Holding

The application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

Summary

The Gujarat Electricity Board (PGVCL) filed a criminal miscellaneous application seeking condonation of a 1,234‑day delay in filing an appeal against an acquittal dated 14‑Oct‑2021 in a theft‑of‑electricity case under the Electricity Act, 2003. The applicant claimed the delay was due to a mistaken belief that the complainant could not appeal and administrative busy‑ness, invoking a "bona‑fide impression". The accused opposed, arguing no day‑by‑day justification and that the delay was an abuse of process. The Court examined numerous Supreme Court precedents on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and held that the applicant’s explanation was unsatisfactory and not a sufficient cause. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay.

Issues considered

Whether the 1,234‑day delay in filing the criminal appeal can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the applicant’s explanation of administrative delay constitutes a sufficient cause for condonation.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378
Electricity Act, 2003s. 135, s. 138, s. 156
Limitation Act, 1963s. 5

Subjects

condonation of delaylimitationelectricity theftcriminal appealSection 5 Limitation ActSection 156 Electricity Actacquittalpublic interestbureaucratic delay

Judgment

R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF
DELAY) NO. 26268 of 2025
In
F/CRIMINAL APPEAL/42690/2025

==========================================
PASHCHIM GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LTD THRO SANDIPKUMAR
CHHAGANBHAI HIRANI
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
==========================================
Appearance:
MS LILU K BHAYA(1705) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR AMIT P SOLIYA(10780) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MS JIRGA JHAVERI APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK

Date : 11/08/2026

ORAL ORDER

1. This application is 3led by the applicant seeking condonation of
delay of 1234 days caused in preferring the criminal appeal.

2. Heard Ms.Lilu Bhaya, learned counsel for the applicant, Ms.Jirga
Jhaveri, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 and
Mr.Amit Soliya, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

3. Ms.Bhaya, learned counsel has submitted that the delay caused
in 3ling the appeal against the judgment and order dated 14.10.2021
passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Gondal in Special
Criminal Case (Elec) No.211 of 2012 whereby the learned Judge
acquitted the accused for the o@ence under Section 135 r/w. Section

Page 1 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

138 of the Electricity Act, 2003. She has submitted that the judgment
and order was pronounced on 14.10.2021 and since the accused was
acquitted, the concerned oBcer of the applicant under impression
that the complainant cannot 3le an appeal under the criminal law. She
has submitted that the present application deserves to be allowed the
delay deserves to be condoned. In support of her submissions
Ms.Bhaya, learned counsel has relied upon the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of (1) State (NCT of Delhi) Vs.
Ahmed Jaan, AIR 2009 SC (Supp.) 695, (2) State of J & K and
others Vs. Mohmad Madbool So7 and others, AIR 1987 SC
1353 and (3) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. MST
Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107.

4. Mr.Soliya, learned counsel for the respondent – accused has
strongly objected the application and submitted that the present
application being meritless deserves to be dismissed. Mr.Soliya,
learned counsel has referred to the aBdavit-in-reply 3led on behalf of
respondent – accused.

4.1 Mr.Soliya, learned counsel for the respondent – accused has
referred and relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of O>ce of the Chief Post Master General Vs. Living
Media India Ltd, (2012) 3 SCC 563 and submitted that the
government and statutory bodies cannot claim condonation as a
matter of right through general explanations of administration when
there is a clear absence of diligence. Mr.Soliya, learned counsel has
also referred and relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bherulal,
(2020) 10 SCC 654.

5. In the Living Media India Ltd (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

Page 2 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

Court has held and observed in para – 9 and 10 as under:-

“9. In view of the stand taken by the Postal Department
as to the reasons for the delay and the serious objections
of the respondents, it is desirable to extract the entire
statement as placed in the form of "better a davit" by the
o cer of the appellant-Department :-

["I, Aparajeet Pattanayak presently posted as SSRM, Air
Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi, do hereby solemnly a rm
and state as under :-

[1) In the o cial capacity mentioned above, I am
acquainted with the facts of the case on the basis of the
information derived from the record.]

[2) On the last date of hearing i.e. 05.12.2011 this Hon'ble
Court was pleased to allow the petitions to 5le better
a davit in support of the application for condonation of
delay in 5ling Special Leave Petition.]

[3) It is submitted that the delay is not intentional but is on
account of the departmental/administrative procedures
involved in for 5ling the petition for Special Leave Petition.
It is submitted that unlike the private litigant the matters
relating to Government are required to be considered at
various levels and then only a decision is taken.]

[4) In the present case it would be evident from the n
following that delay has been caused due to unavoidable
circumstances :- 11.09.2009 Date of judgment in LPA Nos.
418/2007 and 1006/2007. 29.10.2009 Certi5ed copy of
judgment not received from the Government Counsel and
hence copy of judgment was downloaded from the web site
of Delhi High Court and o ce note was put by ASP (Court)
proposing to refer the matter to Postal Directorate for
opinion and further course of action for approval of the
Chief Postmaster General, Delhi. 12.11.2009 Chief
Postmaster General Delhi approved to refer the matter to
Directorate. 16.12.2009 Directorate desired to submit legal
opinion and certi5ed copy of judgment. 08.01.2010 The
Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had applied
for the certi5ed copy of the impugned judgment and order
and the same was received by the Department on
08.01.2010. 11.01.2010 The desired documents supplied to
Directorate. 25.01.2010 Directorate desired to submit

Page 3 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

copies of original writ petition 5led by the party, counter
a davit thereto, copies of appeals 5led by DOP & counter
reply thereto. 12.02.2010 The desired documents supplied
to Directorate. 17.02.2010 Directorate desired to send an
o cial/o cer well conversant with the case. 15.03.2010
Directorate asked to depute an o cer well conversant with
the case to collect the UO Note along with other documents
to pursue the matter with Mr. Suresh Chandra Additional
Legal Advisor. 06.04.2010 Shri Suresh Chandra, Additional
Legal Advisor was contacted on 06.04.2010 and the matter
was briefed thoroughly by ASP (Court). 25.06.2010 Case
5le collected from Directorate and handed over to Central
Agency Section on 25.06.2010 under diary No. 1865/2010
dated 25.06.2010 as per advice of Additional Legal Advisor.
26.06.2010 to 30.06.2010 Central Agency Section sent the
5le back to the Postal Department with directions to send
the same through Ministry of Law and Justice. 01.07.2010
to 10.09.2010 After receiving the 5le through proper
channel. Central Agency Section sent the 5le to Ld ASG for
his considered opinion and Ld. Additional Solicitor General
opined that it is a 5t case for 5ling the Special Leave
Petition. 11.09.2010 to 30-9-2010 On receiving the opinion
of Ld. ASG the 30.09.2010 5le was sent to Central Agency
for drafting the Special Leave Petition. 01.10.2010
Directorate informed that ASG had considered the case and
found it 5t for Special Leave Petition. 15.11.2010 The panel
Counsel prepared the draft of Special Leave Petition and
submitted the draft Special Leave Petition with 5le to
Central Agency Section for further steps. The draft Special
Leave Petition was forwarded to the Department by Central
Agency Section for vetting. After factual veri5cation, the
draft Special Leave Petition was returned to Central Agency
Section for typing and preparation of Paper Book which
also took some time. 04.01.2011 Special Leave Petition
remained pending due to non-availability of disputed
magazines of Reader's Digest and India Today. Hence, ASG
was requested to intervene and direct Shri Akash Pratap
who handled the case to provide the magazines.
14.01.2011 Shri A.K. Sharma was requested to arrange to
collect the above magazines from the record of Delhi High
Court. 31.01.2011 SSRM Delhi Sorting Division was
authorized to sign the a davit on behalf of the respondent.
10.02.2011 Special Leave Petition 5led in Supreme Court.]

[5. It is submitted that it is evident from the foregoing
reasons that the delay caused in 5ling the petition was
result of all the necessary and unavoidable o ce

Page 4 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

formalities and was bona5de and not deliberate or
intentional and the petitioner was prevented by su cient
cause from 5ling the petition within the period of
limitation.]

[6. It is further submitted that the petitioner humbly seeks
leave to draw the kind attention of this Hon'ble Court to the
views expressed by this Hon'ble Court that liberal approach
may be adopted and that the Court should not take too
strict and pedantic stand which will cause injustice while
considering the application for condonation of delay, in
terms of its judgments in the case of Collector Land
Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. V/s. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and
Bhag Singh & Anr. V/s. Major Daljeet Singh & Ors. It is
submitted that the principles for condonation of delay laid
down in the above cited cases may therefore be adopted in
the present case also.]

[7. This Hon'ble Court in G. Ramegowda V/s. Special Land
Acquisition O cer, (1998) 2 SCC 142 laid down that the
expression su cient cause in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice where no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction of lack of bona5de is imputable to the party
seeking condonation of delay.]

[8. In the matter of State of Haryana V/s. Chandra Mani,
reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132, this Hon'ble Court observed
and laid down as follows :-

["when the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of
delay, it is common knowledge that on account of
impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making, 5le-pushing
and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the
State is less di cult to understand but more di cult to
approve, but the State represents collective cause of the
community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by
o cers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and
encumbered process of pushing the 5les from table to
table and keeping it on the table for considerable time
causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine.
Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of
their making decision is a common feature. Therefore,
certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the
appeals brought by the State are lost for such default, no
person is individually aIected but what in the ultimate

Page 5 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

analysis suIers, is public interest. The expression
"su cient cause" should, therefore, be considered with
pragmatism in justice- oriented approach rather than the
technical detection of su cient cause for explaining every
day's delay.]

[9. This Hon'ble Court in Union of India V/s. Manager, Jain
and Associates, 2001 (3) SCC 277 decided on 06.02.2011
has held that delay ought to be condoned when su ciently
explained particularly where party seeking condonation is
the Government. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble
High Court ought to have condoned the delay in
considering the public revenue involved and also because
of the genuine di culties and circumstances beyond the
control of the petitioner, on account of which Special Leave
Petition could not be 5led within the time."]

10. Before considering whether the reasons for justifying
such a huge delay are acceptable or not, it is also useful to
refer the decisions relied on by Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned
senior Counsel for the respondents.

[i) In Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay V/s. Amateur
Riders Club, Bombay, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603, there is a
delay of 264 days in 5ling the SLP by the Commissioner of
Wealth Tax, Bombay. The explanation for the delay had
been set out in petitioner's own words as under :-

[".....2 (g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave
petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the
same for approval to the Board on Jun. 24, 1993 along with
the case 5le. (h) The Board returned the case 5le to the
Advocate-on- Record on Jul. 9, 1993 who re-sent the same
to the Board on Sep. 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP
was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving
the draft SLP sent this 5le to CAS on Oct. 1, 1993."]

After incorporating the above explanation, this Court
refused to condone the delay by observing thus :-

["3. ... .... Having regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot 5nd any way of granting relief. It is
true that Government should not be treated as any other
private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the
decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not
individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged
down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this

Page 6 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation oIered for
the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the
attitude of indiIerence of the Revenue in protecting its
common interests. The a davit is again one of the
stereotyped a davits making it susceptible to the criticism
that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance
to the need for promptitude even where it aIects its own
interest. [Emphasis supplied]]

[ii) In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. V/s. Executive
Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Another, (2008) 17
SCC 448, the question was whether the respondent-
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project had shown
su cient cause to condone the delay of 1724 days in 5ling
appeals before the High Court. In para 17, this Court held:-

[".....The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own
right for long time in preferring appeals. The Court cannot
enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of
equity. Delay defeats equity. The Court helps those who
are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights"]

After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient
view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the
Government and Government Undertaking, this Court
observed as under :-

["29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object
for 5xing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy
5xing 16 a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of
general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do
not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies
promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws
come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the
sleepy.]

[30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount
consideration in exercising the Courts' discretion wherever
conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale
claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner
subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of
compensation to the landlosers facilitating their
rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of
public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the
bene5ciary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not
be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled
legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable

Page 7 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving bene5t
to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent
manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is
acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers.
These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind
by the Courts while exercising the discretion dealing with
the application 5led under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act.
Dragging the landlosers to Courts of law years after the
termination of legal proceedings would not serve any
public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered
with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any
proper explanation of such delay on the ground of
involvement of public revenue. It serves no public
interest."]”

6. In the case of Bherulal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held and observed in para – 5, 6, 7 and 8 as under:-

“5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be
propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the
period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on
merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of
limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does
not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an
appropriate case to condone the delay.

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is
being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as
"certi5cate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a
certi5cate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a
quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be
done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal.
It is to complete this formality and save the skin of o cers
who may be at default that such a process is followed. We
have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a
practice and process. There seems to be no improvement.
The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such
certi5cates and if the Government suIers losses, it is time
when the concerned o cer responsible for the same bears
the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases
any action is taken against the o cers, who sit on the 5les
and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone
the delay and even in making submissions, straight away
counsels appear to address on merits without referring
even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till

Page 8 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

we pointed out to the counsel that he must 5rst address us
on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we
propose to do in all matters today, where there are such
inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities
coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time
which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from
the o cers responsible.

8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner
in which the application has been worded, we consider
appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner- State of
Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty 5ve thousand) to be deposited
with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The
amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be
recovered from the o cers responsible for the delay in
5ling the special leave petition and a certi5cate of recovery
of the said amount be also 5led in this Court within the said
period of time.”

7. This Court has considered the facts of the case and the
submissions made on behalf of learned counsel for both the sides and
the contents of the application. This Court has perused the decisions
cited at the bar and the material on record. It appears that the
present application is 3led by the applicant for condonation of delay
caused in 3ling the appeal challenging the impugned judgment and
order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. It
emerges from the material on record that the judgment and order of
acquittal was passed on 14.10.2021 and applied for certi3ed copy of
the judgment and order after four years from the date of
pronouncement of the judgment i.e. on 28.08.2025 and the same was
ready for delivery on 25.09.2025 and it was delivered on 25.09.2025
in between the gross delay of four years was caused which was not
satisfactorily explained by 3ling additional aBdavit. The relevant
paragraphs of additional aBdavit which are as under:-

“I say and submit that this is case of theft of electricity

Page 9 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

where very serious modus operandi has been applied by
the Opponent no.2 which has wide eIect on the applicant
company and it was found that the circuit which was
available for Rs.500/- was used by number of industries to
keep the meter in hanged condition. Since it was external
device, nothing can be found on the spot. After detailed
and o cers and detailed study of M.R.I. such modus
operandi could be spelt out. In some cases helper, meter
Govt. Law O cersstudy and conferences with the
manufacturer of the reader, and other employees were
found to have been involved in helping such theft of
electricity. Against them also F.I.Rs. were 5led and their
services were terminated. Therefore prompt and
immediate action was required to stop this type of theft of
electricity.

I say and submit that therefore even while issuing
supplementary bills for theft of electricity, option to
compound oIence was not given. The applicant had
objected before Hon'ble High Court through Learned
Advocate General when the Opponent no.2 had applied for
anticipatory bail and the Hon'ble Court granted anticipatory
bail to the Opponent no.2 on the condition that the names
of persons who supplied circuit would be given.

In this case also same modus operandi was found.
However, unfortunately the o cers were not able to
explain to the trial court entire modus operandi and in
absence of proper evidence the trial court acquitted the
Opponent no.2 on 14.10.2021. It was only in 2022 when
the Opponent no.2 5led CrMA No.1980/2022 for refund.
The Special Court vide order dated 6.2.2022 refused to
direct refund of the amount of supplementary bill and only
directed to refund the amount of compounding charges
deposited by the Opponent no.2 with the Special Court.

I say and submit that since the Opponent no.2 had already
deposited the entire amount of supplementary bill for theft
of electricity issued to him, there was no need for the
applicant to 5le suit for recovery of the bill. Further the
order of Special Court did not direct to refund the amount
and therefore there was no question of refunding the
amount of supplementary bill to the Opponent no.2.

I say and submit that subsequently the Opponent no.2
demanded refund of the amount of supplementary bill and
5led SCA No.13449/2023. Thereafter the applicant

Page 10 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

company looking to the fact that there was no order by the
Special Court to refund the amount of civil liability. As per
catena of decisions on this aspect that merely because
there is acquittal in criminal court, it does not entitle party
to claim amount of civil liability unless there is speci5c
order of Special Court under Sec.154 of The Electricity
Act.2003. If the special court would have found it deem 5t,
it would have ordered to refund the amount of civil liability.
But since no such order was passed, there was no question
of refund but as the Opponent no.2 was demanding refund,
it was decided to send the matter to the Head O ce
because there are certain case of the same nature where
this modus operandi has been applied and it has serious
impact on the electricity which is public property, therefore
in the interest of company it was found 5t to prefer appeal
in this case and obtain opinion on the question of action to
be taken in the matter. Thereafter decision was taken to
prefer appeal. In this process there was some delay caused
on the of the applicant. The said delay is bona5de. There
was no negligence of any o cer but looking to the order
passed by Special Court not directing refund of the amount
of civil liability, initially concerned o cer was under
bona5de impression that no further legal action is required
to be taken in the matter. Under the circumstance delay
has been caused in 5ling this appeal and there is su cient
cause.”

8. It reveals from the record that the respondent – accused has
also 3led aBdavit-in-reply and raised an objection for condonation of
delay as it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that
while preferring an application for condonation of delay the applicant
has to explain delay in day by day possibly. The relevant paragraphs
of the aBdavit-in-reply read as under:-

“At the outset, I say and submit that the present
application 5led by the Applicant (PGVCL) seeking to
condone a massive and inordinate delay of 1234 days in
5ling the acquittal appeal is entirely baseless, deceptive,
and an abuse of the judicial process. The application has
been preferred with a clear oblique motive to avoid the
repayment of legitimate money of the present respondent,
which I am seeking via Special Civil Application No. 13449
of 2023 pending before this Honorable High Court, and

Page 11 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

therefore, this delay application should be rejected
outright.

By way of a brief summary of the acquittal details, I state
that an FIR was registered against me under Sections 135
and 138 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003, resulting in a
Special Criminal Case (Elec.) No. 211 of 2012. After the
conclusion of trial, the Learned Special Electricity Judge
and 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Gondal, vide judgment
and order dated 14.10.2021, acquitted me from all
charges. The trial court explicitly observed that the
prosecution failed to recover or produce any external
device or circuit from the spot to prove the alleged theft,
making the case entirely foundationless. Despite my
de5nitive acquittal in October 2021, the Applicant chose to
sit over its rights for more than three years.

I oppose the condonation of this delay on the ground that
the Applicant has failed to mention any speci5c, legal, or
day-to-day justi5cation for this huge delay of 1234 days.

In Paragraph 3 of the application, PGVCL suggests that its
o cers were under a "bona5de impression" that a
complainant cannot 5le a criminal appeal, which is an
absurd and unacceptable excuse from a statutory body
who is dealing day in and day out in the legal department
with the panel of expert advocates. There was clear
Ignorance of law and routine internal negligence cannot
constitute a "su cient cause" under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. The Applicant has provided absolutely no
clear clari5cation or date-wise explanation what prevented
them from taking action between 14.10.2021 and the 5ling
of this appeal in 2025.

I further submit that this acquittal appeal is an afterthought
and 5led only as a defense mechanism against my pending
Special Civil Application No. 13449 of 2023, where I have
sought the repayment of Rs.20,91,713.84 deposited by me
during bail and subsequently withdrawn by PGVCL. It was
speci5cally brought to the notice of the trial court during
my withdrawal application (CRMA No. 1980 of 2022) that
PGVCL had not preferred any appeal against the acquittal.
The law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep over their
rights, and a statutory body cannot be given special
treatment to harass an acquitted citizen after an
unpardonable delay.”

Page 12 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

9. Being aggrieved and dissatis3ed with the impugned judgment
and order of acquittal, the applicant has preferred the criminal appeal
under Section 156 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Section 156 of the
Electricity Act, 2003 reads as under:-

“156. Appeal and revision.

The High Court may exercise, so far as may be applicable,
all the powers conferred by Chapters XXIX and XXX of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), as if the
Special Court within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the
High Court is a District Court, or as the case may be, the
Court of Session, trying cases within the local limits of
jurisdiction of the High Court.”

10. That the High Court while exercising the power is applicable all
the powers conferred by Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Criminal
Procedure Code meaning thereby that the Court is exercising the
jurisdiction under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and exercising the
power under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the order of acquittal.

11. It appears that though there was a delay of 1234 days in
preferring the criminal appeal, no satisfactory reason and explanation
made in the application merely reference of the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of (1) Ahmed Jaan (supra), (2)
Mohmad Madbool So7 (supra) and (3) MST Katiji (supra). The
applicant was defending other litigation 3led by the accused before
this Court and the applicant – company was busy and therefore the
applicant has not preferred the appeal in time. The Court has asked
the applicant to 3le additional aBdavit showing suBcient grounds, if
applicant wants. In the event, the respondent – accused has 3led
aBdavit-in-reply and vehemently opposed this application to the
e@ect that the applicant has failed to explain the delay caused in

Page 13 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

preferring the appeal as per the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court as aforesaid. That the accused had preferred Special Civil
Application No. 13449 of 2023 before this Court seeking direction to
the applicant to refund the amount and the accused had also
preferred Criminal Misc. Application No. 1980 of 2022 whereby the
trial Court ordered to refund Rs.4,24,000/- which was deposited by the
respondent – accused in connection with the criminal case registered
against the accused. When the accused went for execution of the
order, the applicant has 3led the criminal appeal along with the
application for condonation of delay before this Court, which is
opposed by the accused by 3ling aBdavit-in-reply and the applicant
has also 3led additional aBdavit. On perusal of the contents of the
additional aBdavit, it reveals that the applicant has explained that the
applicant was busy with proceeding arising from this criminal case
decided by the trial Court and, therefore, the applicant has not
preferred this appeal in time and also seeking advice and further
discussion with the department and hence the delay cause. So
considering the contents of the additional aBdavit, it emerges that
there is no satisfactory explanation assigned by the applicant in the
application as well as in the additional aBdavit. The reason stated for
delay is not a suBcient ground as the Hon’ble Supreme Court
described the just delay and inordinate delay and considered the
same in way back in 2024.

12. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar and others Vs. State of
Haryana and others reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351 wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the law of limitation is
enshrined in the legal maxim "Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis
Litium" (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to

Page 14 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

litigation). Rules of Limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively $xed period of time.

13. In the Brijesh Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held and observed in paras 7, 8, 9 and 10 as under:-

“8. The Privy Council in General Fire and Life Assurance
Corporation Ltd. V/s. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941
PC 6, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law
Lectures 1932 wherein it has been said that "a law of
limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly
and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for
a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship
to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on applicable
grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its
operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law."

9. In P.K. Ramachandran V/s. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR
1998 SC 2276, the Apex Court while considering a case of
condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation
much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for
condonation of delay had been given, held as under:-

"Law of limitation may harshly aIect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds."

10. While considering a similar issue, this court in Esha
Bhattacharjee V/s. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.
(2013) 12 SCC 649 laid down various principles inter alia:

"xxx

v) Lack of bona 5des imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a signi5cant and relevant fact

vi) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play

xxx

Page 15 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to
its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken
into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is
that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance
of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.

xxx

xvii) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious mater and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters."

(See also: Basawaraj V/s. Land Acquisition O cer (2013)
14 SCC 81)

11. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented
approach in rejecting the application for condonation of
delay. However the court while allowing such application
has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate
delay for want of bona 5des of an inaction or negligence
would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Su cient cause is a condition
precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for
condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held
that when mandatory provision is not complied with and
that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly
explained, the court cannot condone the delay on
sympathetic grounds alone.”

14. It is also pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and others
Vs. Managing Committee of Namtara Girls High School
reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 191 wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held and observed in paras 18 and 21 as
under:-

“18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of
the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowada (supra)
adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and
consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon’ble

Page 16 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI.in course of authoring a brief
order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur
Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing o cers of the
“revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order was
made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda
(supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its
entirety hereunder:

1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior
counsel for the Revenue.

2. This special leave petition 5led on November 16, 1993 is
delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this
Court has been making observations as to the grave
prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on
behalf of the Government being lost on the point of
limitation. Such observations have been made for over a
few years in the past. But there seems to be no
conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present
petition which is 5led in November 1993. The explanation
for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner’s own
words:

“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition
drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for
approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case
5le.

(h) The Board returned the case 5le to the Advocate-on-
Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board
on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not
approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft
SLP sent this 5le to CAS on October 1, 1993.”

3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially
acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the
earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in
the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There
seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a
point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant
even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indiIerence. Having regard to the
law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot 5nd
any way of granting relief. It is true that Government
should not be treated as any other private litigant as,
indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present
and prosecute appeals are not individual but are

Page 17 of 18
R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026

institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the
proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even
with all this latitude, the explanation oIered for the delay
in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of
indiIerence of the Revenue in protecting its common
interests. The a davit is again one of the stereotyped
a davits making it susceptible to the criticism that the
Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the
need for promptitude even where it aIects its own interest.

4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly,
dismissed.

The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred
by time.

21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter
of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or
not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown
to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion tha the cause
sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an
explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of
discretion has been set up.”

15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the
case and aspects and the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, this Court is of the opinion that no case is made out to
entertain this application and the application being meritless
deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the application is
dismissed. Notice discharged.

(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
V.R. PANCHAL

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: VIJAYKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PANCHAL(HC00171), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 14/08/2026 16:36:08

Page 18 of 18