BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.versusNIRMA LTD.

     C/CRA/173/2004                                CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 06/02/2026




                                                  Reserved On   : 28/01/2026
                                                  Pronounced On : 06/02/2026

               IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

          R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 173 of 2004
                               With
 CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 1 of 2025
         In R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 173 of 2004
                               With
           R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 177 of 2004

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
==========================================================

              Approved for Reporting                Yes           No

==========================================================
                      BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.
                                    Versus
                               NIRMA LTD. & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MS MINOO A SHAH(774) for the Petitioner
MR KAMAL TRIVEDI, SR. ADVOCATE with MR KUNAN B NAIK(3210) for
the Respondent No. 1
MR MEHUL VAKHARIYA, ADVOCATE for Respondent No.2
RULE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent Nos.3,4,5
==========================================================
 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI


                                CAV JUDGMENT
1.        These are the rent revisions one by the lessee and
another by sub-lessee challenging eviction order.

2.        The eviction order passed in HRP Suit NO.103 of 1985
con%rmed by common order in Regular Civil Appeal Nos.42
and 2000 and 22 of 2000, is a subject matter of challenge in
these CRAs. Thus, I propose to decide both the CRAs by this


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common judgment.


2.1. For the sake of convenience and brevity, parties are
referred to as per their original status before the learned trial
Court.

3.        The facts essential to decide the matters noted from the
impugned judgment are as under:-

3.1       Mr. Pravinbhai Patel and his brothers in the capacity of
landlord %led the aforestated HRP suit against defendant No.1
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited formerly known as
Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distribution Company of India
Limited (in short “lessee”) and defendant No.2 Mahendra
Motors (in short “sub-lessee”) along with three other sub sub
lessee i.e. Honest Car Repairing Works, Rajesh Auto Centre
and Prashant Tyre Services for eviction of land bearing Final
Plot No.108/1 admeasuring 1000 sq yard being part of Town
Planning Scheme No.3 situated at Ashram Road, Ahmedabad
(in short “demised land”). The landlord claimed that they are
the part of the HUF and they have leased the demised land to
the lessee, a company incorporated in UK and carrying
business inter alia at Bombay by entering and executing lease
deed on 24.3.1972, which was registered as Sr No.3910 at the
Sub Registrar OAicer, Ahmedabad for the time period of 14
years commencing from 29.9.1970 and was to expire in
midnight of 29.9.1984, at a monthly rent of Rs.1000/-
exclusive of all taxes.

3.2       One of the conditions of the lease deed was that the
lessor was at liberty to construct any structure upon the


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demised land and had full and free liberty to use the demised
land as a storage, depot or a service station for the purpose of
selling or otherwise dealing in, or of receiving, storing,
treating or handling for distribution of petroleum or any of its
products and Kindered Motor Accessories or any other trade
or business.

3.3    Under the terms and conditions of the lease deed,
lessee had full and free liberty to erect, and maintain in the
demised land all manner of equipments, plant, building,
machinery, tanks, godowns, pumps, %ling sheds and other
structures, %xtures and appliances and facilities to use all
parcels of the demised land for the purpose stated in the
earlier part of the lease deed and further had full liberty to
sublet, give or license to any third party the demised land
without any further reference to the lessor.

3.4    The lessee is an undertaking of the Government of India
and a successor in title to Burmah Shell Oil Storage &
Distribution Company of India Limited.         The Government of
India on 24.1.1976 undertook the possession of original lessee
by virtue of Burma Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India)
Act ,1976. Thereafter, name of the company was changed to
Bharat Re%neries Ltd. w.e.f. 12.2.1976. Accordingly, name of
the lessee was changed in a lease deed and Bharat Re%neries
Ltd. has been treated as lessee.


3.5    In a suit, it is claimed that the defendants have no right
to interpret the terms and conditions of the lease deed
permitting lessee or sub-lessee to do any business , which


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might be outside the scope of storage, depot or a service
station for the purpose of selling or otherwise dealing in, or of
receiving, storing, treating or handling for distribution of
petroleum or any of its products and Kindered Motor
Accessories or any other trade or business. Thus, it is claimed
by the plaintiAs that lessee has no whatsoever right to erect
any other construction or to use the demised land other than
for the purpose it was let or to induct any sub-lessee, but the
lessee did not abide to the terms and conditions in continuous
use of demised land for which it was let, further, did not abide
abide the terms and conditions of the lease deed and erected
the structure of permanent nature, it cannot be removed
without changing edi%ce of the demised land and thirdly, the
sub-lessee has further sublet the demised land without the
permission of the landlord.


3.6    According to the terms and conditions of the lease deed,
it expired in the midnight of 29.9.1984 and thereafter, the
defendant No.1 – lessee and his sub-lessee have no right to
occupy the demised land, but were liable to vacant the same
after removing the structure set up on it.               However, the
lessee requested for renewal of the lease deed by letter dated
15.11.1983. The lessor did not accept the same and point out
breach of terms and conditions and further stated that he has
no interest in renewal of the lease and asked to handover the
vacant and peaceful possession of the demised land and
further by letter dated 13.2.1983 terminated the tenancy.


3.7    Expanding the case, the plaintiA pleaded that the


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defendant No.2 – sub-lessee without any right unlawfully and
unauthorizedly inducted the defendant No.3 Honest Car
Repairing woks, defendant No.4 Rajesh Auto Centre and
defendant No.5 Prashant Tyres Services and making pro%tory
unit by parting with the possession of the part of the demised
land.


3.8     In addition to the aforesaid grounds, the plaintiA claimed
eviction of other ground of Rent Act viz personal and bona
%de requirement; greater hardship and required the demised
land for the purpose of making some construction. According
to the plaintiAs, since by eHux of time, the lease is terminated
and the status of the defendant No.1 became statutory tenant,
he cannot act beyond statutory permission as he enjoyed
limited right and liability under the provisions of the Rent Act.


3.9     Mainly upon above averments, the plaintiAs put his case
for eviction.


3.10 The learned trial Court in suit proceedings, framed as
many as 25 issues and held that the plaintiAs landlord
succeeded in proving the grounds available u/s 13(1)(a), 13(1)
(b), 13(1)(e) and section 15(d) of the Bombay Rent Act. The
learned trial Court simultaneously held that the plaintiAs
failed to prove the ground of eviction available u/s 13(1)(g)
and 13(1)(i) of the Act.


3.11 The           learned   Court   No.7,      Small     Causes        Court,
Ahmedabad, by judgment and decree 20.12.1999, partly


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decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiAs and directed lessee
and       sub-lessee       to    handover         the   peaceful       and      vacant
possession of the demised land to the plaintiAs and permitted
the plaintiAs to withdraw rent if any deposited by the lessee
or sub-lessee.


3.12 Two appeals were preferred against the judgment and
decree passed by the learned trial Court.                            Regular Civil
Appeal No.42 of 2000 was preferred by the BPCL – lessee and
Regular Civil Appeal No.21 of 2000 was preferred by
Mahendra Motors – sub-lessee before the Bench of the Small
Causes Court, Ahmedabad under the provisions of the Rent
Act.


3.13 Vide             judgment    and      decree       dated     23.3.2004,         the
appellate bench of learned Small Causes Court dismissed both
the appeals by con%rming the judgment and decree passed in
the HRP suit.


3.14 Hence, present revision under the provisions of the
Bombay Rent Act.


4.        I have heard learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah for the
BPCL – lessee, learned advocate Mr. Mehul Vakhariya for
Mahendra Motors – sub-lessee, who has adopted arguments of
learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah for the revisionists and
learned senior counsel Mr. Kamal Trivedi assisted by learned
advocate Mr. Kunal B. Naik for the landlord.                               For other
respondents, none remained present.


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4.1       Both the learned advocates have also placed on record
written submissions.


5.        Learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah appearing for the
revisionist – defendant No.1 would submit that clause 4(b) of
the lease deed is for renewal and it is permitting the lessee to
ask for the renewal of the lease deed.              She would further
submit that the lessee has asked for the renewal within the
stipulated time period, but the lessor having remained
adamant did not accept the request of the lessee to renew the
list. She would further submit that since the lessee was ready
and willing to renew the lease deed as per terms and
conditions of the landlord, the status of the lessee would not
transfer to the statutory tenant, but remains contractual
tenant.         She would further submit that the learned Courts
below have committed serious error in rejecting clause 4(b) of
the lease deed and thereby, concurrent %ndings of fact
impugned in both the petitions suAer from the illegality.


5.1       Learned advocate Ms. Shah would further submit that
since clause 2(g) of the lease deed permits the lessee to sublet
the demised land even without reference to the lessor
inducting Mahendra Motors on sub-lease or others as sub sub
lease would not breach terms and conditions of the lease
deed.        She would further submit that this issue is also not
properly comprehended by the learned Courts below and did
not apply properly to the interest of the parties emerging from
clause 2(g) of the lease deed and thus, serious error has been


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committed by the learned Courts below.


5.2     Learned advocate Ms. Shah would further submit that
%ndings of the learned Courts below that the lessee and sub-
lessee have carried out construction without the permission of
the landlord are in violation of the terms and conditions of the
lease deed are also incorrect %nding, as lease deed permits
the lessee and sub-lessee to do any kind of the business.
Meanwhile, the lessee and sub-lessee have carried out the
construction to do their business. The taste of removability
being a core to decide the application u/s 13(1)(a) and 13(1)
(b) of the Rent Act has not been properly addressed in correct
manner       and   thereby,   the    learned      Courts       below       have
committed serious error.


5.3     Lastly, learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah would submit
that pending the proceedings           respondent – Nirma Limited
has purchased the demised land.               She would further submit
that Transfer of Properties Act, on execution of the sale deed,
recognized transfer of title and possession, but execution of
sale deed if does not recognize transfer of the decree or
assignment of the decree, the subsequent purchaser is not
entitled to get the fruits of the decree. Learned advocate Ms.
Shah, in the aforesaid circumstances, would submit that the
respondent – Nirma Limited is not legally entitled to exercise
right of landlord to recover the possession of the demised
land.


5.4     Learned advocate Ms. Shah would further submit that


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the learned Courts below have erred in interpreting terms and
conditions of the lease deed as well as position of sub-lessee
and       sub         sub-lessee,   as    also      construction     carried       out,
permitted by lease deed.


5.5       In the aforesaid premises, learned Ms. Minoo Shah
requests to allow both the revisions.


6.        Learned advocate Mr. Mehul Vakaria, appearing for the
sub-lessee Mahendra Motors adopted the aforesaid arguments
of learned advocate, Ms. Minoo Shah.


7.        Learned Senior counsel Mr. Kamal Trivedi, assisted by
learned advocate Mr Kunal Naik, in contrast to the aforesaid
arguments, would submit that phrase “any other trade or
business” incorporated in clause 1 of the lease deed has to be
read applying golden rule of interpretation of the document.
The lease deed and its clauses has to be read as a whole and
not in isolation. He would further submit that the said phrase
has to be interpreted by applying rule of ejusdm generis or
rule of Noscitur a sociis. Meaning thereby, the words or
expressions in any de%nition are known by their associate
expressions or words and they take their colour therefrom
accordingly.             He would further submit that the BPCL was
leased the demised land for storage, depot or a service station
for the purpose of selling or otherwise dealing in, or of
receiving, storing, treating or handling for distribution of
petroleum or any of its products and Kindered Motor
Accessories or any other trade or business. Meaning thereby.


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that the BPCL has been leased out the demised land for the
speci%c purpose.       He would further submit that phrase “any
other trade or business” cannot be read in isolation to
interpret on own sweat will and desire, to do any business.


7.1    Learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi further argued that
phrase “ Kindered Motor Accessories” used in clause 1 of the
lease deed mean “akin” or “similar” i.e. accessories relatable
to the main product viz. Petroleum for which the demised land
was leased.        It is thus, argued that defendant Nos.3 to 5
carrying out their business in name of Honest Car Repairing
Works, Rajesh Auto Centre and Prashant Tyre Services
respectively or the business carried out by the sub-lessee
Mahendra Motors to do their respective business fall within
the category, that is not permitted


7.2    Under the circumstances, carrying of the business other
than the purpose for which the demised land was leased is
amounting to subletting.


7.3    Learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi to support that the
document has to be read wholly and the interpretation has to
be made by applying rule of ejusdm generis or by a rule of
Noscitur a sociis, relied upon the judgment in case of Nemai
Chandra Kumar Vs. Mani Square Ltd, (2024) 17 SCC
743 (para 82 and 88) and in case of Rakesh Bhanot Vs.
Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 6 Scc 781 (para 17 & 23).


7.4    Learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi would further argue


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that repairing of cars, motorcycle, electrical business and
puncture work of deJated tyres cannot be said to be allied
business      of   storage   handling         of   petroleum          products.
Secondly, it was argued that the BPCL has not produced on
record copy of the dealership agreement with Mahendra
Motors and therefore, the learned Courts below, at no point of
time, had knowledge that under what kind of terms and
conditions, the BPCL has subleased the demised land to
Mahendra Motors.        It is further submitted that it is not the
case where the lessee has exercised option and sublet the
demised land to sub-lessee, but here it is a case where the
sub-lessee exercised option and sub sub-leased the demised
land to defendant Nos.3 to 5. the sub-lessee at no point of
time has right to sublet the demised land further to sub sub-
lessee and thus, it is in clear breach of section 13(1)(e) and
15A of the Rent Act.


7.5   Reliance was placed upon the judgment in case of
Maheshbhai Nanjibhai Khuman Vs. Ahmedabad Luhana
Mahajan Wadi Trust, 2025 AIJEL HC 252594 and in case
of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. heirs of
deceased Shishirkumari @ Floraben, (2025) AIJEL HC
2520.


7.6   Insofar as issue of permanent construction is concerned,
it was argued by learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi that the
BPCL has not made any averment in written statement in
regards to permanent construction. The defendant Nos.3 and
4, who have %led written statements, clearly admitted that


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they have constructed shed on the                    demised land and
therefore, there is clear attraction of section 13(1)((b).


7.7    Lastly, it is submitted by learned Senior counsel that in
appeal proceedings %led by the lessee and sub-lessee, they
themselves have %led an application to join Nirma Limtied as
Nirma Limited is stepping into the shoes of the landlord on
purchasing demised land along with right to execute the
decree.       It is submitted that copy of sale deed executed
between erstwhile landlord and Nirma Limited placed on
record indicates that the landlord has obtained decree from
the Court in regards to demised land and they are selling the
demised land to the Nirma Limited with the right to obtain
fruit of the decree. Thus, now, no argument can be made that
Nirma      Limited   has   no    right      to   continue      the     eviction
proceedings. Even otherwise, Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code
permit and recognize assignment of decree.


7.8    In support of above argument, learned Senior counsel
Mr. Trivedi place reliance in case of Jugalkishore Saraf Vs.
Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., (1955) 1 SCC 248, Dhani Ram
Gupta Vs, Lala Sriram, (1980) 2 SCC 162 and in case of
Vaishno Devi Construction Vs. Union of India, (2022) 2
SCC 290.


7.9    Learned Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi summarizing the
submissions, would further submit that revisional power of the
High Court u/s 29(2) of the Rent Act is not equated with power
of reconsideration available to the appellate Court in %rst


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appeal.         Power u/s 29(2) is though wider than the power
available u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the
revisional Court u/s 29(2) cannot re-appreciate evidence and
take a diAerent view. In support of this submission, learned
Senior counsel Mr. Trivedi has relied upon the judgment in
case of Helper Girdharbhai Vs. Saiyed Mohmad, (1987) 3
SCC 538 and in case of Patel Valmik Himmatlal Vs. Patel
Mohanlal Muljibhai, (1998) 7 Scc 383.


7.10 Upon above submissions and arguments, learned Senior
counsel Mr. Trivedi requests the Court to dismiss both the
petitions.


8.        I have heard learned advocates appearing for all the
parties, perused the impugned judgment and decree passed
by      the     learned   Courts   below           as   well    as     record      and
proceedings.


9.        At the outset, let refer to the judgment in case of Patel
Valmik Himatlal vs. Patel Mohanlal Muljibhai (Dead) Through
Lrs. - 1998 (7) SCC 383, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court
examined the ambit and scope of Section 29 of the Rent Act.
Honble Supreme Court has observed as under :

          "5. The ambit and scope of the said section came up for
          consideration before this Court in Helper Girdharbhai V/ s.
          Saiyed Mohamad Mirasaheb Kadri and Ors. (JT 1987 (2) SC
          599) and after referring to a catena of authorities,
          Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. drew a distinction between the
          appellate and the revisional jurisdictions of the courts and
          opined that the distinction was a real one. It was held that
          the right to appeal carries with it the right of rehearing both


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       on questions of law and fact, unless the statute conferring
       the right to appeal itself limits the rehearing in some way,
       while the power to hear a revision is generally given to a
       particular case is decided according to law. The Bench
       opined that although the High Court had wider powers than
       that which could be exercised under Sec. 115 of the Code of
       Civil Procedure, yet its revisional jurisdiction could only be
       exercised for a limited purpose with a view to satisfying
       itself that the decision under challenge before it is according
       to law. The High Court cannot substitute its own findings on
       a question of fact for the findings recorded by the courts
       below on reappraisal of evidence. Did the High Court exceed
       its jurisdiction.

       6. The powers under Sec. 29(2) are revisional powers with
       which the High Court is clothed. It empowers the- High Court
       to correct errors which may make the decision contrary to
       law and which errors go to the root of the decision hut it
       does not vest the High Court with the power to rehear the
       matter and reappreciate the evidence. The mere fact that a
       different view is possible on reappreciation of evidence
       cannot be a ground for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction."


10.    Keeping in mind the ambit and scope of revision u/s
29(2) of the Rent Act, if we perused the facts of the case, the
plaintiAs landlord pleaded eviction of the lessee and sub-
lessee on various grounds available u/s 13 and 15 of the Rent
act. The learned Courts below did agree to the submission of
the plaintiAs qua grounds available u/s 13(1)(a), 13(1)(b) and
15(2) of the Rent Act to believe that the lessee and sub-lessee
have carried out construction without prior permission of the
landlord on the demised land, also has sublet and thus, lessee
and sub-lessee required eviction from the demised land.
Other ground of personal bona %de requirement of demised
land for the purpose of construction etc. were repeated.



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11.   Argument of learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah that
renewal clause being clause 4(b) in the lease deed granted
option to the lessee to renew the lease which commenced
from 29.9.1970 and expired in midnight of 29.9.1984.                     The
lessee or the tenant within the time period had applied for
renewal of the lease, say much prior to it expired i.e. on
15.11.1984. Therefore, she would submit that the view taken
by the learned Courts below that the lease deed expired on
midnight of 29.9.1984 is erroneous view.            She would further
submit that once the lessee and sub-lessee opted to renew the
lease, it deemed to have been renewed in view of clause 4(b)
of the lease deed.         I am unimpressed with the such
submission. Clause 4(b) reads as under:-

           "If the lessee shall be desirous of taking a renewal
           lease of the demised premises upon the expiration of
           the term hereby granted then, the lessor shall on
           receipt of a notice in writing to that e ect, grant to
           the lessee a fresh lease of the demised premises for
           one further period not exceeding ten years each at
           the rent and upon the same terms and conditions in
           all respects as are reserved and contained herein.
           Provided however that should the lessee exercise the
           aforesaid option of renewal for a period lesser than
           full renewal period then in that case, the lessee shall
           be entitled to a further option equal to the balance of
           the renewal period and the lessee shall be entitled to
           continue to occupy and use the demised premises for
           such further period as it may desire notwithstanding
           whether a fresh lease has been executed and
           registered or not by the lessor."


12.   The learned Courts below interpreted clause 4(b) of the
lease deed and held that the lease deed provides for the
renewal of fresh lease for further 10 years, contains words

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“mutually agreed by both the parties”.                             Thus, one sided
renewal request of the lessee or sub-lessee would not per se
deemed that the lease deed has been extended for further 10
years.


13.    This Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corp Ltd. (supra) in
identical        fact   situation,    in     para       8     held     that     if    fresh
renewal/lease deed is not executed as per section 107 of the
Transfer of Property Act, it cannot be held that lease deed is
renewed. In the present case, the fact remained undisputed
that the landlord did not acceded to the request of the tenant
to renew the lease for further period of 10 year or any other
period.      The unilateral request of the tenant has not been
accepted. Thus, before expiry of the lease period by eHux of
time the statues of the lessee became statutory tenant and he
is to abide by the provisions of the Rent Act.                               Thus, %rst
contention raised by learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah is
devoid      of     merits.           The     learned          Courts      below       have
comprehensively and thoroughly discussed this issue. I see no
reason to take a diAerent view than the view taken by the
learned Courts below.


14.    The aforesaid %ndings took this Court to the next
submission that permanent construction has been carried out
by sub sub-lessee on the demised land. It is the fact that in
the written statement %led by the lessee i.e. BPCL, no
contention         put-forth   to      deny       the       allegation        of     illegal
construction on the demised land.                       Defendant Nos.3 and 4
who have %led the written statement at Exh.50 in no uncertain


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terms accepted that permanent construction has been carried
out on the demised land in form of shed to protect defendant
Nos.3 and 4 from inclement whether, especially during
summer and monsoon.             This is how the sub sub-lessee
accepted the fact of permanent construction. The lessee, sub-
lessee and sub sub-lessee failed to prove any documentary
evidence on record to show that construction carried out by
them has been carried out after obtaining permission from the
local government. Be that as it may, what could be inferred
that the sub-lessee was permitted to raise construction, but to
the extent it relates to the purport and object of using the
open land being leased out to the lessee i.e. to store the
petroleum products or distribution thereof and not for any
other purpose. Thus, mischief of section 13(1)(a) and (b) of
the Rent Act attracted in the matter. It is %nding of learned
Courts below being compendious and in depth analysis and
appreciation of the evidence. This Court under the revisional
jurisdiction finds no reason to interfere with this encyclical
findings specially being barred u/s 13(1)(e and 15(2) of the Rent
Act attracted in the matter.


15.    Clause 2(g) of the lease deed reads as under:-

            “"That the lessee shall have full liberty to sublet or
            license the said premises without restriction and without
            any further reference to the lessor and this clause shall
            at all times be deemed to be the written consent of the
            lessor for the purpose"


16.    Therefore, the lessee was permitted to sublet or license
demised land without restriction or without any reference to the

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lessor.     However, plain reading of the clause indicates that
lessee can sublet. The case on hand is such where the lessee
sublet to Mahendra Motors, thereby Mahendra Motors became
sub-lessee. Dealership agreement between the lessee and the
sub-lessee claimed to be executed has not been produced on
record.       Thus, at no point of time, the landlord or the
concerned Court below came to know about terms and
conditions of the alleged dealership agreement or on which
ground the lessee has sublet the demised land to the sub-
lessee Mahendra Motors.       Be that as it may, in the present
case, undisputedly, Mahendra Motors has sublet to three
other persons, namely, Honest Car Repairing Works, Rajesh
Auto Centre and Prashant Tyre Services. In absence of any
documentary evidence in line of clause 2(g), it can be
suAiciently inferred that it is further subletting at the hand of
sub-lessee Mahendra Motors for the purpose of making pro%t.
It is proved on record that these three persons have been
leased the demised land further as well as the construction
made thereon at monthly consideration of Rs.65/-, Rs.600/-
and Rs.200/-. Clause 2(g) permitted lessee to sublet demised
land or part thereof not to the sub-lessee to part away with
leased demised land. In other words, it was BPCL who was
entitled to sublet the demised land or part thereof, which has
been done by the lessee to the sub-lessee Mahendra Motors,
however, that sub-lessee Mahendra Motors has no right to
further lease the demised land. This is clear act in breach of
section 13(1)(e) and 15(2) of the Rent Act.


17.    In Gajanan Dattatraya Vs. Sherbanu, AIR 1975 SC


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2156, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-

            “Once there is sub-letting the embargo placed on the
            right of the landlord to get possession is raised and it
            is not necessary that sub-letting should continue till
            the date of the suit. To accede to the contention of
            the appellant that the sub- letting must continue till
            the date of the suit, would mean that a tenant would
            not be within the mischief of unlawful sub-letting, if
            after the landlord gives notice...the sub-tenant
            vacates."


18.    This Court in Maheshbhai Nanjibhai Khuman (supra),
examined the issue of subletting in para 19 to 24, which reads
as under:-

            “19.    In Goppulal Vs. Thakurji, AIR 1969 SC
            1291, the Hon’ble Apex Court in regards to
            Rajasthan Rent Control Act, section 13(1)(e), held
            that sub-letting even if was prior to the Act coming
            into force to continue after the Act, continuation of
            subletting after the Act is justi0ed to pass a decree
            for possession.

            20.     In order to prove subletting, two ingredients
            are necessary. (1) exclusive possession and (2)
            valuable consideration. The sub-tenant must be in
            exclusive possession of the portion given on lease and
            the tenant must make pro0t thereof. Parting with the
            possession of the lease property is the predominant
            test. As far as consideration or pro0t made by the
            tenant is concerned, it is di icult to prove for the
            landlord that there was valuable consideration
            between the tenant and sub-tenant, as it is only
            within exclusive knowledge of the tenant and sub-
            tenant and since both are interested in suppressing
            that fact, it is di icult to 0nd out that whether the
            tenant has made out any pro0t by handing over
            exclusive possession to the sub-tenant.



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          21.    In Bhagwati Spg and Wvg Works vs.
          Ahmedabad New Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1980
          Guj 20, the Coordinate Bench of this Court believed
          that in such case, consideration must be inferred
          from the facts.

          22.     The word “unlawfully” used by law maker in
          section 13(1)(e) of the Act applies to all three i.e.
          subletting, assigned or transferred. [See: Anand
          Nivas Pvt. Versus Anandji Kalyanjis Pedhi, 1965
          AIR(SC) 414] . Section 13(1)(e) of the Rent Act is
          much wider and it is not con0ned merely to the acts
          of unlawful sub-letting.         Therefore, even if,
          ingredients of subletting i.e. possession and
          consideration are not proved, but if sub-tenant is
          found to be in possession and doing di erent business
          than the original tenant, it is su icient to infer that
          there has been assignment or transfer of tenancy
          right by the tenant. [See:            Harshachandra
          Narsibhai Patel And Others Versus Ibrahim Haji
          Khubanbhai, 1985 (1) GLR 192].

          23.     The Coordinate Bench of this Court (G.T.
          Nanavati, J, as he then was) in case of
          Harshachandra (supra), has observed that once the
          tenant is out of possession and a transfer of premises
          is made to a relative or a known person, that would
          be covered by later part of clause (e). this Court has
          also observed that to give these words a restricted
          meaning and equate such a transfer within subletting
          is to make that part of the sub section redundant.
          Thus, in absence of proof of consideration, if there is
          a clear case of third party being in exclusive
          possession, it would be covered by word “transfer”.
          The word “in any other manner” at the end of clause
          (e) go to emphasize that they include any type of
          transfer. To prove subletting, transfer or assignment,
          initial burden is on the landlord, but once the
          landlord had evidence that third party is in
          possession of rented premises, the burden shifts upon
          the tenant to satisfy the conscience of the Court
          about his possession as it is only known to the tenant.
          [See” section 106 of the Evidence Act]. Under the


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            aforesaid premises and legal provision, if we come to
            the facts of the case, it reveals that the defendant
            No.1 appeared before the court and state on oath
            that he has parted possession with the defendant
            No.2 and put defendant No.2 as Pagi in the rented
            premises. In these factual aspects, the case of the
            plainti was proved no sooner the defendant No.1
            has given deposition on oath. The dependent No.2
            tried to put case that she is a tenant of the rented
            premises, the plainti failed to establish so by leading
            evidence in this regard. However, the possession of
            the defendant No.2 is proved in the rented premises
            to be that of sub-tenant or the person in whose favour
            the interest of the tenant has been transferred or
            assigned without contractual permission or without
            the consent of the landlord. Pellucidly, privity of
            contract between landlord and the defendant No.2
            does not exist. The plainti precisely came out with
            the case that the defendant No.2 is the sub-tenant
            and tenancy interest is assigned or transferred to the
            defendant No.2. It is proved on perusal of over-
            whelming evidence of on record.

            24.     As far as contention of learned advocate Mr.
            Gandhi that no relief is prayed by the plainti trust to
            ask for the possession from the defendant No.2 is
            concerned, let me say that relief of asking possession
            from the tenant is su icient enough to pass a decree
            against any person who is holding interest on behalf
            of the tenant. sub-tenant is not even necessary party
            under the provisions of section 13(1)(e) of the Rent
            Act. In this regard, there are clear 0ndings of this
            Court in case of Manjulaben (supra).”


19.    The learned Courts below in the impugned judgment and
decree exhaustively dealt with the issue raised in the revisions
and this Court does not %nd any reason to interfere with such
well reasoned order under revisional jurisdiction.


20.    Lastly, it was also argued that lease deed provides to


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conduct any other business and thus, carrying out business
other than the business of storage of petroleum products is
not a change of user. The important terms and conditions of
the lease deed in this regards reads as under:-

            “(1) and appurtenances thereto belonging Together
            with all rights, easements C or hitherto enjoyed
            therewith.

            (2) And together also, with full and free liberty to the
            lessee to use the demised premises as a Storage
            Depot of a Service Station for the purpose of selling
            or otherwise dealing in or of receiving storing,
            treating or handling for distribution petroleum or any
            of its pro- ducts and kindred motor accessories or any
            other trade or business.”


21.    It   is     no   more   res   integra     that    golden       rule        of
interpretation             is to read document on its entirety with
the object stated therein say “any other trade or business”.
The phrase made in the aforesaid rule operate independently
or is operating to any manner to the expression made in
earlier part of the clause is the question to be address. The
principle of ejusdm generis or by a rule of Noscitur a sociis
applies.


22.    The Hon’ble Apex Court in Nemai Chandra Kumar (supra)
and in case of Rakesh Bhanot (supra), referring to the
aforestated principles, held that word or phrase should not
read in isolation, but should be read in context of earlier
expression.        In the aforesaid premises, if we see the clause
where phrase “any other trade or business” is employed, the
other expressions are that the demised land is leased out as a

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storage, depot or a service station for the purpose of selling or
otherwise dealing in, or of receiving, storing, treating or
handling for distribution of petroleum or any of its products
and Kindered Motor Accessories or any other trade or
business. Thus, interpretation implies that any other trade of
business has to be read with loud object of lease i.e. storing of
petroleum products.      Alike the word “kindered” as per the
dictionary gives meaning very similar or related means
Kindered Motor Accessories, which is permitted to sell his
motor accessories which akin to the storage of the petroleum
products.


23.    In view of above, there is clear breach of terms and
conditions of the tenancy.     The BPCL and Burmah Shell Oil
Storage & Distribution Company of India Limited having
abandoned the demised land permitted Mahendra Motors to
sell diAerent kind of motor accessories on the demised land
and subsequently, Mahendra Motor permitted three other sub
sub-lessee to carry out car repairing work or puncture work
or related business, which cannot be treated as kindered
motor accessories.      The learned Courts below found clear
breach of tenancy terms and conditions. I see no reason to
interfere with such well reasoned %ndings.


24.    Lastly, it was submitted by learned advocate Ms. Minoo
Shah that Nirma Limited did not have any right to execute the
decree.        The contention was that selling or transfer of
property does not include assignment of the decree. This is
not a acceptable submission on the ground that in appeal %led


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by    the     lessee      and    sub-lessee         Mahendra         Motors,        an
applications at Exhs.11 and 13 were moved to join Nirma
Limited as party in the appeal proceedings on the ground that
Nirma Limited became owner of the demised land and also
purchased the decree.               In the aforesaid circumstances, it
would not lie correctly in the mouth of revisionists that Nirma
Limited has not right to carry out proceedings or to execute
the decree. Nonetheless, the sale deed executed between the
erstwhile          landlord   and    Nirma          Limited     clearly      depicts
condition and bestowed right upon Nirma Limited to execute
the decree. Apt to note that Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code
also recognizes assignment of decree. In view of above, the
submission canvassed by learned advocate Ms. Shah failed to
stand on its leg.


25.    Resultantly,       both      the    CRAs       found      meritless        and
accordingly, stand dismissed.               Interim relief, if any, granted
earlier stands vacated forthwith. Rule discharged.


26.    Registry is directed to return back the R & P, if any, to
the concerned Court forthwith.


27.    Registry to maintain copy of this order in each matter.




                                                                     (J. C. DOSHI,J)
SHEKHAR P. BARVE




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                                           FURTHER ORDER


             After pronouncement of the judgment, learned advocate
  Ms. Minoo A. Shah requests to continue the interim-relief for
  04 weeks so as to enable her to approach the higher forum.
  The request is acceded to and the interim-relief is continued
  to operate for a further period of 04 weeks.


                                                                                                  (J. C. DOSHI,J)
  SHEKHAR P. BARVE




Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: SHEKHAR PRAFULBHAI BARVE(HC00200), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 06/02/2026 14:32:46




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