DARSHAN SINGHversusSTATE OF PUNJAB

                  [2024] 1 S.C.R. 248 : 2024 INSC 19
                                  Case Details

                               Darshan Singh
                                        v.
                               State of Punjab
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 163 of 2010)
                               04 January 2024
           [B. R. Gavai, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and
                         Aravind Kumar*, JJ.]
                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt,
       the entire chain of circumstances, not leaving any link missing for
       the appellant to escape from the clutches of law.

                                   Headnotes
       Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 rw s. 34 – Murder – Prosecution
       case that the appellant along with the lady with whom he
       had illicit relations, administered poison to the appellant’s
       wife, with the motive to eliminate her and caused her death
       – Conviction u/s.302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment
       – High Court upheld the order of conviction and sentence
       against the appellant while acquitted the lady – Correctness:
       Held: There was no eye-witness to the incident – Prosecution case
       rested on circumstantial evidence – Presence of the appellant and
       the lady in the appellant’s house in the intervening night not firmly
       and cogently established – Several omissions and improvements
       in the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses – There
       was a strong hypothesis that the deceased had committed suicide,
       which explanation was led by the appellant in his statement u/s.313
       CrPC and is sufficient to create doubt – Furthermore, evidence of
       prosecution witnesses not sufficient to prove presence of the lady at
       the appellant’s house, as a natural corollary, such evidence cannot
       be relied on to conclude that the appellant was present in the house
       – Also the manner in which the High Court sought to distinguish
       the case of the appellant from the lady is perverse – When the
       conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then
       there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances – Failure

* Author
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                DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB


     to prove a single circumstance cogently can cause a snap in the
     chain of circumstances and make the accused entitled to benefit
     of doubt – In view thereof, the concurrent findings of conviction
     set aside – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Evidence. [Paras
     25, 30, 33, 36-38]
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 161 – Examination of
     witnesses by the police – Failure of the prosecution witnesses
     to mention in their statements u/s 161 about the involvement
     of an accused – However, their subsequent statement before
     court during trial regarding involvement of that particular
     accused – Reliance upon:
     Held: It cannot be relied upon – Prosecution cannot seek to prove
     a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not
     stated to police during investigation – Evidence of that witness
     regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [Para 26]
     Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Evidentiary value:
     Held: Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought
     to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established – Those
     circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing
     towards the guilt of the accused – Circumstances taken cumulatively
     should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from
     the conclusion, that within all human probability, the crime was
     committed by the accused and they should be incapable of
     explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the
     accused and inconsistent with his innocence. [Para 9]
     Evidence – Rustic/illiterate witness – Evidentiary value:
     Held: Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be
     treated differently from other kinds of witnesses – It cannot be
     subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry – Evidence of a rustic/
     illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be
     certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition
     – Witness. [Para 27]

                    List of Citations and Other References
           Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
           [1985] 1 SCR 88: (1984) 4 SCC 116; Rohtash Vs. State
           of Haryana [2012] 6 SCR 62: (2012) 6 SCC 589; Sunil
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                   DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS


            Kumar Shambhu Dayal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra
            2011 (72) ACC 699 (SC); Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur
            Vs. State of Karnataka (2004) 7 SCC 422; Vimal Suresh
            Kamble Vs. Chaluverapinake, (2003) 3 SCC 175;
            Pramila vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine
            SC 711; Periasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [1996] 6
            Suppl. SCR 757: (1996) 6 SCC 457; Bhimsingh Vs.
            State of Uttarakhand (2015) 4 SCC 281 – relied on.
            Jaipal V. State of Haryana [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 714:
            (2003) 1 SCC 169; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of
            Maharashtra [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 156: (2006) 10 SCC
            681; State of U.P. Vs. Chhoteylal [2011] 1 SCR 406:
            AIR 2011 SC 697; Dimple Gupta (minor) Vs. Rajiv
            Gupta [2007] 11 SCR 213: AIR 2008 SC 239; Sidhartha
            Vashisht Vs. State of NCT of Delhi [2010] 4 SCR 103:
            AIR 2010 SC 2352 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
       Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

                                   Keywords
       Murder; Acquittal; Imprisonment for life; Homicide; Suicide; Motive;
       Benefit of doubt; Circumstantial evidence; Onus of proof; Improved
       fact; Minor contradictions or inconsistencies; Omissions and
       improvements; Seen together; Rustic/illiterate witness; Reliable
       witness; Chance witness; Chemical examiner’s report; Plea of alibi.

             Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and
                               Appearances

       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.163
       of 2010.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2009 of the High Court
       of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No.593-DB of 2000.
       Appearances:
       Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Siddhant Saroha, Tushar Bathija,
       Praveer Singh, Parth Jain, Manav Bhalla, Advs. for the Appellant.
       Prateek Chadha, DAG, Sreekar Aechuri, Pragya Ganjoo, Ms. Muskan
       Singla, Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, Advs. for the Respondent.
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                       251

                DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB



                Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court
                               Judgment
     Aravind Kumar, J.
1.   This appeal by special leave arises out of judgment and order dated
     23.07.2009 passed in Criminal Appeal No.593-DB of 2000 by the
     High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court has upheld the
     order of conviction and sentence, as against Darshan Singh (the
     appellant) and has allowed the appeal of Rani Kaur (Accused No.
     2), thereby acquitting her of all charges. The State of Punjab has
     not challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur by filing any special leave
     petition. It is in this background that Darshan Singh had sought
     special leave to appeal before us and leave came to be granted by
     order dated 22.01.2010.
     Case of the Prosecution:
2.   The facts can be summed up in brief as follows:
     The deceased, Amrik Kaur was married to Darshan Singh,
     the appellant, some time in 1988. The marriage was arranged
     through Melo Kaur (PW-3), the cousin sister of the deceased. The
     prosecution alleges that their marital relationship was strained
     owing largely to the fact that Darshan Singh had developed an illicit
     partnership with Rani Kaur (A2). Several relatives had prevailed
     on the appellant to put an end to his relationship with Rani Kaur,
     but to no avail. The illicit relationship between Darshan Singh and
     Rani Kaur is said to have lasted for at least three years before the
     fateful day. It is the case of the prosecution that on the intervening
     night of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999, Darshan Singh and Rani
     Kaur, with the motive of eliminating the deceased, administered
     poison and intentionally caused the death of Amrik Kaur.
3.   On these allegations, Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur were prosecuted
     for charges under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court
     convicted both the accused persons for the offence under Section 302
     r/w Section 34 and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life.
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                  DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS


       Findings of the Trial Court and High Court:
4.     The Trial Court has concluded that it was a case of homicide and
       not suicide. It has found that the appellant had a strong motive
       to commit the murder of his wife. It further held that the appellant
       and Rani Kaur were present in the house on the intervening
       night of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 and therefore, the burden
       lay on them to explain as to ‘how the body of Amrik Kaur who
       was alive on the night of 18.05.1999 turned into a corpse’ the
       next morning. The Court has completely disbelieved the theory
       of suicide sought to be advanced on behalf of appellant. It was
       noted that merely because there were no injuries on the body of
       the deceased, that by itself would not obviate the possibility of
       forceful administration of the poisonous substance. On the basis
       of the above circumstances taken together, the Trial Court held
       that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt
       against the appellant and Rani Kaur.
5.     In appeal, the High Court has agreed with the findings of the Trial
       Court in so far as the appellant is concerned and has acquitted
       Rani Kaur by extending her the benefit of doubt. It has found that
       there is no other evidence except the testimony of PW3 and PW4,
       to prove the presence of Rani Kaur on the intervening night of
       18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 at the appellant’s house.
       ARGUMENTS OF MR. ABHIMANYU TEWARI, COUNSEL
       APPEARING FOR APPELLANT:
6.     PW3, Melo Kaur, is not a reliable witness. The presence of the
       appellant, Darshan Singh, at the house on the intervening night
       of 18.05.1999 and 19.05.1999 is sought to be established based
       on her testimony. She has made several improvements in her
       version, and her testimony suffers from several contradictions, and
       therefore, it is not safe to rely on such a witnesses’ uncorroborated
       testimony. It would be prejudicial to the appellant to rely on only
       a part of her testimony and exclude the rest. If her testimony is
       ignored in toto, there is no other evidence to establish the key
       circumstance of appellant’s presence at the spot of crime.
       6.1 That aluminium phosphide is rather impossible to administer
           in a deceitful manner owing to its pungent smell and odour.
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                DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB


           No injury marks have been found on the deceased, which
           further establishes that there could not have been any forceful
           administration of the poison. Therefore, it is submitted that it
           is nothing but a case of suicide, the driving force for which,
           was the confrontation with Melo Kaur. It is the appellants’ case
           that Amrik Kaur was having an illicit affair with Melo Kaur’s
           husband, Gurmel Singh PW4, and embarrassed with her sister
           finding out, she self-administered the poisonous substance and
           committed suicide. Counsel has submitted judgments to support
           the proposition that aluminium phosphide has a pungent smell
           similar to garlic.
     6.2 Reliance has been placed on Jaipal V. State of Haryana –
         (2003) 1 SCC 169 wherein the Apex Court discussed the nature
         of aluminium phosphide. The relevant paragraphs have been
         extracted below for reference:
           “16. According to Modi, symptoms and signs of
           poisoning by aluminium phosphide are similar to
           poisoning by zinc phosphide (p. 197, ibid.). The chief
           symptoms after the administration of zinc phosphide
           are a vacant look, frequent vomiting with retching,
           tremors and drowsiness followed by respiratory distress
           at death. Zinc phosphide acts as a slow poison and is
           decomposed by hydrochloric acid in the stomach with
           the liberation of phosphine which acts as a respiratory
           poison. Being a very fine powder zinc phosphide
           adheres firmly to the crypts in the mucous membrane
           of the stomach, and a very small quantity only in the
           stomach even after vomiting is sufficient to cause death
           by slow absorption.
           17. Phosphine released from zinc phosphide (rat poison)
           and from aluminium phosphide, is mainly used as a
           fumigant to control insects and rodents in foodgrains
           and fields. Liberated from the metal phosphides by the
           action of water or acids, gaseous phosphine exerts
           more potent pesticidal action, for it penetrates to all
           areas otherwise inaccessible for pesticide application.
           Pathological findings from phosphine inhalation are
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             DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS



       pulmonary hyperaemia and oedema. It causes both
       fatty degeneration and necrosis of liver (p. 174, ibid.).
       18. Our attention was invited, as was done in the High
       Court and the trial court, to a paper entitled “Toxicology
       — Acute Aluminium Phosphide Poisoning in Northern
       India” written by Dr Mitra Basu and Prof. S.B. Siwach,
       Head, Department of Medicine, Postgraduate Institute
       of Medical Sciences, Rohtak and published in Current
       Medical Journal, Vol. I, No. 5, July 1995. The authenticity
       of this article has not been doubted by the High Court nor
       questioned either in the High Court or in this Court. The
       learned authors have noticed the aluminium phosphide
       having emerged as a major health problem in northern
       India when these cases first started coming in 1984
       and hardly any literature being available earlier on this
       malady. In Postgraduate Institute of Medical Sciences,
       Rohtak about 2000 cases were reported which were
       all suicidal.
       19. We may briefly sum up the opinion of the learned
       authors from their published paper. Phosphine gas
       (active ingredient of ALP) causes sudden cardiovascular
       collapse; most patients die of shock, cardiac arrhythmia,
       acidosis and adult respiratory distress syndrome
       (ARDS). Aluminium phosphide is available in the form
       of chalky-white tablets. When these tablets are taken
       out of the sealed container, they come in contact with
       atmospheric moisture and the chemical reaction takes
       place liberating Phosphine gas (PH3) which is the active
       ingredient of ALP. This gas is highly toxic and effectively
       kills all insects and thus preserves the stored grains.
       When these tablets are swallowed, the chemical reaction
       is accelerated by the presence of hydrochloric acid in the
       stomach and within minutes phosphine gas dissipates
       and spreads into the whole body. The gas is highly toxic
       and damages almost every organ but maximal damage
       is caused to heart and lungs. Sudden cardiovascular
       collapse is the hallmark of acute poisoning. Patients
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                DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB



           come with fast, thready or impalpable arterial pulses,
           unrecordable or low blood pressure and icy-cold skin.
           Somehow these patients remain conscious till the end
           and continue to pass urine despite unrecordable blood
           pressure. Vomiting is a prominent feature associated
           with epigastric burning sensation. The patients will be
           smelling foul (garlic-like) from their breath and vomitus.
           Many of them will die within a few hours. Those who
           survive for some time will show elevated jugular venous
           pressure, may develop tender hepatomegaly and still
           later adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS),
           renal shutdown and in a very few cases, toxic hepatic
           jaundice. The active ingredient of ALP is phosphine
           gas which causes extensive tissue damage. A spot
           clinical diagnosis is possible in majority of cases of ALP
           poisoning. However, ALP on account of its very pungent
           smell (which can drive out all inmates from the house
           if left open) cannot be taken accidentally.”
     6.3 It was also argued that the courts below have failed to give
         sufficient weight to the evidence led on behalf of the defence,
         in particular, the testimony of DW3 and DW4.
     6.4 Lastly, it was argued that Rani Kaur (A2) having been
         extended benefit of doubt, it was rather anomalous to
         exclude such benefit to A1- the appellant, when the case of
         the prosecution was that both of them were present at the
         scene of crime.
     Arguments of Mr. Prateek Chaddha, learned counsel on behalf
     of State of Punjab:
7.   Melo Kaur was an illiterate person who cannot be expected to
     be aware of the intricacies of law and cross examination and
     therefore, it was rather natural for minor inconsistencies to creep
     into the testimony of such a witness. The Trial Court has rightly
     appreciated her testimony by excluding the uncorroborated parts
     from the corroborated parts of her testimony. In that sense, the
     Trial Court has separated the chaff from the grain, as is expected
     to be done when it has to appreciate the evidence of a partly
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                       DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS



        reliable and partly unreliable witness. Moreover, the accused
        himself has never denied his presence at the scene of crime.
        In his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., he has
        admitted his presence. This, coupled with the testimony of PW3,
        4 and 5, is sufficient to prove the presence of the accused at the
        spot of crime.
        7.1 The case rests on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution
            has proved the circumstances from which an inference of
            guilt is sought to be drawn, cogently and convincingly. The
            circumstances relied on include -– (1) Motive; (2) Presence
            of the appellant at the scene of crime; (3) Cause of Death: By
            Poisoning (4) Opportunity to administer poison; (5) Conduct
            (6) False explanation in 313 Statement.
        7.2 He has further relied on the principle laid down in Trimukh
            Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra1 to contend that
            the degree of evidence needed to prove the case resting
            on circumstantial evidence in the given facts cannot be as
            high as is normally the case. In view of Section 106 of the
            Evidence Act, the appellant was under a burden to explain the
            circumstances leading to the death of the deceased. Merely
            remaining quiet or offering a false explanation would provide
            an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it
            complete. Remaining quiet, or offering a false explanation
            would therefore provide an additional link in the chain of
            circumstances to make it complete. He has also sought to
            distinguish the cases relied on behalf of the appellant.
        ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
8.      We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and respondent
        and perused the materials on record.
9.      There is no eye-witness to the incident. The case of the prosecution
        rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal approach in a case
        based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from
        which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently


1      (2006) 10 SCC 681
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                       257

                   DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB



     and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of
     a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the
     accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form
     a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion,
     that within all human probability, the crime was committed by
     the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on
     any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and
     inconsistent with his innocence. [See Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
     v. State of Maharashtra2]
10. Let us, therefore, examine whether the prosecution had proved
    beyond reasonable doubt, the entire chain of circumstances,
    not leaving any link missing for the appellant to escape from the
    clutches of law. The circumstances which are said to have been
    proved on behalf of the prosecution is as follows:
     1.     Motive
     2.     Presence at the spot
     3.     False explanation in 313 statement
     4.     Death by Poisoning – Doctor’s opinion on cause of death
     5.     Conduct of the Appellant
     6.     Opportunity to administer poison.
11. According to the case of the prosecution, the illicit relationship
    that existed between Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur served as the
    key motive for them to jointly eliminate the deceased. The fact
    that they were in an illicit relationship has been sufficiently proved
    from the testimony of PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4. This circumstance,
    therefore, has been cogently established.
12. The most important circumstance, among all, must be the circumstance
    of the appellant and Rani Kaur having been present in the appellant’s
    house on the intervening night of 18.05.99 and 19.05.99 and they
    having been seen leaving the house in the early hours of the day.
    For, the proof of presence has the effect of triggering into operation,



2   (1984) 4 SCC 116
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                  DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS


       Section 106 of the Evidence Act and the principle laid down in the
       case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra. Even the
       circumstance that the appellant had the ‘opportunity’ to administer
       poison was strongly linked to aspect of proving the presence of the
       appellant and Rani Kaur in the appellants house.
13. In Trimukh’s case, it has been held:
       i.   “If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house
            and in such circumstances where the assailants have
            all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at
            the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be
            extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence
            to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle
            of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted
            upon by the Courts……………………Where an offence
            like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the
            initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly
            be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of
            evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot
            be of the same degree as is required in other cases
            of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of
            a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section
            106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding
            burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent
            explanation as to how the crime was committed. The
            inmates of the house cannot get away by simply
            keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the
            supposed premise that the burden to establish its
            case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is
            no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation”
14. In Trimukh (supra), this Court has pointed out that there are
    two important consequences that play out when an offence is
    said to have taken place in the privacy of a house, where the
    accused is said to have been present. Firstly, the standard of
    proof expected to prove such a case based on circumstantial
    evidence is lesser than other cases of circumstantial evidence.
    Secondly, the appellant would be under a duty to explain as to
    the circumstances that led to the death of the deceased. In that
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                DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB



     sense, there is a limited shifting of the onus of proof. If he remains
     quiet or offers a false explanation, then such a response would
     become an additional link in the chain of circumstances.
15. Both the Courts below have in fact applied the principle referred to
    in Trimukh’s case. Their presence having been held to be proved,
    the Court relied on Section 106 of the Evidence Act and shifted
    the onus of proof on the accused to explain the circumstances
    which led to the unnatural death of the deceased.
16. Whereas the Trial Court found both the accused guilty, the High
    Court has confirmed the order of conviction only against the
    appellant and extended benefit of doubt to Rani Kaur. The appellant
    having failed to give a proper and believable explanation was, in
    fact, used as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. The
    proof of presence in that sense triggered the two consequences
    as laid down in Trimukh’s case (supra)
17. In this case, the presence was sought to be proved by the
    prosecution on the basis of the testimony of PW-3, PW-4, PW-5
    and the statements of the accused at the 313 stage. The Courts
    below had also relied on the testimony of PW 3 and PW 4 to
    conclude that the appellant was present in the house. Therefore,
    it becomes necessary to carefully evaluate this circumstance,
    given the consequences that flow from proof of this circumstance.
18. PW-3 has deposed that her husband, Gurmel Singh (PW-4), on
    his return home from work around 8 pm on 18.05.99, had informed
    her that he saw the appellant along with Rani Kaur present in the
    appellant’s house. He further informed her that it would not be
    appropriate to visit their house at that time since he anticipated
    the possibility of a flare up among the family members. He told
    her that they could talk to the appellant in the morning. PW-3
    stated that she visited the house of the appellant in the morning
    at around 4:45 am, only to find her sister lying dead. She states
    that she saw the appellant and Rani Kaur present in the house.
    She further states that both of them pushed her aside and left
    in a jeep, belonging to the appellant. She then states that she
    called her husband (PW-4) to the spot.
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19. In the cross examination of PW-3 on behalf of the appellant, several
    omissions have been brought on record by drawing her attention
    to her previous statement given to the police under Section 161
    CrPC. For instance, it has come out in the evidence that PW-3
    had omitted to state in her Section 161 statement that: (a) her
    husband had informed her that he saw the appellant and Rani
    Kaur in the appellant’s house when he was returning back home
    from work around 8 pm; (b) she had seen the appellant and Rani
    Kaur in the early hours on 19.05.99 in the appellant’s house and
    they pushed her aside before escaping in a jeep. (c) her husband
    had advised her not to visit the deceased in the night. It had been
    specifically suggested to her that she was falsely deposing and
    that the appellant was being falsely implicated on account of him
    having strained relations with PW-4, the husband of PW3.
20. In the cross examination of PW-3 on behalf of Rani Kaur, it was
    elicited that PW-3 had personally witnessed the appellant and Rani
    Kaur putting poison in the mouth of the deceased. This, according
    to PW-3, was seen by her through the chinks of the door.
21. PW-4 has stated that he met the appellant and Rani Kaur on his
    way home, while he was returning from work around 7.00 PM
    on 18.05.99. He stated that both of them went to the appellant’s
    house. He informed his wife that it would not be appropriate to visit
    their house at this time since there was a possibility of a quarrel
    arising between Amrik Kaur and her husband, the appellant, since
    he had brought Rani Kaur home. Instead, he asked her to go and
    visit her sister on the next morning. In the morning, around 5.30
    am, his wife left to visit her sister at the appellant’s house after
    serving tea to him and his children. On having received a message
    from his wife, he set about to reach the appellant’s house and
    found Amrik Kaur lying dead and his wife, weeping and wailing.
22. Similarly, in the cross examination of PW-4, it has been brought
    on record that PW-4 had omitted to state the following aspects
    in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. before the
    police – (a) that PW-4 had seen the appellant and Rani Kaur
    entering the house of the appellant in a jeep; (b) PW-4 had told
    PW-3 not to visit the appellant’s house since they were intoxicated
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                DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB



     and there was a strong possibility of some dispute arising. (c)
     PW-4’s statement that PW-3 had left for the appellant’s house
     at 5.00 am in the morning on 19.05.99 after serving him tea.
     It has been specifically suggested to this witness that he had
     strained relations with the appellant, and owing to this fact, he
     has falsely implicated the appellant. It was further suggested that
     on account of the quarrel that occurred in the night on 18.05.99,
     the deceased had committed suicide by taking poison.
23. PW 5 is an independent witness having no relationship with any
    of the persons involved, either as an accused or as witnesses,
    in this incident. He stated that on the morning of 19.05.99, at
    about 6.00 am, he had gone to answer the call of nature. At that
    time, he states that he saw the appellant and Rani Kaur were
    going in a jeep to Hiro Kalan and that jeep was covered with
    black cloth. He then returned to the bus stop and found a lot of
    persons having gathered and there, he heard the news that the
    appellant had murdered his wife.
24. PW-5’s deposition that he had heard from persons at the bus stop
    that the appellant had murdered his wife, was an omission since
    he had not stated as such in his statement before the police. It
    has been elicited from him that the jeep came from behind and
    then passed by his side. It has been further elicited that the black
    cloth which was used to cover the jeep was opened on both sides.
25. In the face of the above evidence on record, can it be said that
    the presence of the appellant and Rani Kaur in the appellant’s
    house in the intervening night of 18.05.99 and 19.05.99, has been
    firmly and cogently established? According to us, the answer must
    be in the negative. There are several omissions that have been
    brought out in the cross examination of PW-3 and PW-4, which
    seriously dent the credibility of their testimony.
26. If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements u/s 161 CrPC
    about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement
    before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular
    accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove
    a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not
    stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness
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                      DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS



       regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [See :
       (i) Rohtash Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 (ii) Sunil
       Kumar Shambhu Dayal Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011
       (72) ACC 699 (SC). (iii) Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur Vs. State
       of Karnataka, (2004) 7 SCC 422 (iv) Vimal Suresh Kamble Vs.
       Chaluverapinake, (2003) 3 SCC 175]
27. Of course, PW-3 claims to be an illiterate witness and therefore,
    her testimony must be interpreted in that light. We are cognizant
    that the appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to
    be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses. It cannot be
    subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought
    not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought
    out in the evidence. This Court has held that the evidence of a
    rustic/illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be
    certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition.3
28. However, the testimony of PW-3 suffers not merely from technical
    imperfections, there are glaring omissions and improvements that
    have been brought out in the cross-examination, which cannot
    be attributed to the illiteracy of the individual deposition. If there
    were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have
    been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location
    and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy. However, such
    is not the case here. PW-3 had only heard from her husband that
    the appellant and Rani Kaur were seen together in the appellant’s
    house on 18.05.99. To that extent, it is merely hearsay. Moreover,
    PW-4 has omitted to state this fact to PW3 in his statement before
    the police. He has also omitted to state that he advised his wife
    (PW-3) against going to the appellant’s house in the night since
    there may arise a quarrel between all of them. If these facts are
    ignored from consideration, we only wonder as to why PW-3
    would visit the house of the appellant in the wee hours of the
    morning on 19.05.99. It seems quite unnatural for PW-3 to visit
    the house of the appellant at 430 am in the morning without any
    reason. If PW-3 was aware that the appellant and Rani Kaur


3   State of U.P. Vs. Chhoteylal, AIR 2011 SC 697 ;
    Dimple Gupta (minor) Vs. Rajiv Gupta, AIR 2008 SC 239
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                        263

                DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB



     were in an illicit relationship for a sufficiently long duration, there
     was no reason to suspect all of a sudden that the two of them
     would get together, administer poison and murder the deceased
     on 19.05.1999, which fact, prompted her to visit the house of
     the appellant at such odd hours in the morning. Both the Courts
     have failed to take notice of the several significant omissions and
     improvements in the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4.
29. Further, PW-5 is a chance witness. He was in his village, answering
    the call of nature at 6 am, at which point he claimed to have seen
    the accused persons going in a jeep. It was elicited in his cross
    examination that he had a side-on view since he stated the jeep
    came from behind and he got a side-on glimpse. The side-on view
    would have been only for a couple of seconds at best, since they
    were travelling in a jeep. Therefore, it is not safe to rely on this
    testimony solely to prove that the appellant was escaping along
    with Rani Kaur after having murdered his wife.
30. The appellant had set up a defence that the deceased had
    committed suicide. The Trial Court has disbelieved it on the
    premise that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present in the
    house, and if the deceased were to have committed suicide, it
    was but natural for the appellant to take her to the hospital and
    inform concerned persons/authorities. However, we have come
    to the finding above that the circumstance of appellant and Rani
    Kaur being present in the house has not been convincingly
    proved beyond doubt. Therefore, the reasoning given by the Trial
    Court loses its legs to stand on. In any case, we believe that the
    appellant has raised a doubt in our minds as regards his defence
    that the deceased had committed suicide. There appears to be
    no dispute as to the fact that the death was caused by poisoning.
    The doctor’s testimony on the basis of the chemical examiner’s
    report that the cause of death was linked to aluminium phosphide
    poisoning remains unchallenged. In fact, in his 313 statement,
    even the appellant states that the deceased consumed poison
    (aluminum phosphide) and committed suicide. In Jaipal’s case,
    this Court has considered the characteristic features of death
    caused by poisoning through aluminum phosphide. Review of
    scholarly literature and research papers suggests that the nature
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                  DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS



       of this substance (aluminum phosphide) is such that it is not
       conducive for deceitful administration since it carries a pungent
       garlic-like odour, which cannot go unmissed. It was suspected
       that the substance was mixed in tea and served to the deceased
       since 200ml brownish liquid was found in her stomach as per
       the PMR. We find it doubtful that the deceased would have
       been made to consume tea deceitfully given the nature of the
       substance. Forceful administration of this substance also seems
       doubtful since there are no injury marks suggestive of a scuffle.
       In light of the evidence on record, even assuming for a moment
       that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present, it still cannot be
       said with certainty that it was a case of homicide and not suicide.
       The main principle to be satisfied in a case of conviction based
       on circumstantial evidence is that the proved circumstances must
       be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis
       than that of the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with
       his innocence- in other words, the circumstances should exclude
       every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. In this
       case, it cannot be said that the proved circumstances, even if
       presence was proved, taken with other circumstances would lead
       to an unfailing conclusion that the appellant and Rani Kaur were
       guilty of murdering his wife. There was alive a strong hypothesis
       that the deceased had committed suicide, which explanation was
       led by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 CrPC,
       and it is sufficient to create a doubt in our minds.
31. This Court has held that the standard of proof to be met by an
    accused in support of the defence taken by him under Section
    313 of Code of Criminal Procedure is not beyond all reasonable
    doubt, as such, a burden lies on the prosecution to prove the
    charge. The accused has merely to create a doubt and it is for
    the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
    no benefit can flow from the same to the accused. [See: Pramila
    vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 711]
32. Learned Counsel for the respondent-State has argued that no
    specific plea of alibi was taken in the statement of the appellant
    recorded under Section 313 CrPC. In fact, it is submitted that
    there is an implicit admission as to his presence in the house. It
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                   265

                DARSHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB



     is too well settled that the statement of an accused under Section
     313 CrPC is no ‘evidence’ because, firstly, it is not on oath and,
     secondly, the other party i.e. the prosecution does not get an
     opportunity to cross examine the accused. [ Sidhartha Vashisht
     Vs. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2010 SC 2352]
33. It is trite law that the statement recorded u/s. 313 CrPC cannot
    form the sole basis of conviction. Therefore, the presence of
    the appellant cannot be found solely based on his statement,
    notwithstanding the lack of independent evidence led by the
    prosecution. Further, this Court has previously considered the
    consequences when a particular defence plea was not taken by
    accused u/s 313 CrPC and held that mere omission to take a
    specific plea by accused when examined u/s 313 CrPC, is not
    enough to denude him of his right if the same can be made out
    otherwise. See: Periasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 6
    SCC 457
34. The case of the prosecution has, from the very start, been
    that the appellant was seen jointly along with Rani Kaur in the
    appellant’s house on 18.05.99 and they were seen leaving the
    house together on 19.05.99. They were both tried together on
    charges of having administered poison and killing the deceased
    on the intervening night of 18.05.99 & 19.05.99. Though the
    Trial Court has convicted both of them under Section 302, the
    High Court has extended the benefit of doubt to Rani Kaur and
    acquitted her of all criminal charges. According to the High Court,
    ‘apart from the evidence of Melo Kaur PW3 and Gurmel Singh
    PW4, there is no other evidence to show that she was present
    in the house on the fateful night’. However, even though it was
    the very same evidence that was sought to be used to prove the
    presence of the appellant in the house, the benefit of doubt has
    not been similarly extended to him. The High Court reasoned that
    the appellant, being the husband, it was only natural for him to
    be present in the house.
35. It is important to notice that the respondent-State has not
    challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur before this Court. It has
    accepted the verdict and therefore, the acquittal has reached
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                   DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS



       finality. The State cannot on the one hand accept the verdict of
       the Court that the presence of Rani Kaur along with the appellant
       is doubtful and at the same time, maintain its case that the two
       of them were jointly present, committed the offence together and
       escaped together.
36. According to us, if the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4 was not sufficient
    to prove presence of Rani Kaur at the appellant’s house, as a
    natural corollary, such evidence cannot be relied on to conclude
    that the appellant was present in the house. The manner in which
    the High Court has sought to distinguish the case of the appellant
    from Rani Kaur is perverse and does not seem to impress us. The
    case of the prosecution has consistently been that the accused
    persons were seen present together in the house on the night
    of 18.05.99 and seen leaving together in the wee hours of the
    next morning. In fact, PW 5 has deposed that he had seen them
    together in the jeep travelling towards Hiro Kurd. If the presence
    of Rani Kaur in the house on the date of the alleged incident is
    doubtful, then, the testimony of PW 5 that he had seen her along
    with the appellant in the jeep, will also lose its strength.
37. Seen in this background, we need not go further and consider
    the evidence qua other circumstances sought to be proved by
    the prosecution since the failure to prove a single circumstance
    cogently can cause a snap in the chain of circumstances. There
    cannot be a gap in the chain of circumstances. When the conviction
    is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then there
    should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If there is
    a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. If
    some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any
    other reasonable hypothesis, then also the accused is entitled to
    the benefit of doubt. [See: Bhimsingh Vs. State of Uttarakhand,
    (2015) 4 SCC 281.]
38. Therefore, we allow this appeal and set aside the concurrent
    findings of conviction.


       Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain   Result of the case: Appeal allowed.