DASHRATHversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2536 : 2025 INSC 654

                                Dashrath
                                    v.
                        The State of Maharashtra
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 2120 of 2025)
                                 24 April 2025
                [Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       The conviction of the appellant as well as the sentence imposed on
       him u/ss.7 and 13(1)(d) r/w. s.13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
       Act, 1988 is questioned.

                                  Headnotes†
       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.7 and 13(1)(d) r/w.
       s.13(2) – Appellant contended that i) sanction to prosecute
       was mechanically granted; ii) investigation was conducted
       by an Inspector of Police (PW-4), although in terms of the
       statutory mandate contained in s.17 of the PC Act, no officer
       lower in rank than a Deputy Superintendent of Police can
       investigate the crime; iii) the demand was not proved and the
       conviction is indefensible having regard to the law declared
       by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v.
       State (NCT Delhi); and iv) one of the seizure witnesses was
       related to the complainant:
       Held: As regards first contention, if a draft order is placed before
       the sanctioning authority and he is satisfied that nothing needs
       to be added/deleted therefrom, the grant of sanction cannot be
       faulted merely on the ground of absence of addition of words to/
       deletion of words from the draft – This Court has noticed that
       PW-3 made four minor corrections to ensure that the substance
       conforms to the form in which the sanction was required to be
       given, without altering the substance (i.e. the contents) – On
       facts, there has been no irregularity, far less illegality, in grant
       of sanction – Answering the second contention, the Special
       Court referred to Government Order dated 19.04.1969 bearing
       no. MIS0389/767/CR-140/POL-3, issued in exercise of powers
       conferred by the 1st proviso to s.17 of the PC Act authorizing all

* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                             2537

                    Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra


     the police inspectors in the Anti-Corruption Bureau of the State of
     Maharashtra to investigate any offence punishable thereunder –
     Considering such legal position, it was held by the Special Court
     there was no merit in the contention that investigation had not
     been conducted by an officer competent to do so – The finding
     of the Special Court is affirmed – On question of demand, in view
     of the evidence tendered by the witnesses for the prosecution,
     which are on record, as well as the answers given by the appellant
     in course of his examination u/s.313, Cr.PC – The demand has
     been proved without a doubt – As far as evidence of seizure
     witness (PW-2) is concerned, his evidence need not be discarded,
     on the facts of this case, merely because he was related to the
     complainant, as alleged – The evidence of the said witness had
     been found creditworthy as his version in-chief was not shaken
     after thorough cross-examination – Hence, there is no reason to
     hold that by reason of mere relationship, the conviction would stand
     vitiated – In any event, even apart from the seizure witness, the
     other evidence on record do suggest that no error was committed
     by the Special Court in convicting the appellant and by the High
     Court in affirming such conviction. [Paras 14, 16, 19, 20]

     Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.7 and 13(1)(d) r/w.
     s.13(2) – Appellant convicted u/ss.7 and 13(1)(d) r/w. s.13(2)
     of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – The High Court
     upheld the conviction and also the punishment of R.I. of
     two years and fine of Rs.2,000/- for the offence punishable
     u/s.7, and R.I. of a year and fine of Rs.1,000/- for the offence
     punishable u/s.13, with default stipulation, imposed on the
     appellant – Before the Supreme Court, appellant urged to
     exercise power u/Art.142 of the Constitution to relieve him
     of the necessity to serve his prison term:
     Held: While affirming the conviction of the appellant u/s.7 and
     s.13(1)(d) r/w. s.13(2), PC Act, but having regard to the date of the
     incident of offence, the advanced age of the appellant, the mental
     anxiety and continued stress that he must have experienced all
     these years induced by the pendency of proceedings, this Court
     is of the considered opinion that imposition of sentence of prison
     term for the minimum period would sufficiently serve the interests of
     justice – Accordingly, this Court alters the sentence of 2 years R.I.
     for the offence u/s.7 to a term of S.I. for a year without, however,
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    altering the sentence of imprisonment ordered for the offence
    u/s.13(1)(d) – Both sentences shall run concurrently – This would
    be in addition to the fine that has been imposed by the Special
    Court. [Para 33]

                             Case Law Cited
    Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT Delhi) [2023] 2 SCR 997 : (2023) 4
    SCC 731; H.P. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal
    No. 1466 of 2017; Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India [2014] 7
    SCR 569 : (2015) 2 SCC 33; Narendra Champaklal Trivedi v.
    State of Gujarat [2012] 6 SCR 165 : (2012) 7 SCC 80; Mohd.
    Hashim v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2016] 9 SCR 953 : (2017) 2
    SCC 198; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das [2019] 3 SCR
    691 : (2019) 4 SCC 125 – referred to.

                               List of Acts
    Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

                            List of Keywords
    Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w. Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption
    Act, 1988; Sanction to prosecute mechanically; Investigation;
    Demand; Seizure witness; Reduction of sentence.

                           Case Arising From
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
    2120 of 2025
    From the Judgment and Order dated 03.09.2024 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in CRLA No. 303
    of 2004

                        Appearances for Parties
    Advs. for the Appellant:
    Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Siddharth S. Chapalgaonkar, Ms.
    Sneha Botwe, Pai Amit.
    Advs. for the Respondents:
    Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha
    Pande, Ms. Soumya Priyadarshinee, Vinayak Aren, Amlaan Kumar,
    Jatin Dhamija, Naveen Kumar Bhardwaj.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                          2539

                        Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra


                      Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                    Judgment

      Dipankar Datta, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    The judgment and order dated 3rd September, 20241 of a learned
      Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at
      Aurangabad, is under challenge in this criminal appeal. By the
      impugned order, the learned Judge dismissed a criminal appeal2
      carried by the appellant from the judgment of conviction and order
      on sentence dated 26th April, 2004 of the Special Judge, Parbhani3
      in Special Case No.05/2000. Upon maintaining the conviction of
      the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the
      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,4 the learned Judge also upheld
      the punishment of R.I. of two years and fine of Rs.2,000/- for the
      offence punishable under Section 7, and R.I. of a year and fine of
      Rs.1,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 13, with default
      stipulation, imposed on the appellant.
3.    The facts giving rise to the incident of the offence, the trap proceedings
      and other factual details have been noted in details by the Special
      Court as well as by the High Court. We do not consider it necessary
      to repeat the same here.
4.    The conviction of the appellant as well as the sentence imposed on
      him are questioned by Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel
      for the appellant, by raising the following legal contentions:
      i.      sanction to prosecute was mechanically granted;
      ii.     investigation was conducted by an Inspector of Police
              (PW-4), although in terms of the statutory mandate contained in
              Section 17 of the PC Act, no officer lower in rank than a Deputy
              Superintendent of Police can investigate the crime;



1    impugned order
2    Crl. Appeal No. 303 of 2004
3    Special Court
4    PC Act
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      iii.    the demand was not proved and the conviction is indefensible
              having regard to the law declared by the Constitution Bench of
              this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT Delhi);5 and
      iv.     one of the seizure witnesses was related to the complainant.
5.    Ms. Arora, in the alternative, submitted that the incident being more
      than 25 years old and the appellant by passage of time having become
      a septuagenarian, the Court may consider altering the sentence, if
      it were not inclined to disturb the conviction, so that at this age the
      appellant is not made to suffer any imprisonment.
6.    In support of her contention, Ms. Arora referred to an order dated
      23rd January, 2025 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in
      H.P. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka6 in a case also arising out of
      a conviction under the PC Act. There, taking into consideration the
      facts that the appellant was a sexagenarian, that the occurrence took
      place in 2007 and that he had also been dismissed from service,
      the coordinate Bench in the peculiar circumstances of the case and
      in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,
      modified the sentence to 15 days imprisonment. She prayed for
      similar indulgence.
7.    Per contra, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, learned counsel for the respondent-
      State, contended that the findings returned by the Special Court and
      the High Court are based on the evidence led in the trial and having
      regard to the answers given by the appellant to the questions in
      course of his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
      Procedure, 1973,7 there could be little doubt that he had demanded
      and accepted bribe and, therefore, was guilty of the charges. She
      also submitted that the appellant had not spent a single night in
      custody and in light of the fact that maximum sentence permitted by
      law was not imposed, no interference is called for with the discretion
      exercised by the Special Court. She, accordingly, prayed for dismissal
      of the appeal.
8.    We have heard Ms. Arora and Ms. Bobde and perused the materials
      on record as well as a relevant ‘Order’ of the Government of


5    (2023) 4 SCC 731
6    Criminal Appeal No.1466 of 2017
7    Cr. PC
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                       2541

                       Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra


      Maharashtra, referred to in the judgment of the Special Court, on
      which we have been able to lay our hands through the search
      processes that are now available.
9.    In developing the first contention, exception has been taken by Ms.
      Arora to the sanctioning authority approving the draft order of grant
      of sanction without making any changes. From the evidence of
      the Sub-Divisional Officer, Parbhani (PW-3), being the sanctioning
      authority, we find a categorical assertion that he did not change the
      wording of the draft because he did not find it necessary.
10. We find no reason to accept the contention for the reason that follows.
11. There is a legal impediment to prosecute a public servant for corruption,
    if there be no sanction. Grant of sanction is an administrative function
    based on the subjective satisfaction of the sanctioning authority
    after due application of mind to the materials placed before him.
    Whether sanction should be granted or not is, however, not about
    mental satisfaction of the truth of the facts placed before the officer
    competent to grant sanction but all that is necessary for a sanction
    to be granted is for him to be satisfied about the existence of a
    prima facie case.
12. It is no longer res integra that requirement of sanction has a salutary
    object. Provisions requiring sanction to prosecute, either under Section
    19, PC Act or Section 197 of the (now repealed) Cr. PC or under
    Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are
    intended to protect an innocent public servant against unwarranted
    and mala fide prosecution. Indubitably, there can be no tolerance
    to corruption which has the effect of undermining core constitutional
    values of justice, equality, liberty and fraternity; however, at the same
    time, the need to prosecute and punish the corrupt is no ground to
    deny protection to the honest. This is what was held by this Court in
    its decision in Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India8 while repelling
    a challenge raised in a Public Interest Litigation to the constitutional
    validity of Section 19 of the PC Act.
13. Even otherwise, merely because there is any omission, error or
    irregularity in the matter of granting sanction, that does not affect
    the validity of the proceedings unless the court records its own


8    (2015) 2 SCC 33
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     satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in
     a failure of justice.
14. If a draft order is placed before the sanctioning authority and he
    is satisfied that nothing needs to be added/deleted therefrom, the
    grant of sanction cannot be faulted merely on the ground of absence
    of addition of words to/deletion of words from the draft. We have
    noticed that PW-3 made four minor corrections to ensure that the
    substance conforms to the form in which the sanction was required
    to be given, without altering the substance (i.e. the contents). That
    there has been a complete absence of application of mind by PW-3
    is, thus, not proved; also, that there has been a failure of justice, has
    not been shown. On facts, we are satisfied that there has been no
    irregularity, far less illegality, in grant of sanction. We are, thus, not
    even required to invoke provisions of Section 465, Cr. PC.
15. The first contention, therefore, has no merit.
16. Insofar as the second contention urged by Ms. Arora is concerned, we
    have noted that the Special Court referred to Government Order dated
    19th April, 1969 bearing no. MIS0389/767/CR-140/POL-3, issued in
    exercise of powers conferred by the 1st proviso to Section 17 of the PC
    Act authorizing all the police inspectors in the Anti-Corruption Bureau
    of the State of Maharashtra to investigate any offence punishable
    thereunder. Considering such legal position, it was held by the Special
    Court there was no merit in the contention that investigation had not
    been conducted by an officer competent to do so.
17. Ms. Arora has taken exception by contending that the relevant
    Government Order was not brought on record in a manner known to
    law. Significantly, it is not the case of the appellant that the such an
    order does not at all exist. As referred to above, we have successfully
    searched for the relevant Government Order. We have found that
    it does exist, except that the relevant year of issuance thereof was
    mentioned in the judgment of the Special Court as 1969. We do not
    know whether the Special Court’s judgment does refer to the year
    as 1969 or the paper book version, which is a typed copy of the
    judgment of the Special Court, incorrectly mentions so. Whatever be
    the position on facts, nothing turns on it. The relevant Government
    Order was issued on 19th April, 1989, close on the heels of enactment
    of the PC Act. For the sake of satisfaction of the appellant, we quote
    the same hereunder:
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                      2543

                    Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra


                                  ORDER

                            Home Department,
                       Mantralaya, Bombay 400 032
                                                Dated the 19th April 1989
     No. MIS/0389/767/CR-140/POL-3. – In exercise of the powers
     conferred by the first proviso to section 17 of the Prevention of
     Corruption Act, 1988 (XLIX of 1988), the Government of Maharashtra
     hereby authorizes all the Inspectors of Police in the Anti-Corruption
     Bureau, Maharashtra State, to investigate any offence punishable
     under the said Act and to make arrest therefor without a warrant.
                                By order and in the name of the
                                   Governor of Maharashtra,
                                                 Sd/-
                                           (S.J. Mahajan)
                              Assistant Secretary to the Government of
                                            Maharashtra
18. Statutory instruments, including rules/regulations/orders are framed/
    issued through delegated legislative powers within the administrative
    framework, which mirrors the lawmaking process of the legislature
    within its framework. The Government Order dated 19th April,
    1989 having been issued in terms of authority conferred by the
    first proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act, it is an order having the
    force of a statute and is, therefore, law. Section 56 of the Indian
    Evidence Act, 1872 ordains that a fact judicially noticeable need
    not be proved. In terms of Section 57 thereof, the courts shall
    take judicial notice of, inter alia, all laws in force in the territory
    of India. The State Government having authorised by a general
    order, which is the law for the present case, that a police officer
    not below the rank of an Inspector of Police may investigate any
    offence punishable under the PC Act and PW-4 who conducted
    the investigation being an officer of the rank of Inspector of Police
    in the Anti-Corruption Branch, it was not necessary to bring the
    law on record as evidence in the trial before it could be relied on;
    on the contrary, it was the duty of the special court to take judicial
    notice of such law, which it did, and we approve of such approach.
    In any event, the vires of the said Government Order not having
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     been questioned by the appellant on any ground, we affirm the
     finding of the Special Court in this behalf.
19. On the question of demand not being proved and reliance placed
    by her on the decision in Neeraj Dutta (supra), which is the third
    contention advanced by Ms. Arora, we are simply not impressed in
    view of the evidence tendered by the witnesses for the prosecution,
    which are on record, as well as the answers given by the appellant in
    course of his examination under Section 313, Cr. PC. The demand,
    in our view, has been proved without a doubt. In fact, we appreciate
    the candour of the appellant while answering the questions when the
    circumstances appearing in the evidence against him were sought to
    be explained by the Special Court. He answered them quite frankly.
    However, the amount of arrears being Rs.5/- + and there being no
    material produced by the appellant, in defence, to support his claim
    that the sum of arrears were a little short of Rs.500/-, acceptance of
    Rs.500/- has not been justified particularly when it was the assertion
    of the complainant (PW-1) that after bargaining with the appellant,
    he had reduced the demand from Rs.2,000/- to Rs.500/- for making
    over the 7/12 extracts. The third contention of Ms. Arora is, therefore,
    equally without merit.
20. The contention relating to the evidence of the seizure witness (PW-2)
    has also not impressed us. His evidence need not be discarded,
    on the facts of this case, merely because he was related to the
    complainant, as alleged. The evidence of the said witness had
    been found creditworthy as his version in-chief was not shaken after
    thorough cross-examination. Hence, we see no reason to hold that
    by reason of mere relationship, the conviction would stand vitiated.
    In any event, even apart from the seizure witness, the other evidence
    on record do suggest that no error was committed by the Special
    Court in convicting the appellant and by the High Court in affirming
    such conviction.
21. All contentions on merit, therefore, fail.
22. Turning to the final contention regarding alteration of sentence, much
    emphasis has been laid by Ms. Arora on the advanced age of the
    appellant and the date of the incident and in line with the decision
    in H.P. Venkatesh (supra), she has urged us to exercise power
    under Article 142 of the Constitution to relieve him of the necessity
    to serve his prison term.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                            2545

                      Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra


23. At the outset, we may observe that although a proved offence under
    Section 7 of the PC Act (as it stood on the date of the offence
    committed by the appellant) carried a minimum punishment of six
    months and maximum of seven years imprisonment, with fine, and
    a proved offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of
    the PC Act, at the time of commission of offence by the appellant,
    carried a minimum sentence of a year and a maximum of seven
    years’ imprisonment, with fine, the appellant was not sentenced to the
    maximum terms of punishment but R.I. for two years’ for each count
    of offence, to run concurrently. Since the State has not challenged
    the sentence, we say no more.
24. Before we proceed to consider the prayer for alteration of sentence,
    which is based on the decision in H.P. Venkatesh (supra), it would
    be profitable now to have a look at some of the precedents as to
    whether Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked for reducing
    the term of imprisonment lower than what is prescribed in the statute
    as the minimum punishment.
25. Narendra Champaklal Trivedi v. State of Gujarat9 is a decision
    rendered by a coordinate Bench arising out of a case under the PC
    Act. The following passage is instructive:
            “30. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, where
            the minimum sentence is provided, we think it would not
            be at all appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article
            142 of the Constitution of India to reduce the sentence
            on the ground of the so-called mitigating factors as that
            would tantamount to supplanting statutory mandate and
            further it would amount to ignoring the substantive statutory
            provision that prescribes minimum sentence for a criminal
            act relating to demand and acceptance of bribe. The
            amount may be small but to curb and repress this kind
            of proclivity the legislature has prescribed the minimum
            sentence. It should be paramountly borne in mind that
            corruption at any level does not deserve either sympathy
            or leniency. In fact, reduction of the sentence would be
            adding a premium. The law does not so countenance
            and, rightly so, because corruption corrodes the spine


9   (2012) 7 SCC 80
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             of a nation and in the ultimate eventuality makes the
             economy sterile.”
26. Further, in Mohd. Hashim v. State of Uttar Pradesh,10 a further
    coordinate Bench of this Court made the following pertinent
    observations:
             “19. … We may further elaborate that when the legislature
             has prescribed minimum sentence without discretion, the
             same cannot be reduced by the courts. In such cases,
             imposition of minimum sentence, be it imprisonment or
             fine, is mandatory and leaves no discretion to the court.
             However, sometimes the legislation prescribes a minimum
             sentence but grants discretion and the courts, for reasons
             to be recorded in writing, may award a lower sentence or
             not award a sentence of imprisonment. Such discretion
             includes the discretion not to send the accused to prison.
             Minimum sentence means a sentence which must be
             imposed without leaving any discretion to the court. It means
             a quantum of punishment which cannot be reduced below
             the period fixed. If the sentence can be reduced to nil,
             then the statute does not prescribe a minimum sentence.
             A provision that gives discretion to the court not to award
             minimum sentence cannot be equated with a provision
             which prescribes minimum sentence. The two provisions,
             therefore, are not identical and have different implications …”
27. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das,11 another coordinate
    Bench of this Court after referring, inter alia, to the aforesaid decisions
    held:
             “8. In view of the aforesaid judgments that where minimum
             sentence is provided for, the court cannot impose less than
             the minimum sentence. It is also held that the provisions
             of Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to,
             to impose sentence less than the minimum sentence.”
28. Law is, thus, well-settled that exercise of power conferred by Article
    142, in a case such as the present where a minimum sentence is


10   (2017) 2 SCC 198
11   (2019) 4 SCC 125
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                      2547

                    Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra


     prescribed by the statute, cannot be tinkered, for, the same would
     amount to legislation by the Court; and, prescription of a term of
     sentence quite contrary to what the Parliament has legislated would
     be legally impermissible. The statutory prescription in relation to
     punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be
     reduced by this Court even in exercise of powers under Article 142
     of the Constitution.
29. In any event, offences under the PC Act stand on a completely
    different footing. Obviously, no court, far less this Court, ought to
    tolerate corruption by public servants while discharging official duty
    attracting provisions of the PC Act. In exceptional cases, while
    exercising appellate jurisdiction, a court may, in judicious exercise
    of discretion and for reasons to be recorded, alter the sentence
    to serve justice for both the society and the offender. However, to
    reduce the sentence to a term of imprisonment which is not provided
    in the statute and below the minimum period, as prescribed, could
    be seen as usurpation of the function of the legislature by this Court.
30. At the same time, we are of the view that it is only rarely, and in
    extraordinary cases, that this Court may, in the exercise of its plenary
    power to temper justice with mercy grant a convict a prison-term
    waiver. As and by way of illustration, a convict (on bail) who is too
    ill to understand why he needs to be sent to prison or too ill to be
    taken to prison or the like, could qualify for grant of extreme leniency
    by this Court but only on production of unimpeachable evidence to
    that effect.
31. This is not such a rare or extraordinary case where justice calls for
    being tempered with mercy and hence, we express our inability to
    follow H.P. Venkatesh (supra).
32. The statutory provisions contained in the PC Act, relating to prison
    terms that could be imposed by way of sentence at the time the
    appellant indulged in committing the offences, have been noted.
33. While affirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 7
    and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2), PC Act, but having
    regard to the date of the incident of offence, the advanced age
    of the appellant, the mental anxiety and continued stress that he
    must have experienced all these years induced by the pendency
    of proceedings, we are of the considered opinion that imposition of
    sentence of prison term for the minimum period would sufficiently
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     serve the interests of justice. Accordingly, we alter the sentence
     of 2 years R. I. for the offence under Section 7 to a term of S.I.
     for a year without, however, altering the sentence of imprisonment
     ordered for the offence under Section 13(1)(d). Both sentences shall
     run concurrently. This would be in addition to the fine that has been
     imposed by the Special Court. Ordered accordingly.
34. The appellant shall surrender within 6 (six) weeks from date to serve
    his sentence. If not paid, the amount of fine may also be paid within
    such time as indicated above. In the event, the appellant fails to
    surrender and or make payment of the fine amount, this order of
    alteration of sentence shall stand recalled and he shall be under
    obligation to serve the sentence imposed by the trial court, i.e., term
    of 2 years R.I.
35. The appeal, accordingly, stands partly allowed.
36. Connected applications, if any, stand closed.

     Result of the case: Appeal Partly allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan