Holding

The Screening Committee, under the Delhi Police Standing Order No. 398/2010, may lawfully cancel the candidature of applicants even after acquittal where the acquittal is not honourable or the offence involves moral turpitude, and such decisions are not reversible unless shown to be mala‑fide or extraneous.

Summary

The Commissioner of Police, Delhi, cancelled the candidature of two applicants, Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar, for the post of constable after a Screening Committee found them unsuitable despite their acquittal in criminal cases involving serious offences and moral turpitude. Both candidates had disclosed their involvement in the cases, were provisionally selected, and later acquitted on technical grounds or because witnesses turned hostile. They challenged the cancellation before the Central Administrative Tribunal, which set aside the decision, and the Delhi High Court upheld the Tribunal's order. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Screening Committee, empowered by Standing Order No. 398/2010, could lawfully reject candidates whose acquittals were not honourable. The Court held that the Committee's discretion to assess suitability, including rejecting candidates with acquittals based on benefit of doubt or technicalities, is valid and not subject to interference absent mala‑fide conduct. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court judgments, and upheld the cancellation of the respondents' candidature.

Issues considered

The legality of cancelling the candidature of candidates who were acquitted or discharged in criminal cases under the Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980 and Standing Order No. 398/2010.
Whether the Screening Committee's discretion to assess suitability, especially where the acquittal is not honourable, is subject to judicial review.
Whether Article 14 of the Constitution, invoking the doctrine of equality, bars the cancellation of candidature on the basis of criminal antecedents.
Whether the standard of proof in criminal proceedings (beyond reasonable doubt) versus departmental proceedings (pre‑ponderance of probabilities) affects the suitability assessment.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art. 136, s. Art. 14
Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Ruless. Rule 6
Legal Services Authorities Acts. 1987
Probation of Offenders Acts. 1958

Subjects

service lawappointmentscreening committeemoral turpitudeacquittaldisciplinary forceequality clausestanding orderDelhi Police recruitment

Judgment

(2013] 13 S.C.R. 432

A COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI & ANR. "--
v.
MEHAR SINGH
(Civil Appeal No. 4842 of 2013)
JULY 2, 2013
B
[G.S. SINGHVI AND RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, JJ.]

Service Law - Appointment - Cancellation of candidature
- Delhi Police - Standing Order issued by Delhi Police A "-
c incorporating policy for deciding cases of provisionally
selected candidates involved in criminal cases (facing trial or
acquitted) - Screening Committee constituted as per
Standing Order -Opinion formed by Screening Committee
and endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police
D (Recruitment), Delhi, that both the respondents, who were
subsequently acquitted /discharged in a criminal case, were
not suitable for being appointed in the Delhi Police Force -
Sustainability - Held: Sustainable - Tribunal and the High
Court erred in setting aside the order of cancellation of ~.e
E respondents' candidature - The Screening Committee was
entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral
turpitude out of the police force even if they were acquitted or
discharged if it felt that the acquittal or discharge was on
technical grounds or not honourable - While deciding whether
F
a person against whom a criminal case was registered and
who was later acquitted or discharged should be appointed
to a post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of
the offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal
was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt
because the witnesses turned hostile or because of some ..._
G
serious flaw in the prosecution, and the propensity of such .
person to indulge in similar activities in future - This decision
can only be take'n by the Screening Committee created for •
that purpose by the Delhi Police - If the Screening

H 432
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 433
SINGH

-> Committee's decision is not ma/a fide or actuated by A
extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned -
Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980 -
r.6.
Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 136 - SLP - Rejection B
of, at the threshold without detailed reasons - Held: Does not
constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent.

Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 14 - Doctrine of equality
, ->- A
enshrined
. in . Art. 14 - Held: Does not envisage negative
equality - It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud c
because it embodies a positive concept - On facts, held, that
if the Screening Committee constituted by the Delhi Police
to carry out the object of the comprehensive policy to ensure
that people with doubtful background do not enter the police
force, deviates from the policy, makes exception and allows D
entry of undesirable persons, it is guilty of committing an act
of grave disservice to the police force but one cannot allow
that illegality to be perpetuated - Service Law - Appointment
- Delhi Police ..
E
The question before this Court is whether the
candidature of the respondents who had made a clean
breast of their involvement in a criminal case by
mentioning this fact in their application/attestation form
while applying for a post of constable in Delhi Police; who
were provisionally selected subject to verification of their F
antecedents and who were subsequently acquitted/
discharged in the criminal case, could be cancelled by the
Screening Committee of the Delhi Police on the ground
that they are not found suitable for appointment to the
·----* post of constable. G

Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD:1.1. It is true that in Rule 6 of the Delhi Police
(Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980 which
H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A provides for grounds for ineligibility, criminal antecedents
of a person is not mentioned as a ground for ineligibility.
But, to conclude from this that instances of moral
turpitude, however grave, could be overlooked because
they do not find mention in Rule 6, would be absurd. In
B any case, Standing Order No. 398/2010 issued by the
Delhi Police empowers the police to take appropriate
decision in such cases. Pertinently the respondents have
not challenged the Standing Order. This Standing Order
incorporates policy for deciding cases of candidates
c provisionally.selected in Delhi Police involved in criminal
cases (facing trial or acquitted). [Para 17] [450-D-G]

1.2. Clause 3 of the Comprehensive Policy delineated
in the Standing Order refers to the Screening Committee
comprising high police officers. After a candidate, who
D has disclosed his involvement, is acquitted or discharged,
the Committee has to assess his/her suitability for
appointment. Clause 6 states that those against whom
serious offences or offences involving moral turpitude are
registered and who are later on acquitted by extending
E benefit of doubt or because the witnesses have turned
hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused person shall
not generally be considered suitable for government
service. However, all such cases will. be considered by
the Screening Committee manned by senior officers. The
F word 'generally' indicates the nature of discretion. As a
matter of rule, such candidates have to be avoided.
Exceptions will be few and far between and obviously
must be substantiated with acceptable reasons. [Para 18]
[453-F-H; 454-A-B]
G
1.3. A careful perusal of the policy leads to the
conclusion that the Screening Committee would be
entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral
turpitude out of the police force even if they are acquitted
or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is
H
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 435
SINGH
on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening A
Committee will be within its rights to cancel the
candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is
based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the
prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses
turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the B
Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether
the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert
to similar activities in future with more strength and
vigour, ·if appointed, to the post in a police force. The
Screening Committee will have to consider the nature c
• and extent of such person's invoivement in the crime .and
his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law
and order situation rather than maintaining it. This policy
framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference
from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure that 0
only pe-rsons with impeccable ,character enter the police
force. [Para 19) [454-B-F]
1.4. It cannot be said that by cancelling the
respondents' candidature, the Screening Committee has
overreached the judgments of the criminal court. Though E
the question of co-relation between a criminal case and
a departmental inquiry does nof directly arise here, but,
support can be drawn from the principles laid down by
this Court in connection with it because the issue
involved is somewhat identical namely whether to allow F
a person with doubtful integrity to work in the
department. While the standard of proof in a criminal case
is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a
departmental proceeding is preponderance of
probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal G
because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not
acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt
would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit
after a full fledged trial, where there is no indication of the
witnesses being won over. [Para 20) [454-F-H; 455-A-B] H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 1.5. In S. Samuthiram case, this Court expressed that
when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of
prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to
prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can
possibly be said that the accused was honourably
B acquitted. Since the purpose of departmental
proceedings is to keep persons, who are guilty of serious
misconduct or dereliction of duty or who are guilty of
grave cases of moral turpitude, out of the department, if
found necessary, because they pollute the department;
c surely the above principles will apply with more vigour
at the point of entry of a person in the police department
i.e. at the time of recruitment. If it is found by the
Screening Committee that the person against whom a
serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is
discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the
0
same charge but the acquittal is not honourable, the
Screening Committee would be entitled to cancel his
candidature. Stricter norms need to be applied while
appointing persons in a disciplinary force because public
E interest is involved in it. [Para 21] [455-D, H; 456-A-D]
1.6. In the instant case, as per the complaint,
respondent 'M' and others armed with iron chains, lathis,
danda, stories etc. stopped a bus, rebuked the conductor
of the bus as to how he dared to take the fare from one
F of their associates. Those who intervened were beaten-
up. They received injuries. The miscreants broke the side
window panes of the bus by throwing stones. The
complainant was also injured. This incident is
undoubtedly an incident affecting public order. The
G · assault on the conductor was pre-planned and pre-
meditated. The FIR was registered under Sections 143,
341, 323 and 427 of the IPC. The order dated 30/01/2009
passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate shows
that so far as offences under Sections 323, 341 and 427
H of the IPC are concerned, the accused entered into a
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 437
SINGH

compromise with the complainant. Hence, the Magistrate A
acquitted respondent - 'M' and others of the said
offences. The order further indicates that so far as
offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 of the IPC
is concerned, three main witnesses turned hostile. The
Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused of the said B
offence. This acquittal can never be described as an
-(
acquittal on merits after a full fledged trial. Respondent -
'M' cannot secure entry in. the police force by portraying
-I_:,' ;
this acquittal as an honourable acquittal. Pertinently,
there is no discussion on merits of the case in this order. c
'"' Respondent - 'M' has not been exonerated after
evaluation of the evidence. So far as respondent - 'S' is
concerned, the FIR lodged against him stated that he
along with other accused abused and threatened the
complainant's brother. They opened fire at him due to
D
,Jr,. which he sustained bullet injuries. Offences under
1
Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the IPC were registered
against respondent - 'S' and others. Order dated 14/5/
2010 passed by the Sessions . . Judge shows
. that the
complainant and the injured person did not support the
.. prosecution case. They were declared hostile. Hence, the E
Sessions Judge gave the accused the benefit of doubt
and acquitte~ them. This again is not a clean acquittal.
~ Use of firearms in this manner is a serious matter. For
entry in the police force, acquittal order based on benefit
of doubt in a serious case of this' nature is bound to act F
as an impediment. [Paras 22, 23] [456-E-H; 457-A-F]

1.7. So far as respondent - 'M' is concerned, his case
appears to have been compromised; The plea that
·._....\ acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not G
be treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate
the purpose of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 has
no merit. Compromises or settlements have to be
encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable
atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A disputes. They have to be encouraged also to reduce
arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of
pending litigation. But these considerations cannot be
brought in here. In order to maintain integrity and high
standard of police force, the Screening Committee may
B decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it appears
to it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be
faulted for that [Para 26) [459-H; 460-A·C)

1.8. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from
the fact that in their application and/or attestation form
C they have disclosed their involvement in a criminal case,
but this does not improve their case. Disclosure of these
facts in the application/ attestation form is an essential
requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts
honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements
D of the police force. The respondents should not,
therefore, expect to score any brownie points because
of this disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the
point in issue. While deciding whether a person against
whom a criminal case was registered and who was later
E acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post
in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of the
offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the
acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving
benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile or
F because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the
propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities
in future. This decision can only be taken by the
Screening Committee created for that purpose by the
Gi Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee's decision is not
ma/a fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then,
it cannot be questioned. [Para 27] [460-D-G]

1.9. The police force is a disciplined force. It
shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and
order and public order in the society. People repose great
H
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 439
SINGH
faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that A
confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force
must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have
impeccable character and integrity. A person having
criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if
he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that B
acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to
see whether he has been completely exonerated in the
case because even a possibility of his taking to th.e life
of .crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police
force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the c
task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening
Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee
must be taken as final unless it is ma/a fide. In recent
times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances
of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by 0
misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of
concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a
beating. In such a situation, this Court would not like to
dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like
the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to E
ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility
do not enter the police force. At the same time, the
Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of
trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with even
hand. [Para 28] [460-H; 461-A-E]
F
1.1 O. Though the Screening Committee's proceedings
have been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and
unfettered, but there is no evidence of this. However,
certain instances have been pointed out where allegedly
persons involved in serious offences have been G
recommended for appointment by the Screening
Committee. It is well settled that to such cases the doctrine
of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of
India is not attracted. This doctrine does not envisage
negative equality. It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A fraud because it embodies a positive concept. If the
Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out the
object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that people
with doubtful background do not enter the police force,
deviates from the policy, makes exception and allows
B entry of undesirable persons, it is undoubtedly guilty of
committing an act of grave disservice to the police force
but one cannot allow that illegality to be perpetuated by
allowing the respondents to rely on such cases. It is for
the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to examine whether the A. -._
c Screening Committee has compromised the interest of the
police force in any case and to take remedial action if he ·,
finds that it has done so. Public interest demands an in-
depth examination of this allegation at the highest level.
Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are responsible
for the spurt in police excesses. The Commissioner of
0
Police, Delhi is expected to look into the matter and if there
is substance in the allegations to take necessary steps
forthwith so that policy incorporated in the Standing Order
is strictly implemented. [Para 29] [461-F-H; 462-A-D]
'
E Commissioner of Police v. Dhaval Singh (1999) 1 SCC
246 and Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. JT 2008(10) SC 324 -
held inapplicable.

R.P. Kapur v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 787: 1964
F SCR 431; Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. v. S.
Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598: 2012 (11) SCR 174;
Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal
Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541: 1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 586;
Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary & Ors. v.
Sushi/ Kumar (1996) 11 SCC 605: 1996 (7) Suppl. SCR 199;
G Fuljit Kaur etc. v. State of Punjab etc. (2010) 11 SCC 455:
201 O (7) SCR 317 and Jainendra Singh v. State of Utt(!r
Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 748: 2012 (6) ~CR 1047- referred
to.
H Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce (2006)
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. 441
MEHAR SINGH
10 SCC 572: 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 564; K. Venkateshwarlu A
v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 73; Chandigarh
Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr. AIR 1995 SC 705:
1995 (1) SCR 126 and Maharaj Krishan Bhatt & Anr. v. State
of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 24: 2008 (11)
SCR 670 - cited. B
2. In certain orders of this Court, according to the
respondents, special leave petitions filed by the State,
arising out of similar fact situations, have been
dismissed. However, in limine dismissal of special leave
petition does not mean that this Court has affirmed the C
judgment or the action impugned therein. The order
rejecting the special leave petition at the threshold
without detailed reasons does not constitute any
declaration of law or a binding precedent. [Para 30) (462-
E-F] D

3. The opinion formed by the Screening Committee
in both these cases which is endorsed by the Deputy
Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), Delhi, that both
the respondents are not suitable for being appointed in E
the Delhi Police Force does not merit any interference. It
is legally sustainable. The Tribunal and the High Court
erred in setting aside the order of cancellation of the
respondents' candidature. The cancellation of
candidature of the respondents is upheld. (Para 31] (462- F.
G-H; 463-A]

Case Law Reference:
1996 (7) Suppl. SCR 199 referred to Para 13
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 564 cited Para 13 G
2010 (7) SCR 317 referred to Para 13
(2012) 8 sec 73 cited Para 13
2012 (11) SCR 174 referred to Para 13 H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 1995 (1) SCR 126 cited Para 13
2008 (11) SCR 670 cited Para 13
(1999) 1 sec 246 held inapplicable Para 14
JT 2008(10) SC 324 held inapplicable Para 14
B
2012 (6) SCR 1047 referred to Para 15
1964 SCR 431 referred to Para 20
A "h. -
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 586 referred to Para 21
c ...'
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4842 of 2013.

From the Judgn:ient and Order dated 09.07.2012 of the
High Court of Delhi At New Delhi in W.P (C) No. 3918 of 2012.
D
WITH

C.A.No. 4965 of 2013

Rakesh Kr. Khanna, ASG, Satya Siddiqui, D.S. Mahra,
E Seema Thapliyal, S.K Mishra for the Appellants.

Ajesh Luthra, Vikrant Yadav for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the court was delivered by

F (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. Leave
granted in both the petitions.

2. In both the appeals the judgments of the Delhi High
Court are under challenge. Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No.
G 38886 of 2012 is against Judgment dated 09/07/2012 passed
in Writ Petition (Civil) No.3918 of 2012. Appeal arising out of
SLP (Civil) No.4057 of 2013 is against Judgment dated 21/
05/2012 passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No.3015 of 2012. Since
both these appeals raise the same question of law, they can
H be disposed of by a common judgment. It may be stated here
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 443
SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
A
~ that while issuing notice, this Court has stayed the orders
impugned in both the appeals.

3. The facts relating to the appeal against respondent -
Mehar Singh could be shortly stated.

4. FIR No.126/04 was registered against respondent - B
Mehar Singh and others under Sections 143, 341, 323 and 427
of the Indian Penal Code ("the IPC") upon a complaint received
from Ramji Lal s/o. Mamraj Saini r/o. Khetri - the owner of Bus
.....¥ " No.RJ-18P 0493. The substance of the complaint was that
... when the bus reached the bus stand of village Raipur on 15/5/ c
1 2004 at about 3.15 p.m, respondent - Mehar Singh along with
others armed with iron chain, lathi, belts, danda, stones etc.
stopped the bus on the road and rebuked the conductor of the
bus as to how he dared to take the fare from one of his
associates. Sanjay Singh, Basant, Udai Bhan, Rajesh, D
Sandeep, Jagmal, Suresh and Karan Singh intervened and
tried to save the conductor of the bus. During intervention,
Sanjay and Basant suffered injuries on their back, eyes and
ears. All the accused broke the side window panes of the bus
by throwing stones and by giving blows with lathis/dandas. E
When the other passengers intervened, the accused fled the
spot. The complainant along with the injured reached the police
station and lodged the aforementioned complaint.
}.-
5. In the year 2009, the appellants issued an advertisement
F
for filling-up the post of constables (Exe.) (male). It appears that
in the criminal case registered against respondent - Mehar
Singh, he arrived at a compromise with the complainant. In
terms of the compromise, he and other accused were acquitted
of the offences under Sections 323, 341 and 427 of the IPC
~·~
on 30/1/2009. As regards the offence under Section 147 of the G
IPC, the trial court acquitted him and other co-accused for want
of evidence. It is pertinent to note that the witnesses turned
hostile. Respondent - Mehar Singh applied for the post of
constable pursuant to the advertisement issued by the
appellants. In relevant papers, he disclosed his involvement in H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A criminal case and his acquittal as both parties had entered into
,_
a compromise. He was assigned Roll No.422165 and put "'-
through the physical endurance and measurement test and
written test. After interview, he was declared provisionally
selected, subject to verification of character and antecedents.
B During character and antecedent verification, his involvement
in the criminal case and his subsequent acquittal due to
compromise between the parties was taken into account.

6. The case of respondent - Mehar Singh was examined A
by the Screening Committee constituted by respondent 1 i.e. "-
c the Commissioner of Police, Delhi. The Screening Committee
"'"
observed that respondent - Mehar Singh and others had
assaulted the bus conductor with iron chain, belt and stones in
a preplanned manner and caused injuries to him, which showed
respondent - Mehar Singh's violent nature and scant respect
D for the law of the land. The Screening Committee in the
circumstances did not recommend his case for appointment to -A
the post of constable.
'
7. On 3/3/2011, appellant 2 - the Deputy Commissioner
E of Police (Recruitment), New Delhi issued a notice to
respondent - Mehar Singh calling upon him to show cause as
to why his candidature should not be cancelled. He replied to
the show cause notice. He submitt~d that he was falsely
implicated in the criminal case and acquitted in the year 2009
F after a full fledged trial. He submitted that a mere registration
of an FIR would not show any criminal pr.opensity. According ,
to him the offence was falsely reported by the complainant due
to local issues and to avoid prolonged proceedings, the issue
was settled between him and the complainant and the trial court
G
had acquitted him. The Screening Committee did not find his
reply to be convincing. In his order dated 22/3/2011, the Deputy ~ "'•
Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), New Delhi stated that
the Screening Committee has, inter alia, observed that the
actions of respondent - Mehar Singh depicted his violent nature
and that he had no respect for the law of the land and on
H
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. 445
MEHAR SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

·->- considering the totality of the circumstances, the Screening A
Committee held that he was not suitable for appointment to the
post of constable. By the said letter, candidature of respondent
- Mehar Singh was cancelled.

8. On 22/4/2011, respondent - Mehar Singh filed O.A.
B
No.1819 of 2011 before the Central Administrative Tribunal (for
short "the Tribunal"), Principal Bench, New Delhi challenging
the order of the Screening Committee. The Tribunal by its order
-r ,( dated 7/3/2012 allowed his application. The Tribunal set aside
order dated 22/03/2011 cancelling the candidature of Mehar
Singh. The Tribunal referred to a couple of cases in which c
persons charged under Section 307 of the IPC were appointed
by the appellants and held that there was total non-application
of mind on the part of the appellants. A direction was given to
consider the case of respondent - Mehar Singh if he was
• otherwise found to be fit, within six months . D
...
9. Aggrieved by the order dated 7/3/2012 passed by the
Tribunal, the appellants filed a writ petition before the Delhi High
Court. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition holding
that since respondent - Mehar Singh had been acquitted of the E
offences for which he had faced trial, the same cannot be held
against him. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order,
the appellants have preferred this appeal by special leave.

10 .. The facts relating to the appeal against respondent -
Shani Kumar could be shortly stated. In 2007, FIR No.114/2007 F
was registered against respondent Shani - Kumar under
Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Babri,
District Muzuffar Nagar, (U.P.). Admittedly, pursuant to an
advertisement issued in the year 2009 for the post of Constable
~
(Exe.) (male) in Delhi Police for Phase II respondent - Shani G
""' Kumar applied for it. He mentioned in his application as well
as attestation form that a criminal case was registered against
him. On 23/4/2010, he was provisionally selected to the said
post subject to verification of antecedents. On 14/5/2010, he
was acquitted in the said case by giving him benefit of doubt. H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A On 3/3/2011, the appellants issued a show cause notice to "\-·
respondent - Shani Kumar calling upon him to show cause as
to why his candidature to the post of Constable (Exe) (male) in
Delhi Police should not be cancelled as he along with other co-
accused was found involved in the offence of attempt to commit
8 murder with deadly weapons and causing bullet injuries to the
complainant's brother. Respondent - Shani Kumar sent a reply
to the show cause notice on 14/3/2011, which did not find
favour with the appellants. By order dated 22/3/2011, the
Deputy Commissioner of Police, (Recruitment), NPL, Delhi >-- -r-
e cancelled respondent - Shani Kumar's candidature.to the post
of Constable (Exe.) (male).

11. Being aggrieved by this cancellation, respondent -
Shani Kumar filed O.A. No.1821 of 2011 before the Tribunal.
By order dated 24/1/2012, the Tribunal allowed the application
D and set aside order dated 22/3/2011 cancelling his •
candidature. A direction was issued that respondent - Shani
Kumar be offered appointment to the said post as expeditiously
as possible. Being aggrieved by the Tribunal's order, the
appellants filed writ petition before the Delhi High Court. The
E High Court dismissed the appellants' writ petition. Hence, this
appeal by special leave.

12. We have heard Mr. Rakesh Kumar Khanna, learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the
F appellants and Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the. respondents. We have perused the written
submissions filed by the appellants as well as by the
respondents in both the appeals.

13. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Khanna, learned Additional
G Solicitor General, submitted that the employment in Delhi Police
is of a very sensitive nature. Therefore, the character, integrity
and antecedents of a candidate aspiring to join it, assume
importance. Keeping this in mind, the Commissioner of Police
issued a Standing Order No.398/2010 dated 23/11/2010 laying
H down a uniform policy for deciding cases of candidates
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. 447
MEHAR SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
-J- provisionally selected in Delhi Police involved in criminal cases A
(facing trial or acquitted). A Screening Committee has been
constituted for that purpose. Taking an overall view of the
matter, in the interest of Delhi Police, which is a disciplined
force, the Screening Committee has taken a decision to cancel
the candidature of both the respondents. The respondents have B
not challenged the Standing Order. The decision taken by the
Screening Committee, in the circumstances, ought not to be
interfered with. Counsel submitted that it is the settled law that
~ ,(.
acquittal of a person in a criminal case does not entitle him to
reinstatement as a matter of right. The appointing authority may c
still find such a person unfit to be appointed to the post. Counsel
submitted that even in cases of acquittal, departmental
proceedings may follow when the acquittal is otherwise than
honourable. If the acquittal in a criminal case is on account of
flawed prosecution, it would not have any impact on the finding
D
,,. of misconduct recorded in a departmental enquiry on the basis
of adequate evidence. It is only if a person is honourably
acquitted, that he can possibly argue that he should be
appointed to any post. Counsel submitted that assuming the
appellants have appointed some persons with criminal
antecedents in the past; the doctrine of equality is not attracted
E
to such cases. He submitted that if some candidates have
been granted some benefits inadvertently, such order does not
confer any right on the respondents to get the same relief.
Counsel submitted that the impugned order does not take note
of the above vital aspects and, therefore, must be set aside. In F
support of his submissions, counsel relied on the judgments of
this Court in Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary
& Ors. v. Sushi/ Kumar1; Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank
of Commerce 2; Fuljit Kaur etc. v. State of Punjab etc 3 ; K.
;J.
Venkateshwarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh4; Deputy Inspector G
~

-{

1. (1996) 11 sec 605.
2. (2006) 10 sec 572.
3. (2010) 11 sec 455.
4. (2012) a sec 73. H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A General of Police & Anr. v. S. Samuthiram 5 ; Chandigarh
Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr6. and Maharaj
Krishan Bhatt & Anr. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors. 7 •

14. Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that the appellants' reliance on Sushi/ Kumar is
8
misplaced because Sushi/ Kumar has been distinguished in
Commissioner of Police v. Dhaval Singh 8• Sushi/ Kumar was
a case of concealment of facts whereas in this case, there is
no concealment. Counsel submitted that, many a time, due to
personal enmity and political reasons, people are falsely
C implicated in criminal cases. Very often, criminal cases end in
acquittal or are compounded. Compounding or acquittal of a
criminal case should, therefore, not act as an obstacle to a
person being appointed t,o any post. Counsel submitted that an
order of acquittal is always honourable. An acquittal is an
D acquittal for all purposes. Relying on Ghurey Lal v. State of
U.P. 9, counsel submitted that a person is innocent unless
proved otherwise. Administrative authorities cannot adjudicate
the suitability of a selected candidate in this manner. Quasi
judicial authorities cannot overreach the judgments delivered
E by a competent court of law. Counsel submitted that Lok
Adalats have been created under the provisions of the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987 to encourage compromises. If
a selectee is to be denied appointment by adjudging him
unsuitable because the criminal case against him has ended
F into acquittal only because of compromise, then, it will defeat
the object of the said Act. Counsel submitted that the present
case is different from cases involving departmental
proceedings. In the matter of appointments, principles relating
to pendency of criminal case and initiation of departmental
G
5. c2013) 1 sec 598.
6. AIR 1995 SC 705.
7. c2000) 9 sec 24.
8. (1999) 1 sec 246.
H 9. JT 2008 (10) SC 324.
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 449
SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
_,._ proceedings will not be applicable. Counsel attacked the A
proceedings of the Screening Committee as being arbitrary,
unguided and unfettered. He cited cases where, according to
him, the Screening Committee has recommended candidates
against whom FIRs have been registered for serious offences,
for appointment. Counsel further pointed out that involvement B
in a criminal case is not a disqualification or a stipulation
towards ineligibility in Delhi Police (Appointment and
Recruitment) Rules, 1980 ("the Delhi Police Rules"). Counsel
~
~ submitted that for verification of antecedents, the appellants
must not rely upon the criminal case where acquittal has been c
the final outcome. It is open for the appellants to conduct an
independent enquiry about the character and antecedents of a
candidate concerned. Counsel submitted that inasmuch as the
respondents have honestly disclosed that criminal cases were
registered against them and they ended either in acquittal or D
acquittal on account of compromise, they cannot be denied
r appointment in Delhi Police once having been selected for the
same. He submitted that the appeals, therefore, be dismissed.

15. Before we deal with the rival submissions, it is
necessary to refer to the judgment of this Court in Jainendra E
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 10 . In that case the appellant had
applied for the post of constable and was selected for the same.
He had suppressed the fact that a criminal case was registered
).. against him. Subsequently the said fact came to light and his
appointment was terminated .•Thereafter, he was acquitted in F
the criminal case. The question which fell for consideration of
this Court was whether, after a person is appointed to a post
in a disciplined force, it comes to light that he had suppressed
the fact that he was involved in a criminal case his appointment
·,... 11 can be terminated' on the ground of suppression of material G
facts. Noticing conflicting decisions of this Court on this point
and also the fact that different yardsticks are being applied in
the matter of grant of relief, this Court formulated issues and
referred them to a larger bench. Since all the formulated issues
10. (2012) s sec 748. H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A are premised on suppression of facts and since in this case -It..-
there is no suppression of facts it is not necessary for us to
defer the judgment of this case till the reference is answered
by a larger Bench.

B 16. The question before this Court is whether the
candidature of the respondents who had made a clean breast
of their involvement in a criminal case by mentioning this fact
in their application/attestation form while applying for a post of
constable in Delhi Police; who were provisionally selected > ~
subject to verification of their antecedents and who were
c subsequently acquitted/discharged in the criminal case, could ..,
be cancelled by the Screening Committee of the Delhi Police
on the ground that they are not found suitable for appointment
to the post of constable.

D 17. We must first deal with the submission that under the
Delhi Police Rules, past involvement of a person in a criminal ~
case is not a disqualification for appointment. It is true that Rule
6 thereof which provides for grounds for ineligibility, criminal
antecedents of a person is not mentioned as a ground for
E ineligibility. But, to conclude from this that instances of moral
turpitude, however grave, could be overlooked because they
do not find mention in Rule 6, would be absurd. In any case,
Standing Order No. 398/2010 issued by the Delhi Police to
which our attention is drawn empowers the police to take
F appropriate decision in such cases. Pertinently the respondents
have not challenged the Standing Order. This Standing Order
incorporates policy for deciding cases of candidates
provisionally selected in Delhi Police involved in criminal cases
(facing trial or acquitted). It would be appropriate to re-produce
the relevant portions of the said Standing Order:
G "IC ...•

"STANDING ORDER NO. 398/2010

POLICY FOR DECIDING CASES OF CANDIDATES
PROVISIONALLY SELECTED IN DELHI POLICE
H INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL CASES (FACING TRIAL OR
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 451
• SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
ACOUITIED). A

During the recruitments made in Delhi Police, several
cases come to light where candidates conceal the fact of
--~ their involvement in criminal cases in the application Form/
,, Attestation Form in the hope that it may not come to light
8
and disclosure by them at the beginning of the recruitment
process itself may debar them from participating in the
various recruitment tests. Also the appointment if he/she
~· '°"- has been acquitted but not honourably.

' In order to formulate a comprehensive policy, the C
following rules shall be applicable for all the recruitments
conducted by Delhi Police:-

(1 ). )()()( )()()( )()()(

2). )()()( )()()( xxx D

3). If a candidate had disclosed his/her involvement and/
or arrest in criminal cases, complaint case, preventive
proceedings etc. and the case is pending investigation or
pending trial, the candidature will be kept in abeyance till E
the final decision of the case. After the court' judgment, if
the candidate is acquitted or discharged, the case will be
referred to the Screening Committee of the PHO
comprising of Special Commissioner of Police/
Administration, Joint Commissioner of Police/ F
Headquarters and Joint Commissioner of PoliceNigilance
to assess his/her suitability for appointment in Delhi Police.

4) If a candidate had disclosed his/her involvement in
criminal case, complaint case, preventive proceedings etc.
both in the application form as well as in the attestation G
form but was acquitted or discharged by the court, his/her
case will be referred to the Screening Committee of PHO
to assess his/her suitability for appointment in Delhi Police.

5). )()()( xxx xxx H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A 6). Such candidates against whom charge-sheet in any
criminal case has been filed in the court and the charges
fall in the category of serious offences benefit of doubt or
the witnesses have turned hostile due to fear of reprisal
by the accused person, he/she will generally not be
B considered suitable for government service. However, all
such cases will be judged by the Screening Committee of
PHQ to assess their suitability for the government job. The
details of criminal cases which involve moral turpitude may
kindly be perused at Annexure 'A'.
c 7) Such cases in which a candidate had faced trial in any
criminal case which does not fall in the category of moral
turpitude and is subsequently acquitted by the court and
he/she discloses about the same in both application form
as well as attestation form will be judged by the Screening
D Committee to decide about his/her suitability for the
government job.

8)xxx xxx xxx
9). I( any candidate is discharged by extending the benefit
E
of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 this will also not be
viewed adversely by the department for his/her suitability
for government service.

a
10). If a candidate was involved in criminal case which
F was withdrawn by the State Government, he/she will .,
generally be considered fit for government service, unless
there are other extenuating circumstances."

Annexure 'A' as mentioned in Clause 6 above lays down
G the following offences involving moral turpitude: )( ....

1. Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120-B, IPC)

2. Offences against the State (Sections 121 - 130,
IPC)
H
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 453
SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

-~ 3. Offences relating to Army, Navy and Air Force A
{Sections 131-134, IPC)

4. Offence against Public Tranquility (Section 153-A
·~
& B, IPC).

False evidence and offences against Public Justice B
5.
{Sections 193-216A, IPC)_

6. Offences relating to coin and government stamps
A
~ (Section 231-263A, IPC}.

-
"
..\
7. Offences relating to Religion (Section 295-297,
IPC)
c

8. Offences affecting Human Body (Sections 302-304,
3048, 305-308, 311-317, 325-333, 335, 347, 348,
354, 363-373, 376-376-A, 376-B, 376-C, 376-D, D
."-" 377, IPC)

9. Offences against Property (Section 379-462, IPC)

10. Offences relating to Documents and Property Marks
E
(Section 465-489, IPC}

11. Offences relating to Marriage and Dowry
Prohibition Act (Section 498-A, IPC}

18. Clause 3 of the Comprehensive Policy delineated in F
the Standing Order is material for the present case. It refers to
the Scteening Committee comprising high police officers. After
a candidate, who has disclosed his involvement, is acquitted
or discharged, the Committee has to assess his/her suitability
for appointment. Clause 6 states that those against whom
G
"' serious offences or offences involving moral turpitude are
registered and who are later on acquitted by extending benefit
of doubt or because the witnesses have turned hostile due to
fear of reprisal by the accused person shall not generally be
considered suitable for government service. However, all such
H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 13 S.C.R.

A cases will be considered by the Screening Committee manned
_...,_
by senior officers. In our opinion, the word 'generally' indicates
the nature of discretion. As a matter of rule, such candidates
have to be avoided. Exceptions will be few and far between ...
and obviously must be substantiated with acceptable reasons.
B
19. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that
the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons
involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force
even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the ~.
~-
acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable.
c The Screening Committee will be within its rights to cancel the
"" );
candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based
on some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case
or is the result of material witnesses turning hostile. It is only
experienced officers of the Screening Committee who will be
D able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate
is likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength :ii
and vigour, if appointed, to the post in a police force. The
Screening Committee will have to consider the nature and
extent of such person's involvement in the crime and his
E propensity of becoming a cause for worsening the law and
order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion, this
policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any
interference from this Court as its object appears to be to
ensure that only persons with impeccable character enter the
F police force.
20. We find no substance in the contention that by
cancelling the respondents' candidature, the Screening
Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal
court. We are aware that the question of co-relation between )I'
G a criminal case and a departmental inquiry does not directly
arise here, but, support can be drawn from the principles laid
down by this Court in connection with it because the issue
involved is somewhat identical namely whether to allow a
person with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While
H
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. 455
MEHAR SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all A
reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is
preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end
in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are
not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt
would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a B
full fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses
being won over. i.rl R.P. Kapur v. Union of lndia 11 this Court
has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed
even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other
than honourable. c
21. The expression 'honourable acquittal' was considered
by this Court in S. Samuthiram. In that case this Court was
concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending
against him under Section 509 of the IPC and under Section 4 D
of the Eve-teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because
of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a seri~us
flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses
turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in
Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal E
Singh Panchal12 , where in somewhat similar fact situation, this
Court upheld a bank's action of refusing to reinstate an
employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he
was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it
was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High F
Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed
in departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the
expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'acquitted of blame' and
'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code
or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial G
pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the
expression 'honourably acquitted'. This Court expressed that

11. AIR1964SC787.
12. (1994) 1 sec 541. H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.CR.

A when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of ~-·
prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove
the charges leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said
that the accused was honourably acquitted. In light of above,
we are of the opinion that since the purpose of departmental
8 proceedings is to keep persons, who are guilty of serious
misconduct or dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave
cases of moral turpitude, out of the department, if found
necessary, because they pollute the department, surely the
above principles will apply with more vigour at the point of entry >- ...
c of a person in the police department i.e. at the time of
recruitment. If it is found by the Screening Committee that the
person against whom a serious case involving moral turpitude
is registered is discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted
-
of the same charge but the acquittal is not honourable, the
Screening Committee would be entitled to cancel his
D
candidature. Stricter norms need to be applied while
appointing persons in a disciplinary force because public
interest is involved in it.

22. Against the above background, we shall now examine
E what is the nature of acquittal of the respondents. As per the
complaint lodged by Ramji Lal, respondent Mehar Singh and
others armed with iron chains, lathis, danda, stones etc.
stopped a bus, rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he
dared to take the fare from one of their associates. Those who
F intervened were beaten-up. They received injuries. The
miscreants broke the side window panes of the bus by throwing
stones. The complainant was also injured. This incident is
undoubtedly an incident affecting public order. The assault on
the conductor was pre-planned and pre-meditated. The FIR was
G registered under Sections 143, 341, 323 and 427 of the IPC. )I' ~

The order dated 30/01/2009 passed by the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Khetri shows that so far as offences under
Sections 323, 341 and 427 of the IPC are concerned, the
accused entered into a compromise with the complainant.
H Hence, learned Magistrate acquitted respondent - Mehar Singh
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. 457
MEHAR SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
- ,.. and others of the said offences. The order further indicates that A
so far as offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 of
the IPC is concerned, three main witnesses turned hostile.
Learned Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused of the
said offence. This acquittal can never be described as an
acquittal on merits after a full fledged trial. Respondent - Mehar B
Singh cannot secure entry in the police force by portraying this
acquittal as an honourable acquittal. Pertinently, there is no
.;, discussion on merits of the case in this order. Respondent -
~·~
Mehar Singh has not been exonerated after evaluation of the

- evidence.

23. So far as respondent - Shani Kumar is concerned, the
c

FIR lodged against him stated that he along with other accused
abused and threatened the complainant's brother. They opened
fire at him due to which he sustained bullet injuries. Offences
under Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the IPC were registered D
'j(
against respondent - Shani Kumar and others. Order dated 14/
5/2010 passed by the Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar shows
that the complainant and the injured person did not support the
prosecution case. They were declared hostile. Hence, learned
Sessions Judge gave the accused the benefit of doubt and E
acquitted them. This again is not a clean acquittal. Use of
firearms in this manner is a serious matter. For entry in the
police force, acquittal order based on benefit of doubt in a
serious case of this nature is bound to act as an impediment.
F
24. In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushi/
Kumar. In that case, the respondent therein had appeared for
recruitment as a constable in .Delhi Police Services. He was
selected provisionally, but, his selection was subject to
~ ~ verification of character and antecedents by the local police.
G
On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such that
his appointment to the post of constable was not found
desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. He approached
the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application on the ground
that since the respondent had been discharged and/or
H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 13 S.C.R.

A acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304, Section
324 read with Section 34 and Section 324 of the IPC, he cannot
be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State.
This Court disapproved of the Tribunal's view. It was observed
that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the
s important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is
suitable to the post under the State. This Court observed that
though the candidate was provisionally selected, the appointing
authority found it not desirable to appoint him on account of his
antecedent record and this view taken by the appointing
c authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be
unwarranted. Whether the respondent was discharged or
acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do
-
with the question as to whether he should be appointed to the
post. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the
candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result
0
thereof. It was argued that Sushi/ Kumar must be distinguished
from the facts of the instant case because the respondent
therein had concealed the fact that a criminal case was
registered against him, whereas, in the instant case there is
no concealment. It is not possible for us to accept this
E submission. The aspect of concealment was not considered in
Sushi/ Kumar at all. This Court only concentrated on the
desirability to appoint a person, against whom a criminal case
is pending, to a disciplined force. Sushi/ Kumar cannot be
restricted to cases where there is ccncealment of the fact by a
F candidate that a criminal case was registered against him.
When the point of concealment or otherwise and its effect was
not argued before this Court, it cannot be said that in Sushi/
Kumar this Court wanted to restrict its observations to the
cases where there is concealment of facts.
G
25. Reliance placed by the respondents on Dhaval Singh
is misplaced. In Dhaval Singh, the respondent had not
mentioned the fact that a criminal case was pending against
him in the application form submitted by him on 21-27/8/1995
H seeking post of a constable. He was provisionally selected and
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 459
SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
·- 1- was interviewed pending verification of his character. Before A
any order of appointment could be issued in his favour, he,
realizing the mistake, wrote a letter to the Deputy
Commissioner of Police on 15/1111995 that a criminal case
was pending against him and he had inadvertently not
mentioned this fact in the application form. On the ground that B
the respondent had concealed a material fact, his candidature
was cancelled on 20/11/1995. He was acquitted in the criminal
case on 8/12/1995. On being so acquitted, he filed a
~
~ representation before the Commissioner of Police which was

- turned down. He approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal set c
aside the cancellation of candidature of the respondent and the
rejection of his representation. Aggrieved by this, the
Commissioner of Police approached this Court. This Court
confirmed the Tribunal's order basically on the ground that the
order of cancellation dated 20/11/1995 did not show that the D
.lr; information furnished by the respondent vide his letter dated 15/
11/1995 was communicated to the Commissioner of Police.
There was no indication in the record that the competent
authority had a look at the letter. Therefore, the cancellation of
candidature was without any proper application of mind and
E
without taking into consideration all relevant materials. The
Tribunal's order was upheld on the ground of non-application
of mind by the Commissioner of Police to a vital fact. Besides,
.A this Court also noted that pursuant to the Tribunal's order the
respondent therein was already reinstated. This decision will
have no application to the present case. Reliance on Ghurey F
Lal is also misplaced. There can be no debate over the
observation made by this Court in that case that an accused
is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty. These
observations were made while dealing with a reversal of
- )i
acquittal by the High Court. They are not relevant to the present G
case.

26. So far as respondent - Mehar Singh is concerned, his
case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that
acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the ~-
purpose of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no
merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements have to
be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable
atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to disputes.
B They have to be encouraged also to reduce arrears of cases
and save the litigants from the agony of pending litigation; But
these considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to
maintain integrity and high standard of police force, the
Screening Committee m~y decline to take cognizance of a ,lo._

compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The Screening
·~
c Committee cannot be faulted for that.
.._

27. The· respondents ~re trying to draw mileage from the
fact that in their application and/or attestation form they have
disclosed their involvement ih a criminal case. We do not see
D how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of the$e facts in
)(
the application/attestation form is an .essential requirement. An
aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and
integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force. The
respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie
E points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has no
relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition to state that
While deciding whether a person against whom a criminal case
was registered and who was later acquitted or discharged
should be appointed to a post in the police force, what is A,
F relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of his
involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an
acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses
turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the
prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in
G similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only ~ •
be taken by the Screening Committee created for that purpose
by the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee's decision is
not ma/a fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then,
it cannot be questioned.
H 28. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 461
SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
-' f- great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public A
order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence
in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing
to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude.
He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person
having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if 8
he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal
or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he
has been completely exonerated in the case because even a
_) > possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to
the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, c
has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to
the Screening Committee. The decision _of the Screening
Committee must be taken as final unless it is ma/a fide. In
recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished.
.. ,.. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner
by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of
D
concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating.
In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance
and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee
created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are
E
likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the
same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the
importance of trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates
with even hand.
~

29. The Screening Committee's proceedings have been F
assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. But, in the
present cases, we see no evidence of this. However, certain
instances have been pointed out where allegedly persons
involved in serious offences have been recommended for
. .,,. appointment by the Screening Committee. It is well settled that G
to such cases the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14
of the Constitution of India is not attracted. This doctrine does
not envisage negative equality (Fuljit Kaur). It is not meant to
perpetuate illegality or fraud because it embodies a positive
concept. If the Screening Committee which is constituted to H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 13 S.C.R.

A carry out the object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that ~· -
people with doubtful background do not enter the police force,
deviates from the policy, makes exception and allows entry of
undesirable persons, it is undoubtedly guilty of committing an
act of grave disservice to the police force but we cannot allow
B that illegality to be perpetuated by allowing the respondents to
rely on such cases. It is for the Commissioner of Police, Delhi
to examine whether the Screening Committee has
compromised the interest of the police force in any case and
to take remedial action if he finds that it has done so. Public
c interest demands an in-depth examination of this allegation at
the highest level. Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are
responsible for the spurt in police excesses. We expect the
Commissioner of Police, Delhi to look into the matter and if
there is substance in the allegations to take necessary steps
D forthwith so that policy incorporated in the Standing Order is
strictly implemented. '"

30. Our attention is drawn to certain orders of this Court
where, according to the respondents, special leave petitions
filed by the State, arising out of similar fact situations, have
E been dismissed. It is not necessary for us to state that in limine
dismissal of special leave petition does not mean that this
Court has affirmed the judgment or the action impugned therein.
The order rejecting the special leave petition at the threshold
without detailed reasons does not constitute any declaration of
F law or a binding precedent. This submission is, therefore,
rejected.

31. In the ultimate analysis, we are of the view that the
opinion formed by the Screening Committee in both these
cases which is endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner of
G Police (Recruitment), Delhi, that both the respondents are not
suitable for being appointed in the Delhi Police Force. does not
merit any interference. It is legally sustainable. The Tribunal and
the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the order of
cancellation of the respondents' candidature. In the
H
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. 463
MEHAR SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

circumstances, the appeals are allowed. The orders of the Delhi A
High Court impugned in both the appeals are set aside. The
cancellation of candidature of the respondents - Mehar Singh
and Shani Kumar is upheld.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals allowed. B