Holding

The promotion and extension decisions of State Bank of India were fair, objective and not influenced by bias, and therefore the appellant’s appeals were dismissed.

Summary

The appellant, a former Deputy General Manager of State Bank of India, sought promotion to General Manager (TEGS VII) and an extension of service beyond the age of superannuation. Both claims were rejected by the Bank after a structured interview and a three‑member committee assessment, respectively. The appellant alleged institutional bias stemming from earlier litigations and challenged the decisions before the High Court, which was set aside by the Division Bench. The Supreme Court examined the composition and procedures of the Interview Committee and the Extension Committee, finding them fair, objective and free of bias, and noted that the appellant’s poor interview performance justified denial of promotion. It also held that extension of service is a discretionary right of the employer, not vested in the employee, and that the appellant had no entitlement to monetary relief for himself or his heirs. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals.

Issues considered

Whether the Interview Committee’s decision to deny promotion was tainted by bias or procedural irregularity.
Whether the appellant satisfied the performance appraisal and interview criteria for promotion to TEGS VII.
Whether the appellant was entitled to an extension of service beyond the age of superannuation under Rule 15 of the SBI Service Rules.
Whether the three‑member Extension Committee acted objectively or was influenced by bias.
Whether the legal heirs of a deceased employee could claim monetary relief for denied promotion and extension.
Whether the High Court’s interference under Article 226 was proper.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226
State Bank of India Service Ruless. Rule 15

Subjects

promotionservice extensionbiaswrit jurisdictionbanking service lawstructured interviewcivil appeallegal heirsmonetary reliefadministrative discretion

Judgment

A D.C. AGGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS.
v.
STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANR.

APRIL 27, 2006

B [B.N. SRIKRISHNA AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.]

Service law-Banking services:

State Bank of India Officers Service Recruitments Regulations-
C Regulation 17-Promotion--Jn Top Executive grade-Structured and formal
interview conducted by Departmental Committee-Committee found employee
unfit for promotion based on his performance at interview-Consequently
promotion declined by Bank-Employee challenged the decision of Bank
alleging bias against him in view ofprevious litigations between the parties-
D Held: Allegation of bias not tenable since the Committee did not include any
officer involved in the previous litigations-Moreover, answers given by
employee to questions put before him by the Committee suggest that either he
was incapable of answering them or that he was deliberately filibustering the
interview-Jn either event, he did not deserve to be promoted.

E State Bank ofIndia Service Rules-Rule 15-Extension ofservice beyond
the age ofsuperannuation--Grant of-Is discretion of the employer-No right
vested in an employee to demand extension.

State Bank of India Service Rules-Rule 15-Extension ofservice beyond
the age of superannuation--Claim disallowed by a Committee which took the
F decision after going through the entire service record of the employee and
after scanning through his Annual Confidential Reports-Held: The decision
of Committee was fair and objective-Allegation that there was institutional
bias against the employee which affected the decision of the Committee not
acceptable in/acts and circumstances of the case-Extension had been refused
G for good reasons and was not liable to be interfered with by the Single Judge
of High Court in its writ jurisdiction--Constitution of India, 1950---Article
226--Writ jurisdiction-Invocation of---Scope.

State Bank of lndia--Bank disallowed claim for promotion and extension
of service by employee-High Court upheld decision of Bank-Meanwhile
fl 390
D.C. AGGARWAL°(DEAD) BY LRS. v. STATE BANK OF INDIA 39]
claimant diecl---'-His Legal Representatives (LRs) came up in appeal before this A
· Court'-Entitlement of the LRs to claim monetary relief-Held, not entitled-
Even ·ifthe deceased employee was to succe~din his appeal, the most favourable
order for him could have been a direction to the Bank to ·reconsider his case
for promotion and extension-Even with such a direction, the Bank was not
bound to grant either of his claims-Thus, there is no question of monetary
relief being granted to his legal heirs.
B

Appellant, a Deputy General Manager in Respondent-bank in the
Top Executive Grade Scale VI (TEGS VI) claimed promotion to the post
of General Manager (TEGS VIij. The claim was rejected by the Bank after
an Interview Committee found the Appellant unfit for promotion. C
Appellant filed writ petition challenging the action of Respondent-bank
which was allowed .by a Single Judge of the High Court.

Meanwhile, Appellant sought extension ofservice by two years. The
claim was not granted and consequently he retired from service. Appellant
challenged the decision of Respondent-bank declining grant of extension D
by filing a writ petition which was allowed by a Single Judge of High
Court.

The Division Bench of High Court however set aside the judgment
of the Single Judge in both the promotion and extension matters holding
that the action of the Respondent-Bank was not liable to be interfered with E
on any ground. Hence the present appeals in which it was inter alia
contended that both the claims of Appellant were rejected on account of
bias against him in view of the previous litigations between the parties.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court
F
HELD: 1.1. The Interview Committee noted that the Appellant had
been under suspension from 21.7.1981to12.11.1987 and his service upto
21.7.1981 only had to be taken into consideration for appraisal of the past
performance of the Appellant in the same manner as had been done for
other eligible officers. Considering the case of the appellant on each of G
the relevant dates, the Committee found that although the appellant had
obtained 60% marks for "performance appraisal", his performance at the
interview was very poor as tie had obtained only 25.7% marks. Thus; on
each of the relevant dates, the Committee was of the view that his case
could not be considered for promotion to TEGS VII. The High Court
rightly pointed out that, whatever might have been the assessment of the H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A appellant on the basis of an informal interview conducted under the
promotion policy prior to 1982, he was now required to undergo a
structured and formal interview before a Committee which would adjudge
him on the basis of indicia as prescribed in the 1984 policy. Hardly any
fault can be found with the Committee for its decision in rejecting the claim
B of the appellant for promotion to TEGS VII, which undoubtedly, is a grade
at the highest level requiring extreme responsibility on the part of the
officer concerned. (403-E-GI

1.2. The argument of the appellant, that his case was rejected because
of institutional bias, is nothing but resurrection of an issue which had been
C finally laid to rest by this Court. Having examined the matter between
the parties, this Court had said by its order that the appellant's acts should
be considered by a Committee which did not include any of the officers
who had been made respondents in the previous litigations. The general
argument of institutional bias or that of senior officers being biased against
Appellant, does not cut ice. Having noted the questions that were asked
D of him, and the manner in which the appellant replied to them, it appears
that there was no doubt that the appellant (who had been adjudged to be
excitable by the Interview Committee, the Single Judge, the Division Bench
and even this Court) had either displayed ignorance of the requisite
knowledge to answer the questions or was taking up an obstructive attitude
E in order to scuttle the interview, which according to him could not have
been held. It cannot be said that the assessment made by the Division
Bench is in anyway erroneous or does not arise from the facts placed
before it. (404-A-Df

1.3. No fault could be found with the Interview Committee when they
F assessed the performance of the appellant to be poor. This Court has seen
the record and the three questions that the Committee put to the appellant.
Answers to the three questions would have demonstrated the depth of
knowledge the appellant had in his professional field. The answers given
by him to the questions asked, suggest that either he was incapable of
answering them or that he was deliberately filibustering the interview. In
G either event, he did not deserve to be selected by the Interview Committee.
No fault can be found with the decision of the Interview Committee or
with the decision of the respondent-bank that the appellant was not fit
for promotion to TEGS VII. (404-E-Ff

2.1. As a result of orders made by this Court, the Respondent-bank
H
D.C. AGGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS. v. STATE BANK OF INDIA 393

requisitioned the services of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, A
Central Bank of India to act as the Chairman/Competent Authority of a
three-member Committee to make recommendations as to whether the
Appellant's services were to be extended till the age of sixty years. The
Appellant could not have challenged the constitution of the Committee as
this Court had specifically precluded any such attempt. The contention
that there was an institutional bias that affected the decision of the three- B
member Committee, which was not objective in its assessment, is difficult
to accept. That there was bad blood between the Appellant and some top
officers of the bank is an admitted fact. It was precisely because of this
that this Court took the trouble of formulating a Committee headed by
an outsider as its Chairman, so that a decision could be taken objectively C
as to the suitability of the Appellant to be granted the extension he sought.
The Committee went into the entire service record and after scanning
through the Annual Confidential Reports of the Appellant, took a decision
which was fair and objective, that no extension as sought for, could be
granted. (404-H; 405-A, D, E]
D
2.2. The further contention that the decision of the Committee was
influenced by a report made by the General Manager, Chandigarh Circle
and that the Committee did not independently look into the facts of this
case, is an argument that cannot be countenanced. It is difficult to believe
that the two top-most officers of the Respondent-bank, who were accepted
without demur or protest as members of the Committee, and a person of E
the rank of Chairman-cum-Managing Director of an unconcerned bank
and who had no interest in the matter whatsoever, would all conspire
together so that that the Appellant was denied an extension. [405-F, G]

2.3. The argument of the Appellant proceeded on a misapprehension
of the manner in which extension of service is to be granted. In the case F
of Jagmohan Lal, it was pointed out that the sole purpose of giving
extension of service is to promote the interest of the bank and not to confer
any benefit or favour on retiring officers. Merely because the officer has
put in the requisite number of years of service, that does not earn him/
her that benefit or privilege. If the bank considers that the continuance G
of services of an officer is desirable in the interest of the bank, it may allow
him to continue beyond the age of superannuation. If the bank consid~rs
that the service of the officer is not required beyond the age of
superannuation, that is the end of the matter. Further, non-extension of
service is no reflection on the calibre of the officer and it carries no stigma,
[405-H; 406-A, B, El H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A 2.4. It appears that these principles were not kept in mind by the
Single Judge when he interfered with the discretion of the respondent-bank
not to grant an extension to the appellant. The Division Bench has,
however, rightly applied the legal principle stated in Jag Mohan Lal and
found that there was no such right vested in the appellant to demand an
extension beyond the age of fifty-eight years. Further, in the facts and
B circumstances of the case, the Division Bench found that the extension had
been refused for good reasons and was not liable to be interfered within
its writ jurisdiction. This Court agrees with this reasoning of the High
Court. (406-F, G; 407-A(

C State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and Ors. v. Jag Mohan Lal, AIR
(1989) SC 75, relied on.

3. There is another issue that precludes any relief being granted to
the appellant. As a matter of fact, the appellant retired from service on
9.9.1993 and died in 2005. Even if the appellant were to succeed in his
D appeal, the most favourable order for him could have been a direction to
the respondent-bank to reconsider his case for promotion to TEGS VII
as also to reconsider extension of his service beyond the age of fifty-eight
years. Thus, even with such a direction, it would not have been possible
to say that the respondent-bank was bound to grant either of the
appellant's claims. Thus, there is no question of monetary relief being
E granted to the legal heirs of the appellant. (407-8, E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 959-960 of
2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.3.1999 of the Punjab and Haryana
F High Court in LPAs 364 and 365 of 1998.

Jaideep Gupta, Sandeep Parekh and Rajeev Mishra (for Mis. P.H. Parekh
& Co.) for the Appellants.

Rakesh Dwivedi, Sanjay Kapur, Ms. Vimla Sinha, Abhishek Chaudhary,
G Gaurav Bhatia, Shubra Kapur, Rajiv Kapur and Arti Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SRIKRISHNA, J. These two appeals arise between the same parties
and are interconnected. Hence, they can be disposed of by a common judgment.
H
D.C. AGGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS. V. STATE BANK OF INDIA [SRIKRISHNA,J] 395
The appellants are the legal representatives of. one D.C. Aggarwal, .an A
erstwhile employee of the respondent-State Bank of India, who have brought
these appeals claiming: (a) the benefits of an extension in service of the said
.. D.C. Aggar\val up to the age of sixty years; and (b) the benefits arising out
of notional promotion which ought to have been granted to the said employee,
etc. For the purpose' of convenience, the said D.C. Aggarwal shall be referred
to as "the appellant"· in the course of our judgment.
B

Background to the Promotion Issue
.~ The appellant joined the respondent-bank as. Probationary Officer on
15.1.1960. He got repeated promotions during the period 1960-1980, reaching
all the way to Top Executive Grade Scale VI (hereinafter "TEGS VI") as a
c
Deputy General Manager on 27.7.1980. On 4.1.1981, the appellant was posted
., as Deputy General Manager of the respondent-bank at Chandigarh and was
put in charge of the respondent-bank's branches in the State of Haryana and
in the Union Territory of Chandigarh. On 8.7.1981, the appellant's explanation
was called for in respect of some irregularities pertaining to his work. He D
gave an explanation, which was not acceptable to the respondent-bank and
on 11.7.1981, he was placed under suspension. The respondent-bank conducted
an inquiry and the investigating officials held an ex-parte inquiry. The appellant

-
challenged the investigation and the matter ultimately landed up in this Court.
This Court disposed of the matter by a direction that the Central Vigilan·ce
Commission appoint an inquiry officer who would re-open the inquiry from
E
the stage it was closed. Further directions were given so as to enable the
parties to lead evidence and to ensure that the inquiry was conducted
expeditiously.

The inquiry was·conducted by one A.K. Rastogi, a senior IAS officer, F
who submitted his report on 30.5.1985 by which he exonerated the appellant
of most of the major charges; and put on record that most of the charges were
fabricated and were intended to denigrate the conduct of the appellant as a
senior and responsible official of the bank. The report of A.K. Rastogi was
considered by the Central Vigilance Commission, which, however, disagreed
with his findings and found the charges proved against the appellant. It G
.. recommended that, at the very least, the appellant be removed from service .
The Disciplinary Authority of the respondent-bank, through an elaborate order,
agreed with the findings of the Central Vigilance Commission, except with
regard to the recommendation on the quantum of punishment. It found that
the recommended punishment of removal from service, was too harsh and
H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A instead imposed the punishment of demotion by two grades on the appellant.

Consequently, the appellant was relegated to Middle Management Scale
IV, virtually resulting in the forfeiture of almost more than a decade's service
of the appellant. This order was confirmed by the executive committee of the ..
respondent-bank on 4.11.1987. The appellant joined the demoted post of
B Secretary, Banking Services Recruitment Board, Chandigarh, though under
protest. Within twenty-six days, he was transferred to Bhopal. He, however,
did not join the post at Bhopal on the ground that it was against the rule for
officers of Middle Management Grade Scale to be transferred out of the
circle. After about six months, the transfer of the appellant was cancelled and
C he was permitted to join in the demoted post as Officer on Special Duty,
Zonal Office, Chandigarh. A departmental appeal carried by the appellant
against the order of the penalty imposed on him, was dismissed.

During the aforesaid period, the appellant was not considered for
-·
promotion to the post of General Manager (TEGS VII) on 1.8.1984, 20.2.1986,
D 8.6.1987, 1.8.1988, 24.4.1989 and 3.2.1992. Also, the appellant's case was
not considered under the "sealed cover procedure" pending finalisation of the
departmental proceedings. On 17.4.1989, the appellant moved a Civil Writ
Petition No.15874/1989 challenging his order of demotion before the Punjab
and Haryana High Court. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition
and granted him the relief sought for. A Letters Patent Appeal No. 553/1991
E carried by the respondent-bank was dismissed by the Division Bench of the
High Court. The respondent-bank moved this Court by filing Special Leave
Petition No. I 019811991. This Court dismissed the appeal by holding that the
appellant had been prejudiced in the matter of his defence; it was held:

" ... The order is vitiated not because of mechanical exercise of powers
F or non-supply of the inquiry report but for relying and acting on
material \Vhich was not only irrelevant but could not have been looked
into. Purpose of supplying document is to contest its veracity or give
explanation. Effect of non-supply of the report of Inquiry Officer
before imposition of punishment need not be gone into nor it is
G necessary to consider validity of sub-rule 5. But non-supply of CVC
recommendation which was prepared behind the back of respondent
(appellant herein) without his participation, and one does not know
•
on what material which was not only sent to the Disciplinary Authority
but was examined and relied, was certainly violative of procedural

H
D.C. AGGARWAL(DEAD)BY LRS. v. STATE BANK OF INDIA [SRIKRISHNA,J.] 397
safeguard and contrary to fair and just inquiry."' A
In the result, this Court was of the view that the inquiry against the
appellant had been rightly quashed by the High Court.

Consequent to the aforesaid Order, on 7.11.1992, the appellant was
transferred to Hyderabad as Deputy General Manager, but he refused to join B
there as a matter of protest and remained absent without leave. Subsequently,
the appellant's posting in Hyderabad was cancelled and he was posted at
Chandigarh once again and he retired with effect from 10.9.1993 after working
as Deputy General Manager.

However, when the appellant was still in service, on 28.12.1992, the C
appellant was given a fresh showcause notice for an inquiry against him. The
appellant challenged the fresh show cause notice by filing Contempt Petition
No. I 098/92 before the High Court in which two Managing Directors of the
respondent-bank V. Mahadevan and P.V. Subba Rao were made respondents.
The said respondents challenged the initiation of the contempt proceedings D
against them, before this Court, by Special Leave Petition Nos. 1707-08/
1993. Leave was granted therein and Civil Appeal Nos. 1017-18/1993 was
disposed of by this Court with the following three directions :

I. :' ..... no fresh enquiry shall be held against the respondent for the
E
-- act or commission for which action was taken against him which
resulted in reduction from rank in 1987. Notice dated 28th
December, 1992 shall stand withdrawn."

2. "The State Bank of India shall reconsider the claim of promotion
of the respondent to higher scale in accordance with rules. We
do not express any opinion on the question if interview for higher F
scale is necessary and if there was any valid justification for not
promoting the respondent whose record prior to these proceedings
is unblemished but if under the policy framed by the bank and
followed in other cases, constitution of a committee and interview
is necessary then the committee be constituted but the Managing
Director, State Bank of India, Central Office, Bombay and G
Managing Director (Personnel), State Bank of India, Central
.,. . Office, Bombay who are appellants in this Court may not be its
members."

I. State Bank of India and Ors. v. D.C. Aggarwal, J T. (1992) 6 S.C. 673 at PP. 676-677 H
(paragraph), per Sahai, J.
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A 3. "The committee shall be constituted within three weeks from
today which shall decide if respondent (the appellant herein)
was entitled to be promoted to higher scale .... " and if the
committee decides that the appellant is not suitable for promotion
it shall give reasons therefor.

B 4. In view of the abovesaid conditions, the contempt proceedings
against the two Managing Directors of the respondent-bank were
dropped.

Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the General Manager
(Operations) Chandigarh issued a letter dated 26.8.1993 calling upon the
C appellant to attend an interview so as to adjudge his suitability for promotion
to TEG Scale VII (General Manager's Post). The appellant appeared before
the Interview Committee on 1.9.1993. The Committee awarded him only
25.7% marks as a result of which he was informed by a letter dated 8.9. 1993
that his claim for promotion was rejected as he was found unsuitable by the
D Interview Committee. The appellant made a representation thereagainst to the
Chairman of the respondent-bank. He also approached this Court by a
Contempt Petition No. 324/1993 in Civil Appeal No. 4017-18/!993 for
initiation of contempt proceedings against the respondent-bank and its officers.
This Contempt Petition was withdrawn on 17. 9. l 993 with liberty to move the
High Court for appropriate relief. The appellant thereupon filed Civil Writ
E Petition No. l 5245/1993 before the High Court by which he impugned the
action of the respondent-bank in not granting hirn the promotion he sought.
He also claimed therein salary from November 1992 to 16.6.1993, which was
denied to him on the ground that he had failed to report to Hyderabad where
he had been posted and had remained absent without leave.

F The appellant's Writ Petition No. 15245/1993 was allowed on the ground
that, under the policy applicable to the appellant's case, an interview by the
Departmental Promotion Committee was not envisaged and that his claim for
promotion had to be decided by an informal interview by the Managing
Director and some other officers. The Single Judge also held that it could not
G be said that the appellant had been absenting himself from 8. I I.I 992 to
16.6.1993 as his posting at Hyderabad was unfair and had been cancelled.
Thus, his claim for salary was allowed. The respondent-bank challenged the
learned Single Judge's judgment by filing Letters Patent Appeal No. 364/
I 998 in which the appellant also filed cross-objections.

H
D.C. AGGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS .. v. STATE BANK OF INDIA [SRIKRISHNA, l.] 39.9

Background to the Extension Issue A
During the pendency of the litigation between the appellant and the_
respondent-bank, the appellant ..yas granted ext~nsion in service from 10.3.1991
to 9._9.1993 i.e. upto the a~e of fifty-eight years by a letter dated 9.9)993.
He was also inf9rmed that the Review Committee had not recommendeq
further extension of his service in terms of Rule 15 of the State Bank of India B
Service Rules; as a result of which, the appellant would retire on attaining the
~ge of sup~rannuation with effect from I0.9'.1993. The appellant preferred an
appeal before the Chairman of the respondent-bank, which was turned down.
Th~r~aft~r, h~ filed Civil Writ Petition No.12062 of 1993, which was als6
dismissed by the Division Bench on 5.10.1993. He then carried Spec.ial Leave C
Petition 17752/1993 to this Court. Leave was granted therein and the resultant
Civil Appeal No. 1609/1994 was allo~ed on 11.3.1994. This Court dispdsed
of the appeal by the following operati,ve order:

"In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The orders passed
by the High Court, the Appellate A~thority a_nd the Review Committee D
ate quashed. The respondents are directed to constitute a fresh
committee of the personnel mentioned in the rule itself. In case t~e·
_appellant had made any allegation against any of those Deputy
Managing Directors, then the committee shall comprise of Deputy
Managing Directors, other than those .who are mentioned in the rules'.
The earlier Deputy Managfog Directors whci were the members' of the E;
committee shall not be members of the· new c6mmittee: The
recommendations of the committee shall be placed .before the
competent authority who shall be different_ and higher in rank then
(sic-than) the mem\Jers who shall constitute the committee. Such
co111mittee shaH be constituted within two weeks from today '!nd the F
_decision by the competent authority shall be taken within two weeks
thereafter." 2

The respondent-bank filed I.A. No. '.311994 for clarification of the
aforesaid order on the ground that the Chairman and 'Managing Director is
the Appellate Authoricy and as a consequence, he could not deal with the G
Committee to consider the case for extension of the appellant. It was pointed
• out' that the appellant had made serious allegations against several ·senior
officers, as a result of which, they couid not be nominated ~s members of the

2. D.C. Aggarwal v. State Bank of India & Ors., J.T. (1994) 2 S.C.- 678 at p. 681 (paragraph
4),'per Sahai, J. · H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Review Committee. Accordingly, in pursuance of the time bound directions
of this Court, the Executive Body of the respondent-bank decided on 27.5.1994
to formally constitute a three-member committee comprising S. Doreswamy,
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Bank of India as its Chairman/
Competent Authority, and the two other members were R. Vishwanathan,
B Deputy Managing Director (Commercial Banking) and G. Kathuria, Deputy
Manager Director (Treasury and Investments Management). The three-member
Review Committee would consider and decide the claim of the appellant for
extension of his term in accordance with the rules. It was also made clear in
the order of this Court that it was not open to the parties to challenge the
constitution of the Committee in any further proceedings. Jt was also directed
C that, the Committee be constituted within two weeks and thereafter the
Competent Authority take a decision within two weeks.

R. Vishwanathan and G. Kathuria held two meetings on 6.6.1994 and
9.6.1994 and on 16.6.1994 recommended to the Chairman/Competent
Authority that it was not in the interest of the respondent-bank to extend the
D services of the appellant beyond the age of fifty-eight years. The Chairman
accepted the recommendation on the very same day. All the three members
of the Committee met on 16.6.1994, and recorded the minutes of the
proceedings making a recommendation against granting an extension of service
to the appellant. The appellant once again challenged this by way of C;)ntempt
E Petition No. 4/1995 which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to impugn
it by appropriate proceedings.

The appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No. 5567/1995 challenging the
decision of the respondent-bank not to grant an extension to him. The learned
Single Judge was of ·the view that the Committee was biased against the
F appellant on account of his history of previous litigation; that other officers
who were not as competent as the appellant had been granted extensions up
to the age of sixty years and thus, there was discrimination against the
appellant. Consequently, the learned Single Judge interfered and set aside the
recommendation and held that the action of the Review Committee and the
Competent Authority was arbitrary. Thus, the writ petition was allowed and
G the relevant orders were quashed. The respondt:nt-bank challenged the said
judgment of the learned Single Judge in Letters Patent Appeal No.81/1999 in
which the cross-objections were also filed by the appellant.

The Division Bench of the High Court by its impugned judgment dated
H 9.3. l 999 referred commonly to the Letter Patent Appeals in the Promotion
D.C. AGGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS. v. STA TE BANK OF JNDIA [SRIKRISHNA, J.] 401
and Extension matters. It allowed both the appeals and set aside the judgments A
of the learned Single Judge by holding that the action of the respondent-bank
was not liable to be interfered with on any ground. Hence this appeal.
4
Promotion Matter

The learned counsel for the appellant elaborately pointed out the history B
of the litigation between the parties commencing from the first showcause
notice given to the appellant and the final order made against him. Counsel
also highlighted the fact that all the disciplinary orders had been set aside by
... this Court from time to time. His contention was that, this had resulted in an
institutional bias against the appellant. Counsel suggested that all the top
officers of the respondent-bank were biased against the appellant and were
c
unanimously against him.

The second contention of the learned counsel is that the appellant was
a brilliant officer who, between the period 1960 to 1981, had succeeded to
the top echelons of the respondent-bank by dint of his merit. It was only D
thereafter that, the top officers deliberately spoiled his good record by giving
hi!n showcause notices on frivolous grounds, which were ultimately quashed
by this Court. He submitted that the appellant had already reached TEGS VI
and the case of the appellant for TEGS VII had to be considered on four
different dates: 1.8.1984, 20.2.1986, 8.6.1987, 1.8.1988 and thereafter on
24.4.1989 and 3.2.1992. It is contended that, during the period the appellant E
was under suspension, the respondent-bank was bound to consider his case
under the "sealed cover procedure", which the respondent-bank had failed to
do. Thus, the legitimate claim of the appellant was defeated on account of the
bias against him, as well as, for not following the procedure prescribed.

Taking the second point first, it appears to us that the contention is
F
misconceived. The learned counsel contends (and the learned Single Judge
agreed with this) that the respondent-bank had erred by retrospectively
applying the procedure prescribed in the policy document dated 11.3.1989,
for promotions to be considered between I .8.1984 to 1.8.1988. We are satisfied
that this was a mistake on the part of the learned Single Judge for he failed G
.. to take notice of a document which was placed on record. This document was
dated 23.2.1984, and modified an earlier promotion policy enunciated in the
year 1982. There is no dispute that such a document existed and that it was
placed on record before the learned Single Judge. There is also no dispute
that 3Uch a policy governed the case of the appellant. With this in mind, the
H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. i S.C.R.

A Division Bench has correctly analysed the facts and pointed out that for the
first four dates on which the appellant's promotion had to be considered i.e.
on 1.8.1984, 20.2.1984, 8.6.1987 and 1.8.1988, the assessment had to be
made under the terms of the policy dated 23.2.1984. While learned Single
Judge was under the impression that the case of the appellant for promotion
B was governed by the policy of 1982, the Division Bench rightly points out
that by this time the modified policy of 1984 had already come into force.
By the Government oflndia Circular dated 28.9.1983, guidelines were issued
to add to Regulation 17 of the Officers Service Recruitments the following:

"All promotions to Senior Management Grade, Scale V and Top
Executive Grade, Scale VI and VII will be made by a Committee of
c Directors consisting of the Managing Director, the Government
Director and the Reserve Bank of India Director on the basis of the
evaluation of the past performance and the assessment of the potential
of the eligible officers by the said Committee."

D The memorandum titled "Executive Selection System", prepared for
the Central Board of the respondent-bank dated 21.2.1984 in respect of the
promotion system inter a/ia for TEGS VI, TEGS VII, TEG Special Scali;,
noted ( vide paragraph 2 ):

"The system is essentially merit based, seniority being given due
E weightage for the purpose of reckoning eligibility (among officers of
equal merit or suitability, seniority would count). While performance
on a given job is assessed in temJ'S of the identified key responsibility
areas, potential to shoulder the responsibilities in the higher
management cadres assumes importance ..."

F For assessing these factors, the memorandum prescribed (vide paragraph 2(iv))
" .... a supplementary process of structured interview for promotion to Senior
Management Grade Scale V and Top Executive Grade Scale VI." The
interviews were to be held by a Committee consisting of the Managing Director
and any one or more of the other members of the Central Management
G Committee " ....with a view to assessing the officer's potential".

More importantly, the memorandum noted (vide paragraph 2(v)):

"The eligible officials are assessed separately on the basis of their (a)
past performance and (b) potential for handling higher assignments.
An officer who is unable to get a minimum score of60% (or equivalent
H
D.C. AGGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS. v. STATE BANK OF INDIA [SRI KRISHNA, J.] 403

rating) either in the appraisal of his performance or in the interview, A
is not considered for promotion. Giving equa[ weightage to the two
processes, the merit list is prepared by adding the ratings/scores. in
respect of both the aspects and officers equivalent to the number of
vacancies are recommended to the Executive Committee of the Central
Board for promotions strictly according to their positions in the merit B
list."

The above memorandum was placed before the Central Board of the
respondent-bank and was considered by it during its meeting on 23.2. I 984.
In pursuance of the memorandum, the Central Board resolved that a
Departmental Promotion Committee act as the Recommending Authority for C
promotions to Senior Management Grade Scale V and above. Thus, it is clear
that the appellant's case for promotion between 1.8.1984 to 1.8.1988 had to
be considered in the light of the promotion policy of 1982, as modified by
the policy of 1984. Hence, the Division Bench was right in its view that there
was no question of the policy of 1989 being applied retrospectively iri the
case of the appellant. We agree with the view of the Division Bench in this D
regard.

The Interview Committee noted that the appellant had been under
suspension from 21.7.1981 to 12.11.1987 and his service upto 21.7.1981
only had to be taken into consideration for appraisal of the past performance
of the appellant in the same manner as had been done for other eligible E
officers. Considering the case of the appellant on each of the relevant dates,
the Committee found that although the appellant had obtained 60% marks for
"performance appraisal", his performance at the interview was very poor as
he had obtained only 25. 7% marks. Thus, on each of the relevant dates, the
Committee was of the view that his case could not be considered for promotion p
to TEGS VII. The High Court rightly points out that, whatever might have
been the assessment of the appellant on the basis of an informal interview
conducted under the promotion policy prior to 1982, he was now required to
undergo a structured and formal interview before a Committee which would
adjudge him on the basis of indicia as prescribed in the I 984 policy. We can
hardly find fault with the Committee for its decision in rejecting the claim of G
the appellant for promotion to TEGS VII, which undoubtedly, is a grade at
the highest level requiring extreme responsibility on the part of the officer
' concerned.

Taking the first argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, that H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the appellant's case was rejected because of institutional bias, we are of the
view that this is nothing but resurrection of an issue which had been finally
laid to rest by this Court. Having examined the matter between the parties,
this Court had said by its order that the appellant's acts should be considered
by a Committee which did not include any of the officers who had been
B made respondents in the previous litigations. The general argument of
institutional bias or that of senior officers being biased against him, does not
cut ice with us. Having noted the questions that were asked of him, and the
manner in which the appellant replied to them, it appears to us that there was
no doubt that the appellant (who had been adjudged to be excitable by the
Interview Committee, the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench and even
C this Court) had either displayed ignorance of the requisite knowledge to
answer the questions or was taking up an obstructive attitude in order to
scuttle the interview, which according to him could not have been held. The
Division Bench was being charitable in assuming that the appellant had
sufficient knowledge but deliberately obstructed the interview. We cannot
say that the assessment made by the Division Bench is in anyway erroneous
D or does not arise from the facts placed before it. The Division Bench of the
High Court came to the conclusion that the appellant had never intended to
submit to the interview but wanted to filibuster and ultimately to scuttle it,
although he was aware of the consequences of his actions.

E We agree with the impugned judgment of the High Court that no fault
could be found with the Interview Committee when they assessed the
performance of the appellant to be poor. We have seen the record and the
three questions that the Committee put to the appellant. Answers to those
three questions would have demonstrated the depth of knowledge the appellant
had in his professional field. The answers given by him to the questions
F asked, suggest that either he was incapable of answering them or that he was
deliberately filibustering the interview. In either event, he did not deserve to
be selected by the Interview Committee. No fault can be found with the
decision of the Interview Committee or with the decision of the respondent-
bank that the appellant was not fit for promotion to TEGS VII.

G Extension Matter
As a result of the order made by this Court in Civil Appeal No.1609/
1994 dated 11.3.1994, together with the order made on 13.5.1994 in I.A. No.
3/1994, the respondent-bank requisitioned the services of S. Doreswamy,
H Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Bank of India to act as the
D.C.AGGARWAL(DEAD)BYLRS. v. STATEBANKOFINDIA[SRIKRISHNA,J.) 405
Chairman/Competent Authority of a three-member committee to make A
recommendations as to whether the appellant's services were to be extended
till the age of sixty years. As we have already pointed out, the other two
members of the committee were R. Vishwanathan, Deputy Managing Director
(Commercial Banking) and G. Kathuria, Deputy Manager Director (Treasury
and Investments Management). In the course of the hearing, the parties
accepted the names of the above-mentioned officers without demur or protest. B
The two members of the Committee i.e. R. Vishwanathan and G. Kathuria,
considered the entire service record of the appellant and recommended that
it was not in the respondent-bank's interest to give an extension in service to
the appellant. The Chairman of the Committee/Competent Authority also
concurred with this recommendation. The recommendations thus made by C
the Committee were accepted by the management of the respondent-bank.

The appellant could not have challenged the constitution of the
Committee as this Court had specifically precluded any such attempt. The
learned counsel before us contended that there was an institutional bias that
affected the decision of the three-member Committee, which was not objective D
in its assessment. We find this difficult to accept. That there was bad blood
between the appellant and some top officers of the bank is an admitted fact.
It was precisely because of this that this Court took the trouble of formulating
a Committee headed by an outsider as its Chairman, so that a decision could
be taken objectively as to the suitability of the appellant to be granted the E
extension he sought. The Committee went into the entire service record and
after scanning through the Annual Confidential Reports of the appellant, took
a decision, which we think was fair and objective, that no extension as sought
for, could be granted.

The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the decision p
of the Committee was influenced by a report made by the General Manager,
Chandigarh Circle and that the Committee did not independently look into
the facts of this case. Th is is an argument that cannot be countenanced. It is
difficult to believe that the two top-most officers of the respondent-bank,
who were accepted without demur or protest as members of the Committee,
and a person of the rank of Chairman-cum-Managing Director of an G
unconcerned bank and who had no interest in the matter whatsoever, would
all conspire together so that the appellant ·was denied an extension.

The argument for the learned counsel for the appellant proceeded on a
misapprehension of the manner in which extension of service is to be granted. H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and Ors. v. Jag Mohan LaP (hereinafter
"Jag Mohan Lal") this Court had occasion to point out that a rule under
which extension of service can be granted beyond the normal age of retirement,
does not invest a legal right in the employee to be granted such an extension.
The very same regulation as in this case was interpreted in Jag Mohan Lal
B (supra) and it was pointed out therein that the sole purpose of giving extension
of service is to promote the interest of the bank and not to confer any benefit
or favour on retiring officers.• It was pointed out that it was not a conferment
of a benefit or privilege on officers. Merely because the officer has put in the
requisite number of years of service, that does not earn him/her that benefit
or privilege. This Court observed:
c "The Bank, however, is required to consider the case of individual
officers with due regard to (i) continued utility; (ii) good health; and
(iii) integrity beyond reproach of the officer. If the officer lacks one
or the other, the Bank is not bound to give him extension of service.
In this case, the Bank has shown to the High Court that the case of
D the respondent was considered and he did not fit in the said guidelines.
The High Court does not sit in an appeal against that decision. The
High Court under Article 226 cannot review that decision."'

If the bank considers that the continuance of services of an officer is desirable
in the interest of the bank, it may allow him to continue beyond the age of
E superannuation. If the bank considers that the service of the officer is not
required beyond the age of superannuation, that is the end of the matter.
Further, non-extension of service is no reflection on the calibre of the officer
and it carries no stigma. 6

It appears to us that these principles were not kept in mind by the
F learned Single Judge when he interfered with the discretion of the respondent-
bank not to grant an extension to the appellant. The Division Bench has,
however, rightly applied the legal principle stated in Jag Mohan Lal (supra)
and found that there was no such right vested in the appellant to demand an
extension beyond the age of fifty-eight years. Further, in the facts and
G circumstances of the case, the Division Bench found that the extension had

3. AIR (1989) SC. 75
4. Ibid. at p. 78 (paragraph I 0).
5. Ibid, at. 78 (paragraph 11,) per Shetty, J.
H 6. Ibid, at p. 78 (paragraph l 0).
D.C. AGGARWAL(DEAD) BY LRS. v. STATE BANK OF INDIA [SRIKRISHNA, J.] 407

been refused for good reasons and was not liable to be interfered within its A -
writ jurisdiction. We agree with this reasoning of the High Court.

Relief Prayed For

There is another issue that precludes any relief being granted to the
appellant. As a matter of fact, the appellant retired from service on 9.9.1993 B
and died in 2005. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that even
though the appellant had died, his legal heirs could be granted the monetary
benefits on the footing that the appellant was entitled to get extension of
service by two years and was also entitled to promotion to TEGS VII. In our
view, both these contentions are unsustainable. Even if the appellant were to C
succeed in his appeal, the most favourable order for him could have been a
direction to the respondent-bank to reconsider his case for promotion to
TEGS VII as also to reconsider extension of his service beyond the age of
fifty-eight years. Thus, even with such a direction, it would not have been
possible for us to say that the respondent-bank was bound to grant either of
the appellant's claims. Thus, there is no question of monetary relief being D
granted to the legal heirs of the appellant. Further discussion on this aspect
becomes unnecessary since we are not satisfied that the appellant was entitled
to any relief.

In the result, we find no substance in both the appeals. The impugned
judgment of the High Court is unexceptionable. Consequently, the appeals E
before us are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall
be no order as to costs.

B.B.B. Appeals dismissed.