Holding

The appellate court held that the trial court correctly acquitted the accused as the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

Summary

The complainant, Somabhai Hirabhai Bagada, alleged that neighbours damaged his agricultural boundary and, when he objected, a group of accused approached him armed, insulted him with caste-based slurs, and assaulted him, with one accused facilitating their escape. The trial court acquitted all accused of offences under the IPC, the Atrocities Act, and the Gujarat Police Act, finding the prosecution evidence unreliable and contradictory. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court erred by discarding substantial oral and documentary evidence and misapplying Section 149 IPC and the Atrocities Act. The respondents contended that the complainant’s testimony was inconsistent, no independent witnesses corroborated caste insults, and essential elements of the offences were not proved. The High Court re‑examined the evidence, noted material contradictions in the complainant’s statements, and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court’s acquittal and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing the judgment of acquittal
Whether the Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses
Whether the impugned judgment suffers from any illegality or perversity

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 173, s. 372, s. 419, s. 438
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 143, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 352, s. 504, s. 506(2)
Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955s. 7(1)(d)
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(1)(r), s. 3(1)(s), s. 3(1)(x), s. 3(2)(5-A), s. 3(2)(5)(a)

Subjects

Atrocities ActIPC offencesAcquittalAppellate reviewEvidence appraisalSection 149 IPCCaste discriminationCriminal ProcedureBurden of proofDouble presumption

Judgment

R/CR.A/1755/2024 ORDER DATED: 13/08/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 1755 of 2024
==========================================================
SOMABHAI HIRABHAI BAGADA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MRS REKHA H KAPADIA(2246) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR RATHIN P RAVAL(5013) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No.
2,3,4,5,6
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 13/08/2026
ORAL ORDER

1. The appellant- original complainant-victim has preferred
this appeal under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 now Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagrik
Suraksha Sahnita (hereinafter be referred to as the “BNSS”)
against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 14.06.2024
passed by the learned Special Judge (Atrocity) and 4 th
Additional Sessions Judge, Amreli (hereinafter be referred to
as “the Trial Court”) in Special (Atrocity) Case No.26 of 2016
whereby the Trial Court has acquitted the respondents
accused from the charges under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149,
352, 504 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be
referred to as the “IPC”) r/w Section 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(5)(a) of
the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, (hereinafter be referred to as the “Atrocities
Act”) r/w the provision of Section 135 of G.P. Act.

2. The brief facts leading to present appeal are that the

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complainant, Somabhai Hirabhai Bagada, lodged the FIR
stating that his agricultural land is situated within the limits
of Village Nilvada, on the Taivadar road. Adjoining the
complainant’s land, the land of original accused No.5,
respondent No.5 herein, is situated, wherein work relating to
a Windmill (Pavan Chakki) was being carried out. In
connection with the said work, the accused had damaged the
boundary of the complainant’s field and constructed a road
through his land. When the complainant questioned the
accused about the same, original accused Nos.1 to 4 and
other persons, in furtherance of their common object and
pursuant to a conspiracy, came towards the complainant
armed with deadly weapons. Original accused No.1 was
armed with a stick, original accused No.2 was armed with an
iron pipe, original accused No.3 was armed with a knife, and
original accused No.4 was armed with a stick. All the accused
abused the complainant and insulted him by referring to his
caste. Accused No.2, Gabharubhai, assaulted the complainant
with an iron pipe and inflicted an injury on his head with an
intention to cause his death. Accused No.5 facilitated the
escape of the other accused in his Bolero vehicle.

2.1 Accordingly, the complainant-appellant herein lodged an
FIR being C.R. No.45 of 2016 with Babara Talluka Police
Station for the above mentioned offences. Thereafter, the
accused were arrested pursuant to the registration of the FIR
and, after completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet
under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed
before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, and the

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case was registered accordingly. As the offences were
exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned
Magistrate committed the case to the learned Sessions Court,
Amreli, in accordance with law. Upon committal, the case was
registered as Special Atrocity Case No.26 of 2016 before the
Trial Court Amreli.

2.2 Thereafter, charge was framed at Exh.8, and the pleas of
the accused were recorded at Exhs.9 to 13. The accused
denied the allegations levelled against them, pleaded not
guilty, and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the trial
proceeded further. During the course of the trial.

2.3 The prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses and
produced 16 documentary evidences in support of its case
against the accused which read as under:-

Oral Evidence

Sr. Exh. Name of Witness Witness Details
No. No.
1 28 Somabhai Hirabhai Bagda Complainant
2 34 Govindbhai Becharbhai Parmar Panch of the place of
incident
3 37 Raghubhai Nathabhai Ratadiya Panch of arrest of Accused
4 39 Bharatbhai Dhanjibhai Pilukiya Panch of arrest of Accused
5 41 Jaydipbhai Mulubhai Vala Panch of arrest of Accused
6 45 Chhaganbhai Valjibhai Baraiya Panch of arrest of Accused
7 47 Deepakbhai Mohanbhai Parmar Panch of seizure of
Muddamal
8 50 Mukeshbhai Thakorbhai Panch of seizure of
Makwana Muddamal
9 51 Vishalbhai Ramjibhai Baraiya Panch of arrest of Accused
10 53 Karansingh Bhavsingh Witness

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Chauhan
11 56 Kamleshbhai Surmanji Kotwal Witness
12 65 Nileshbhai Somabhai Bagda Witness
13 68 Kanjibhai Laljibhai Bagda Witness
14 73 Pareshbhai Waghjibhai Bagda Witness
15 77 Bavkubhai Dadubhai Khachar Witness
16 83 Gordhanbhai Talshibhai Witness
Parmar
17 86 Govindbhai Badhabhai Witness
Khimsuriya
18 94 Bhagwanbhai Gagubhai Investigating Officer (I.O.)
Bharwad
19 99 Ashokbhai Govindbhai Gohil The officer who has
registered the complaint.

Documentary Evidence.
Sr. Exh. Description of Document
No. No.
1 29 Complaint
2 35 Panchnama of scene of offence
3 38 Panch of arrest of Accused
4 42 Panch of arrest of Accused
5 46 Panch of arrest of Accused
6 48 Panchnama of seizure of Muddamal
7 54 Notification of Arms Prohibition
8 57 True copy of register page regarding issuance of Caste
Certificate
9 58 True copy of Caste Certificate
10 59 True copy of supporting documents for issuance of Caste
Certificate
11 84 Proof of residence of accused No. 5 issued by Sukhpur
Gram Panchayat
12 87 Certificate from Nilvada Gram Panchayat regarding the
caste of Accused No. 4.
13 88 Certificate from Nilvada Gram Panchayat regarding the
caste of Accused No. 1.
14 89 Certificate from Nilvada Gram Panchayat regarding the
caste of Accused No. 2.

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15 90 Certificate from Nilvada Gram Panchayat regarding the
caste of Accused No. 3.
16 95 Depute Order

2.4 After hearing both the sides and after evaluation the
evidence placed on record, the trial Court has acquitted the
accused of the charges levelled against them vide judgment
and order dated 14.06.2024 passed in Special (Atrocity) Case
No.26 of 2016.

2.5 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order of Trial Court acquitting the present
respondents accused, the original claimant has preferred
present appeal.

3. Heard Ms.Rekha Kapadia, learned counsel for the
appellant, Mr. Dave, learned counsel for Mr. Rathin Raval,
learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 6 and Ms. Jirga
Jhaveri, learned APP for the respondent No.1-State.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant, referring to the
depositions of the witnesses and upon perusal of the
impugned judgment, contended before the Court that the Trial
Court had committed serious errors of law and facts in
passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal in
favour of the respondents. She further contended that,
although the prosecution had produced both oral and
documentary evidence, as referred to in the impugned
judgment, the Trial Court had discarded the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses on the basis of minor discrepancies and
contradictions. The impugned judgment and order was,

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therefore, bad in law and deserved to be quashed and set
aside, and the appeal deserved to be allowed.

4.1 The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
Trial Court had failed to properly appreciate the oral and
documentary evidence led by the prosecution and had thereby
committed a serious error in law. She submitted that the Trial
Court had erroneously disbelieved the prosecution case and
acquitted the respondents of the charges levelled against
them.

4.2 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court is
contrary to the evidence on record, provisions of law and
settled legal principles. The Trial Court has erred in
acquitting the accused despite the prosecution having led
sufficient oral and documentary evidence to establish the
charges under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 352, 504 and
506(2) of the IPC, Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(5-A) of the
Atrocities Act and Section 135 of the G.P. Act beyond
reasonable doubt.

4.3 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
complainant, examined at Exh.28, fully supported the FIR and
specifically deposed regarding the overt acts of the accused,
the weapons carried by them, the assault, caste-related
abuses and threats. The panch witnesses and other
prosecution witnesses, including the witnesses to the
panchnamas, notification, caste certificate, Investigating
Officer and PSO, also supported the prosecution case.

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4.4 The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted
that the complainant had identified the weapons recovered
from the accused and that the panchnama of the scene of
offence established that the boundary and fencing of the
complainant's field had been damaged and a road had been
made through the field. The oral and documentary evidence,
when considered cumulatively, clearly established the
prosecution case.

4.5 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
Trial Court erred in discarding the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and in giving undue importance to
minor contradictions and omissions which did not go to the
root of the case. Even the evidence of hostile witnesses, to the
extent it supported the prosecution, ought to have been
considered. The Trial Court also failed to properly appreciate
the evidence of the Investigating Officer and PSO.

4.6 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in
view of Section 149 of the IPC, once the common object of the
unlawful assembly is established, it is not necessary to prove
an individual overt act against each accused. The Trial Court
therefore committed an error in appreciating the individual
roles of the accused in isolation.

4.7 The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal suffers from
misappreciation of evidence and settled principles of law,
resulting in miscarriage of justice, and deserves to be quashed

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and set aside.

5. On the other hand, Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the
respondents, contended that the prosecution had failed to
establish the charges levelled against the respondents. He
submitted that, upon perusal of the deposition of PW-1, i.e.
the complainant himself, it was evident that, during his cross-
examination, he had admitted that he had not sustained any
injury and had not been referred to any doctor. He further
submitted that, in paragraphs 10 to 16 of his deposition, the
complainant had substantially contradicted and undermined
his own case. Therefore, in view of the complainant’s own
deposition, the prosecution had failed to prove the alleged
offences against the respondents.

5.1 So far as the independent witnesses were concerned,
learned counsel for the respondents submitted that they had
not supported the prosecution case. With regard to the
offences under the provisions of the Atrocities Act, he
submitted that the Trial Court had rightly disbelieved the
prosecution case, as no independent witness had supported
the allegations regarding the use of filthy or caste-based
words with an intention to insult the complainant on account
of his caste.

5.2 Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that,
as per the prosecution case, at about 10:00 a.m., the
complainant was informed by one Sukhabai Channabhai
Rathod that the erection of the windmill had commenced and
that the boundary wall of his agricultural field had been

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damaged. However, although said information was allegedly
conveyed to the complainant over the telephone no details
regarding the telephonic conversation were produced nor was
Sukhabai Channabhai Rathod examined as a prosecution
witness. The complainant had also referred to one Kanubhai
Kalubhai, who was not an accused in the present case.
Further, in paragraph 11 of his deposition, the complainant
admitted that the persons whom he had seen present near his
agricultural field and at the western boundary wall were not
the present accused. Thus, in the absence of any clinching or
cogent evidence led by the prosecution, the Trial Court had
rightly appreciated the evidence of the complainant and
acquitted the respondents. Therefore, no interference was
warranted in the present appeal preferred by the original
complainant.

5.3 Learned advocate appearing for the respondents-accused
submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court is just, legal, and proper and does
not call for any interference by this Court. It was submitted
that the Trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral as well as
documentary evidence available on record and has recorded
findings based on proper appreciation of facts and settled
principles of law.

5.4 Learned advocate for the respondents accused has further
submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish its case
beyond reasonable doubt. Learned advocate for the
respondents accused has submitted that the prosecution
failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt as mere

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examination of witnesses and production of documentary
evidences do not establish the guilt of the accused unless the
evidence is reliable and inspires confidence.

5.5 Learned advocate for the respondents accused has
submitted that the prosecution has failed to point out any
perversity, illegality or misreading of evidence in the
impugned judgment of the Trial Court and the appeal is
devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.

6. I have perused the relevant documents and material placed
on record. I have also gone through the judgment and order
passed by the Trial Court as well as the record and
proceedings.

7. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order, as well
as the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for
both sides, the issues that arises for consideration before this
Court are as under:-

Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal?

Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence of
the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of law or
fact?

Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
suffers from any illegality or perversity?

8. Now, in light of the aforesaid facts and the issues framed by
this Court for the purpose of determination, let us first
examine the facts of the present case. The complainant,
Somabhai Hirabhai Bagada, alleged that the accused

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damaged the boundary of his agricultural land at Village
Nilvada and constructed a road for windmill-related work on
adjoining land. When he objected, accused Nos.1 to 4
allegedly approached him armed with weapons, abused and
caste-insulted him, and accused No.2 assaulted him on the
head with an iron pipe with an intention to cause death.
Accused No.5 allegedly facilitated their escape in a Bolero
vehicle. Accordingly, FIR C.R. No.45 of 2016 was registered at
Babara Police Station. After investigation, a charge-sheet was
filed and the case was committed to the Sessions Court,
Amreli, where it was registered as Special (Atrocity) Case
No.26 of 2016. The prosecution examined 19 witnesses and
produced 16 documentary evidences. However, by judgment
dated 14.06.2024, the Trial Court acquitted all the accused.
Aggrieved by the acquittal, the original complainant has
preferred the present appeal.

9. Upon perusal of the evidence produced by the appellant,
including the depositions of the prosecution witnesses on
record, and upon closely examining the same, I am of the
opinion that the Trial Court has rightly recorded its findings
and reasons in paragraphs 30 to 36 of the impugned judgment
and order.

10. So far as the offences under the Atrocities Act are
concerned, the Trial Court, after referring to and relying upon
the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court,
examined the evidence in detail from paragraph 37 onwards
and, ultimately, recorded its findings and reasons in
paragraphs 38 to 41. The Trial Court rightly held that, in the

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absence of any cogent and reliable evidence produced by the
prosecution, the prosecution case could not be believed. After
considering the applicable legal principles enunciated by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in various decisions, the Trial Court
rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

11. Upon perusal of the deposition of PW-1, the complainant,
it is evident that his testimony suffers from material
contradictions and does not support the prosecution case.
Even during his cross-examination, he had admitted that he
had not sustained any injury and had not been referred to any
doctor. Further, the panch witnesses did not support the case
of the prosecution. Having carefully evaluated the entire
evidence on record, I am of the opinion that the Trial Court
has rightly appreciated the evidence and has committed no
error in passing the impugned judgment and order. Therefore,
no interference is warranted, and the appeal deserves to be
dismissed at the admission stage.

12. Further, it is required to be noted herein that at about
10:00 a.m., the complainant was informed by one Sukhabai
Channabhai Rathod that the erection of the windmill had
commenced and that the boundary wall of his agricultural
field had been damaged. The said details conveyed to the
complainant over the telephone, no details regarding the
telephonic conversation were produced nor was Sukhabai
Channabhai Rathod examined as a prosecution witness. Even
the complainant had also referred to one Kanubhai Kalubhai,
who was not an accused in the present case and in paragraph
11 of his deposition, the complainant admitted that the

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persons whom he had seen present near his agricultural field
and at the western boundary wall were not the present
accused. Therefore, in the absence of any clinching or cogent
evidence led by the prosecution, the Trial Court had rightly
appreciated the evidence of the complainant and acquitted the
respondents. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the Trial
Court has not committed any error in passing the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal.

13. Now, So far as basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of
Atrocity Act is concerned, it is relevant to refer the decision of
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shajan Skaria Versus
State Of Kerala reported in 2024-AIR(SC)-0-4557 more
particularly head notes (d) to (h) which reads as under:-
“(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u) - decline to grant anticipatory bail - when can it be said
that a prima facie case is made out in a given FIR/complaint - held,
'prima facie' is a Latin term that translates to "at first sight" or
"based on first impression" - expression "where no prima facie
materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint or FIR" should be
understood as "when based on first impression, no offence is made
out as shown in FIR or complaint" - this means that when
necessary ingredients to constitute offence under the Act, 1989 are
not made out upon reading of complaint, no case can be said to
exist prima facie.

(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Constitution of India - Art. 226 - rejection of
application for anticipatory bail - legal bar - duty of Court - in
present case, an accused may argue that although allegations
levelled in FIR or complaint do disclose commission of an offence
under the Act, 1989, yet FIR or complaint being palpably false on
account of political or private vendetta, Court should consider plea
for grant of anticipatory bail despite specific bar of S. 18 of the Act,
1989 - however, if accused puts forward case of malicious
prosecution on account of political or private vendetta then the
same can be considered only by High Court in exercise of its
inherent powers u/S. 482 of CrPC or in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution - however, powers

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u/S. 438 of CrPC cannot be exercised once contents of
complaint/FIR disclose a prima facie case - thus, if all ingredients
necessary for constituting offence are borne out from complaint,
then remedy of anticipatory bail becomes unavailable to accused -
duty to determine prima facie existence of case is cast upon courts
with a view to ensure that no unnecessary humiliation is caused to
the accused - Courts should not shy away from conducting a
preliminary inquiry to determine if narration of facts in
complaint/FIR in fact discloses essential ingredients required to
constitute an offence under the Act, 1989 - it is expected of courts
to apply their judicial mind to determine whether allegations
levelled in complaint, on a plain reading, satisfy ingredients
constituting alleged offence application of judicial mind should be
independent and without being influenced by the provisions
figuring inLicenced to : Shri.Ashish Modi (Judicial Academy)
complaint/FIR - words "having committed an offence under this
Act" denote that it is only when accusation in complaint clearly
points towards commission of an offence under the Act, 1989 that
bar of S. 18 would apply - minimum threshold for determining
whether an offence under the Act has been committed or not is to
ascertain whether all ingredients which are necessary to constitute
offence are prima facie disclosed in complaint or not - accusation
which does not disclose necessary ingredients of offence on a
prima facie reading cannot be said to be sufficient to bring into
operation bar envisaged by S. 18 of the Act, 1989 - in cases like the
one in hand, Courts should have the discretion to look into
materials based upon which complaint has been registered, in
addition to verifying the averments made in the complaint - if on a
prima facie reading of materials referred to in complaint and
complaint itself, ingredients necessary for constituting offence are
not made out, then bar of S. 18 would not be applicable - hence, it
would be open to Courts to consider plea for grant pre-arrest bail
on its own merits.

(f) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u) - whether averments in
FIR/complaint in question disclose commission of any offence u/S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 held, no - in present case appellant is
alleged to have published a video on YouTube, containing a slew of
reckless statements in the form of allegations levelled against
complainant - there is nothing in transcript of uploaded video to
indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by
appellant only on account of fact that complainant belongs to a SC
- from nature of allegations made by appellant, it appears that he is
at inimical terms with complainant - his intention may be to malign
or defame him but not on ground or for reason that complainant
belongs to a Scheduled Caste - offence u/S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989
is not established merely on fact that complainant is a member of a
SC or ST, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member
for reason that he belongs to such community - S. 3(1)(r) of the
Act, 1989 is attracted where reason for intentional insult or

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intimidation is that person who is subjected to it belongs to a SC or
ST - object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide
stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted
towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the
reason of their caste status.

(g) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r) - expression "intent to humiliate" -
words "with intent to humiliate" as they appear in text of S. 3(1)(r)
of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to caste identity of person
who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation - not every
intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST
community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation - it
is only in those cases where intentional insult or intimidation takes
place either due to prevailing practice of untouchability or to
reinforce historically entrenched ideas like superiority of the
"upper castes" over the "lower castes/untouchables", notions of
purity and pollution, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or
intimidation of type envisaged by the Act, 1989 - mere fact that
person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a SC or ST
would not attract offence u/S. 3(1)(r) unless it was intention of
accused to subject concerned person to caste-based humiliation -
humiliation is not so much a physical injury but is in the nature of a
psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar on the heart -
distinction between systemic and regimented humiliation -
resistance is internal to humiliation - thus, those who are
humiliated also inherently possess capacity to protest against it -
however, those who protest also run risk of inciting opposition
from those who want to push traditionally humiliated groups to
margins - this apprehension of opposition and push back from
dominant against marginalised is also evident from Statements of
Objects of the Act, 1989 - thus, term humiliation as it appears in S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it
deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation
is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.

(h) Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 - S. 7(1)(d) - Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 -
S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 -
grant of anticipatory bail - legal bar - it is clear from a plain
reading of provision of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act that any insult
against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the
ground of "untouchability" was punishable with imprisonment for a
maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act - Civil
Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based
offences and the practice of "untouchability", leading to enactment
of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for
combating such practices - S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus,
be seen in the context of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act - thus, words
"with an intent to humiliate a member of a SC or ST" become

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inseparable from underlying idea of "untouchability" which is
sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989 - having
regard to reprehensible conduct and nature of derogatory
statements made, appellant, at best could be said to have prima
facie committed offence of defamation punishable u/S. 500 of IPC -
if that be so, it is always open for complainant to prosecute
appellant accordingly - however, complainant could not have
invoked provisions of the Act, 1989 only on premise that he is
member of SC, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of
transcript of video and complaint fails to disclose that actions of
appellant were impelled by caste identity of complainant.

14. In the decision in the case of Sohanvir @ Sohanvir
Dhama Versus State Of U.P. reported in 2025 (4) Crimes
375 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-

“9. In order to examine this contention, it is necessary to refer to
Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as under: 3.
Punishments for offences of atrocities. (1) Whoever, not being a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (s) abuses any
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name
in any place within public view;

10. The expression any place within public view has been
interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions, most recently in
Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 0 INSC 132. Relying on
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 this
Court reaffirmed that:

11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place within public
view, the place should be open where the members of the
public can witness or hear the utterance made by the
accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place
within the four corners of the wall where members of the
public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has
taken place at a place within public view.

11. A perusal of the Application filed by the complainant under
Section 156(3) of the CrPC reveals that the alleged casteist abuses
were stated to have been used by the Appellants inside the
premises of the complainant. This circumstance, on its face, does
not satisfy the statutory requirement that the abuses were made in
any place within public view, which is an essential component of
the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. The house of
the complainant cannot be considered to be within public view.

12. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 2 has not

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been able to show that the complaint or the statement recorded
under Section 200 CrPC contained any specific averment that the
caste based abuses were hurled at a place within public view.

13. In our considered view, the High Court erred in concluding that
the incident occurred in public view. A careful reading of the
complaint makes it evident that the alleged castebased abuses
were uttered inside the premises, in the presence of the Appellants
and Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the essential requirement of the
offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied.

14. Upon consideration of the submissions and scrutiny of the
material placed on record, we find merit in the contention raised
on behalf of the Appellants insofar as the applicability of the SC/ST
Act is concerned. On the allegations as they stand, a prima facie
case under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not made out against
the Appellants.

15. It is beyond dispute that the appellate powers are to be invoked
with due caution, and only in exceptional circumstances. It is
equally well established that the Court cannot delve into the
truthfulness or credibility of the allegations contained in the FIR or
complaint. The Appellate Court has to examine the contents of the
complaint as they stand. In the facts of the present case, the High
Court ought to have exercised its appellate powers to quash the
summoning order with respect to offences under the provisions of
the SC/ST Act.

16. In view of the foregoing discussion and having found that the
essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act are not prima facie satisfied, we deem it appropriate to
interfere to that limited extent. Accordingly, the proceedings
initiated against the Appellants under the Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act are hereby quashed. However, the trial insofar as it
pertains to the remaining offences under the IPC shall proceed in
accordance with law.”

15. Even in the decision in case of Karuppudayar Versus
State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent Of Police,
Lalgudi Trichy reported in 2025 (0) AIR(SC) 705,
Gunjan @ Girija Kumari Versus State (Nct Of Delhi)
reported in 2026 (0) AIJEL-SC 76984 and Talari Naresh
Versus State Of Telangana reported in 2026 (0) AIR(SC)
2499, the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken a similar view. In
the decision of this Court in the case of State Of Gujarat

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Versus Laxmanji Sadaji Thakor reported in 2025 (0)
GUJHC 36421 also similar view has been taken by this Court.

16. In view of the above, the Court has rightly observed that
unless the basic ingredients required to attract the provisions
of Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are proved and
established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be held
liable under the said provision. In the absence of the
fulfilment of such basic ingredients, the Trial Court has rightly
passed the impugned judgment and order in favour of the
present respondents.

17. In that circumstance the Trial Court has rightly passed the
impugned judgment in order in favour of the present
respondents and there was no any infirmity found in the
impugned judgment in order.

18. Further, on perusal of the record of the appeal, it
transpires that the respondent-accused has established his
innocence before the Trial Court and that, after due
appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and
other material placed on record, the Trial Court has rightly
passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The
findings recorded by the Trial Court are just, proper and in
accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore,
no interference is warranted by this Court.

19. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate
Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.

20. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal
against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not
ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the
approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at
by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which
would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below.
However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by
the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on
record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a
just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find

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out whether the accused are connected with the commission
of the crime with which he is charged.

21. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly
paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-
affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State
of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general
principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph
No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex
Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 =
(2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the Trial Court.

22. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20
and 21 as under:-

“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general
principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs.
State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court
while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The
principles read thus:

“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,

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reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.

21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High
Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and
weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the
Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of
guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal
against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High
Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses
and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly
finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their
testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the
jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the
brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal,
resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing
the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial
Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”

23. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly
appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the

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present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on
record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore,
the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record.

24. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it
clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any
error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record
and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled
against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it
clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal
is liable to be dismissed.

25. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of
merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is
dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond
stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the
concerned Trial Court forthwith.

(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
SURESH SOLANKI

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: SURESHKUMAR MOTIBHAI SOLANKI(HC00208), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 18/08/2026 11:58:34

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