Supreme Court of India
DAROGA SINGH AND ORS.versusB.K. PANDEY
- Citation
- 2004 INSC 263
- Decided
- 13 April 2004
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- R C LAHOTI
Holding
Criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act is a distinct offence not covered by the proviso to Section 10, allowing the High Court to take suo motu cognizance of contempt of a subordinate court; the summary procedure was fair and the convictions are upheld.
Summary
The case arose from an incident on 18 November 1997 in Bhagalpur where police officers, not in uniform and armed with lathis, forcibly entered the courtroom and chambers of Additional District and Sessions Judge D.N. Barai, assaulting him, court staff and lawyers while demanding the unconditional release of an investigating officer. The Patna High Court initiated criminal contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, found a prima facie case of contempt, and convicted nine of the twenty‑six accused to simple imprisonment, rejecting the appellants’ claims of procedural irregularities. The appellants contended that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to take suo motu cognizance of contempt of a subordinate court, that the contempt was punishable under Section 228 IPC, and that they were denied a fair trial, including cross‑examination of witnesses. The Supreme Court held that criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Act is a distinct offence not covered by the proviso to Section 10, and that the High Court may take suo motu cognizance of contempt of subordinate courts. It further ruled that the summary procedure adopted complied with the requirements of fairness and that the High Court’s findings were supported by corroborative evidence, so the convictions stand. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed and the appellants were ordered to surrender and serve their sentences. The Court also directed the speedy conclusion of pending disciplinary, criminal and inquiry proceedings against the accused.
Issues considered
- The High Court's jurisdiction to take suo motu cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
- Whether the alleged contempt falls within Section 228 of the IPC, thereby invoking the proviso to Section 10 and barring High Court jurisdiction
- Whether the summary procedure adopted by the High Court complied with principles of natural justice, including the right to cross‑examine witnesses and the standard of proof required
- Whether the evidence on record was sufficient to sustain convictions of the nine police officials
Legislation cited
- Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 1, s. 10, s. 15(1), s. 15(2), s. 2(c)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 228
Subjects
contempt of courtcriminal contempthigh court jurisdictionpolice assaultsummary procedurenatural justicerule of law
Judgment
DAROGA SINGH AND ORS. A
v.
B.K. PANDEY
APRIL 13, 2004
[R.C. LAHOTI AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.] B
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:
Sections JO and 2(c)-Contempt of subordinate court-Assault on
Additional District and Sessions Judge in a pre-planned and calculated manner C
in his court room and chambers by police officials not In uniform-Jurisdiction
ofHigh Court to take cognizance-Held: Acts committed amounts to deliberate
interference with the discharge of duty of a judicial officer by intimidation,
lowers the dignity ofthe Court and interferes with the administration ofjustice
and as such are not punishable as contempt under section 228 JPC, but D
covered under the definition of criminal contempt-Hence, High Court
competent to take cognizance of such matter-Penal Code, I 860-Section
228.
Sections I 5(2) and I 0-Criminal contempt of subordinate court-Suo
motu cognizance by High Court-Permissibility of-Held: On proper E
construction, sub-section (2) of section I 5 does not restrict power of High
Court to take cognizance of and punish contempt of subordinate court on its
own motion-Interpretation of statutes.
Sections 17 and 2(c)-Criminal contempt-Procedure for conviction-
Held: High Court has to decide contempt proceedings in a summary manner- F
It must follow fair procedure and give fair and reasonable opportunity to the
contemnors-On facts, Judicial Officer assaulted in a pre-planned and
calculated manner in his court room and chambers by police officials not in
uniform-Conviction on the basis ofaffidavit filed, High Court giving/air and
reasonable opportunity to contemnors-Opportunity of cross-examination not G
availed at appropriate stage-Thus, no fault could be found with the summary
procedure adopted by High Court in conducting the proceedings-Sentence of
simple imprisonment imposed on contemnors justified
Investigating Officer was to be cross-examined in Sessions trial. All
113 H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A means of securing his presence were exhausted but still he did not appear.
Ultimately non-bailable warrant was issued but was of no avail. After
about two months, he appeared before the court and was remanded to
judicial custody. On his behalf bail petition was filed after the court hours
and was placed for hearing on the next day. On the same day one. of the
B office bearers of policemen's association went to the chamber~ of the
Judicial Officer for release of the 1q ~ut it was declined. Next d~y when.
the bail petition was taken up, .it was withdrawn. Thereafter, the police
officials not in uniform, armed with lathis and other weapons attacked
and manhandled the Judicial Officer in his courtroom and chamber and
reiterated their demand for unconditional release of the IO. They also
C attacked the court staff and some of the lawyers and also damaged
furniture and motor vehicles parked in the court compound. Another
Judicial Officer sent report of the incident to High Court. It included
names of police officials who were identified. Criminal case was registered
and also writ petition was filed by Lawyer's As$ociation.
D Primafacie case of criminal contempt was made out and proceedings
under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 were initiated against contemnors
and also show cause notice were issued against them. The contemnors filed
their detailed r'eplies. Director General of Police filed his independent
report which disclosed names of nine officers found guilty for the alleged
incident. State Government issued different orders and suspended all the
E officials from service. Thereafter, Commission of Inquiry was also set up.
Apart from the departmental proceedings, different criminal cases were
filed against them. Some of the senior police officials gave their statements
and identified more names involved in the incident. Judicial officer
involved, his staff and some of the lawyers also filed their affidavits. 26
F persons were issued show cause notices. Out of these persons except for
one or two, the remaining asserted that they were not involved in the
incident and for proof they attached their duty chart. High Court dropped
the proceedings against contemnors other than the nine police officials
·~amed in DGP's report. K being the leader of the contemnors was
sentenced to simple imprisonment for three month_s and remaining 8 were
G sentenced to ~imple imprisonment for two months. It was made clear that
the departmental proceedings initiated by State Government and criminal
cases registered against them would not be affected by disposal of
proceedings in the criminal contempt. Hence the present appeals. _.
~
Appellants contended that the contempt alleged to have been
H committed is of subordinate court which constitutes an offence under
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY 115
Section 228 IPC and as such the jurisdiction of High Court to take A
cognizance of such case is expressly barred under proviso to Section 10
of the Act; that High Court cannot take suo motu notice of the criminal
contempt of a subordinate court but only on a reference made to it by
the subordinate court or on a motion made by Advocate General under
section 15(2); that the charge of criminal contempt has to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt by holding a trial; that the appellants were not B
given reasonable and adequate opportunity either to defend themselves
or put forward their case; that the witnesses were not examined in Court
and also the appellants were not given an opportunity to cross-examine
the persons who had deposed against them on affidavits; and that the High
Court did not take into consideration affidavits of independent witnesses. C
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. For the survival of the rule of law the orders of the courts
have to be obeyed and continue to be obeyed unless overturned, modified
or stayed by the appellate or revisional courts. The court does not have D
any agency of its own to enforce its orders. The executive authority of the
State has to come to the aid of the party seeking implementation of the
court orders. The might of the State must stand behind the Court orders
for the survival of the rule of the court in the country. Incidents which
undermine the dignity of the courts should be condemned and dealt with
swiftly. When a judge is attacked and assaulted in his court room and E
chambers by persons on whose shoulders lay the obligation of maintaining
law and order and protecting the citizen against any unlawful act nee.ds
to be condemned in the severest of terms. The effect of such an act is not
confined to a particular court or a district, or the State; it has the tendency
to effect the entire judiciary in the country. It is a dangerous trend. Such F
a trend has to be curbed. For passing judicial orders to the annoyance of
the police, if the presiding officers of the Courts are to be assaulted and
humiliated the judicial system in the country would collapse. If judiciary
has to perform its duties and functions in a fair and free manner, the
dignity and the authority of the courts has to be respected and maintained
at all stages and by all concerned failing which the very constitutional G
scheme and public faith in the judiciary runs the risk of being lost.
(136-G-H; 130-G-H; 131-A; 137-A, BJ
2. In the instant case, the Investigating Officer had appeared as a
witness. His cross-examination was not concluded without which his
H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A testimony was liable to be excluded from being read in evidence. Judge
had exhausted practically all means for securing the presence of the
witness. Even the threat of initiation of contempt proceedings did not deter
him from abstaining. To secure his presence a non-bailable warrant had
to be issued. He avoided the service of arrest warrant and appeared in
the Court in the late hours. He was not apologetic and felt. that he was
B above the process of the Court. It cannot be said that the higher authorities ·
of police were not aware of the behaviour of the IO. Either they knew
about it or they should have known about it. Instead of offering the bail,
the IO was busy managing for the Judge being approached or influenced
by extra legal methods. He and his confederate decided to take the law in
C their own hands and assault the Judge and anyone who came in their way.
As such the appellants do not deserve any sympathy or .mercy.
(120-G, H; 121-A, BJ
3.1. Criminal contempt defined under section 2(c) of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971 is wide enough to include any act by a person which
D would either scandalize the court or which would tend to interfere with
the administration of justice. It would also include any act which lowers
the authority of the Court or prejudices or interferes with the due course
of any judicial proceedings. It is not limited to the offering of intentional
insult to the Judge or interruption of the judicial proceedings, which is
E made punishable under section 228 IPC. (130-A, BJ
3.2. In the instant case, a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge
was attacked in a pre-planned and calculated manner in his courtroom
and his chambers. The raising of slogans and demanding unconditional
bail for the Investigating Officer further compounded the offence. Courts
p cannot be compelled to give "command orders". The act committed
amounted to deliberate interference with the discharge of duty of a judicial
officer by intimidation apart from scandalizing and lowering the dignity
of the Court and interference with the administration of justice. Therefore,
it cannot be said that the alleged contempt committed of subordinate Court
constituted an offence under section 228 IPC, and as such High Court is
G precluded from taking cognizance of it under proviso to section 10 of the
Act. [130-F-GJ
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. The State of Madras, [1952J SCR 425,
followed.
H State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar, (1959] SCR 1367 and Arun
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY 117
Paswan S./. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2003) 10 SCALE 658, relied on. A
/
/
Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat and Ors., [1991)
4 sec 406, referred to.
4. On proper construction of sub-section (2) of section 15, it does
not restrict power of High Court to take cognizance of and punish B
contempt of subordinate court, on its own motion. Hence, High Court
could on its own motion take action of a criminal contempt against the
appellants. Furthermore, apart from the report sent by the other Judicial
Officer of the incident, Young Lawyers Association had also filed a writ
petition. The Presidents of the three Bar Associations and Advocate
General were present and were heard before initiating the proceedings C
for the criminal contempt and they arrived at the conclusion that a prima
facie case of criminal contempt was -made out against the contemners. This
shows that the Advocate General of the State was also of the opinion that
prima facie a case for initiation of proceedings for criminal contempt was
made out and he was a consenting party to the initiation of the proceedings. D
[133-E, F, G)
S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue and U.P. Lucknow v. Vinay
Chandra Misra, [1981) 1 SCC 436, relied on.
5.1. The procedure prescribed either under the Code of Criminal E
Procedure or under the Evidence Act is not attracted to the proceedings
initiated under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. high Court can
deal with contempt matters summarily and adopt its own procedure. The
only caution the Court has to observe while exercising this inherent power
of summary procedure is that the procedure followed must be fair and
the contemnors are made aware of the charges leveled against them and F
given a fair and reasonable opportunity. Judge has to remain in full control
of the hearing of the case and immediate action is required to be taken to
restore order as early and quickly as possible. Dragging the proceedings
unnecessarily would impede the speed and efficiency with which justice
ti
has be administered. [134-F, G; 135-D, E] G
In re Vinay Chandra Mishra, [1995] 2 SCC 584, referred to.
5.2. In the instant case, though High Court had decided to proceed
with the contempt proceedings in a summary manner but adequate
safeguards were taken to protect the contemners' interest. The contemners H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.
A were issued notices apprising them of the specific allegations made against
them. They were given an opportunity to counter the allegations by filing
their counter affidavits and additional counter/supplementary affidavits,
affidavits of any other persons; and were also given opportunities to
produce any other material in their defence, which they did not do. Most
of the contemners took the plea that at the relevant time they were on
B duty in their respective Police Stations and in support they attached copies
of station diaries and duty chart. High Court did not accept the plea of
alibi as all these papers had been prepared by the contemners themselves
and none of the superior officer had supported such a plea. Another
judicial Officer, Director General of Police, Superintendent of Police, the
C judge who was attacked, two court's officials and some of the lawyers filed
their reports with regard to the incident which confirmed the presence of
the appellants. [134-H; 135-A-C]
5.3. High Court after verifying and cross-checking the entire evidence
and material available on record including the evidence produced by the
D contemners, coming from different reliabl" sources, affording due
opportunity of hearing to the counsel for the contemners convicted only
nine persons out of twenty six persons array~d as contemners before it.
High Court has taken care not to convict a person unless direct evidence
and/or circumstances with sufficient corroborative material doubtless
E fastening guilt on the contemners who have been punished was available.
Affidavit evidenc.e if based on hearsay has been excluded. Contemners
against whom there was single identification ·were also·given the benefit
of ~oubt. It w~s not necessary for the High Court to discuss each and every,
affidavit individually. Thus the plea that the High Court did not take into
consideration the affidavits of independent witnesses and that due
F reasonable and adequate opportunity was not afforded to the appellants
to defend themselves and put forth their point of view is not tenable.
Therefore, there is ,no fault in the procedure adopted by High Court in
conducting the proceedings. [138-D-F)
5.4. The submission that principles of natural justice were not
G observed in as much as opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who
had deposed on affidavits is concerned it may be stated that no such
opportunity was asked for in the High Court at trial stage. It was for them
to ask for such an opportunity t-0 cross-examine the parties who had
deposed against them on affidavit. Since the contemners did not avail of
H the opportunity at the trial stage the plea of non-observations of principles
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY 119
of natural justice is not tenable. Furthermore, High Court in its order has A
noted that the counsel appearing for both the parties have taken a stand
that all possible fair and proper opportunities were extended to them. In
view of such statements, at this stage the contemnors cannot take the stand
that in. the absence of cross-examination of the concerned persons, relfance
(Ould not be placed on the statements which were made on oath. B
(137-C-D; 134-C-D]
Arun Paswan S.l. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2003) 10 SCALE 658,
referred to.
6. It is unfortunate that neither the criminal proceedings nor. the
disciplinary proceedings or the inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry C
Act have been concluded. No doubt the appellants had been suspended
initially but in due course they have been reinstated. Some of them have
retired as well. Inaction on the part of the authorities resulted in
emboldening others to commit similar acts. [139-B, C]
D
Arun Paswan, S.l. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2003) 10 SCALE 658,
referred to.
(The Court directed that the criminal proceedings, disciplinary.
proceedings and the enquiry under the Commissions of Enquiry
Act should be concluded at the earliest; and that the proceedings E
before criminal court which were kept pending awaiting decision
of these appeals when there was no stay by High Court or this
Court, be decided on the basis of evidence adduced in these casts.]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
316 of 1998. F
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.2.98 of the Patna High Court
in original Crl. M.C. No. 24 of 1997.
WITH
Crl. A Nos. 317, 318, 332 and 396 of 1998 G
Ms. Meenakshi Arora (A.C.), M.P. Jha, Ram Ekbal Roy, Harshvardhan
Jha, Anil K. Chopra, Amitesh Kumar, Lakshmi Raman Singh, Braj Kishbre
Mishra, Ms. Aparna Jha, Ehaz Maqbool, Ramesh Singh, Ms. Rakhi Ray, Ms. I
Bina Gupta, Ms. Divya Roy, S.K. Sinha, Ms. Sindbu Pratibha Jha, B.B.
Singh, Kumar Rajesh Singh and Ms. Sunita Pandit for the appearing parties. H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAN, J. The instant criminal appeals arising from a common judgment
relating to the same incident, depict a rare, unfortunate and condemnable act
of the police officials who contrary to the duty enjoined upon them to protect
and maintain law and order, indulged in the act of attacking in a pre-planned
B and calculated manner Shri D.N. Barai, Ist Additional District and Sessions
Judge, in his court room and Chambers on 18th November, 1997 at Bhagalpur
in the State of Bihar.
Facts of the present case:
c . In Sessions trial No. 592 of 1992, the Investigating Officer (Jokhu
Singh) was examined as a witness on 7th May, 1997 in the Court of Shri
D.N. Barai, 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur. As tl;e
cross-examination could not be concluded the case was adjourned to 26th
May, 1997. Thereafter the case was adjourned to several dates but this witness
D did not appear for the cross-examination. A show cause notice was issued
against Jokhu Singh through Superintendent of Police, Madhepura, requiring
him to appear on 11th June, 1997. In spite of that Jokhu Singh did not
appear. On 14th July, 1997, a wireless message was sent to him through
Superintendent of Police to appear in the court on 5th August, 1997. qpce
again the witness did not tum up. The Court, therefore, having no other
E option issued a notice to Jokhu Singh to show cause why proceedings under
the Contempt of Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') be not
initiated against him. Ultimately, on 27th August, 1997 the case was adjourned
to 20th September, 1997 and to procure his presence, non-bailable warrant
was issued. On this date also the witness did not tum up. He did not file reply
F to the show cause notice either. On 17th November, 1997, Jokhu Singh'
appeared in the court in the afternoon. Having regard to the previous order
of non-bailable warrant of arrest, he was remanded to judicial custody. A
petition for bail was filed on his behalf after the court hours. It was directed
that the same be placed for hearing on the next date.
G Shri K.D. Choudhary, one of the appellants who was an office bearer
of the Policemen's Association at District Level and was posted as SHO of
the Police Station in the evening of the same day went to the Chambers of
Shri Barai for release of Shri Jokhu Singh on execution of a personal bond:
Shri Barai did not agree. Thereafter he approached the District Magistrate'
and on the basis of his advice he met the District Judge and renewed his
H
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. P'A:NDEY [BHAN, J.] 121
demand for release of Jokhu Singh, which was declined. A
On 18th November, 1997, when the bail petition of Jokhu Singh was
taken up, the learned counsel appearing on his behalf made a prayer seeking
withdrawal of the bail application. Accordingly, the bail application was
dismissed as withdrawn. Soon thereater, a large number of police officers
(without uniform), armed with lathis and other weapons and shouting slogans B
against Shri Barai, barged into his court room. The court peon Shri Bishundeo
Sharma who tried to shut the door was brutally assaulted. Shri Barai
apprehending danger to his life, rushed to his Chambers and managed to bolt
the door. Unruly mob forcibly broke open the door, overpowered the
bodyguard and assaulted Shri Barai. They reiterated their demand for C
unconditional release of Jokhu Singh. Due to the manhandling Shri Barai felt
dizziness and became unconscious. It was due to timely arrival of a team of
doctors that his life was saved.
The police personnel after assaulting Shri Barai and his court staff,
took away certain records and damaged the doors and grills of the gate. They I)
also assaulted some of the lawyers and damaged their furniture and motor
vehicles parked inside the court compound. Since at the relevant time the
District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur had gone to Banka for holding camp
court and Shri Barai was not in a position to send any report, the 5th Additional
District and Sessions Judge sent a report to the High Court narrating the
incident. On the next day, on return from Banka, District & Sessions Judge :e
also enquired into the matter and submitted a detailed report. In the report the
names of police officials who were identified by the court staff, Shri Barai
and the lawyers were also disclosed. They are (i) A. Natarajan, the then
Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur (ii) Harihar Prasad Choudhary, the then
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur, (iii) K.D. Choudhary, the then F
Inspector of Police, Kotwali P.S., (iv) Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.l.,
(v) Daroga singh, the then S.I. (vi) P.K. Singh, the then S.I., (vii) Rajib Rajan
Dayal alias Bhagat, the then S.I., (viii) Gurubachan Singh, the then S.I., (ix)
Krishna Ram, the then Inspector of Police, (x) C.D. Jha, the then A.S.I., (xi)
K.N. Singh, the then Officer Incharge of Harijan P.S. Bhagalpur and (xii)
Ranjit Pandey, the then Sergeant Major, Police Line, Bhagalpur. G
On 19th November, 1997, on the basis of the report sent by the 5th
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur dated 18th November,
1997, Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 24 of 1997 was registered
and placed before a Bench of the High Court for admission. Along with the H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. l S.C.R.
A said case Civil Writ Petition C.W.J.C. No. 10625 of 1997 filed on behalf of
the Young Lawyers' Association was also listed. On perusal of the report and
after hearing the three Presidents of the High Court Associations and the
Advocate General, the Court arrived at the conclusion that a prima facie case
of criminal contempt was made out against the contemners. Accordingly
B proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act were initiated and a direction
was issued to the Registry to issue notices to the above referred persons
along with a copy of the report, containing allegations against the concerned
persons, calling upon them to show cause as to why suitable action be not
taken against them for the alleged misconduct. The show cause' was made
returnable by 25th November, 1997. The Chief Secretary and the Director
C General of Police were directed to affirm on affidavits regarding the steps
taken by the State Government in the matter relating to the incident.
On 25th November, 1997, all the contemners appeared through their
respective advocates. On a request made the hearing was postponed to I 0th
December, 1997 to enable them to file their detailed replies to the show cause
D notice. Chief Secretary filed his affidavit indicating that the Director General-
cum-Inspector General of Police after holding a detailed inquiry, had in his
report, disclosed names of nine police officials namely (i) K.D. Choudhary,
the then Officer Incharge, Kotwali, (ii) Ranjit Pandey, the then Sergeant
Major, Bhagalpur, (iii) Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.I., (iv) K.B. Sin.~h,
E the then Thana Incharge, Harijan P.S. Bhagalpur, (v) Gurubachan Singh, the
then S.I., (vi) Daroga Singh, the then S.I., (vii) Prem Kumar Singh, the then
S.I. (Officer Incharge Kajraili), (viii) Rajeev Ranjan Bhagar, the then S.I.,
and (ix) C.D. Jha, the then ASI Bhagalpur.
The Director General of Police found the officers, named above, guilty
p for the alleged incident and condemned the police officials for their act. It
was also mentioned in the affidavit that the State Government, acting on the
basis of the report of the Director General of Police, had issued different
orders, suspending all such officials from service. Keeping in view the gravity
of the situation, a Commission of Inquiry was also set up under the provisions
of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952.
G
Besides the departmental proceedings, different criminal cases were
also lodged against them.
On behalf of some of the contemners a request was made to keep the
contempt matter in abeyance until the conclusion of the proceedings initiated
H under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the departmental
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.) 123
proceedings and the report of the Commission constituted under the A
Commission of Inquiry Act. The request was declined by the High Court. It
was held that the pendency of a criminal case or judicial inquiry could not
constitute a bar to the continuation of the contempt proceedings. But before
adjourning the proceedings to the next date and having noticed that all the
contemners and their advocates were present and every body was condemning B
the occurrence, the Court expressed the desire that some of the responsible
officers like Superintendent of Police, Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Inspector of Police Kotwali Shri K.D. Choudhary and Sub-Inspector of Police
Ms. Shashi Lata Singh and Sergeant Major of Police Line Ranjit Pandey
should disclose details of the occurrence which had taken place in the court
premises on 18th November, 1997 and if possible, identify more names of C
such persons, who, according to them, had taken part at the time of occurrence.
On the adjourned date of hearing, the Court recorded the statement of (i) A.
Natarajan, the then S.P., (ii) Harihar Choudhary, the then DSP, (iii) K.D.
Choudhary, the then Inspector of Police, Kotwali P.S., (iv) Ms. Shashi Lata
Singh, the then S.I., and (v) Ranjit Pandey, the then Sergeat Major, Bha~alpur. D
The Superintendent of Police in his statement fairly narrated a part of the
incident and identified certain more names, like Awadhesh Singh, Subodh
Kumar Yadav and Aswan, Vice-President of the Association who, according
to him, had also taken part in the alleged assault. The court issued notices to
these three persons also calling upon them to show cause why they be also
not proceeded for the criminal contempt. The officials whose statements had E
been recorded were directed to file their additional or supplementary replies
to the show cause on the next date of hearing.
On I 0th December, 1997, all the contemners appeared and filed
additional or supplementary replies to show cause notice. The Superintendent
of Police in his supplementary reply disclosed names of .14 more police: F
officials and constables, who, as per his inquiry, had also taken part along
with the main persons named earlier. They are (i) Ram Suresh Singh 'Nirala',
SI, (ii) Sriram Singh, ASI, (iii) Ram Rekha Pandey, SI, (iv) Shivji Singh, SI,
(v) B.N. Singh, ASI, Kotwali, (vi) Sukh Narain Sharma, SI, (vii) D.D. Singh
Officer Incharge, Tatarpur P.S., (viii) Gopalji Prasad, SI, (ix) Madhusudhan G
Sharma Ole Sultanganj P.S., (x) Awadesh Singh, Constable, (xi) Subodh
Kumar Yadav, Constable, (xii) Ram Prakash Paswan, Constable, (xiii) Dilip
Ojha, Treasure, Policemen's Association, Bhagalpur, and (xiv) Anil Kumat
Soren, General Secretary, Policemen's Association.
Notices were issued to the above-named persons as well along with H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A copies of the report calling upon them to show cause ;by 8th January, 1998
as to why they be also ·not proceeded with the criminal contempt. On 9th
January, 1998 all the contemners including those fourteen against whom
notices were issued on 10th December, 1997 appeared and filed their replies
to the show cause notice.
B At the same time, affidavits were also filed on behalf of Shri Barai, 1st
Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur and his staff namely R. Das
and B.Sharma and some of the lawyers of the Bhagalpur Court namely Shri
M.P.Singh, President Bar Association, Bhagalpur; Shri Y.K. Rai, Secretary,
Advocate Assiciation and S/Shri N.K. Choudhary, J.K.,Gupta (Secretary, Bar
C Association), B.N. Mishra and S.C.Pandey, Advocates. Copies of the affidavits
filed were served on their opposites on 16th January, 1998 all the learned
advocates appearing for different parties fairly accepted that copies of all the
material brought on the record so far was properly served on the advocates
appearing for the contemners and those who were appearing in support of the
contempt proceedings.
D
In response to the show cause all the contemners in their affidavits
condemned the incident of assault on Shri Barai and the lawlessness created
in the civil court campus, Bhagalpur. It would be relevant to notice that some
of the contemners like Harihar Choudhary, DSP, K.D. Choudhary, inspector
of Police and few others have tried to justify the act by saying t~at there was
E a resentment amongst the police personnels for the arrest of Jokhu Singh and
removal of stars from his uniform in the court. The reply of the Superintendent
of Police also indicated that because of such steps taken ·by Shri Barai the
Police Officers Association led by Shri K.D. Choudhary on 17th December,
1997 met the Inspector General (Prosecution) and the Zonal I.G. and protested
F again$t the arrest of Jokhu Singh and the removal of stars. After showing
their resentment these contemners also criticised the unfortunate incident and
assault on Shri.Barai, and his staff but they denied their presence at the time
of incident in the' court premises on 18th November, 1997. Show cause
notice had been issued to 26 persons. Except for one or two the remaining
asserted that they were not involved in the incident and were on duty elsewhere
G at the relevant time. In proof of such defence they attached their duty chart
etc.
After considering the relevant evidence on the record, and after taking
due care and caution to see that innocent persons are not punished the High
H Court dropped the proceedings against the contemners other than Shri K.D.
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.] 125
Choudhary, Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, Daroga Singh, P.K. Singh, Rajib Ranjan A
Bhagat (Dayal), Gurubachan Singh, C.D. Jha, K.N. Singh and Ranjit Pandey.
Shri K.D. Choudhary was found to be the ring leader of the contemners and
was imposed with the punishment of undergoing simple imprisonment for a
period of three months and the remaining eight to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of two months. It was made clear that the discharge
of rule of contempt notice of the proceedings against the other seventeen B
would not absolve them of their misconduct and guilt for their respective
offences, if any. In other words, the departmental proceedings initiated by the
State Government and the criminal cases registered against them would not
be affected by the disposal of the proceedings in the criminal contempt.
Learned counsel appearing for the State of Bihar, has fairly stated that
c
neither the dep<!rtmental proceedings nor the criminal cases nor the
Commission of Inquiry have been concluded so far. The plea taken is that
they are awaiting the result of the present appeals.
Appellants who were convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act and D
visited with the punishment of simple imprisonment have filed five different
appeals. S/Shri Daroga Singh, Chakradhar Jha, Shashi Lata Singh and P.K.
Singh have filed Criminal Appeal No. 316 of 1998, Shri K.D. Choudhary has
filed Criminal Appeal No. 332 of 1998, Shri Kedar Nath Singh has filed
Criminal Appeal No. 318 of 1998, Shri Ranjeet Pandey has filed Criminal
Appeal No. 317 of 1998 and Shri Gurbachan Singh and Rajib Ranjan Dayal E
have filed Criminal Appeal No. 396of1998. Daroga Singh, P.K. Singh, C.D.
Jha have already retired from service. The remaining are still in service and
posted at different places.
Learned counsels appearing for the appellants in different appeals, apart F
from the merits in individual appeals, which we shall deal with later, have
raised some common points challenging the correctness of the impugned
judgment. The saroe are:
(i) the alleged contempt is that of a court subordinate to the High
Court and the allegations made constitute an offence under Section G
228 IPC, and therefore the jurisdiction of the High Court to take
cognizance of such a case is expressly barred under proviso to
Section I 0 of the Act;
(ii) that the High Court cannot take suo motu notice of the contempt
of a court subordinate to it. The procedure given in the High H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. l S.C.R.
A Court Rules and Orders for initiation of procee~ings for contempt
of subordinate court having not been followed the entire
proceedings are vitiated and liable to be quashed;
(iii) the standard of proof required in the crimipal contempt is the
same as in a crimin~I charge and therefore the charge of criminal
B contempt has to be proved by holding a trial as in a criminal
case. The appellants could not be convicted on the basis of
evidence by way of affidavits only. The witnesses should have
been examined in Court and in any case the appellants should
have been given an opportunity to cross-examine. the persons
who had deposed against them on affidavits to verify the version
c of the incident as according to them there were conflicting
versions of the incident;
·~
(iv) reasonable and adequate opportunity was not afforded to the
appellants either to defend themselves or put forward their case;
and
D
(v) affidavits of independent witnesses which were on record have
not been dealt with by the High Court.
Answer to the first point would depend upon the interpretation to be
put on Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 which deals with the power of the
E High Court to punish for the contempt of subordinate courts reads:
"IO. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate ~
I
courts.- Every High Court shall have and exercise the same
jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same
procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate
F to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself:
Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt
alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to
it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
G
According to the .learned counsels appearing for the appellants the
proviso to Section 10 means that if the act by which a party is alleged to have
committed contempt of a subordinate court constitutes offence of any
description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High
Court is precluded from taking cognizance of it. According to them in the
H present case the allegations made amounts to an offence under Section 228
¥
I-
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.] 127
of the Indian Penal Code and consequently the jurisdiction of the High Court A
is barred.
We do not find any force in this submission. The point raised is
concluded against the appellants by a judgment of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. The State of Madras, (1952]
SCR 425. In that case, sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts B
Act, 1926 which is similar to proviso to Section IO of the Act was under
consideration. Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 provided
that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been
committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an
offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Interpreting this Section, it C
was held that sub-section (3) excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court to
take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of
a court subordinate to it only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute .
contempt are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian
Penal Code, but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other
description for which punishment has been provided in the Indian Penal D
Code.
This judgment was analyzed and followed by a Bench of three Judges
of this Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar, (1959] SCR
1367. In this case as well the point arose regarding the interpretation to be E
put to a similar provision and it was held:
"The sub-section was considered in two decisions of this Court,
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. The State of Madras, (1952] SCR
425) and Brahma Prakash Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1953] SCR 1169. In the earlier case of Ramakrishna Reddy (1952] F
SCR 425 the appellant was the publisher and managing editor of a
Telugu Weekly known as "Praja Rajyam". In an issue of the said
paper dated February 10, '1949, an article appeared which contained
defamatory statements about the stationary Sub-Magistrate, Kovvur,
and the point for consideration was if the jurisdiction of the High G
Court to take cognizance of such a case was expressly barred under
section 2(3) of the earlier Contempt of Courts Act, when the allegations
made in the article in question constituted an offence under section
499, Indian Penal Code. On behalf of the appellant it was argued that
what the sub-section meant was that if the act by which the party was
. alleged to have committed contempt of a subordinate court constituted H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A offence of any description whatsoever punishable under the Indian
Penal Code, the High Court was precluded from taking cognizance of
it. This argument was repelled and this Court said at page 429. :-
"In our opinion, the sub-section referred to above excludes the
jurisdiction of High Court only. in cases where the acts alleged
B to constitute contempt of a subordinate court are punishable as
contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but
not where these acts merely amount to offences of other
description for which punishment has been provided for in the
Indian Penal Code. This would be clear from the language of the
c sub-section which uses the words "where such contempt is an
offence" and does not say "where the act alleged to constitute
such contempt is an offence."
On an examination of the decisions of several High Courts in India
it was laid down that the High Court had the right to protect
subordinate. courts against contempt but subject to this restriction,
D
that cases of contempt which have already been provided for in the
Indian Penal Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High
Court. This, it was stated, was the principle underlying section 2(3)
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 19~6. This Court then observed that
it was not necessary to determine exhaustively what were the cases
E of contempt which had been already provided for in the Indian Penal
Code; it was pointed out, however, that some light was thrown on the
matter by the provision of section 480 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which empowers any civil, criminal or revenue court to
punish summarily a person who is found guilty of co111tnitting any
F offence under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or section 228 of the
Indian Penal Code in the view or presence of the court. The later
decision of Brahma Prakash Sharma [1953) S.C.R. 1169 explained
the true object of contempt·proceedings. Mukherjea J. who delivered
the judgment of the Court said (at page 1176) :
G "It would be only repeating what has been said so often by
various Judges that the object of contempt proceedings is not to
afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to ~hich
they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a
protection to the public whose interests would be very much
affected if by the act or conduct of any p~rty, the authority of the
H court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.) 129
in the administration of justice by it is weakened." A
It was also pointed out that there were innumerable ways by which
attempts could be made to hinder or obstruct the due administration
of justice in courts and one type of such interference was found in
cases where there was an act which amounted to "scandalising the
court itself' : this scandalising might manifest itself in various ways B
but in substance it was an attack on individual Judges or the court as
a whole with or without reference to particular cases, causing
unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character and ability
of the Judges. Such conduct is punished as contempt for the reason
that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the C
confidence of the people in the courts which are of prime importance
to the litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties;"
These two judgments have been followed recently in Arun Paswan, S.L
v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2003) 10 SCALE 658. We respectfully agree
with the reasoning and the conclusions arrived at in these cases.
D
"Criminal contempt" is defined in Section 2 (c) of the Act, to mean :
"(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words,
spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or
otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever E
which -
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the
authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course
of any judicial proceeding; or F
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;"
Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code provides :
"228. Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in G
judicial proceeding.- Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or
causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant
is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a tenn which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both." H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A What is made· publishable under Section 228, IPC is the offence of
intentional insult to a Judge or interruption of court proceedings but not as
a contempt of Court. The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to
include any act by a person which would either scandalize the court or which
would tend to interfere with the administration of justice. It would also include
any act which lowers the authority of the Court or prejudices or interferes
B with the due course of any judicial proceedings. It is not limited to the
offering of intentional insult to the Judge or interruption of the judicial
proceedings. This Court observed in Delhi Judicial Service Association v.
State of Gujarat and Ors., [1991] 4 SCC 406 :
c " ...The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration
of justice. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the
community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted
with the power to commit for contempt of court, not to protect the
dignity of the Court against insult or injury, but, to protect and
vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice
D is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. The power
to punish for contempt is thus for the protection of public justice,
whose interest requires that decency and decorum is preserved in
Courts of Justice. Those who have to discharge duty in a Court of
Justice are protected by the law, and shielded in the discharge of their
duties. Any deliberate interference with the discharge of such duties
E either in court or outside the court by attacking the presiding officers
of the court, would amount to criminal contempt and the courts must
take serious cognizance of such conduct."
In the present case, a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge was
F attacked in a pre-planned and calculated manner in his court room and when
he tried to protect himself from physical harm by retiring to his chambers,
by chasing him there and causing injuries to him. The raising of slogans and
demanding unconditional bail for Jokhu Singh further compounded the offence.
The Courts cannot be compelled to give "command orders". The act committed
amounts to deliberate interference with the discharge of duty of a judicial
G officer by intimidation apart from scandalizing and lowering the dignity of
the Court and interference with the administration of justice.The effect of
such an act is not confined to a particular court or a district, or the State, it
has the tendency to effect the entire judiciary in the country. It is a dangerous
trend. Such a trend has to be curbed. If for passing judicial orders to the
H annoyance of the police the presiding officers of the Courts are to be assaulted
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.) 131
and humiliated the judicial system fin the country would collapse. A
The second contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the
High Court cannot on its own motion take action of a criminal contempt of
a subordinate court. According to the learned counsels the High Court can
take cognizance of a criminal contempt under Section 15 (2) of the Act of
a subordinate court only on a reference made to it by the subordinate court B·
or on a motion made by the Advocate General. Since the procedure as laid
down in the High Court Rules and Orders had not been followed the very
initiation of proceedings for contempt was vitiated and therefore liable to be
quashed. We do not find any force in this submission as well. This point also
stands concluded against the appellants by a decision of this Court in S.K. C
Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow, v. Vinay Chandra Misra,
[1981] 1 SCC 436. In this case an advocate filed a petition before the High
Court under the Contempt of Courts Act alleging that the appellant therein
as a Member of Revenue Board made certain contemptuous remarks, viz.,
na/ayak gadhe saale ko jail bhijwa dunga; kis idiot ne advocate bana diya
hai and acted in a manner which amounted tq criminal contempt of the Court D
of Revenue Board, in which he (the advocate) was the counsel for one of the
parties. The advocate requested the High Court to take suo motu action under
the Contempt of Court Act against the member of the Revenue Board or pass
such orders as it deemed fit. The question for determination was whether the
High Court was competent to take cognizance of contempt of a subordinate E
court when it was moved by a private petitioner and not in accordance with
either of the two motions mentioned in Section 15 (2). Analyzing Section 15
(2) of the Act and in reading it in harmony with Section 10 of the Act it was
held:
"16. Section 2(c) of the Act defines "criminal contempt". Section 9 F
emphasizes that "nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as
implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or other act is
punishable as contempt of court which would not be so punishable
apart from this Act". Section IO runs as under :
Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, G
powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure
and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it
as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself :
Then, there is a proviso which is not material for our purpose. The
nrovision in Section IO is but a replica of Section 3 of the 1952 Act. H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A The phrase "courts subordinate to it" used in Section IO is wide
enough to include all courts which are judicially subordinate to the
High Court, even though administrative control over them under
Article 235 of the Constituti_on does not vest in the High Court.
Under Article 227 of the Coastitution the High Court has the power
of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the
B territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The Court of
Revenue Board, therefore, in the instant case, is a court "subordinate
to the High Court" within the contemplation of Section l 0 of the Act.
17. Section 14 provides for the procedure where contempts is
committed in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court. Section
c 15 is very material for our purpose. It provides in regard to cognizance
of"criminal contempt" in cases other than those falling under Section
14. The material portion of Section 15 reads thus :
15. (I) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt
referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the ~High Court
D may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by -
(a) the Advocate General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate
General.
E (2) In the. case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court,
the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the
subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate General
or, in relation to a union territory, by such law officer as the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
F specify in this behalf ...
The operation of sub-section (l) appears to be confined to cases
of "criminal c6ntempt" of the Supreme Court or the High Court,
itself. Criminal contempt of a subordinate court is dealt with in
sub-section (2).
G 18. A comparison between the two sub-sections would show that
whereas in sub-section ( l) one of the three alternative modes for
taking cognizance, mentioned is "on its own motion", no such mode
is expressly provided in sub-section (2). The only two modes of
taking cognizance by the High Court mentioned in sub-section (2)
H are : (i) on a reference made to it by a subordinate court; or (ii) on
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.] 133
a motion made by the Advocate General, or in relation to a union A
territory by the notified Law Officer. Does the omission in Section
15(2) of the mode of taking suo motu cognizance indicate a legislative
intention to debar the High Court from taking congnizance in that
mode of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court ? If this question
is answered in the affirmative, then, such a construction of sub-section B
(2) will be inconsistent with Section 10 which makes the powers of
the High Court to punish for contempt of a subordinate court,·
coextensive and ·congruent with its power to punish for its own
contempt not only in regard to quantum or prerequisites for
punishment, but also in the matter of procedure and practice. Such a
construction which will bring Section 15(2) in conflict with Section C
10, has to be avoided, and the other interpretation which will be in
harmony with Section 10 is to be accepted. Harmoniously construed,
sub-section (2) of Section 15 does not deprive the High Court of the
power of taking cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate
court, on its own motion, also. If the intention of the legislature was
to take away the power of the High Court to take suo motu cogni2:ance D
of such contempt, there was no difficulty in saying so in unequivocal
language, or by wording the sub-section in a negative form. We have,
therefore, no hesitation in holding in agreement with the High Court,
that sub-section (2) ofSection 15, properly construed, does not restrict
the power ofthe High Court to take cognizance ofand punish contempt E
of a subordinate court, on its own motion. " [Emphasis supplied]
We respectfully agree with the view taken in this judgment and hold
that the High C::ourt could ini~iate proceedings on its own motion under the
Contempt of Courts Act against the appellants. On the facts of this case apart
from the report sent by the 5th Additional District and Sessions Judge of the F
incident, Young Lawyers Association had also filed a writ petition. The
Presidents of the three Bar Associations and the Advocate General were
present and heard before initiating the proceedings for the criminal contempt.
It has been noted by the High Court that "all the three Presidents of the High
Court Associations and the Advocate General arrived at the conclusion that
a prima facie case of criminal contempt was made out against the contemners". G
This shows that the Advocate General of the State was also of the opinion
that prima facie a case for initiation of proceedings for criminal contempt
was made out and he was a consenting party to the initiation of the proceedings.
The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.
A that the standard of proof required in the criminal contempt is the same as
in a criminal charge and therefore the charg~ of criminal contempt has to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. That the appellants could not be convicted
on the basis of the affidavits filed. That the witnesses should have been
examined in Court and in any case the appellants should have been given an
opportunity to cross-examine the persons who had deposed against them on
B affidavits to verify the version of the incident as according to them there
were conflicting versions of the incident. It was emphasized that justice must
not only be done; but must be seen to be done by all concerned to establish
confidence that the contemners will receive a fair, just and impartial trial. We
do not find any substan~e in this submission as well. High Court in its order
C has noted that the learned counsels appearing for both the parties have taken
a stand that all possible fair and proper opportunities were extended. to them.
In view of the statements made by the counsels for the parties it will not be
open to the counsels for the parties at this stage to take the stand that in the
absence of cross-examination of the concerned persons, reliance could not be
placed on the statements which were made on oath. Learned counsel who had
D appeared for the contemners before the High Court did not claim the right of
cross-examination. Only at the stage of arguments a submission was made
that opportunity to cross-examine the concerned persons was not given which
vitiated the trial. High Court rejected this contention by holding that such a
stand could not be taken at that stage of the proceedings. It has been held in
E Arun Paswan case (supra) that a party which fails to avail of the opportunity
to cross-examine at the appropriate stage is precluded from taking the plea
of non-observance of principles of natural justice at a later stage. Such a plea
would not be tenable.
It has repeatedly been held by this Court (Ref: (1995] 2 SCC 584) that
F the procedure prescribed either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or
under the Evidence Act is not attracted to the proceedings initiated under
Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The High Court can deal with
such matters summarily and adopt its own procedure. The only caution that
has to be observed by the Court in exercising this inherent power of summary
G procedure is that the procedure followed must be fair and the conte~ers are
made aware of the charges levelled against them and given a fair and
reasonable opportunity. Having regard to the fact that contempt proceedings
are to be decided expeditiously in a summary manner the convictions have
been recorded without extending the opportunity to the contemners to cross
examine those who had deposed against them on affidavits. Though the
H procedure adopted in this case was summary but adequate safeguards were
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.] 135
taken to protect the contemners' interest. The contemners were issued notices A
apprising them of the specific allegations made against them. They were
given an opportunity to counter the allegations by filing their counter affidavits
and additional counter/supplementary affidavits as per their request. They
were also given opportunity to file affidavits of any other persons which they
did. They were given opportunities to produce any other material in their B
defence which they did not do. Most of the contemners had taken the plea
that at the relevant time they were on duty in their respective Police Stations
though in the same town. They also attached copies of station diaries and
duty chart in support of their alibi. The High Court did not accept the plea
of alibi as all these papers had been prepared by the contemners themselves
and none of the superior officer had supported such a plea. The evidence C
produced by the respondents was rejected in the face of the reports made by
the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Director General of Police coupled
with affidavits of Mr. Barasi, the Additional District and Sessions Judge, two
court's officials and affidavits of some of the lawyers who had witnessed the
occurrence.
D
The contempt proceedings have to be decided in a summary manner.
The Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of the case and immediate
action is required to be taken to make it effective and deterrent. Immediate
steps are required to be taken to restore order as early and quickly as possible.
Dragging the proceedings unnecessarily would impede the speed and efficiency E
with which justice has to be administered. This Court while considering all
these aspects held in In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged contemner),
[1995) 2 SCC 584, that the criminal contempt no doubt amounts to an offence
but it is an offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the procedure
adopted both under the common Jaw and t~e statute Jaw in the country has
always been summary. It was observed that the need was for taking speedy F
action and to put the Judge in full control of the hearing. It was emphasised
that immediate steps were required to be taken to restore order in the court
proceedings as quickly as possible. To quote from the above-referred to case
"However, the fact that the process is summary does not mean that
the procedural requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting the G·
charge, is denied to the contemner. The degree of precision with
which the charge may be stated depends upon the circumstances. So
Jong as the gist of the specific allegations is made clear or otherwise
the contemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is not always
necessary to formulate the charge in a specific allegation. The H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A consensus of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike is that
despite the objection that the Judge deals with the contempt himself
and the contemner has little opportunity to defend himself, there is a
residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to punish on the spot
but it is the only realistic way of dealing with certain offenders. This
procedure does not· offend against the principle of natural justice,
B viz., nemo judex in sua causa since the prosecution is not aimed at
protecting the Judge personally but protecting the administration of
justice: The threat of immediate pUnishment is the most effective
deterrent against misconduct. The Judge has to remain in full control
of the hearing of the case and he must be able to take steps to .restore
c order as· early and quickly as possible. The time factor is crucial.
Dragging out the contempt proceedings means a lengthy interruption
to the inain proceedings which paralyses the court for a time and
indirectly impedes the speed and efficiency with which justice is
administered. Instant justice can never be completely satisfactory yet
it does provide the simplest, most effective and least unsatisfactory
D method of dealing with disruptive conduct in court. So long as the
contemner's interests are adequately safeguarded by giving him an
opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary procedure
in the case of contempt in the face of the court is commended and not
faulted."
E In the present case the High Court had decided to proceed with the
contempt proceedings in a summary manner. Due opportunity was afforded
to all the contemners and after verifying and cross checking the material
available before it, coming from different reliable sources the High Court
convicted only nine persons out of twenty six persons arrayed as contemners
F before it. The High Court took due care to ascertain the identity of the
contemners by cross-checking with the affidavits filed by the different persons.
It is also based on the independent reports submitted ,by the Director General
of Police and Superintendent of Police. We do not find any fault in the
procedure adopted by the High Court in conducting the proceedings in the
G present case. For the survival of the rule of law the orders of the courts have
to be obeyed and continue to be obeyed unless overturned, modified or
stayed by the appellate or revisional courts. The court does not have any
agency of its own to enforce its orders. The executive authority of the State
has to come to the aid of the party seeking implementation of the court
orders. The might of the State must stand behind the Court orders for the
H survival of the rule of the court in the country. Incidents which undermine
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.] 137
the dignity of the courts should be condemned and dealt with swiftly. When A
a judge is attacked and assaulted in his court room and chambers by petsons
on whose shoulders lay the obligation of maintaining law and order and
protecting the citizen against any unlawful act needs to be condemned in the
severest of terms. lf judiciary has to perform its duties and functions in a fair
and free manner, the dignity and the authority of the courts has to be respected B
and maintained at all stages and by all concerned failing which the very
constitutional scheme and public faith in the judiciary runs the risk of being
lost.
It was urged with some vehemence that principles of natural justice
were not observed in as much as opportunity to cross examine the witnesses C
who had deposed on affidavits is concerned it may be stated that no such
opportunity was asked for in the High Court at trial stage. It was for them
to ask for such an opportunity to cross examine the parties who had deposed
against them on affidavit. Since the contemners did not avail of the opportunity
at the trial stage the plea of non-observations of principles of natural justice
is not tenable. Appellants were made aware of the procedure which was D
adopted by the High Court. They were given full opportunity to put forth
their point of view. Each of them filed detailed affidavits along with evidence
in support thereof. They had attached their duty charts showing that they
could not have been present at the place of occurrence as they were on duty
somewhere else. High Court has considered and discussed the entire evidence E
present on the record before recording the conviction. The contention that the
affidavits of independent witnesses were not considered cannot be accepted.
Only those were convicted against whom corroboration of the fact of their
presence and participation in the incident was confirmed from more than one
source.
F
Plea that reasonable and adequate opportunity was not afforded to the
appellants is equally untenable. We find from the record that all the material
(affidavits, show cause notice etc.) which were brought on record was properly
served on the learned advocates appearing for the contemners. The reports
submitted by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, District Judge affidavit of
Shri Barai and his staff, namely, R. Dass and B. Sharma and the other affidavits G
of the advocates who had seen the occurrence and the reports submitted by
the Director General of Police and the Superintendent of Police were given
to the learned advocates who were appearing in the contemners in the High
Court. Statements of A. Natarajan, the then S.P., Harihar Chaudhary, the then
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ranjeet Pandey, the then Sergeant Major H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A and Shashilata Singh, the then S.I. \\'.ere recorded by the High Court in the
presence of all the lawyers. The Registry of the High Court was directed to
keep their statements in a sealed cover. The contemners were permitted to
file affidavits and produced any other material in support of the same. They
were also permitted to file affidavits of any other person supporting their
version. They were all taken on record. After affording due opportunity of
B hearing to the counsels appearing for the contemners the High Court recorded
the order of conviction. Thus the appellants were given the evidence which
had come on the record. They were given an opportunity to controvert the
allegations made against them and produce evidence in support thereof.
Counsel appearing for the contemners were satisfied with the opportunity
C provided to them by the High Court. Plea that reasonable opportunity was not
afforded to the contemners was not raised before the High Court. We are of
the opinion that due reasonable and adequate opportunity was afforded to the
appellants to defend themselves and put forth their point of view.
The High Court has taken into consideration tpe entire evidence and
D material available on the record including the evidence produced by the
contemners. It was not necessary for the High Court to discuss each and
every affidavit individually. Out of 26. persons named only 9 have been
convicted by the High Court. S1ince the procedure adopted was summary the
High Court has taken care not to convict a person unless direct evidence and/
E or circumstances with sufficient corroborative material doubtless fastening
guilt on the contemners who have been punished was available. The High
Court found·only those contemners guilty against whom the element of doubt,
was completely eliminated. Affidavit evidence if based on hearsay has been
excluded. Contemners against whom there was single identification were also
given the benefit of doubt. The version put forth by the appellants was not
F accepted as it fell short of proof. High Court has considered the entire evidence
on the record while recording a finding of guilt against the appellants. Thus
the plea that the High Court did not take into consideration the affidavits of
independent witnesses is not tenable.
Learned. counsel for the appellants tried to point out that the appellants
G were not present at the scene of incident as the appellants were ·on duty
elsewhere. He made reference to their duty charts which had been placed on
record. We find that the presence of S/Shri K.D. Choudhary, Ranjit Pandey,
Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, K.B. Singh, Gurubachan Singh, Daroga Singh, Prem
Kumar Singh, Rajeev Ranjan Bhagar and C.D. Jha, appellants herein has
H been confirmed by several persons. The plea of alibi taken by_ the appellants
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.] 139
has been negatived by the High Court as the duty charts had been prepared A
by these officers themselves. None of the superior officers supported their
versions. Presence of most of the appellants had been confirmed by the 5th
Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Barai, the other two Court officials, advocates,
the reports of Director General of Police and the Superintendent of Police.
None of these has any interest in falsely implicating any of the appellants. B
It is unfortunate that neither the criminal proceedings nor the disciplinary
proceedings or the inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act have been
concluded. No doubt the appellants had been suspended initially but in due
course they have been reinstated. Some of them have retired as well. Inaction
on the part of the authorities resulted in emboldening others to commit similar C
acts. In Arun Paswan (supra), proceedi~gs for criminal contempt were initiated
against the appellant therein pursuant to the complaint lodged by the District
& Sessions Judge, Sasaram addressed to the Registrar General of the High
Court of Patna. In the report it was stated, inter a/ia, that S.I. Arun Paswan
(contemner) was directed to produce the case diary in case No. 2000/2001
under Sections 302 and 201/34 I.P.C. As the investigation officer did not D
appear in the case on the date fixed the District & Sessions Judge issued
notice requesting the investigation officer to appear personally to show cause
as why he should not be prosecuted under Section 349 Criminal Procedure
Code. The investigation officer produced the case diary and replied to the
show cause notice. The court was not satisfied with the cause shown for E
absence and rejected the explanation. Contemnor was directed to remain
present in the court till the rising of the court at 4.30 P.M. A group of persons
in plain clothes as also in police uniforms came on the road in front of the
court room of the District & Sessions Judge and started raising the abusive
slogans against the District & Sessions Judge. One of the slogans raised was
"District Judge Murdabad, Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai". Proceedings under the F
Contempt of Courts Act were initiated. They were convicted under the
Contempt of Courts Act and their conviction was upheld by this Court. What
is being emphasised is that had timely action been taken by the authorities
and the criminal proceedings concluded in time, incident, as referred to above,
where slogans were raised "District Judge Murdabad, Bhagalpur Dohrana G
Hai" could have been avoided.
The incident with which we are dealing with took place on 18th
November 1997. The incident which has been dealt with in the case of Arun
Paswan, S.I. (supra) is dated 20th January, 2002. Both the incidents have
taken place in the State of Bihar, one in Bhagalpur and the other in Sasaram. H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.
A The manner in which the police personnel belonging to middle level .of
police administration and entrusted with such responsibilities as require theirs
coming into contact with public day to day persuades us to make observation
that there is something basically wrong with the police in Bihar. Misconduct
amounting to gross violation of discipline committed not by a single individual
but by so many collectively and that too by those who have formed an
B association consisting of members of a disciplined force in uniform was not
promptly and sternly dealt with by the State or its senior officials so as to
take care to see thatsuch incident, even if happened, remains solitary incident.
Faced with the initiation of contempt proceedings, the persons proceeded
against did not have the courtesy of admitting their guilt and tendering an
C apology which if done could have been d~alt with mercy. They decided to
contest, of course the justice administration system allows them the liberty of
doing so - and they had every right of doing so - but at the end it has been
found that their pleas were false and their denial of charges was aimed at
prolonging the hearing as much as they could. We are shocked to learn that
the criminal courts seized of trial of the accused persons on substantive
D charges for offences under the penal law of the land are awaiting the decision .
of this appeal? Why for? Neither the High Court nor this Court has ever
directed the proceedings ·before the criminal Courts to remain stayed. The
criminal Court shall have to decide on the charges framed against the accused
persons on the basis of the evidence adduced in those .cases and not on the
E basis of this judgment.
Though we have found no merit in any of the pleas raised on behalf of
the appellants and we have formed an opinion without hesitation that the
appeals are to be dismissed, this is a case the facts whereof persuade us to
place on record certain observations of ours.
F
In the constitutional scheme the judiciary is entrusted with the task of
upholding the Constitution and the laws. Apart from interpreting the
Constitution and the laws, the judiciary discharges. the function of securing
maintenance of law and order by deciding the disputes in a manner acceptable
to civilised and peace loving society. In order to maintain the faith of the
G society in the rule of law the role of the judiciary cannot be undermined. In
a number of cases this Court has observed that foundation of the judiciary is
the trust and confidence of the people of the nation and when such foundation
or trust is rudely shaken by means of any disrespect by the very persons who
are required to enforce the orders of the court and maintain law and order the
H people's perception of efficacy of the systems gets eroded.
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.] 141
The Judges are - as a jurist calls - 'paper tigers'. They do not have A
any machinery of their own for implementing thei~ orders. People, while
approaching the Court of law which they regard as temple of justice, feel safe
and secure whilst they are in the Court. The police personnel is deployed in
the Court campus for the purpose of maintaining order and to see that not
only the Judges can work fearlessly in a calm, cool and serene atmosphere B
but also to see that anyone coming to the Court too feels safe and secure
thereat. Every participant in court proceedings is either a seeker of justice or
one who comes to assist in administration of justice. So is the expectation of
the members of the Bar who are treated as officers of the Court. We shudder
to feel what would happen if the police personnel itself, and that too in an
organised manner, is found to be responsible for disturbing the peace and C
order in the Court campus, for causing assault on the Judges and thus sullying
the temple of justice apart from bringing a bad name to an indispensable
organ of the executive wing of the State.
Police is the executive force of the State to which is entrusted the duty
of maintaining law and order and of enforcing regulations for the prevention D
and detection of crime. (Encyclopaedia Britanica, Vol.58, p.158). The police
force is considered by the society as an organised force of civil officers under
the command of the State engaged in the preservation of law and order in the
society and maintaining peace by enforcement of laws and prevention and
detection of crime. One who is entrusted with the task of maintaining discipline E
in the society must first itself be disciplined. Police is an agency to which
social control belongs and therefore the police has to come up to the
expectations of the society.
We have not been able to forget the policing role of the police of
British Raj wherein an attitude of hostility between the police and the policed F
under the colonial rule was understandable. It is unfortunate that in one of the
largest constitutional democracies of the world the police has not been able
to change its that trait of hostility.
Long back Sardar Patel had said, after achieving independence, - "the
police have inherited a legacy of suspicion and dislike. For this reason, there G
is insufficient respect for the police today. But, now that the country is free,
both the public and the police must change their attitude." Shri S.V.M. Tripathi,
former Director General of Police has, in his evaluation 'Indian Police After
Fifty Years of Independence', said - "A sensitive police officer can ensure
justice 'arid ·rair-play as no other public servant can. The least he should do H
142 SUPREME COVRT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. I S.C.R.
·A is to prevent injustices on the poor in the society and other areas of
administration, specially a police station. Upholding human rights, and
protection of life and property of citizens should be a matter of habit with the
police rather than that of display. The sooner we accept this premise as
imperative and honestly work towards achieving it, the better it would be for
B the society and the nation. The police leadership will have to push the limits
offeasibility for this purpose." (The Indian Police Journal - Vol.XLV - Nos. I
& 2, at p.5). Citizens of democratic India expect the police as humane and
efficient, professional and disciplined. It must be remembered that the task
entrusted to police is onerous and the police cannot succeed in fulfilling their
functions without people's cooperation and public approval. Professor R.
C Deb, a scholar in Indian Police Service said - "If law represents the collective
conscience of Society, the Policeman, its principal law enforcing agent ought
to be the staunchest protagonist, defender and keeper of that conscience."
(Police and Law Enforcement, published by S.C. Sarkar & Sons in 1988,
p. l ). He quotes Shri B.N. Mallick - an eminent policeman of his times, as
saying, that a modem policeman ought to be an ideal citizen from every point
D of view. "He must be on the side of good everywhere, and at all times. But
to do good the policema_n must himself be good. To be able to induce others
to obey the laws of society, he must obey them first. With his example set
before them, people will flock to his banner not only to seek his help and
protection but also to assist him in his noble task. He must be the leader
E amongst men. This leadership he must earn by his integrity, kindness, character,
steadfastness, dignity, ability and self-s_acrifice. He must always set the right
example". Professor R.Deb's description of an ideal police is - "He should
never forget that, like every other citizen he too is subject to the Rule of Law,
and is legally responsible for his actions in carrying out his duties, for he who
enforces law must live by the law. In discharging his onerous duties and
F responsibilities under the law the policeman must eschew all temptations. to
have recourse to short-cuts and extra-legal methods. He must also be absolutely
honest, impartial and fair even to the worst legal transgressor. In fine he must
be the ideal citizen and a true servant of the people in the performance of his
duties under the law." (ibid, p. 9)
G After all, what the learned Addi. Sessions Judge ha~ done. Jokhu Singh
had appeared as a witness. His cross-examination was not concluded without
which his testimony was liable to be excluded from being read in evidence.
The learned Judge had exhausted practically all means for securing the presence
of the witness. He would neither attend nor make any communication to the
H Court. Even the threat of initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of
DAROGA SINGH v. B.K. PANDEY [BHAN, J.] 143
Courts Act did not deter him from abstaining. To secure his presence a non- A
bailable warrant had to be issued. He avoided the service of non-bailable
warrant of arrest and appeared in the Court in the late hours. He was not
apologetic and felt that he was above the process of the Court. It cannot be
said that the higher authorities of police were not aware of 1.he behaviour of
Jokhu Singh. Either they knew about it or they should have known about it. B
Instead of offering the bail, Jokhu Singh was busy managing for the Judge
being approached or influenced by extra legal methods. Jokhu Singh and his
confederate decided to take the law in their own hands and assault the Judge
and anyone who came in their way. We do not think that any of the appellants
deserve any sympathy or mercy.
We trust and hope that this case would set in motion the thinking
c
process of the persons occupying higher echelons in police administration
specially in Bihar and take care to ensure that such incidents do not recur in
future.
We direct the disciplinary authorities before whom the disciplinary D
proceedings are pending and the criminal Courts before whom the prosecutions
are pending against the appellants to conclude the proceedings and the trial
at the earliest. The Commiss~on holding the enquiry under the Commissions
of Enquiry Act, 1952 would also do well to conclude its proceedings at the
earliest. We request Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna to
watch and if necessary monitor the proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry E
and issue directions to the criminal courts to expeditiously conclude the
pending criminal cases. If the commission of enquiry faces non-cooperation
or any obstruction in its progress, the Secretary of the Commission may send
a communication to the Registrar General of this Court pointing out the
difficulties, if any, faced by the Commission and contributing to the delay in F
proceedings and any communication so received shall be placed by the
Registrar General before the Court for directions on judicial side. The result
of disciplinary proceedings, the judgment of the criminal Courts and the
findings of Commission of Enquiry shall be communicated forthwith to the
Registrar Gener~l ofthis Court and in any case before expiry of a period of
six months from today. Copies of this judgment shall be circulated to the G
Registrar General, High Court of Patna and the Chief Secretary of the State
of Bihar for being brought to the notice of all concerned. Non-compliance
with the directions given herein may be treated as disobedience of the order
of this Court liable to be dealt with accordingly.
H
•'
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A The appeals are dismissed. The appellants who are on bail shall forthwith
surrender to their bail bonds and taken into custody to serve out the sentences
as passed by the High Court of Patna. The Director General of Police, Bihar
is directed to ensure compliance with this order by securing presence of all
the appellants to serve out the sentences passed on them by the High Court..
B We place on record our ;ippreciation for the invaluable assistance
rendered to the Court by Ms. Meenakshi Arora, who appeared as Amicus
Curiae at our request.
N.J. Appeals dismissed.
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