Holding

A non‑speaking arbitral award may be set aside only if the arbitrator has acted beyond his jurisdiction or misconducted the proceedings; here the arbitrator had considered all relevant documents, so the award stands.

Summary

The Union of India invited tenders for six bridges and incorporated an arbitration clause. The contractor D.D. Sharma submitted a tender with conditional offers of rebates subject to the award of a 10% interest‑free advance and timely allotment of the work. The Union failed to hand over the site on time, leading the contractor to refer four claims to arbitration; the arbitrator issued a non‑speaking award partially allowing three claims. The Union sought to set aside the award under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, alleging the arbitrator had not considered two rebate offers, but the High Court partially upheld that objection. The Supreme Court held that a court may interfere with a non‑speaking award only if the arbitrator exceeds jurisdiction or misconducts the proceedings, and that the arbitrator had expressly considered all documents, so the award could not be set aside. Consequently, the Court allowed the contractor's appeal and dismissed the Union's appeal, affirming the arbitral award.

Issues considered

Whether a court can set aside a non‑speaking arbitral award under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 on the ground that the arbitrator failed to consider certain documents.
Whether the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by not adjudicating the conditional rebate offers.
Whether the contract contained any provision barring the arbitrator from deciding the rebate claims.
Whether the High Court erred in interfering with the arbitral award.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 30

Subjects

ArbitrationNon‑speaking awardSection 30Award setting asideJurisdictionContract interpretationConditional rebateConstruction contract

Judgment

D.D. SHARMA A
v.
UNION OF INDIA

APRIL 27, 2004

[V.N. KHARE, CJ., S.B. SINHA AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]

Arbitration Act, 1940-Section 30-Conditional offer of rebates made
by bidder in response to the Notice Inviting tenders-Bid accepted-Bidder
referring disputed claims to arbitration-Arbitrator, by a non-speaking award, C
partially allowed the claims of the bidder-High Court reversing on the
ground that the Arbitrator has not considered some documents-Correctness
of-Held, a Court can interfere with the award of the Arbitrator only if he
exceeds his jurisdiction or misconducted himself or the proceedings-On
facts, the Arbitrator has considered all documents before granting the Award-
Hence, the Interference of the Court in the Award was uncalled for. D
Respondent-Union of India issued a notice inviting tenders for
construction of six bridges with an arbitration clause. The appellant-contractor
submitted his tender stipulating certain terms and conditions. In response to
the alternative design proposed by the respondent, the appellant offered a
suitable rebate if the work is allotted within 60 days of opening of the tender. E
On the request by the respondent for withdrawal of various terms and
conditions specified in the tender, the appellant made another conditional offer
of withdrawing all terms and conditions and granting a specified amount of
rebate per bridge subject to the payment of interest free 10% advance over
the tendered amount against bank guarantee. The appellant made a further F
conditional offer of granting further rebates of specified amount for each
bridge subject to the condition that the work is allotted as a whole within a
specified date and payment of the 10% advance to be adjusted proportionately
along with the interim payment. The respondent accepted the offer and
conveyed to the appellant stating that the advance would be adjusted fully by
the time 50% of the work is completed. G
The respondent could not hand over the site to the contractor within
the stipulated period. The period of contract was extended from time to time.

The appellant referred four claims for arbitration. The Arbitrator, by a
767 H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A non-speaking Award, rejected one of the claims and partially allowed the
remaining three claims. The appellant filed a suit before trial court for
direction upon the Arbitrator to file a copy of the Award and to make the same ·
rule of the Court. The respondent filed an objection before the trial court
under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for settin~ aside the Award of
B the Arbitrator. The trial court rejected the objection of the respondent and
made the Award rule of the Court The High Court partly allowed the appeal
of the respondent on the ground that the Arbitrator had not considered two
offers of rebate made by the appellant The appellant and the respondent filed
cross appeals before this Court

C The appellant contended that the Award of the Arbitrator is a non-
speaking Award and that Arbitrator had stated in his Award that he had
considered all documents before granting the Award; and that the respondent
is not entitled for rebates as it has failed to fulfil the conditions stipulated in
the two conditional offers of rebates.

D The respondent contended that the appellant is not entitled to any further
claim since the appellant had already claimed a huge amount by way of
escalation cost.

Allowing the appeal of the ~ppellant and dismis~ing the appeal of the
respondent, the Court
E
HELD:l.1. A Court can. set aside an award if the arbitrator has
misconducted himsel~ or the rroceedings. The jurisdiction of the Court in
interfering with a non-speaking award is very limited. It is also trite that
correspondence exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into
consideration for the purpose of construction of a ·contract Interpretation of
a contract is a matter for the Arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to
determination of a question oflaw. [774-G-H; 775-A-B)

1.2. The arbitrator was required to consider as to whether the contractor·
·can substantiate his claim relying on or on the basis of non-compliance of
G the conditions precedent in relation to the offer of rebate made by it in his ·
letters. The said contention evidently was a subject matter of determination
by the Arbitrator. An Arbitrator being a judge chosen by the parties, his
decision would ordinarily be final unless one or the other condition contained
in Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is 'satisfied for the purpose of
setting aside his award. Once it is held that the construction of an agreement
H fell for consideration of the Arbitrator, the determination thereupon shall not

T
D.D. SHARMA v. U.0.1. 769

ordinarily be interfered with. (775-D-EJ A
1.3. The Court's jurisdiction in this behalf is merely to see whether
the Arbitrator has exceeded his jurisd~ction or not. The High Court did !lot
point out any material on the basis whereof it could be said to have been
established that the two documents in question had not been considered by
the Arbitrator. Such a conclusion could be arrived at if the award was a B
speaking one. The award being not a speaking one, the averments made
therein should be accepted at their face value unless contrary is proved by
the party questioning the validity of the award.

Continental Construction Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2003) 8 SCC 4; State of
U.P. v. Allied Constructions, (2003) 7 SCC 396; HP. State Electricity Board C
v. R.J. Shah & Company, (1999) 4 SCC 214 and Rajasthan State Mines &
Minerals Ltd v. Eastern Engineering Enterprises and Anr., (1999) 9 SCC
283, referred to.

1.4. lt has not been shown before us on behalf of the respondent Union D
of India that there exists any provision in the contract which precluded the
arbitrator from deciding the dispute or there existed any specific bar in the
contract precluding the contractor to raise such a claim. Once it is held that
the Arbitrator had the jurisdiction, no further question shall be raised and
the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists
any bar on the face .of the award. There existed no material on records to E
show that the Arbitrator while making an award ignored any material
documents. (778-A-B; Fl

Pure Helium India (P) Ltd v. Oil & Natural Gas. Commission, (2003) 8
SCC 593 and Union of India v. Mis .Banwari Lal & Sons (P) Ltd, (2004) 4
SCALE 443, referred to. F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6678 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.9.98 of the Gauhati High Court
in F.A. No. 8of1993.
G
WITH

Civil Appeal No. 1984 of2000.

K.K. Rohtagi, Praveen Jain, Rakesh K. Sharma, Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari
and Mrs. Anil Katiyar for the appearing parties. H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. l S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. These appeals arise out of a common judgment and
order dated 15.09.1998, passed by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court
in FA No. 8 of 1993 whereby and whereunder an objection filed by the Union
of India purported to be in terms of Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940,
B was allowed in part.

The parties hereto admittedly entered into a contract for construction
of six permanent major bridges on Lekhabali Basar-Along Road in State of
Arunchal Pradesh wherefor a notice inviting tender was issued by the Chief
C Engineer, Project Vartak, Director General (Border Roads). Shri D.D. Sharma,
appellant .in Civil Appeal No. 6678 of 1999, (hereinafter referred to as 'the
contractor') pursuant thereto and in furtherance thereof made an offer.
Negotiations admittedly took place between the parties in relation thereto.

The notice inviting tender, inter a/ia, stipulated that the entire work was
D to be completed within 36. months from the date of handing over the site ·
which would be within one month from the date of issue of acceptance letter.
It was· furt~er stipulated that the notice of tender shall form part of the
contract.

It appears that the Union of India proposed an alternative design and
E in reponse thereto the contractor by his letter dated 25.8.1983, made an offer
on the terms and conditions stipulated therein, clause 6 whereof reads as
under:

"All other terms and conditions will be as per NIT except that the
tender is valid for all the 6 bridges and cannot be divided. To avail
F the coming working season if the work is allotted within 60 days of
opening of the tender, we are ready to offer suitable rebate."

The Union oflndia in response thereto show its inclination but requested
the contractor to withdraw various stipulations/conditions specified in his
tender in terms of a letter dated 30.09.1983, stating:
G
"You are requested to withdraw various stipulations/conditions
specified by you in your tender as brought out above. In case you
consider that the withdrawal of the stipulation/conditions involve
financial effect, you are requested to indicate the same for each
withdrawal/modification of condition separate itemwise."
H
D.D. SHARMA v. U.0.1. [SINHA, J.] 771
The contractor replied thereto stating : A
"We are pleased to withdraw all our tenns and conditions besides our
condition no. 4 for design assumption and the interim payment schedule
as the same has been prepared keeping confonnity with the estimate.
As such the same will fonn a part of contract. We are also pleased
to infonn you that if the work is allotted to us, we will offer a rebate B
of Rs. 90,000.00 only per bridge. For withdrawal of the above stated
conditions and for offering rebate, the Department will have to give
us 10% advance over our L.S. tendered amount against H.G. Bond of
Industrial Cooperative Bank Ltd., Gauhati. This 10% advance will have
to be adjusted proportionately along with the interim payment and the C
B.G. Bond for the adjusted amount will have to be released from time
to time."

From a perusal of the said counter offer made by the contractor, it will
appear that one of the conditions laid down therein was to the effect that all
withdrawal of conditions and rebate would b~ made subject to the conditions D
stated therein. It was, therefore, a conditional offer.

By another letter dated 22.11.1983, the contractor offered further rebate
on 10% mobilization advance, stating:

"In partial modification to our rebate offered by us vide our letter E
under reference at serial (2) we are pleased to offer the following final
rebate ifthe department gives interest free 10% over our L.S. tendered
amount against B.G. bond oflndustrial Cooperative Bank Ltd., Ganhati.
This 1Oo/~ advance will have to be adjusted proportionately along with
the interim payment and the B.G. bond for the adjusted amount will
have to be released from time to time. F
The Rebates of the Bridges are as follows: These rebates are over and
above the rebates mentioned in our letter at Serial (2) under reference.
I. Nallah at 15.5 m Rs. 9, 18,000.00
2 Lalim at 20.442 Km Rs. 6,21,000.00
3. Cane at 25.841 Km Rs. 6,48,000.00
G
4. Saiki at 63.88 Km Rs. 9,18,000.00
5. Kiddi at 96.542 Km Rs. 9, 18,000.00
6. Sipu at 148.3 Km Rs. 6,66,000.00

Rs. 46,89,000.00 H~
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Rupees forty six lakhs eighty nine thousand only.,

This rebate has been offered subject to our condition that the work
is allotted to us by 31st December, 1983, and if the work is allotted
to us as a whole, without breaking up the same partwise as referred
to in para 5 of your letter no. 27537/DGBRENTK/72/ES dt. 30th Sep.
B 1983.

Hope this clarified all the points raised by you."

The said offer was, thus, again a conditional one.

The Central Government by a letter dated l.3.1984, addressed to the
c Director General, Border Roads, conveyed the sanction of the President to the
variation from the standard and special conditions of the contract, inter alia,
stating:

"Mobilisation Advance
D After acceptance of the tender and at the time of placing the work
order on the contractor, he shall be pl\id on demand l 0% interest free
mobilization advance of the contract value against the bank guarantee
bond from a Scheduled Bank.

The loan advance shall be recovered proportionately from his 'on
E account' payment made to him under the contract and in such a way
that by the ti~e 50% of the work is completed the entire advance
would be recovered. The first instalment commencing from the first on
account payment and Bank Guarantee Bond will be released for the
adjusted amount. If the advance thus made is utilized by the firm for
F purpose other than for which it was provided, the entire advance
together with interest at 12% p.m. would be recovered from the firm
in one instalment."

It is not in dispute that the Union' of India could not hand over the site
to the contractor within the stipulated period. The period of contract, however,
G was extended from time to time.

Admittedly, the notice inviting tender contained an arbitration agreement.
Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties, the matter was
referred to the arbitration of Brig. S.B. Joshi, Chief Engineer.

H Before the learned Arbitrator, inter alia, four claims- were raised by the
D.D. SHARMA v. U.0.1. [SINHA, J.] 773

contractor which are: A
"Claim No. J(a)

Refund of payment of sum offered as rebate on account of placing
Work Order for all the six bridges as a whole Rs. 5,40,000.00.

Claim No. J(b)
B
Refund of rebate offered subject to the condition that l 0% interest
free mobilization advance is paid in one lump sum and the work is
alloted as a whole Rs. 46,89,000.00

Claim No. J(c) c
Escalation as per terms of contract on claims l(a) and (b) considering
these as part of quoted lump sum as calculation Rs. 60,591.00 and
Rs. 5,21,131.00

Claim No. 2 D
Extra infructuous/Uncompleted expenses, expenseds and loss of profit
due to enlargement of period of performance Rs. I0,00,000.00."

The learned Arbitrator rejected the claim of the contractor in respect of
Claim No. l(c) but partially allowed Claim Nos. l(a), l(b) and 2 to the extent E
of Rs. 90,000, Rs. 6,48,000 and Rs. 5,00,000 respectively.

The contractor filed an application before the Court of the Assistant
District Judge, Tezpur, which was marked as Money Suit (Arbitrationj Case
No. 12 of 1990, purported to be under Sections 14(2) and 17 of the Arbitration
Act, 1940, praying therein for a direction upon the Arbitrator to file a copy p
of the award and to make the same rule of the Court.

The Union of India filed an objection thereto purported to be under
Section 30 thereof. By reason of a judgment and order dated 26.8.1992, the
learned Assistant District Judge at Tezpur : Sonitpur, rejected the application
filed by the Union of India for setting aside the award and made the same G
rule of the Court.

Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, an appeal was filed by the
Union of India before the Gauhati High Court which was marked as F.A. No.
8of1993.
II
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A The High Court allowed the appeal· in part holding, inter alia, that
having regard to the delay in handing over the site for Cane Nallah Bridge,
the award of Rs. 5,00,000 for the damages caused to the contractor although
justified but as the contractor made two offers of rebate in terms of its letters
dated 25.8.1983 and 22.11.1983, which had not been considered by the learned
B Arbitrator, the award in respect thereof was not sustainable, and a part of the
award could be served, it set aside the award for a sum of Rs. 7,38,000.

The parties are in appeals before us against the said judgment.

Mr. K.K. Rohtagi, learned couns~I, appearing on behalf of the appellant,
C would, inter alia, submit that the award being a non-speaking one and having
regard to the fact that the learned Arbitrator in his award categorically stated
that he had taken into consideration all the documents, .the High Court must
be held to have committed a manifest error in interferring therewith. The
learned counsel would contend that the two offers of rebate referred to by
the High Court in the impugned judgment being conditional ones and the
D conditions precedent therefor having not been fulfilled, the contractor was
entitled to make his claim on rebate. According to the learned counsel, one
of the rebates was offered ifthe amount of IO~o mobilization advance is given
at a time which admittedly was not done, as has been noticed by the High
Court itself in the impugned judgment. It was further contended that the
second rebate was offered by the c;:ontractor on the condition that the
E mobilization advance of 10% should be proportionately deducted from the
bills for the entire period of 36 months whereas the Union of India directed .
recover of the said amount within a period of 18 months.

Handing over of. possession of site within the stipulated period, Mr.
F Rohtagi would contend, had a direct relationship with the requirement of
deployment of heavy machinery and staff and as a result of non"compliance
of the said condition of contract on the part of the Union of India, the
contractor had suffered a huge loss as it had to keep machinery idle for a long
time and bear other cost of establishment unnecessarily.

G Mrs. Anil Katiyar, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, would submit that as the contractor had
claimed a sum of more than Rs. 6,00,000 as ~scalation cost and the same
having been duly granted, no further claim by the contractor was admissible.

The jurisdiction of the court to set aside an arbitration is well-settled.
H The court, inter alia, can set aside an award ifthe arbitrator has misconducted
D.D. SHARMA v. U.0.1. [SINHA, J.] 775

himself or the proceedings. The jurisdiction of the court in interfering with a A
non-speaking award is very limited.

It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required
to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract.
Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the Arbitrator to determine, even
if it gives rise to determ_ination of a question of law. B
The Arbitrator in his award dated 5.10.1990 categorically stated that "he
had examined and considered the pleadings submitted by and on behalf of
the parties and documentary and oral evidences were produced before him
by the parties".
c
It has not been disputed that the documents in question referred to in
para 17 of the judgment of the High Court were filed before the learned
Arbitrator.

The arbitrator was, thus, required to consider as to whether the contractor
can substantiate his claim relying on or on the basis of non-compliance of D
the conditions precedent in relation to the offer of rebate made by it in his
letters dated 25.8.1983 and 22.11.1983. The said contention evidently was,
thus, a subject matter of determination by the Arbitrator. An Arbitrator being
a judge chosen by the parties, his decision would ordinarily be final unless
one or the other condition contained in Section 30 of the Arbitration Act is E
satisfied for the purpose of setting aside his award. Once it is held that the
construction of an agreement fell for consideration of the Arbitrator, the
determination thereupon shall not ordinarily be interfered with.

The court's jurisdiction in this behalf is merely to see whether the
Arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction or not. The High Court did not point F
out any material on the basis whereof it could be said to have been established
that the two documents in question had not been considered by the learned
Arbitrator. Such a conclusion could be'arrived at if the award was a speaking
one. The award being not a speaking one, the averments made therein should
be accepted at their face value unless contrary is proved by the party G
questioning the validity of the award.

The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, has
failed to point out that any material was brought on records on the basis
whereof the findings of the High Court could be justified.
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A In Continental Construction Ltd v. State of U.P., [2003] 8 SCC 4, it was,
inter a/ia, held:

"16. The award is a non-speaking one. It is trite that the court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 30 ofthe Arbitration Act, 1940
can interfere with the award only in the event the arbitrator has
B misconducted himself or the proceeding or there exists an error
apparent on the face of the award.

17. The learned Civil Judge and the High Court have not found that
the umpire acted arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously.or independent of
the contract. No finding has been arrived at that the umpire has made
c conscious disregard of the contract which was manifest on the fact
of the award."

This Court in State of U.P.. v. Allied Constructions, [2003] 7 SCC 396,
observed:

D " .. .Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for arbitrator to
detennine (see Mis Sudarsan Trading Co. v. The Government of
Kera/a, AIR (1989) SC 890. Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940
providing for setting aside an award is restrictive in its operation.
Unless one or the other condition contained in Section 30 is satisfied,
lUl award cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a Judge chosen by the
E parties and his decision is final. The Court is precluded from
reappraising the evidence. Even in a case where the award contains
reasons, the interference therewith would still be not available Ytithin
the jurisdiction of the Court unless, of course the reasons are totally
preverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. As
F error apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer
scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once it
is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one, the Court
will refrain itself from interfering..."

Yet again in H.P. State Electricity Board v. R.J. Shah and Company.,
G [1999] 4 sec 214, it was held:

"26. In order to detennine whether the arbitrator has acted in excess
of jurisdiction what has to be seen is whether the claimant could raise
a particular dispute or claim before an arbitrator. If the answer is in
the affirmative then it is clear that the arbitrator would have the
H jurisdiction to deal with such a claim. On the other hand ifthe arbitration
D.D. SHARMA v. U.0.1. [SINHA, J.) 777
clause or a specific tenn in the contract or the law does not pennit or A
give the arbitrator the power to decide or to adjudicate on a dispute
raised by the claimant or there is a specific bar to the raising of a
particular dispute or claim then any decision given by the arbitration
in respect thereof would clearly be in excess of jurisdiction. In order
to find whether the arbitrator has acted in excess of jurisdiction the B
court may have to look into some documents including the contract
as well as the reference of the dispute made to the arbitrators limited
for the purpose of seeing whether the arbitrator has the jurisdiction
to decide the claim made in the arbitration proceedings."

In Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd v. Eastern Engineering C
Enterprises and Anr., [1999] 9 SCC 283, this Court, opined:

"44. (a) It is not open to the Court to speculate, where on reasons are
given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at
his conclusion.

(b) It is not open to the Court to admit to probe the mental process D
by which the arbitrator has reached his conclusion where it is not
disclosed by the tenns of the award.

(c) If the arbitrator has committed a mere error of fact or law in
reaching his conclusion on the disputed question submitted for his E
adjudication then the Court cannot interfere.

(e) In a case of non-speaking award, the jurisdiction of the Court is
limited. The award can be set aside if the arbitrator acts beyond his
jurisdiction.

(t) To find out whether the arbitrator has travelled beyond his F
jurisdiction, it would be necessary to consider the agreement between
the parties containing the arbitration clause. Arbitrator acting beyond
his jurisdiction is a different ground from the error apparent on the
face of the award.

(g) In order to detennine whether arbitrator has acted in excess of his G
jurisdiction what has to be seen is whether the claimant could raise
a particular claim before the arbitrator. If there is a specific tenn in the
contract or the law which does not pennit or give the arbitrator the
power to decide the dispute raised by the claimant or there is a
specific bar in the contract to the raising of the particular claim then H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A the award passed by the arbitrator in respect thereof would be in
excess of jurisdiction."

It has not been shown before us on behalf of the Union of India that
there exists any provision in the contract which precluded the arbitrator from
deciding the dispute or there existed any specific bar in the contract precluding
B the contractor to raise such a claim. Once it is held that the arbitrator had the
jurisdiction, no further question shall be raised and the court will not exercise
its jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists any bar on the face of the
award. [See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission,
c20031 8 sec 593];

c While considering a speaking award, this court has, however, albeit in
a different context in Union of India v. Mis Banwari Lal and Sons (P) Ltd,
(2004) 4 Scale 443, noticed:

"17. It is now well settled that when a question of law is referred to
the arbitrator the award cannot be set aside only if a different view
D is possible. However, it is also trite that if no specific question of law
is referred, the decision of the Arbitrator on that question would not
be final, however, much it may be within his jurisdiction and indeed
essential for him to decide the question incidentally. Only in a case
where specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the
·arbitrator was referred for determining his jurisqiction by the parties,
E then the finding of the arbitrator on the said question between the
parties may be binding.

18. It is also trite that where the award contains reasons, the same may
be interfered, inter a/ia, when it is based on a wrong proposition of
law. However, when the view of the arbitratQr is a plausible one, the
F Court would not normally interfere."

Furthermore, as we do not find that there existed any material on
records to show that the Arbitrator while making an award ignored any
material documents, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set
aside accordingly.
G
In the result Civil Appeal No. 6678 of 1999 filed by the contractoris,
therefore, allowed and Civil Appeal No. 1984 of 2000 filed by the Union of
India is dismissed. No costs.

B.S. C.A No. 6678/99 allowed.
H C.A No. 1984/2000 dismissed