Holding

The conviction under IPC s.302 and s.148 stands because voice identification by a close relative is admissible and the acquittal of co‑accused does not preclude conviction.

Summary

Dalbir Singh, the nephew of Ram Pratap, was convicted of murder (IPC s.302) and rioting (IPC s.148) for killing his uncle over a property dispute. The sole eyewitness, the victim's father Surja Ram (PW‑8), identified Dalbir by his voice in a dark‑night setting, though he could not name the other assailants who were acquitted. The appellant challenged the conviction on the ground that voice identification in darkness was unreliable and that the acquittal of co‑accused should preclude his conviction. The Supreme Court held that a close familial relationship permits reliable voice, gait and speech identification even in low‑light conditions, and that the acquittal of other accused does not automatically invalidate the evidence against the convicted person. The Court rejected the maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" as a mandatory rule, emphasizing the need to separate reliable "grain" from unreliable "chaff". Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Issues considered

The reliability of voice identification in darkness, especially when the witness is a close relative of the accused.
The effect of the acquittal of co‑accused persons on the conviction of the remaining accused.
The applicability of the maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" in assessing the weight of evidence.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 9
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302

Subjects

murdervoice identificationdark night identificationevidence weightfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusco‑accused acquittalproperty disputeIPC 302IPC 148criminal law

Judgment

[2008] 8 S.C.R. 1026

l
A DALBIR SINGH +- ' i
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 899 of 2008)
MAY 15, 2008
B
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P.SATHASIVAM, JJ.)
--;
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 148 - Conviction under
..../Prosecution case that nephew killing his uncle over prop-
c --e,rty dispute - Other co-accused also caused injuries to de-
ceased - Incident witnessed by grandfather and he identified
his grandson - Conviction of nephew, however, acquittal of
other co-accused by courts below - Held: Grandfather identi-
fied the accused from his voice at dark night - His evidence
D
cannot be discarded, though he did not identify other assail- ..,
ants - Duty of Court is to separate grain from chaff - Where
chaff can be separated from grain, the Court can convict ac-
cused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found
to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons - Thus,
order of conviction upheld.
E
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.9 - Identification of accused -
Dark night -::- Ocular identification - Possibility of -:- Held: Is
possible if person is acquainted and closely related to another
from manner of speech, gait and voice identification - On ~·

F facts, grand father of accused recognized the accused from
his voice in a dark night.
Maxims - Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus - Meaning
and applicability in India - Stated.
Evidence - Normal discrepancies and material discrep-
G
ancies - Difference between. .,..
According to the prosecution case, DS is nephew of
RP. RP was cultivating land of his father-SR, who is the
grandfather of DS. On account of the same OS was on
H 1026
DALBIR SINGH v. STATE OF 1027
HARYANA
,. '

--t-' inimical terms with RP. On the fateful day, during night A
hours, when RP had gone to his field with SR, 5-6 armed
persons came there in a jeep. OS raised lalkara to RP that
he should be taught a lesson for cultivating his
grandfather's land. SR recognized the voice of OS and
went towards the scene of occurrence. He saw that OS B
and others were causing injuries to RP. SR raised alarm
¥ and all the assailants fled away. RP was taken to the hos-
~ pital and he succumbed to his injuries. Investigation was
carried out. Trial court convicted and sentenced DS-ac-
cused u/s.302 and 148 IPC. However, the other co-ac- c
cused were acquitted. OS filed appeal on the ground that
PW-8 had undergone eye operation about two years prior
to the date of occurrence and in the dark night there was
no scope of identification. High Court holding that the
identification by PW8 was possible, upheld the convic-
D
tion. Hence the present appeal.
"
;
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. With regard to the acquittal of the co-ac-
cused and its effect on prosecution version, courts be-
low noted the fact that the only person named was PW8 E
who was the grand father of the present appellant. He did
not identify the co-accused person i.e. the other assail-
ants. PW8 had categorically stated that he did not recog-
nize other assailants, and though he knew other assail-
ants, he did not know their names and, therefore, had not F
given their names. He had categorically also stated that
from the voice of accused who raised the lalkara he rec-
ognized the assailant as his grandson. In a dark night
ocular identification may be difficult in some cases but if
a person is acquainted and closely related to another, from G
-t
the manner of speech, gait and voice identification is pos-
sible. Therefore, there is nothing to discard the evidence
of PW8 so far as his claim to have recognized the appel-
lant is concerned. [Para 6 and 7] [1034-C,E,F,G, 1035-A]
H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S.C.R.

A Anwar Hussain v. The State of UP and Anr. AIR 1981 -.+ ""
SC 2073 - relied on.
1.2. It is emphatically urged that the evidence is par-
tisan, lacks cogency and credibility. Acquittal of other ac-
cused persons is the foundation for such plea. [Para 8]
B [1035-B]
1.3. Coming to applicability of the principle of fa/sus
in uno falsus in omnibus, even if major portion of evidence
is found to be deficient, residue is sufficient to prove guilt
c of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of large num-
ber of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be
maintained. However, where large number of other per-
sons are accused, the Court has to carefully screen the
evidence. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from
chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would
0
be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstand-
ing the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient
to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of par-
ticular material witness or material particular would not
ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "fa/sus in
E uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the
witnesses cannot be branded as liar. [Para 9] [1035-C,D,E]
1.4. The maxim "fa/sus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false
in one thing, false in everything) has not received general
F acceptance in different jurisdiction in India, nor has this
maxim come to occupy the status ofrule of law. It is merely
a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases
testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be
disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question
G of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given
set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called "a
mandatory rule of evidence". [Para 1O] [1035-F,G]
t---

Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 366
- relied on.
H
DALBIR SINGH v. STATE OF 1029
HARYANA
_,
-t-' 1.5 Merely because some of the accused persons have A
been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far
as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a
necessary corollary that those who have been convicted
must also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to dif-
ferentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those B
who were convicted. [Para 10) [1035-G, 1036-A]
y
Gurucharan Singh and another v State of Punjab AIR
1956 SC 460 - relied on.
1.6. The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in In- c
dia for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected,
because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in
some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of crimi-
nal justice would come to a dead-stop. The witnesses just
cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true
'
~
in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case
D
as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance,
and merely because in some respects the Court consid-
ers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the
testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a
matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as E
well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The afore-
said dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one
hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not
i
contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, em-
broideries or embellishment. [Para 10) [1036-8,C,D] F

Sahrab sis Belli Nayata and another v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh (1972) 3 SCC 751; Umar Ahir and others v.
The State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277 - relied on.
1.7. An attempt has to be made to in terms of felici- G
--+ tous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from
falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from
falsehood, because grain arid chaff are inextricably mixed
up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new,
H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPOR'tS [2008] 8 S.G.R.

A case has to be reconstructed by divorcing ess~ntial de• +
tails presented by the prosecution completely from the
context and the background against which they are made,
the only available course to be made is discard the evi-
dence in toto. [Para 1OJ (1036-E,F,G]
B Zwieo/ae Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh Ai~ Hl54 SS
15; Ba/aka Singh and others v. The State of Punja: AIR 1975 'f
SC 1962; State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki AIR 1981 SC 1396
- relied on.

c 1;a Normal discrepancies in evidence are those
which are due to normal errors of observations, normal
errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental dis-
. position such as shock and horror at the time of occur-
rence and these are always there however honest and
truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those ~
D
which ar.e not normal and not expected of a normal per- ..
son. Courts have to label the category to which a discrep-
ancy may be categorised. While normal discrepancies do
not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material dis-
crepancies do so. [Para 10)(1036-G,H, 1037-A,B]
E
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 899 of 2008
From the final Judgment and Order dated 28.4.2007 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or Chandigarh in Crl. r
F Appeal No. 843-DB/1997 ·

B:S. Jain, Ajay Vir Singh Jain, Manish Raghav and Dr. Vipin
Gupta for the Appellant.
Rajesh Ranjan, Rajeev Gaur 'Naseem', T.V. George and
G Naresh Bakshi for the Respondents.
+-
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of theDivi-
H
DALBIR SINGH v. STATE OF 1031
HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ]
1
" sion Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing A
the appeal filed by the appellant who was convicted for offence
punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short the 'IPC'), and Section 148 of !PC. He was sentenced
to undergo RI for life and one year respectively for the two of-
fences. B

y 3. This is one of the cases of a nature which are increas-
ing by leaps and bounds i.e. commission of offence for prop-
. erty. In the instant case the key player is the appellant Dalbir
(hereinafter referred to as the 'accused') who killed his uncle
Ram Pratap {hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') and the c
key witness is Surja Ram (PW8), the grandfather of the accused.
4. Flittering out unnecessary details the case of the pros-
ecution is as follows:

~ On 17.5.1995 on receipt of a ruqa from the doctor, CHG D
Rania, regarding admission of injured Ram Partap !since
deceased), Sub Inspector Ram Partap, visited the hospital
where the doctor produced before him a ruqa regarding
death of Ram Partap, Surja Ram, complainant, father of
the deceased, was found present there near the dead E
body. He made a statement to the effect that he had two
sons, namely Banwari and Ram Partap. Banwari had two
sons, namely, Dalbir the accused and Om Parkash.
Banwari had already died two years ago. Ram Partap
used to reside with him and they also owned landed F
property in village Mameran, where family of Ram Partap
used to reside and cultivate the land. His deceased son
Ram Partap had come to him three-four days earlier for
thrashing the wheat and when they were thrashing the
wheat, at about 9.30 p.m. after stopping the operation of
G
thrasher, Ram Partap went to nearby canal for taking a
bath. After some time, a jeep came and stopped near the
bank of the canal and in the meanwhile, five-six persons
came down from the jeep and went near Ram Partap.
Accused Dalbir Singh raised a lalkara to Ram Partap
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
[2008] 8 S.C.R.
1032

A deceased that he should be taught a lesson for cultivating ',
the land of his grand father. Complainant recognized the
-'
voice of Dalbir and rushed towards them and saw that
Dalbir had a tangli in his hands, whereas other persons
were armed with lathi, jallis and gandasis and were causing
B injuries on his son Ram Partap. He raised an alarm as to
why they were attacking Ram Partap and on seeing him, '
all the assailants ran away with their respective weapons
in the said jeep and he did not know the names of the
remaining persons. He further disclosed that the
'f
• •
.....•
c relationship between them and Dalbirwas strained, as he
wanted to take share of his land. His son became
unconscious due to the injuries suffered by him. He went
to village for making arrangement of a jeep of one Sukh
Ram at about 12.00 during night he .shifted Ram Partap
to CHC Rania for medical treatment, where doctor treated
D '.J
Ram Partap and during treatment he succumbed to his
injuries. Dalbir alongwith his companions caused injuries
,'
to his son without any right. On the basis of this statement,
Ex. P0/1 and an endorsement made by Sub Inspector
Amar Singh thereon, a case was registered against the '
E
accused. The Investigating Officer started the investigation,
recorded statements of the witnesses and thereafter sent
the dead body for autopsy.

Dr. Dharambir Singh conducted post mortem examination
'r
F on the dead body of Ram Partap the deceased and found
ten injuries on his person. He disclosed the cause of death
to be due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of injuries
to vital organs, which were ante mortem in nature and
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
Sub Inspector Amar Singh went to the place of occurrence
G
and lifted blood stained earth from there and sealed the
same in a parcel and took it into possession after preparing ...
recovery memo of the same. He also recorded the
statements of Kamla, the widow and Durga, the daughter
of Ram Partap deceased on the same day. From their
H
DALBIR SINGH v. STATE OF 1033
HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ]
'
i- statements, it was revealed that in the evening on the A
previous day at about 7 P.M., they were going to the fields
to serve meals to Ram Partap Surja and others, who were
thrashing the wheat in the fields. When they passed near
the house of Dalbir accused, they saw a jeep bearing
No.HR-44A 0856 standing in his courtyard and there Pala B
Jani, Sube Singh, Krishan, Kuldeep and Parkash, all
Jr accused, were talking to each other. They were known to
-,
these witnesses. Two persons were sitting in the jeep and
when these witnesses were returning from their fields
towards home and reached near the culvert of canal, the c
same jeep came near them and stopped. From the side
of the jeep, Dalbir asked them about the whereabouts of
Ram Partap, and they told him that he was in the fields.
Then Dalbir asked Madan to take the vehicle ahead. In
j- the meantime, one person got down the jeep for urinating
D
1
and when the jeep started Sube Singh called him by the
name of Devi Lal to come immediately and then all of
them occupied their seats in the jeep and went. They had
seen all the persons in the house of Dalbir in the evening
and these witnesses came to know that during night hours
Dalbir and others had caused injuries to Ram Partap, E
who died later on. After completion of necessary formalities,
accused were sent up for trial.
Accused were charge sheeted for offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 148 read with Section 149 IPC F
to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial.
The Trial Court placed reliance on the evidence led, more
particularly, PW8 and directed conviction and imposed
sentences as aforenoted so far as appellant is concerned
and directed acquittal of co-accused. In appeal, before G
-t the High Court the main stand taken was that PW8 had
undergone eye operation about two years prior to the date
of occurrence and in dark night there was no scope for
identification. The High Court did not accept the stand
and held that identification was possible, particularly, when H
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R.

A the accused was the grandson of the witness. The appeal +
was dismissed by the impugned judgment.
5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appel-
lant submitted that all other accused persons have been acquit-
•
1''"
ted except the appellant. The Trial Court and the High Court
B should not have accepted the statement of Surja Ram (PW8)
that he identified the accused from his voice in a dark night --i-
which was probable. Learned counsel for the State on the other ,'
hand supported the judgment.

c 6. The first point relates to the acquittal of the co-accused
and its effect on prosecution version. Learned Additional Ses-
sions Judge and the High Court have noted the fact that the only
person named was PW8 who was the grand father of the present
appellant. He did not identify the· co-accused person i.e. the
D
other assailants. In the instant proceedings PW8 had mentioned
~
...
about 5-6 persons, but only identified by appellant as one of the ;.,.
assailants. PW8 disclosed before the Court that the deceased '
· ·went for taking a bath in the canal and after 10-15 minutes a
jeep came on the bank of the canal. He did not see the other
""
occupants of the jeep and only identified the appellant who
E raised the lalkara to teach lesson to the deceased for cultivat-
ing the land of his grandfather. The accused persons came with »··
the respected weapons and started inflicting injuries on the
person of the deceased. PW8 had categorically stated that he
did not recognize other assailants, and though he knew other r
F assailants, he did not know their names and, therefore, had not
given their names. He had categorically also stated that from
the voice of accused who raised the lalkara he recognized the
assailant as his grandson. The stand of the appellant that in ..;.:.

dark night recognition would not have been possible from voice ~
G is clearly untenable. In a dark night ocular identification may be ~_._.

difficult in some cases but if a person is acquainted and closely +
related to another, from the manner of speech, gait and voice
identification is possible.
7. In Anwar Hussain v: The State of U.P and Anr. (AIR
H
DALBIR SINGH v. STATE OF 1035
HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ]

1981 SC 2073) it was observed that even if there is insufficient A
light, a witness can identify a person, with whom he is fairly ac-
quainted or is in intimate terms, from his voice, gaits, features
etc. Therefore, there is nothing to discard the evidence of PW8
so far as his claim to have recognized the appellant is con-
rem~. B
8. It is emphatically urged that the evidence is partisan,
lacks cogency and credibility. Acquittal of other accused per-
sons is the foundation for such plea.
9. Coming to applicability of the principle of falsus in uno c
falsus in omnibus, eve!] if major portion of evidence is found to
be deficient, residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused,
notwithstanding acquittal of large number of other co-accused
persons, his conviction can be maintained. However, where
large number of other persons are accused, the Court has to
0
carefully screen the evidence. It is the duty of Court to separate
grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it
would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstand-
ing the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove
guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material
witness or material particular would not ruin it from the begin- E
ning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no
application in Indian and the witnesses cannot be branded as
liar.

10. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in F
one thing, false in everything) has not received general acrep-
tance in different jurisdiction in India, nor has this maxim come
to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.
All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be
disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine G
merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court
may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may
be called "a mandatory r~le of evidence". (See Nisar Alli v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 366). Merely because
some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evi- H
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A dence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was
the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who
have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open
to a Court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted
from those who were convicted. (See Gurucharan Singh and
B another v. State of Punjab: AIR 1956 SC 460). The doctrine is a
dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the testi-
mony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently
speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that ad-
ministration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. The
C witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidety to a story, how-
ever, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each
case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance,
and merely because in some respects the Court considers the
same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of
a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that
0
it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence
has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound
rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose
evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exag-
geration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sahrab s/s Belli
E Nayata and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh: (1972) 3
sec 751, and Umar Ahir and others v. The State of Bihar: AIR
1965 SC 277). An attempt has to be made to in terms of felici- i
tous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from false- I
hood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood,
F because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the
process of separation an absolutely new case has to be recon-
structed by divorcing essential details presented by the pros-
ecution completely from the context and the background against
which they are made, the only available course to be made is
G discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwieolae Ariel v. State of
Madhya Pradesh: AIR 1954 SC 15; and Balaka Singh and oth-
ers v. The State of Punjab: AIR 1975 SC 1962). As observed
by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and another: '
AIR 1981 SC 1390, normal discrepancies in evidence are those
H which are due to normal errors of observations, normal errors
DALBIR SINGH v. STATE OF 1037
HARYANA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ]

of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such A
as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and these are
always there however honest and truthful a witness may be.
Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not
expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category
to which a discrepancy may be cateogrised. While normal dis- B
crepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case,
material discrepancies do so.

11. The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal which
we direct.

N.J.
c
Appeal dismissed.