. K. V. Motors & Timber (P) Limited. · The company
maintains an account pertaining to him in its books. The accounts G
showed that· as on March 31, 1958 a sum of Rs. 36,546.17 np. was
clue to him by the company. In January, 1959 for the first time
he became indebted to the company in the sum of Rs. 3,757.04 np:
His drawings increased, and as on March 31, 1959 the total amount
due by him stood at Rs. 25,107.22 np. It is also relevant to state
that the Balance Sheet of the company as on March 31, 1958 showed It
a net profit of Rs. 18,950.98 np.
6-743SCJ/79
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l980] l s.c.R.

A The assessee was originally assessed for the assessment year J
1959-60 (the relevant previous year being the year ended March 31, ·
1959) on a total income of Rs. 43,407. Thereafter, the Income Tax
Officer came to know that the asseS&ee had been withdrawing moneys
from the company, and in the belief that those amounts were liable
to be treated as "dividend" under section 2(6A) (e) of the Indian
B Income Tax Act, 1922, he reopened the assessment by virtue of sec-
tion 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. In the assessment proceed-
ings which followed, the assessee claimed that the accumulated pro-
fits of the c001pany amounted to Rs. 1,050 only, and that amount
alone could be considered as "dividend" under section 2(6A)(e).
c asThea figure was worked out on the basis that a sum of Rs. 11,000
provision for tax and of Rs. 6,900 as a provision for dividend
had to be adjusted against the balar,ce of Rs. 18,950 .in the Profit
& Loss Account. The Income Tax Officer reii'cted the contention
of the assessee and determined a sum of Rs. 25,107 as dividend
under section 2(6A) (e). He arrived at this figure by including the
D current profits of the company for the account year ending March
31, 1959. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed an appeal
filed by the assessee. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, in
second appeal, upheld the claim of the assessee that the words
"accumulated profits" in section' 2(6A) (e) could not be construed
as including current profits, but it rejected the contention that the
E two sums of Rs. 11,000 and Rs. 6,900 had to be taken into account
in determining the figure of the accumulated profits. Accordingly,
it determined the accumul.atcd profits at Rs. 18,950.

The Revenue applied for a reference to the High Court of
Kerala, and at its instance the Tribunal referred the following ques-
t<: tion to the High Court :
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of
this case, the Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in
holding that the aceumulated profit will not include current
profits for the purpose of section 2(6A) of the Indian
Income Tax Act, 1922 ?"

The assessee also requested the inclusion of a question, and
therefore the second question referred to the High Court was :

"Whether, on the ;fa(:ts and in the circumstances of
8 the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that Rs. 18,950
constituted accumulated profits for the purpose of section
i( 6A) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 ?"
C.l.T. v. v. DAMODARAN (Pathak, J.) 9-17

The High Court, by its judgment dated January 18, 1972 has A
.answered the first question in the affinnative and the second ques-
tion in the negative, both questions being answered in favour of
the a"c>Sce. And now, the present appeal by the Revem1e.

We have heard Shri B. B. Ahuja, for the Revenue. No one
appear> for the assessee. B

' The Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 did not originally contain
any definition of "dividend", and the meaning of that word was
confined to the connotation it held under the law relating to com-
panies. By section 2 of the Indian Income-Tax (Amendment)
Act, 1939, the Indian Legislature inserted sub-section (6A) in sec- c
tion 2 of the Act and set forth an inclusive definition. Certain
clauses of the sub-section were amended thereafter, and in their
ultimate form section 2(6A) (c) and section 2(6A) (e) read as.
follows :
"6(A) "Dividend" includes - D
( c) Any distribution made to the shareholders by a
company on its liquidation, to the extent to which
the distribution is attributable to the accumulated
profits of the company immediately before its liqui-
d•tion, whether capitalised or not..
E
Ce) Any payment by a company, not being a company
in which the public are substantially interested within
the meaning of section 23A, of any sum
(whether as representing a part of the assets of
the company or otherwise) by way of advance or
Joan to a shareholder or any payment by any such
company on behalf or for the individual benefit of
a shareholder, to the extent to which the company
in either case possesses accumulated profits."
The question is whether the profits earned by the company dur-
ing the year in which the loans were advanced to the assessee, tnat
G
is to say the current profits, can be regarded as included within
the accumulated profits of tne company. It will be noticed that
the expression "accumulated profits" occurs in section 2 ( 6A)( c) of
the Act. Construing that clause in Gird/wrdas & Co. Ud .. v.
Commissioner Qf Income Tax, Ahmedabad,(1) the Bombay High
Court said : "The limitation imposed by the Legislature is that H
the profits must in the first place be accumulated in contradistinc-
(1) [!957] 31 T.T.R. 82, 88.
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] l S.C.R.

It.·. tion to the profits being {;Urrent. .... ". The Madras High Court'
in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. M. V. Murugappan and
Others(') and Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. A. ZH. M. V.
Valliammai Achi & Others(') took the same view. It analysed
. the concept of "accumulated profits" and in that connection parti-
cularly referred to the observations of Isaacs and Rich JJ. in
JI; Hooper & Harrison Limited (In Liquidation) v. Federal Commis-
sioner of Taxation,(') who relied on Hollins v. Allen(') and Sproule v.
Bouch(') and Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Blolt(') where
the distinction between current profits and accumulated profits was
graphically brought out. The decision of the Madras High Court
was affirmed in appeal by this Court in· Co111missioi1er of Income- ·
9 tax, Madras v. M, V. Murugappan & Ors.(') and it was observed.
that "The profits or the year fo. the course of Which the company
was ordered to be wound up not being .accumulated profits were
not pan -Of the dividend." Thereafter, the Bombay High Court in ·
Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Bombay v. P. K. Badiani,(8 )
D while interpreting section 2(6A}(e) of the Act, applied the same
. construction and held that the expression "accumulated. profits;, in
that clause. 111ust mean profits .which had accumulated prior to the
accounting. year of _which the income profits and gains were being
assessed, while current profit would mean the profits of the account-
ing year. In a recent case, Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras-
£ TI v. G. Sankaran,("} the Madras High Court has reaffirmed that
the expression "accumulated profits" in section 2(6A)(e) cannot
take in current profits.
The. position appears to be well-settled. Except for T. Sundaram
Chettiar v. Commissioner of- Income Tax, Madras and T. Manicka-
F vasagam Chett.iar · v. Comnussioner of Income-tax, Madras,(10) in
which the ratio is far from clear, a long line of judicial decisions
has taken the view that the words "accumulated profits" in section
6(2A) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 cannot be construed

(I) J.L.R.[1967] 2 Mad.256.'
(!) [1966] 62 I.T.R. 382.
(3) 33 C.L.R.158, 480.
(4) [1866] 14 W.R. 980. '
(5) [1885] 29 Ch, D. 635.
(6) [1921] 2 A.C. 171.
Ci) [1970]77 I.T.R. 818.
(8) [1970] 76 I.T.R. 369.
(9) [19781111 I.T.R. 220.
(10) [1963]49 l.T.R. 287.'
C.J.T. v. v. DAMODARAN (Pathak, J.) 949

to include current profits. We are in agreement · with that view, A
being persuaded in that behalf by the reasoning which has prevailed
in the aforementioned cases. The distinction between "accumulated
• profits" and "current profits" has long held the field, and as the
learned judges of the High Court of Australia observed in Hooper
& Harrison Ltd. (In Liquidation)(supra), it has been well known
B
in judicial decision and in the mercantile world for well over a
century. Moreover, this Court in M. V. Murugappan (supra) has
also taken the view that current profits cannot be included in accu-
mulated profits. It appears to be now the established law of the
land. An attractive submission was raised on behalf of the Revenue
• that in the Twelfth Report of the Law Commission of India, (c) the c
authors of the Report consider that the intention of the
Legislature was to include current profits in the expression "accu- ·
mulated profits" in section 2(6A) and that the present definition
of "accumulated profits" by Explanation 2 to section 2(22) of the
Jncome Tax Act, 1961 only clarifies what the true intent was all
along. In the view which has found favour with us, we are not) D
persuaded by that submission.

Accordingly, we hold that the High Court was right in answering
the first que::t,ion in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

The second question is whether the provision for payment of tax E
and dividend can be taken into account when computing the accu-
mulated profits as on March. 31, 1958. The Revenue contends
that this question should not. have been referred by the Appellate
Tribunal to the High Court at the instance of the assessee because
no reference application was made by the assessee. The only ref-
~rence application, it is pointed out, before the Appellate Tri- F
bunal was the reference application filed by the Commissioner of
Income Tax. We are of opinion that the Revenue is right. The
•• objection was taken by the Revenue. before the Appellate Tribunal
when the statement of case was being prepared, but the Appellate
Tribunal overruled the objection, relying on Girdhardas & Co. Ltd. ·
v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad.( 2 ) It does not appear G
that the Revenue contended. before the High Court that the reference
• made to it by .the Appellate 'l'ribunal was incompetent insofar as the
second question was concerned. Since, however, the objection pertains
. )
to the competence of the reference to the extent that it covers the second
question and, therefor~, relates to the jurisdiction of the High Court to
H
(I) P. 324 Item 17.
(2) [1957] 3! l.T.R. 87
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] l s.c.a.

A consider and decide that question, we are of opinion that the Revenue
is entitled to raise that question before us.

Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 entitles the assessee. ..
or the Commissioner, as the case may be, to apply to the Appellate
B Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out
of the order made by the Appellate Tribunal under section 254. A
period of !imitation for making such application is prescribed. If
the application is reiected by the Appellate Tribunal the applicant
is entitled to apply to the High Court, again within a prescribed
period of limitation, and the High Court may, if it is not satisfied of
c the correctness of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, require the
Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer it. It is clear that the
statute expressly contemplates an application in that behalf by a party
desiring a reference to the High Court. The application has to .be
filed within a prescribed period of limitation. If tbe application is
D rejected by the Appellate Tribunal, it is ·the applicant thus refused
who is entitled to apply to the High Court. If the Appellate Tribunal
allows the application made to it, s. 256(1) requires it to draw up
the statement of the case and refer it to the High Court. The state-
ment of the case is drawn up on the basis of the application made by
the applicant, who in that application must specify the questions of
E law which, he claims, arise out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal
made under s. 254. The form of reference application prescribed by
rule 48 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 specifically requires the appli-
cant to state the questions of law which he de.sires to be referred to
the High Court. He may, in appropriate cases, be permitted by the
Appellate Tribunal, to raise further questions of Jaw at the hearing
F of the reference application. But in every case, it is only the party
applying for a reference who is entitled to specify the questions of law
which should be referred. Nowhere in the statute do we find a right
in the non-applicant (a phrase used here for convenience) to ask for
a reference of questions of law on the application made by the ...
G
applicant.
1
In this connection, two categories of cases can be envisaged.
One consists of cases where the order of the Tribunal under section
254 has decided the appeal partly against one party and partly against
F
-
,.,
-
the other. This may be so whether the appeal consists of a single
subject matter or there are more than one independent claims in :the
H appeal. In the former, one party may be aggrieved by the grant of <
relief, even though partial, while the other may be aggrieved by the
refusal to grant total relief. In the latter, relief may be granted or
C.I.T. v. v. DAMODARAN (Pathak, J.) 951

refused with reference to individual items in dispute, and accordingly
one party or the other will be aggrieved. In either case, the party
who is aggrieved and who desires a reference to the High C~urt must
• file a reference application for that purpose. It is not open to him
to make a reference application filed by the other party the basis of
his claim that a question of law sought by him should be referred.
The second category consists of cases where the order made by the
App~llate Tribunal under s. 254 operates entirely in favour of one
party, although in the course of making the order the Appellate Tri-
bunal may have negatived some points of law raised by that party.
Not being a party aggrieved by the result of the appeal, it is ncJl open
• to, that party to file a reference application. But on a reference applica-
tion being filed by the aggrieved party it is open to the non-applicant,
in the event of the Appellate Tribunal agreeii;g to refer the case to the
High Court, to ask for a reference of those questions of law also which
arise on its submissions negatived in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal.
It is, as it were, recognising a right in the winning party to support the
order of the Appellate Tribunal also on grounds raised before the
Appellate Tribunal but negatived by it.
There are, therefore, those two categories, one in which a non-
applicant can ask for the reference of questions of law suggested
by it and the other in which it cannot. To the extent to which the
Courts have omitted to consider the distinction between these two E
categories, they have erred. There are cases where it has been held
that there is an absolute bar against a non-applicant seeking a refer-
ence of questions of law on a reference application made by the other
party. They include: Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. S. K.
Srinivasan(') and Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Ramdas
Pharmacy.(') cases taking the opposite extreme view are : Com- F
missioner of Income Tax v. Bantiah Bank Ltd.,( 3 ) followed in Girdhar
Das & Co. Ltd. (supra) and Eudcational" & Civil List Reserve Fund
II
•. .. . No. 1 through H. H. Maharana Bhagwat Singhji of Udaipur & Ors .
v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Rajasthan(') Smt.
Dhirajben R Amin v. Commission" of Income Tax, Gujarat ll,
Ahmedaliad(') and Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Gujorm II v. Mrs. G
Arundhati l3alkrislma.<'·) The judgment in the last case was affirmed
• by this Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Gujarat v. Arundhati
(1) (1970) 75 l.T.R. 93.
(2) (1970) 77 l.T.R. 276.
(3) I.T. Ref. No. 20 of 1950 decided on 10-10-50.
(4) (1964) 51 l.T.R. 112.
R
(5) (1968) 70 I.T.R. 194.
(6) (1968) 701.T.R. 203.
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.lt.

J\. Balkrishna(") but tl1e point raised before, us does not appeal to have
been.taken there. The observations in Bantiah Bank Limited (supra)
seem to show that the High Court was alive to the possibility of a
•
winning party being deprived' of'tlie righ( to raise questions of law
which could properly arise as further questions because they ·would
be intimately involved in a decision on the questions referred .at· the
B iruiance of the applicant, but it failed to classify such a case separately
from the case where a non-applicant seeks to raise independent and
unassociated questions of law. Cases in which a distinction was
noticed between the iwo categories but· no opinion was expressed on
the right phi.winning P.~\h'-,to ~ai~e. qFes\i~ns of .I"\", without applying
fpr a reference are Conimissioner of lncome· Tax v: Jiwaji Rao Sugar
{: · Co .. Li4.,(2). followed]~ (;:ommissioner of Incom~ Tax, M.P . .v. Dr. •
· Fida Hu'ssain.G. Abbasi(') ·and Commissi011er of Income Tax, Madraa
v: K." R~thnam Nadar. (') Some attention has been given to the dis-
. I . •

tinction between the. two categori~s in Commissioner of Income Tax,
West Bengal v. A. K. Das.(')·.·.·
D In the present case, the question whether the prov1s10n of Rs.
11,000 for tax and Rs. 6,900 for dividend can· be takeri into account
\"hen determining the accumulated profits as on March 31, 1958 is
· not related to the question whether accumulated profits can take in
current profits. The two questions involve the grant of separate and
distinct reliefs and the decision on one question does not affect the
E
decision on the other.
Acoordihgly, we hold that the Appellate Tribunal was not com-
petent to refer the second question, and the reference to that extent
must be considered void. In the circumstances; it is not necessary
. to examine the second question on its merits. The judgment of the
11 High Court must be set aside so far as it incorporates its opinion on
the second question.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed to the extent that the judgment
.· ciftfie ij:igh Court on the second question is set aside while the appeal
' iS "d\Smissed in respect of the judgment on the first question. There
G · \\6.11 be no order as to costs.

N.K.A. Appeal allowed in part.
(1) (1970) 77 I.T.R. 505.
(2) (1969) 71 I.T.R. 319.
ff (3) (1969) 71 I.T.R. 314.
(4) (1969) 71 I.T.R. 433.
(5) (1970) 77 I.T.R. 31, 44