Holding

No mandamus can be issued to the Central Government to bring the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 into force, and Section 5 of the General Clauses Act does not apply where the legislature has expressly delegated the commencement power.

Summary

The petitioners, Common Cause, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Union of India to issue a Gazette notification under Section 1(3) of the Delhi Rent Act, 1995, which required the Central Government to fix the date of the Act’s commencement. The Central Government had not issued such a notification because pending amendments and representations from tenant groups prompted the drafting of a Delhi Rent (Amendment) Bill, 1997. The Supreme Court held that where Parliament expressly delegates the power to determine the commencement date to the executive, the court cannot issue mandamus to force that notification; the executive may consider relevant facts before acting. The Court further ruled that Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not apply when a specific provision (Section 1(3)) delegates the commencement power, and therefore the Act had not come into force. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The Central Government can be compelled by mandamus to issue a notification under Section 1(3) of the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 to bring the Act into force.
Whether Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deems the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 to be in force in the absence of a notification.
Whether the delegation of power to the executive to fix the commencement date precludes judicial intervention.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 111, s. Article 226, s. Article 245, s. Article 368
Delhi Rent Act, 1995s. 1(3)
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 5

Subjects

Delhi Rent Actmandamuscommencement dateGeneral Clauses Actlegislative delegationwrit petitionpublic interest litigationconstitutional amendment

Judgment

COMMON CAUSE A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

OCTOBER 8, 2003

[R.C. LAHOTI AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.] B

Delhi Rent Act, 1995-Section 1(3)-Enforcement ofAct-Delhi Rent
Bill, 1994 received Presidential assent-Bill enacted as Act and notified-
However, Parliament did not fix the date for coming into operation of the
Act and left it to the discretion of the Central Government-Writ of C
Mandµmus seeking issuance of notification in Official Gazette by Central
Government under Section 1(3) notifying the date for coming into force
ofthe Act-Maintainability of-Held: There were numerous representations
from tenant organisations demanding changes in the Delhi Rent Act, 1995
and as such Delhi Rent (Amendment) Bill was drafted and introduced in D
Rajya Sabha-Government accepted recommendations of Parliamentary
Standing Committee and sent the notice to Rajya Sabha to in~oduce the
Amendment Bill-As such the Government was aware of the problem-
Hence, the Writ ofMandamus cannot be issued to the Central Government
in view of the facts on record-Further, when legislature vested the power
in the Central Government to notify the date from which Act would come E
into force, Central Government is to take into consideration various facts
while considering the same-Delhi Rent (Amendment) :Act Bill, 1997-
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226.

Delhi Rent Act, 1995-Section 1(3)-Enforcement ofAct-Legislature F
providing that the date of coming into force of the Act would be a date
to be notified by the Central Government-Section 5 of the General
Clauses Act, application of-Held : Section 5 has no application to such
cases-It cannot be said that by virtue of Section 5, Act of 1995 has come
into force-Section 5 is applicable only when the Act does not express arry G
date with effect from which the Act would come into force-General
Clauses Act, 1897-Section 5.

Delhi Rent Bill, 1994 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on
26.8.1994 and was passed unanimously in the Rajya Sabha and in the
Lok Sabha. It received Presidential assent on 23.8.1995 and was H
471
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201J3] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A enacted as the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 and notified on 23.8.1995.
Parliament did not fix the date with effect from which the Act would /
come into operation and it was left to the discretion of the Central
Government to notify the date w.e.f. which the Act would come into
operation. Central Government did not notify the date. Appellant filed
B writ petition seeking writ of mandamus directing the~ Union of India
to issue a notification in. the Official Gazette, as contemplated under
Section 1(3) of the Act notifying the date for coming into force of the
Act. Union of India contended that on account of several representations
received from tenant organizations demanding changes in some of the
C provisions of the Act and the report of the All Party Committee
constituted to examine the same, Delhi Rent (Amendment) Bill, 1997
was drafted. It was introduced in the Rajya Sabha and was referred
to the Parliamentary Standing Committee which examined the same
and finalized its reports. The Government accepted the
D rec.ommendations of the Committee and thereafter, sent the notice to
the Secretary-General, Rajya Sabha to introduce the Amendment Bill.
However, due to the workload the Bill could not be taken up for
consideration in the Rajya Sabha and since the Government wanted
to introduce the Amendment Bill of 1997, the Original Act was not
notified and as such delayed. It was further submitted that the Court
E could not issue a writ of mandamus to the Central Government for the
enforcement of the Act.

Writ petition came up before the Division Bench of High Court.
The Bench issued limited mandamus and the Central Government filed
F an affidavit reporting compliance therewith and as such the writ
petition was disposed of. Hence the present appeals.

Appellant contended that on the President conveying his assent
to the Bill, a Bill is lawfully enacted and converts itself into an Act;
G and that as neither a particular date has been stipulated by the
Parliament in its enforcement nor the Parliament has expressed any
contrary intention by the prescription of permitting different dates
being stipulated for enforcement of different provisions of the Act, the
Act would be deemed to have come. i~to force in terms of provisions
H of section 5 of the General Claus~s Act.
COMMON CAUSE v. U.O.I. 473

Dismissing the appeals, the Court A
HELD : 1. In the instant case, on basis of the facts it cannot be
said that Government is not alive to the problem or is desirous of
ignoring the will of the Parliament. When the legislature itself had
vested the power in the Central Government to notify the date from B
which the Act would come into force, then, the Central Government
is entitled to take into consideration various facts including the facts
set out above while considering when the Act should be brought into
force or not. No mandamus can be issued to the C~ntral Government
to issue the notification contemplated under Section 1(3) of the Act to
bring the Act into force, keeping in view the facts brought on record C
and the consistent view of this Court. [487-F-G)

2.1. Section 5(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that
where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on
particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which D
it receives the assent'. Sub-clause (3) provides that 'unless the contrary
is expressed, a Central Act or Regulation shall be construed as coming
into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its
commencement'. Sub-section (3) has to be read as a corollary to sub-
section (1). [488-B-D)
E
2.2. Section ·5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is applicable only
when the Act does not express any date with effect from which the Act
would come into force. It will apply to such cases where there is no
provision like Section 1(3) of the Act or Section 1(2) of the 44th
Constitutional Amendment. When the Legislature itself provides that F
the date of coming into force of the Act would be a date to be notified
by the Central Government, Section 5 will have no application. It is
plain and evident from the language of the provision. It cannot be said
that by virtue of Section 5, the Delhi Rent Act, lcJ95 has come into
force. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act has no application.
Furthermore, it would not apply to cases where the legislature has. G
delegated the power to the executive to bring into force the Act from
a date to be notified by publication in the Officiai Gazette. [488-D-F]

A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982] 1 SCC 271, explained and
followed. H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A- Sardar Inder Singh v. State ofRajasthan, [1957]SCR 605; Sita Ram
Bishambhar Dayal v. State of UP., [1972] 4 SCC 485; Gwalior Rayon
Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. C.S.T, [1974] 4 SCC 98; Aeltemesh
Rein v. Union ofIndia, [1988] 4 SCC 54; Union ofIndia v. Shree Gajanan
Maharaj Sansthan, [2002) 5 SCC 44 and Prabhakaran Nair and Ors. v.
B State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1987] 4 SCC 238, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE WRISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3988-
3989 of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.3.2001 of the Delhi High
C Court in C.W. No. 1495 and C.M. No. 4409 of 1997
Arvind K. Nigam, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal and Ms. Shyomila Bakshi for
the Appellant.

P.P. Malhotra, S. Balakrishnan, Hemant Sharma, D.S. Mabra, K.L.
D Rathee, Ramesh N. Keswani and Ramlal Roy. ,for the Respondents

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAN, J. : Keeping in view the National Housing Policy and for
E rationalisation of rent laws to give incentive to the growth of the housing
in general and rental housing, in particular, and the observation made by
this Court in Prabhakaran Nair and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and
Others [1987] 4 SCC 238 to the following effect:

"The laws of landlord and tenant must be made rational, humane,
F certain and capable of being quickly implemented. Those landlords
who are having premises in their control should be induced and
encouraged to part with available accommodation for limited
periods on certain safeguards which will strictly ensure their
recovery when wanted. Men with money should be given proper
G and meaningful incentives as in some Europea_n countries to build
houses, tax holidays for new houses can be encouraged. The
tenants should also be given protection and security and certain
amount of reasonableness in the rent. Escalation of prices in the
urban properties, land, materials and houses must be rationally
H checked. This country very vitally and very urgently requires a
COMMON CAUSE v. U.O.I. [BHAN, J.] 475

National Housing Policy if we want to prevent a major breakdown A
of law and order and gradual disillusionment of people. After all
shelter is one of our fundamental rights. New national housing
policy m~st attract new buildings, encourage new buildings, make
available new spaces, rationalise the rent structure and rationalise
the rent provisions and bring certain amount ofuniformity though B
leaving scope for sufficient flexibility among the States to adjust
such legislation according to its needs. This Court and the High
Court should also be relieved of the heavy burdens of this rent
litigations. Tier of appeals should be curtailed. Laws must be
simple, rational and clear. Tenants are in all cases not the weaker
sections. There are those who are weak both among the landlords C
as well as the tenants. Litigations must come to end quickly. Such
new Housing Policy must comprehend the present and anticipate
the future. The idea of a National Rent Tribunal on an All India
basis with quicker procedure should be examined. This has
become an urgent imperative of today's revolution. A fast D
changing society cannot operate with unchanging law and
preconceived judicial attitude."

'Delhi Rent Act, 1995 (for short 'the Act') was enacted by the
Parliament. It was ineant to be the Model Rent Control Legislation
formulated by the CeP.tral Government and sent to the States to enable them E
to carry out necessary amendments to the prevalent rent control laws in
the States.

The Delhi Rent Bill, 1994 (for short 'the Bill') was introduced in the
Rajya Sabha on 26th August, 1994. It was passed unanimously in the F
Rajya Sabha on 29th May, 1995. Thereafter it was tabled in the Lok Sabha.
Lok Sabha unanimously passed the same on 3rd June, 1995. Presidential
assent was given to the Bill on 23rd August, 1995 and the same was
accordingly enacted as the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 (Act 33 of 1995) and
notified on 23rd August, 1995, as enacted. The Parliament did not fix the G
date w.e.f which the Act would come into operation. It was left to the
discretion of the Central Government to notify the date w.e.f. which the
Act would come into operation. Section 1(3) of the Act reads:

"(3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoin~." H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A As the Central Government did not notify the date, appellant filed writ
petition No.1495 of 1997 in the High Court of Delhi in public interest
seeking a writ or order in the nature of mandamus directing the Union of
India to forthwith and without delay issue a notification in the Official
Gazette, as contemplated under Section 1(3) of the Act notifying the date
B on which the said Act shall come into force in its present form.

In the written statement filed by the Union of India, it was stated that
a section of people, particularly trader tenants, launched an agitation
demanding changes in some of the provisions of the Act. In the wake of
C this agitation, the then Chief Minister, Government of NCT of Delhi
appointed an All Party Committee to examine the Act and make
recommendations for changes which could address the grievances of the
agitating groups. These primarily related to provisions of the Act
concerning deemed rent, registration of tenancies, inheritability of tenancies,
eviction, etc. Following the receipt of numerous representations and the
D All Party Committee Report, the entire issue was re-examined to decide
whether the Act should be notified as assented to by the President, or it
should be amended in the light of the representations that had been
received. · After detailed examination, it was finally decided to carry out
the amendments to the Act before notifying it. Accordingly the Delhi Rent
E (Amendment) Bill, 1997 was drafted and introduced in the Rajya Sabha
on 28th July, 1997. The Bill was referred to the Parliamentary Standing
Committee which examined the amendments suggested in depth. The
Parliamentary Standing Committee finalised its Report in December, 2000.
The Government considered the Report and accepted all the
F recommendations of the Committee on 3rd April, 2001 and notice for
moving the official amendments in respect of Delhi Rent (Amendment)
Bill, 1997 was accordingly sent to the Secretary General, Rajya Sabha in
July, 2001. Because of the workload the Bill could not be taken l;IP for
consideration in the Rajya Sabha and is expected to be taken up shortly.
Since the Government wanted to introduce the Amendments Bill of 1997,
G the Original Act was not notified .

. It wa~ further averred that the enforcement of the Act has been
delayed for the above stated reasons arid not for any other reason. It was
asserted that this Court could not issue a writ in the nature of mandamus
H to the Central Government for the enforcement of the Act. That it was
COMMON CAUSE v. U.O.I. [BHAN, J.] 477

normal and legally valid for the Parliament to delegate the authority to the A
Executive government to notify the date from which the Act would come
into force.

The writ petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench. One
of the learned Judges was of the view that a mandamus could be issued B
to the Union of India to bring the Act in force and accordingly issued the
following directions:

"In view of the above discussion, the writ petition succeeds and
the rule is made absolute. The respondent-Union of India is
directed to bring into force the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 (Act No.33 C
of 1995) by issuing an appropriate notification within six weeks
from today."

The other learned Judge, however, did not agree with the above
directions and was of the view that such an absolute mandamus could not D
be issued. According to him the only mandamus which could be issued
to the Government was to consider whether the time to bring into force
the Act has arrived or not. Accordingly the limited mandamus was issued
in the following terms:

" ... In my opinion only a limited mandamus in accordance with E
the Aeltmesh Rein's case (supra), can issue to the Central
Government to consider within 6 weeks whether the time to
enforce the Act has arrived and in this view of the matter I
respectfully disagree with the ultimate directions while agreeing
with the rest of the reasoning and discussion in the aforesaid F
judgment of my esteemed Brother Anil Dev Singh,J.

Ordered accordingly."

Because of the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges
the matter was referred to the third Judge. The third learned Judge did not G
agree with the view taken by either of the Judges. According to him,
keeping in view the position of law as understood by him it would not be
appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government
to bring the Act into force in its present form. That a limited mandamus
could be issued, but, keeping in view the position explained by the Union H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A oflndia that it does not want to bring the Act into force in its present fonn
and that it would be brought in force with certain amendments which are
pending consideration by the Parliament, even a limited mandamus could
not be issued. Accordingly, he passed the following order:

" ... Consequently. I am of the view that even a writ of mandamus
B as postulated by Aeltemesh Rein need not be issued, since the
response of the Central Government is already known. Moreover,
it is well settled that the Courts do not issue infructuous writs or
writs which are of an academic nature. However, since this is not
an issue before me, I leave it as that."
c
The third Judge directec !hat the case be listed before the Division
Bench for appropriate orders, subject to the orders of Hon'ble the Chief
Justice. Thereafter the matter was placed before the Division Bench.

Before the Division Bench, in response to the limited mandamus
D which had been issued in accordance with the view of the majority, the
Central Government filed an affidavit reporting compliance therewith. In
view of the affidavit of compliance the writ petition was ordered to be
disposed of. On an oral prayer made by the counsel for the petitioner the
Division Bench granted Certificate of Fitness under Article 134(A) of the
E Constitution of India for filing appeals to this· Court. Accordingly, the
present appeals have been filed.

Counsel for the appellant contended that legislative arena for Parliament
is exited once Article 111 of the Constitution is complied with. On the
President conveying his assent to the Bill, a Bill is lawfully enacted and
F converts itself into an Act. According to him, Parliament has used different
prescriptions to give effect to its mandate. The same are:

a) When the enactment itself stipulates the date for
implementation;
G b) When the enactment delegates its power to the executive to
appoint the date of enforcement and different dates may be
appointed for different provisions of the Act;

As per counsel submission when the enactment delegates its
H power to the executive to appoint the date of enforcement
COMMON CAUSE v. U.O.I. [BHAN, J.] 479

- but does not pennit different dates being appointed for A
different provisions of the Act, then the provisions of Section
5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 govern such enactments
and it comes into force as soon as the President gives his
assent to the Bill.
B
Section 5 of the General Clauses Act prescribes:

"5. Coming into operation ofenactments-(!) Where any Central
Act is not expressed to come into operation on particular day, then
it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the
assent, -- c
(a) in· the case of a Central Act made before the
commencement of the Constitution, of the Govemor-
General, and
D
(b) in the case of an Act of Parliament, of the President.

(2) omitted

(3) Unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or Regulation
shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the E
expiration of the day preceding its commencement."

According to the appellant, the Act was enacted as Act No.33 of 1995.
It was placed on the statute book by public notification in tenns of Article
366(18) of the Constitution on 23rd August, 1995. By this, the Act is now F
out of the legislative arena. As neither a particular date has been stipulated
by the Parliament in its enforcement nor the Parliament has expressed any
contrary intention by the prescription of pennitting different dates being
stipulated for enforcement of different provisions of the Act, the Act would
be deemed to have been come into force in tenns of provisions of Section
5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. G
Point in issue is not res-integra. This point was considered in depth
by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.K.Roy v. Union ofIndia, [1982]
l SCC 271. It was ~eld that an Act cannot be said to commence or put
in force unless it is brought into operation by a legislative enactment or H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A by exercise of authority by the delegatee empowered to bring the Act into
operation by issuing the necessary notification. When enforcement of a
statute or a provision therein is left to the discretion of the government
-
without laying down any objective standards, no writ or mandamus can be
issued to the government to enforce the statute or any of the provisions
B of the statute.

In A.K.Roy's case (supra), this Court was examining the Constitution
(Amendment) Act, 1978 which was passed by both Houses of Parliament
and assented to by the President of India. Section 1(2) of the Amending
.. .Act read as-under:
c
"It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government .
may by notification in the official Gazette appoint and different
dates may be appointed for different provisions of the Act."

D This Court examined the point regarding the interpretation to be put
o~ Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act; the consequences of the
-failure of the Central Government to issue a notification under Section 1(2)
for bringing into force the provisions of 44th Amendment Act within a
reasonable time, and, the question, as to whether despite the provisions
contained in Section 1(~), the 44th Amendment must be deemed to have
E come into force on the date on which the President gave his assent to it.
Another question examined was as to whether Section.1(2) of the 44th
Amendment Act was severable from the rest of the provisions or if that
Section was bad for any other reason.

F The point was examined in depth from various angles including the
constitutional validity of Section 1(2); the power of the constituent to
delegate its power to bring into force the Act to the executive; as to whether
there was any internal· contradiction between the provisions of Article
368(2) and those of Section 1(2) of the Constitution 44th Amendment Act,
G and, as to whether, since the Central Government had failed to exercise
its power within a reasonable time the Court could. issue a mandamus
calling upon the Central Government to discharge its duties without any
further delay.

After due consideration, this Court by a majority of 3:2 upheld the
H constitutional validity of Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act and the
COMMON CAUSE v. U.0.1. [BHAN, J.] 481

power of the Parliament to delegate its authority to an outside agency. It A
was held that no mandamus could be issued to the Central Government to
bring into force the Act. Drawing a distinction between the Constitution
standing amended (in our case the enactment of the Act) in accordance
with the terms of the Bill assented to by the President and the date of
coming into force of the amendment, thus, introduced in the Constitution, B
it was observed that there was no internal contradiction between the
provisions of Article 368(2) and those of Section 1(2) of the 44th
Amendment Act. That Article 368(2) lays down a general rule of
application to a date from which the Constitution would stand amended
in accordance with the Bill assented to by the President whereas Section
1(2) of the amended Act specifies the manner in which the Act or any of C
its provisions would be brought into force. The distinction was pointed
out in the following words:

"The distinction is between the Constitution standing amended in
accordance with the terms of the Bill assented to by the President D
and the date of the coming into force of the Amendment thus
introduced into the Constitution. For determining the date with
effect from which the Constitution stands amended in accordance
with the terms of the Bill, one has to tum to the date on which
the President gave, or was obliged to give, his assent to the
Amendment. For determining the date with effect from which the E
Constitution, as amended, came or will come into force, one has
to tum to the notification, if any, issued by the Central Government
under Section 1(2) of the Amendment Act."

It was held that the 44th Amendment Act itself prescribes by enacting F
Section 1(2) a pre-condition which must be satisfied before any of its
provisions could come into force. The pre-condition was the issuance of
a notification by the Central Government duly published in the Official
Gazette, appointing the date from which the Act or any particular provision
thereof will come into force. None of the provisions of 44th Amendment G
Act could come into operation until the Central Government issues a
notification as contemplated by Section 1(2). It was held in para 47 as
under:

"The Amendment Act may provide that the amendment introduced
by it shall come into force immediately upon the President giving H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A his assent to the Bill or it may provide that the amendment shall
come into force on a future date. Indeed, no. objection can be " ..
~

taken to the constituent body itself appointing a specific future
date with effect from which the Amendment Act will come into
force; and if that be so, different dates can be appointed by it for
bringing into force different provisions of the Amendment Act.
---
j;

B I<
The point of the matter is that the Constitution standing amended
in accordance with the terms of the Bill and the amendment thus
introduced into the Constitution coming into force are two distinct
things. Just as a law duly passed by the legislature can have no
effect unless it comes or is brought into force, similarly, an
c amendment of the Constitution can have no effect unless it comes
or is brought into force. The fact that the constituent body may
itself specify a future date or dates with effect from which the
Amendment Act or any of its provisions will come into force

D
shows that there is no antithesis between Article 368(2) of the
Constitution and Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act. The
,..
expression of legislative or constituent will as regards the date of
enforcement of the law or Constitution is an integral part thereof.
I
That is why it is difficult to accept the submission that, contrary
to the expression of the constituent will, the amendments introduced
E by the 44th Amendment Act came into force on April 30, 1979
when the President gave his assent to that Act. The true position ,_
is that the amendments introduced by the 44th Amendment Act
did not become a part of the Constitution on April 30, 1979. They
will acquire that status only when the Central Government brings
them into force by issuing a notification under Section 1(2) of the
F Amendment Act."

The Bench also considered the Constitutional validity of Section 1(2)
of the 44th Amendment Act. Repelling the argument that the constituent
power must be exercised by the constituent body itself and that it could
G not be delegated by it to the executive or any other agency, it was observed
in para 48 as follows:

" ... For determining this question, it is necessary to bear in mind
that by 'constituent power' is meant the power to frame or amend ..
H the Constitution. The power of amendment is conferred upon the
COMMON CAUSE v. U.0.1. [BHAN, J.] 483
Parliament by Article 368( l ), which provides that the Parliament A
may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of
addition, variation or repeal any provision of the Constitution in
accordance with the procedure laid down in that article. The
power thus conferred on the Parliament is plenary subject to the
limitation that it cannot be exercised so as to alter the basic B
structure or framework of the Constitution. It is well settled that
the power conferred upon the Parliament by Article 245 to make
laws is plenary within the field of legislation upon which that
power can operate. That power, by the terms of Article 245, is
subject only to the provisions of the Constitution. The constituent C
power, subject to the limitation aforesaid, cannot be any the less
plenary than the legislative power, especially when the power to
amend the Constitution and the power to legislate are conferred
on one and the same organ of the State, namely, the Parliament.
The Parliament may have to follow a different procedure while
exercising its constituent power under Article 368 than the D
procedure which it has to follow while exercising its legislative
power under Article 245. But the obligation to follow different
procedures while exercising the two different kinds of power
cannot make any difference to the width of the power. In either
event, it is plenary, subject in one case to the constraints of the E
basic structure of the Constitution and in the other, to the
provisions of the Constitution."

Contention that after amendment of the Constitution, by virtue of
Article 368(2) of the Constitution, the Constitution stood amended as F
enacted, it was held:

" .. .It is, therefore, permissible to the Parliament to vest in an
outside agency the power to bring a constitutional amendment into
force. In the instant case, that power is conferred by the
Parliament on another organ of the State, namely, the executive, G
which is responsible to the Parliament for all its actions. The
Parliament does not irretrievably lose its power to bring the
Amendment into force by reason of the empowerment in favour
of the Central Government to bring it into force. If the Central
Government fails to do what, according to the Parliament, it ought H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to have done, it would be open to the Parliament to delete Section
1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act by following the due procedure
and to bring into force that Act or any of its provisions."

Coming to the next question as to whether legislature could delegate
its power to bring a law into force to the executive or an outside agency,
B it was held that it could do so. On a detailed consideration, it was held
in para 50 as follows:

" .... They read the Privy Council decisions as laying down that
conditional legislation is permissible whereby the legislature
c entrusts to an outside agency the discretionary power to select the
time or place· to enforce the law. As stated by Shri H.M.Seervai
in his Constitutional Law oflndia (2nd ed., p.1203): "The making
of laws is not an end in itself, but is a means to an end, which
the legislature desires to secure. That end may be secured directly
by the law itself. But there are many subjects ~f legislation in
D
which the end is better secured by extensive delegation of
legislative power". There are practical difficulties in the
enforcement of law contemporaneously with their enactment as
also in their uniform extension to different areas. Those difficulties
cannot be foreseen at the time when the laws are made. It,
E therefore, becomes necessary .to leave to the judgment of an
outside agency the question as to when·the law should be brought ·
into force and to which areas it should be extended from time to
time. What is permissible to the legislature by way of conditional
legislation cannot be considered impermissible to the Parliament
F when, in the exercise <?f its constituent power, it takes the view
that the question as regards the time of enforcement of a
constitutional amendment should be left to the judgment of the
executive. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section 1(2) of
the 44th Amendment Act is not ultra vires the power of amendment
G conferred upon the Parliament by Article 368(1) of the
Consti~tion."

In Para 51, it was observed:

" ..... The executive is responsible to the Parliament and if the
H Parliament considers that the executive has betrayed its trust by
COMMON CAUSE v. U.0.1. [BHAN, J:] 485

not bringing any provision of the Amendment into force, it can A
censure the executive. It would be quite anomalous that the
inaction of the executive should have the approval of the Parliament
and yet we should show our disapproval of it by issuing a
mandamus ..... "
B
Rejecting the argument that Section 1(2) of the 44th Amendment Act
was bad because it vested an uncontrolled power in the executive, it was
observed that in similar and even more extensive delegation of powers to
the executive had been upheld by this Court over the years. Reference was
made to a number of decisions such as Sardar Inder Singh v. State of
Rajasthan, [ 1957] SCR 605, Sita Ram Bishambhar Dayat v. State of U.P. C
[ 1972] 4 SCC 485 and Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Asstt.
c.s.r., [1974] 4 sec 98.
Again this point was considered by this Court in Aeltemesh Rein v.
Union ofIndia, [ 1988] 4 sec 54. There the government had failed to issue D
a notification to bring into force Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961
into operation for a period of 30 years. A writ petition was filed seeking
a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government to issue a notification
to bring into force Section 30 of the Advocates Act with immediate effect.
Following the judgment in A.K. Roy's case (supra), it held that such a E
mandamus could not be issued. It was observed:

" .... Dealing with a similar question a Constitution Bench of this
Court in A.K.Roy v. Union ofIndia has taken the view that a writ
in the nature of mandamus directing the Central Government to
bring a statute or a provision in a statute into force in exercise of F
powers conferred by Parliament in that statute cannot be issued.
Chandrachud, CJ., who spoke for the majority of the Constitution
Bench has observed at pages 314 to 316 of the Report thus : [SCC
pp. 310-12 :SCC(Cri) pp.188-89, paras 51 and 52]
G
But we find ourselves unable to intervene in a matter
of this nature by issuing a mandamus to the Central
Government obligating it to bring the provisions of
Section 3 into force. The Parliament having left to the
unfettered judgment of the Central Government the H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A question as regards the time for bringing the provisions
of the Forty-fourth Amendment into force, it is not for
the court to compel the government to do that which,
according to the mandate of the Parliament, lies in its
discretion to do when it considers· it opportune to do
it. The executive is responsible to the Parliament and
B
if the Parliament considers that the executive has
betrayed its trust by not bringing any provision of the
amendment into force,_it can censure the executive. It
would be quite anomalous that the inaction of the
executive should have the approval of the Parliament
c and yet we should show our disapproval ofit by issuing
a mandamus..... . But, the Parliament has left the
matter to the judgment of the Central Government
without prescribing any objective nonns. That makes
it difficult for us to substitute our own judgment for that
D of the government on the question whether Section 3
of the Amendment Act should be brought into
force ...... .It is for these reasons that we are unable to
accept the submission that by issuing a mandamus, the
Central Government must be compelled to bring the
E provisions of Section 3 of the Forty-fourth Amendment
into force ...... "

It was further observed:

" ..... As long as the majority view expressed in the above decision
F holds the field it is not operi to this Court to issue a writ in the
nature of mandamus directing the Central Government to bring
Section 30 of the Act into force. But, we are of the view that this
decision does not come in the way of this Court issuing a writ in
the nature of mandamus to the Central Government to consider
G whether the time for bringing Section 30 of the Act into force has
arrived or not.. ... "

This point was again considered by this Court in a recent case in
Union of India v. Shree Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan, [ 2002] 5 SCC 44.
H It was observed in para 7, as follows:
COMMON CAUSE v. U.0.1. [BHAN, J.] 487

" ... .It, therefore, became necessary to leave the jud&_,ment to the A
executive as to when the law should be brought into force. When
enforcement of a provision in a statute is left to the discretion of
the Government without laying down any objective standards, no
writ of mandamus could be issued directing the government to
consider the question whether the provision should be brought B
into force and when it can do so. Delay in implementing the will
of Parliament may draw adverse criticism but on the data placed
before us, we cannot say that the Government is not alive to the
problem or is desirous of ignoring the will of Parliament."

In the present case, the Government received several representations C
from tenant organisations demanding changes in some of the provisions
and the Government on receipt of numeral representations constituted an
All Party Committee to re-examine as to whether the Act should be
notified or it should be amended in the light of the representations received.
After detailed examination, it was finally decided to carry out certain D
amendments to the Act. Accordingly, Delhi Rent (amendment) Bill was
drafted and introduced in the Rajya Sabha. The Amendment Bill was
referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee which examined the
amendments suggested in depth. The Parliamentary Standing Committee
finalised its reports in December, 2000. The Government after considering E
the Report accepted the recommendations of the Committee on 3rd April,
2001 and thereafter the notice was sent to the Secretary-General, Rajya
Sabha to introduce the Amendment Bill.

... From the facts placed before us it cannot be said that Government'
is not alive to the problem or is desirous of ignoring the will of the F
Parliament. When the legislature itself had vested the power in the Central
Government to notify the date from which the Act would come into force,
then, the Central Government is entitled to take into consideration various
facts including the facts set out above while considering when the Act
should be brought into force or not. No mandamus can be issued to the G
Central Government to issue the notification contemplated under Section
1(3) of the Act to bring the Act into force, keeping in view the facts brought
on record and the consistent view of this Court.

The submission that by virtue of Section 5 of General Clauses Act,
the Act has come into force is misconceived. Section 5 of the General H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A Clauses Aclt has no application. Section 5 is applicable only when the Act
does not express any date with effect from which the Act would come into
force. It will apply to such cases where there is no provision like Section
1(3) of the Act or Section 1(2) of the 44th Constitutional Amendment.
When the Legislature itself provides that the date of coming into· force of
B the Act would be a date to be notified by the Central Government, Section
5 of the General Clauses Act will have no application. It is plain and
evident from the language of the provision. Section 5(1) provides that
'where any Central Act is not expressed io come into operation on
particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which it
C receives the assent'. Sub-clause (3) provides that 'unless the contrary is
expressed, a Central Act or Regulation shall be construed as coming into
operation. immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its
commencement'.' In simple words it would mean that unless otherwise
provided a Central Act would come into operation on the date it receives
Presidential assent and is construed as coming into operation immediately
D on the date preceding its commencement. Thus, if a Central Act is assented
by the President on 23.8.1995 then it would be construed to have come
into operation on the mid-night between 22nd and 23rd August, 1995.
Sub-section (3) has to be read as a corollary to sub-section (1). Sub-section
(I) provides that the Act would come into operation on the date it receives
E the assent of the President where a particular day w.e.f. which the Act
would come into force is not prescribed whereas sub-section (3) provides
the exact time of the day/night when the Act would come into force. It

F
would not apply to cases where the legislature has delegated the power to
the executive to bring into force the Act from a date to be notified by
publication in the Official Gazette.
..
For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in these appeals
and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.

N.J. Appeals dismissed.