DAYANDEOGANPAT JADHAVversusMADHAV VITHAL BHASKAR AND ORS.

                    DAYANDEOGANPAT JADHAV                                          A
                                v.
                 MADHA V VITHAL BHASKAR AND ORS.

                             OCTOBER 21, 2005

                (B.N. SRIKRISHNA AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]                            B


      Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948-Sections 15(2),
32 and 32?-Land in possession of tenant entitled to become 'deemed
purchaser '-Its surrender to landlord-Legality of-Held: Consequences of C
refusal to purchase· the land were explained to tenant, yet he indicated his
unwillingness to purchase it, reiterated same after second thought and also
in a subsequent year-Tenant surrendered his tenancy rights in respect of
that piece of /and-Subsequent initiation of proceedings by him for same
piece of land combined with another piece showed he wanted to take a
chance by playing 'second innings'.                                          D
     Constitution of India, 1950-Artic/e 136-Revocation of leave to
appeal-Al/ facts placed on record in affidavit-in-reply not stated in Special
Leave Petition-However, material document on which strong reliance was
placed in counter-affidavit had not been suppressed by appellant-Held:
Leave to appeal should not be revoked especially as it was granted after           E
counter-affidavit had been filed, matter heard on several occasions, whereby
Court became aware of stand of respondent and vacated interim relief

       Appellant was tenant of respondent-landlord in respect of agricultural
lands comprised in gut nos. 2325 and 2326, and was cultivating them. On
tiller's day, 1st April, 1957, their father was in possession of lands comprised   F
in gut nos. 2326, and as per Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, on that day they were entitled to become
'deemed purchaser' of those lands. However, the Mamlatdar, based on
statements of appellant and respondent, held that possession of the lands
comprised in gut nos. 2326 should be handed over to respondent. The                G
Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal held that the appellant had
surrendered the above land as he was not interested in purchasing it and hence
the 'deemed purchase' had become ineffective.

      The appellant on December 10, 1976, approached the Mamlatdar and
                                      439                                          II
    440                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Agricultural Lands Tribunal praying that they had become 'deemed
    purchaser' of agricultural lands comprised in gut nos. 2325 and 2326. The
    Tribunal, in its order dated January 31, 1985 held that as an inquiry in
    respect of lands comprised in gut no. 2326 had been conducted and purchase
    had been declared ineffective, it was not necessary to make inquiry for that
B   land. Regarding that lands comprised in gut no. 2325, it held that the appellant
    had become 'deemed purchaser', fixed the price and ordered them to pay it.

          The appellant preferred an appeal against this order. The Appellate
    Authority held that the surrender by appellant of land comprised in gut No.
    2326 was not in accordance with Section 15(2) of the Act. The appeal was
C   allowed and matter was remanded to lower court for fixation of purchase-price
    of the land. Against this, revision application of respondent before the
    Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was dismissed. Aggrieved by this, respondent
    moved the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court
    held that in respect of land comprised in gut no. 2326, the father of appellant
    had become 'deemed purchaser' on the tiller's day. However as he was not
D   willing to purchase that land, possession was given to the respondent of the
    said land in accordance with the order of Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands
    Tribunal. This order remained unchallenged. In the circumstances, the High
    Court allowed the writ petition. Hence the present appeal.

          Appellant contended that they had surrendered property comprised in
E   gut no. 2325 and not the land in gut no. 2326. Alternatively, it was contended,
    assuming that surrender was in respect of property comprised in gut no. 2326,
    since requisite procedure was not followed, the so called surrender was
    unlawful.

F         Respondent contended that (i) appellant surrendered their tenancy rights
    to them and they were put in possession of the disported land; (ii) appellant
    had suppressed the fact that they had taken over the possession of land
    comprised in gut no. 2326, and hence they were not entitled to equitable relief
    under Article 136 of the Constitution.

G         Dismissing the appeal, the Court

          HELD: 1.1. Order ofMamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal that
    the tenant was no more interested in purchase of land and surrendered his
    tenancy rights in favour of the landlord was correct and in accordance with
    the provisions of law. (453-B(
H
              DAYANDEOGANPATJADHAVv.MADHAVVITHALBHASKAR                    441
      1.2. Statement of tenant was recorded. He was also explained of the         A
consequences of his unwillingness to purchase the land and he had expressly
stated that he was aware of the consequences of his refusal to purchase the
land and yet had declined to purchase it Even in 1962, again his statement
was recorded and he repeated what he had stated earlier. Even on 'second
thought', he reiterated that he was not willing to purchase the land. (448-FI     B
      Sakharam Shripati Jadhav Ors. v. Chandrakant Ors., (198711 SCC 486,
Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, (19591 Supp I SCR 489, Ramchandra
Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, (197511 SCC 559 and Babu Prasasu
Kaikadi v. Babu, (2004] I SCC 681, relied on.

      2.1. Only in 1976 the appellant started 'second innings' by initiating
                                                                                  c
the present proceedings. Since an order was passed and possession had been
given to the landlord, the application submitted by the appellant was not
maintainable. It, however, appears that the application was entertained since
the appellant had stated that he had become 'deemed purchaser' in respect of
other land also. [448-H; 449-AI                                                   D
      2.2. The tenant had surrendered his tenancy rights in respect of one
piece of land and it was only in respect of Gut No. 2326 which was in 1959.
Initiation of proceedings for two gut numbers itself shows that the tenant
wanted to take a chance by playing 'second innings' though he had already
surrendered his tenancy rights over gut no. 2326 and hence the Mamlatdar          E
and Agricultural Lands Tribunal was right in negativing the claim of the
tenant for Gut No. 2326. Appellate and revisional authorities were wrong in
setting aside the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands
Tribunal dated January 31, 1985 and in ignoring the order dated November
16, 1959. The High Court was, therefore, right in quashing both the orders.       F
                                                                 (449-C, DJ

      3. The order passed by the High Court deserves no interference under
Article 136 of the Constitution. Though all the facts which have been placed
on record by the landlord in his affidavit-in-reply have not been stated in the
Special Leave Petition, nevertheless the appellant has produced on record the     G
order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal on November
16, 1959. In fact, it is the trump~card on which strong reliance is placed by
respondent. The material document th.us has not been suppressed by the
appellant Moreover, after notice was issued, the respondents appeared and
counter-affidavit was filed in July, 2001. The matter was heard on several
occasions thereafter and leave was granted in April 2003. The Court was thus      H
    442                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A aware of the stand of the respondent-landlord as reflected in the counter-
    affidavit. The Court, therefore, vacated interim relief, but granted leave. Jn
    light of these facts, it would not be proper to revoke leave at this stage.
                                                                     [447-B, C, DJ

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3370 of2003.
B
         From the Judgment and Order dated 30.8.2000 of the Bombay High
    Court in W.P. No. 5844of1987.

         K. Sukumaran and N.R. Shonker for M/s. T.T.K. Deepak & Co. for the
    Appellant.
c
         V.A. Mohta, R.S. Soni, Rakesh K. Sharma and Nilakanta Nayak for the
    Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D         C.K. THAKKER, J. This appeal is instituted by the appellant against the
    judgment and order passed by a single Judge of the High Court of Bombay
    on August 30, 2000 in Writ Petition No. 5844 of 1987. By the said order, the
    High Court quashed and set aside the order passed by the Sub-Divisional
    Officer, Junnar Sub-Division, Khed (Pune) on September 24, 1985 and confirmed
E   by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune in Revision Application as also
     in Review Petition on September 29, 1986 and October I, 1987 respectively.

          To appreciate the controversy in the appeal, the relevant facts may be
    stated in brief.

        The case of the appellant before this Court is that the disputed property
F consists of agricultural land bearing Survey No. 521/A/4B, Gut No. 2326
  situate at Village Chakan, District Pune admeasuring 15 gunthas. The land
  originally belonged to one Vitthal Babaji Bhaskar. Hari Ganpat Jadhav, ancestor
  of the appellant was the tenant of that land since 1929. After the death of Hari,
  his son Ganpat was cultivating the land as tenant. Thereafter the appellant
G continued to cultivate it. According to the appellant, on the 1st April, 1957,
  the tenant became 'deemed purchaser' of the land under the Bombay Tenancy
  and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
  Admittedly, on that day, i.e. April 1, 1957 (Tillers' day), Ganpat (father of the
  appellant) was in possession of suit land as tenant. Under Section 32 of the
  Act, therefore, Ganpat became 'deemed purchaser'. The Mamlatdar and
H Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Khed passed an order on November 16, 1959
       DAYANDEOGANPAT JADHA Vv. MADHA VVITHAL BHASKAR[THAKKER,J.]         443

under Section 32-P of the Act holding that the tenant had surrendered the         A
land as he was not interested in purchasing it and hence the purchase had
become ineffective. The Mamlatdar recorded the statement of the tenant
(Ganpat) and of the landlord (Vitthal) and held that the possession of the land
should be handed over to the landlord. It is the contention of the appellant
that the provisions of the Act had not been complied with and as the tenant       B
became 'deemed purchaser', the order passed by the Mamlatdar and
Agricultural Lands Tribunal was non est. It was also his case that the
possession of the land was never handed over to the landlord.

       The appellant, therefore, approached the Mamlatdar and Agricultural
Lands Tribunal on December 10, 1976 praying that since the tenant had             C
become 'deemed purchaser' under Section 32 of the Act, in accordance with
the provisions of Section 32-G of the Act, the purchase price of the land
should be fixed. The proceedings under Section 32-G of the Act, however,
were dropped and purchase was declared ineffective by the Mamlatdar and
Agricultural Lands Tribunal as the appellant remained absent on the date of
the hearing. The application was accordingly dismissed. Against the said          D
order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, the appellant
preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Khed which was allowed
on August 20, 1983, the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural
Lands Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for
fresh inquiry in accordance with law. The case, therefore, again came up for      E
hearing before the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Khed and the
Tribunal by an order dated January 31, 1985, partly allowed the prayer of the
appellant. The Tribunal noted that the prayer was made by the appellant in
respect of two pieces of land as mentioned in the order. According to the
Tribunal, however, from the evidence led by the Jandlord, it was clear that an
inquiry in respect of one piece of land had been conducted and purchase had       F
been declared ineffective as the tenant was not interested in purchase of land
and the possession of the land had been handed over to the landlord. It was,
therefore, not necessary to make inquiry under Section 32-G of the Act for
that land. Regarding the other land, the tenant had become 'deemed purchaser'
and, hence, purchase price was required to be fixed. Considering the nature       G
of land, the Tribunal fixed the price and ordered the tenant-purchaser to pay
the amount in two equal instalments with interest thereon. The Tribunal also
ordered to issue certificate on payment of purchase-price by the tenant under
Section 32-M of the Act.

      Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural       H
    444                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Lands Tribunal rejecting the claim, the appellant preferred an appeal before .
    the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Appellate Authority held that the surrender
    of land bearing Survey No. 521/A/48 Gut No. 2326 was not in accordance with
    law since the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act had not been complied
    with. In the light of the said finding, the appellate authority held the so-called
B   surrender as illegal and unlawful, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of
    the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal in respect of Gut No. 2326 and
    remanded the case to the lower court for fixation of purchase-price of the land.

          The landlord challenged. the said order by preferring a Revision
    Application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal contending that the
C   tenant had already surrendered possession of Gut No. 2326 and after following
    procedure laid down in the Act, the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal
    had passed an order in 1959. It was, therefore, not open to the appellate
    authority to quash the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands
    Tribunal and the Revision Application deserved to be allowed. The Tribunal,.
    however, held that the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act had not been
D   complied with and as such, surrender could not be held to be legal and valid
    and the order passed by the appellate authority did not deserve interference.
    Accordingly, the Revision Application was dismissed. A Review Application
    against the order in Revision Application also met with the same fate.

          The landlord hence moved the High Court by invoking Article 227 of
E the Constitution. The High Court, in the judgment impugned in this Court,
    held that the appellate and the revisional authority were wrong in ignoring
    the order passed in 1959 in respect of land comprising Survey No. 521/A/48
    Gut No. 2326. According to the High Court, the tenant, father of the appellant
    had become 'deemed purchaser' on tillers' day. He, however, specifically
p   stated that he was not willing to purchase the land. An inquiry was conducted
    and an order was passed on November 16, 1959 and in pursuance of the said
    order, possession was given to the landlord of the said land. No proceedings
    were initiated nor the said order was challenged. In the circumstances, the
    authorities had committed an error in passing the orders in favour of the
    tenant. The writ petition was accordingly allowed and the orders passed by
G   the appellate authority and revisional authority were set aside.

          Being aggrieved by the said order, the tenant has approached this
    Court. On February 2, 2001, notice was issued by the Court and status quo
    as to possession was granted. Affidavit-in-reply and affidavit-in-rejoinder
H   were filed. On April 10, 2003, leave was granted. Status quo granted earlier
        DA YANDEOGANPAT JADHA V v. MAD HA VVITHALBHASKAR[THAKKER,J.]          445

was, however, vacated.                                                               A
      We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

        Mr. Sukumaran, Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant contended
 that the High Court has committed an error of law as well as of jurisdiction
 in setting aside orders passed by the appellate authority as well as revisional     B
authority. According to him, the High Court was exercising supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. It, therefore, could not have
entered into questions of fact and/or of law. Since the authorities under the
Act had not exceeded their jurisdiction, it was not open to the High Court
to re-appreciate and re-weigh the evidence and to set aside those orders. It         C
was also submitted that the High Court was wholly wrong in holding that the
appellant had surrendered Gut No. 2326. What was surrendered by the
appellant was the other land and he was not claiming ownership over that
 land. Alternatively, it was submitted by the learned counsel that even if it is
assumed that the appellant had surrendered Gut No. 2326, since the requisite
procedure had not been followed, the so-called surrender was illegal, unlawful       D
and contrary to law. The appellate authority and the revisional authority were
right in holding that such surrender would neither deprive the tenant of his
right to become 'deemed purchaser' nor would entitle the landlord to get
possession from the tenant who had become owner of the land. It was also
submitted that the Act has been enacted to protect tenants and the provisions
of the Act must be so construed that tillers are not deprived of their livelihood.   E
When both the authorities under the Act had held that the appellant-tenant
had become 'deemed purchaser', the High Court should not have interfered
with the said finding. It was, therefore, submitted that the order passed by
the High Court deserves to be set aside by restoring the orders passed by
the appellate and revisional authority. ·                                            F
      Mr. Mohta, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent-
landlord, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the High Court.
The counsel submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed on a
preliminary ground and leave which has been granted requires to be revoked
as there was suppression of material facts by the appellant. According to him,       G
the appellant claims ownership over the land bearing Survey No. 521/A/48
admeasuring 15 gunthas of Gut No. 2326. As held by the Mamlatdar and
Agricultural Lands Tribunal in the order dated November 16, .1959, tenant-
Ganpat was not interested in purchase of land and surrendered tenancy. The
Mamlatdar thereupon recorded a statement and after satisfying about                  H
    446                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A willingness of the tenant and following the provisions of Section 15 of the
  Act, passed an order that the tenant had surrendered his tenancy rights in
  accordance with law. Even thereafter, when possession was sought to be
  given by the tenant to the landlord in 1962, again his statement of was
  recorded. According to Mr. Mohta, this is not a case of taking over possession
B by the landlord, but handing over possession by the tenant. Thus, as early
  as in 1962, the tenant had handed over the possession of the land to the
  landlord. The appellant is aware of this fact and yet he had suppressed it and
  obtained an order of status quo. This Court, no doubt, subsequently after
  referring to the affidavit of the landlord vacated interim relief. In view of
  concealment of material fact, however, the appellant is not entitled to equitable
C relief under Article 136 of the Constitution.
          On merits, Mr. Mohta submitted that the High Court was wholly justified
   in setting aside the orders of the authorities below inasmuch as those orders
   were ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction. The High Court rightly observed
   that what was relevant was the order dated November 16, 1959 after following
D procedure in accordance with law and declaring that the tenant was not
   interested in purchase of land and had surrendered his tenancy rights. In view
   of the said order, no proceedings could have been initiated under the Act so
   far as the disputed land is concerned. The counsel also submitted that as the
   tenant had surrendered tenancy in 1959 and possession was handed over to
E the landlord in 1962, nothing was done by him thereafter. In view of increase
   in price of the land that in 1976, again the proceedings had been initiated by
   the appellant to pressurize the respondent-landlord to pay some amount. The
   Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal went into the question as to the
   legality of the order passed in 1959 and held that the said order was legal,
  .valid and in accordance with law and the tenant had no right ov~r the land.
F Unfortunately, however, the appellate and revisional authority held in favour
   of the tenant. The High Court, therefore, was justified in setting aside those
   orders. The counsel also submitted that the stand of the appellant is
   inconsistent inasmuch as on the one hand, he contended that the tenant had
   become 'deemed purchaser' and hence no order could have been passed by
G the authorities depriving him of that right and, on the other hand, he conceded
   that he had surrendered land bearing Gut No. 2325 and not 2326. Even the
   appellate and revisional authority had not proceeded on the basis that there
   was no surrender. They set aside the order of Mamlatdar and Agricultural
   Lands Tribunal on the ground that the provisions of Section 15(2) had not
   been complied with and the surrender was unlawful. It was, therefore, submitted
H that the order passed by the High Court is in accordance with law and no
        DAYANDEOGANPATJADHAVv.MADHAVVITHALBHASKAR[fHAKKER,J.]                447

interference is called for.                                                          A
        Having given anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the
parties and having applied our minds to the facts and circumstances of the
case, in our opinion, the order passed by the High Court deserves no
 interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. We are of the view that
though all the facts which have been placed on record by the landlord in his         B
affidavit-in-reply have not been stated in the Special Leave Petition,
nevertheless the appellant has produced on record the order passed by the
Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal on November 16, 1959. In fact, it
is the trump-card on which strong reliance is placed by Mr. Mohta. The
material document thus has not been suppressed by the appellant. Moreover,           C
after notice was issued, the respondents appeared and counter-affidavit was
filed in July, 200 I. The matter was heard at several occasions thereafter and
leave was granted in April, 2003. The Court was thus aware of the stand of
the respondent-landlord as reflected in the counter-affidavit. The Court,
therefore, vacated interim relief, but granted leave. In the light of these facts,
in our opinion, it would not be proper to revoke leave at this stage.                D
       On merits, however, according to us, submission of Mr. Mohta is well-
 founded that in 1959, an order was passed in accordance with the provisions
 of law and the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal held that the
tenant was no more interested in purchase of land and surrendered his
tenancy rights in favour of the landlord. Our attention in this connection was       E
invited by the counsel for the respondents to a statement of Ganpat Hari
Yadav (tenant) made before the Mamlatdar on October 15, 1959 wherein he
had stated that he was cultivating the land since about 40 years on 'manual
 labour'. He had also stated that his name was shown as tenant in Village form
7/12. He had further stated that if on April 1, 1957, he had right to purchase       p
land. He, however, stated that he did not want to purchase it. He then stated
that he was given to understand that if he would decline to purchase the land,
it would be disposed of and yet he had not purchased it. The statement was
signed by him. It was counter-signed by Tehsildar, Khed in presence of
Mamlatdar, who also signed it.
                                                                                     G
      On the same day, statement of landlord-Vitthal was recorded. He had
stated that Ganpat was cultivating the land since about 40 years on 'manual
labour', but his name had been entered as tenant in 7/12 extract. He then
stated that if the land is given to him, he would cultivate it personally. He
would not sell it. He also stated that he had no other land elsewhere nor he         H
    448                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A had inducted any other tenant. He had stated that he was working as a
    Mechanic in Power House at Junner and was getting salary of Rs. 90 p.m.

          On the basis of the statement of landlord and tenant, an order was
    passed by the Mamlatdar on the same day. He considered the provisions of
    Section 32-P read with Section 15(2) of the Act and recorded a finding that
B   the total holding of the landlord was 15 gunthas which was below the ceiling
    area; it was the only land and Ganpat was the only tenant of the said land.
    He also held that the landlord required the land for bona fide personal
    cultivation and, hence, he was entitled to retain the land.

          From the record, it appears that though the order was passed in
C November, 1959, the tenant continued to remain in possession up to 1962. On
    December 18, 1962, when Ganpat was to hand over possession to the landlord,
    again his statement was recorded by Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands
    Tribunal, Khed in which he stated that he was entitled to purchase the land
    under the Act, but he was not willing to purchase it. He stated that he was
D   aware of the consequences of his refusal to purchase the land. He stated that
    even after 'second thought', he was not willing to purchase the land and was
    ready to hand over possession. Accordingly, the possession of the land was
    handed over to the landlord. A panchnama was prepared of handing over
    possession by tenant-Ganpat to landlord Vitthal and a re~eipt to thai effect
    had been issued by the landlord.
E
          From the above documents, it is clear that an order had been passed
    by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal under the Act. Statement
    of tenant was recorded. He was also explained as to the consequences of his
    unwillingness to purchase the land and he had expressly stated that he was
F   aware of the consequences of his refusal to purchase the rand and yet he had
    declined to purchase it. Even in 1962, again his statement was recorded and
    he repeated what he had stated earlier. Even on 'second thought', he reiterated
    that he was not willing to purchase the land. In the circumstances, in our
    opinion, the respondents are right in contending that since the tenant was
    not ready and willing to purchase the land and surrendered his tenancy rights
G   in favour of the landlord, the landlord was put in possession of the disputed
    land.

          The respondents are also right in submitting that only in 1976 the
    appellant started 'second innings' by initiating the present proceedings.
    Since an order was passed and possession had been given to the landlord,
H   the application submitted by the appellant was not maintainable. It, however,
        DAYANDEOGANPATJADHA Vv. MADHA VVITHALBHASKAR[THAK.KER,J.]        449

appears that the application was entertained since the appellant had stated A
that he had become 'deemed purchaser' in respect of other land also. Mr.
Sukumaran, appearing for the tenant submitted that the appellant· had
surrendered his tenancy rights in respect of one Gut Number but not for the
other. According fo him, the tenant had become 'deemed purchaser' of Gut
No. 2326.
                                                                                 B
       We are unable to uphold the argument. From the order dated January
31, 1985, passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, it is clear
that the tenant had been declared 'deemed purchaser' of land bearing Gut No.
2325 and even purchase-price had been fixed and the tenant was ordered to
pay the same with interest in two equal instalments. In our view, therefore,     C
Mr. Mohta is right in submitting that the tenant had surrendered his tenancy
rights in respect of one piece of land and it was only in respect of Gut No.
2326 which was in 1959. Initiation of proceedings for two Gut numbers itself
shows that the tenant wanted to take a chance by playing 'second innings'
though he had already surrendered his tenancy rights .over Gut No. 2326 and
hence the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal was right in negativing      D
the claim of the tenant for Gut No. 2326. Appellate and revisional authorities       /
were wrong in setting aside the order passed by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural
Lands Tribunal dated January 31, 1985 and in ignoring the order dated
November 16, 1959. The High Court was, therefore, right in quashing both the
orders.
                                                                                 E
     It is, no doubt true that surrender of tenancy by the tenant, who had
become 'deemed purchaser' under the Act must be in accordance with law.

       Mr. Sukumaran on this point invited our attention to some of the
important provisions of tlie Act. He submitted that special provisions have F
been made by the Legislature relating to purchase of land by tenants (Sections
32-33). Sub-section (I) of Section 32 of the Act enacts that on first day of
April, 1957, styled as the tillers' day, every tenant had become 'deemed
purchaser' of the land cultivated by him. Section 32-G requires the Tribunal
to issue notice and to determine price of land to be paid by the tenant. Section
32-H lays down procedure for fixation of purchase price. Section 32-K relates G
to mode of payment of price by the tenant-purchaser as also deals with power
of the Tribunal to recover purchase price. Section 32-M provides for issuance
of certificate of purchase to the tenant-purchaser and also covers those cases
where there is failure on the part of the tenant to pay purchase price. Section
32-P enables the Tribunal to resume and dispose of land not purchased by H
    450                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A tenant. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of the said secti.on states that subject
    to the provisions of Section 15, the land shall be surrendered to the former
    landlord.

         Section 15 deals with cases of termination of tenancy by surrender of
    land by the tenant. It reads as under;
B
           "15. Termination of tenancy by surrender thereof-:-(!) A tenant may
           terminate the tenancy in respect of any land at any time by surrendering
           his interest therein in favour of the landlords;

               Provided that such surrender shall be in writing, and verified
C          before the Mamlatdar in the prescribed manner.

                (2) Where a tenant surrenders his tenancy, the landlord shall be
           entitled to retain the land so surrendered for the like purposes, and
           to the like extent, and in so far as the conditions are applicable subject
           to the like conditions as are provided in sections 31 and 3 IA for the
D          termination of tenancies.

               (2A) The Mamlatdar shall, in respect of the surrender verified
           under sub-section(!), hold an inquiry and decide whether the landlord
           is entitled under sub-section (2) to retain the whole or any portion of
           the land so surrendered and specify the extent and particulars in that
E          behalf.

                (3) The land, or any portion thereof, which the landlord is not
           entitled to retain under sub-section (2), shall be liable to be disposed
           of in the manner provided under clause (c) sub-section (2) of Section
           32P.
F
         In exercise of power conferred by Section 82 of the Act, the State
    Government framed rules known as the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
    Lands Rules, 1956. Rule 9 is material for our purpose and reads thus;

               "9. Manner of verifying surrender of tenancy.-The mamlatdar
G          when verifying a surrender of a tenancy by a tenant in favour of the
           landlord under section 15 shall satisfy himself, after such enquiry as
           he thinks fit, that the tenant understands the nature and consequences
           of the surrender and also that it is voluntary and shall endorse his
           findings in that behalf upon the document of surrender."

H         Conjoint reading of Section 15 and Rule 9 makes it clear that a tenant
        DAYANDEOGANPATJADHAVv.MADHAVVITHALBHASKAR[THAKKER,J.]                 451
who has become 'deemed purchaser' under the Act may surrender tenancy.               A
Such surrender, however, must be as per the procedure laid down in the Act
and the Rules. If the surrender is not in accordance with the law, it must be
held illegal, unlawful and the status of a tenant as 'deemed purchaser' would
not get adversely affected.

      Mr. Sukumaran is again right in submitting that the Act has been               B
enacted with a view to protect tenants and the provisions of the Act, therefore,
must be construed in favour of a weaker class of tlie society to ensure that
the object underlying the Act is fulfilled.

       As held by this Court in Sakharam Shripati Jadhav and Ors. v.
Chandrakant and Ors., [1987] l SCC 486, the Act has been enacted with a              C
"high purpose of transferring the land to the tillers of the soil". In Sri Ram
Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, [1959] Supp I SCR 489, it has been
held by the Constitution Bench of this Court that the title of the landlord to
the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tillers' day and there is a
complete purchase and sale between the landlord and the tenant. But in the           D
said decision itself, it has been observed by the Court that the tenant had
been given a locus penitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or
is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. Jfhe fails to appear
or he appears and shows his unwillingness to purchase it, an appropriate
order can be passed by the authority after following the procedure required
~~.                                                                                  E
      In Ramachandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, [1975] I SCC
559, a question similar to the one with which we are concerned came up for
consideration before this Court. It was held that surrender of tenancy by a
tenant in order to be valid and effective must fulfill the following requirements-   F
       (i)    It must be in writing.

       (ii)   It must be verified before the mamlatdar.
       (iii) While making such verification the mamlatdar must satisfy himself
             in regard to two things, namely
                                                                                     G
              (a) that the tenant understands the nature and consequences of
                  the surrender, and

              (b) that it is voluntary.

       (iv) The mamlatdar must endorse his finding as to such satisfaction           H
       452                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

   A               upon the document of surrender.

             The Court considered provision of Section 5(3)(b) as then stood, which
       was similar to Section 15(1) of the Act, read with Rule 2-A, similar to present
       Rule 9 of the Rules and held that the provision was absolute, express and
       peremptory.
   B
             The Court stated;

                  "The language of Section 5(3)(b) and Rule 2-A is absolute, explicit
              and peremptory. The words "provided that" read with the words
              "shall be", repeatedly used in Section 5(3)(b), make the termination of
   C          tenancy by surrender entirely subject to the imperative conditions laid
              down in the proviso. This proviso throws a benevolent ring of
              protection around tenants. It is designed to protect a tenant on two
              fronts against two types of dangers-one against possible coercion,
              undue influence and trickery proceeding from the landlord, and the ,
              other against the tenant's own ignorance, improvidence and attitude
   D          of helpless self-resignation stemming from his weaker position in the
              tenant-landlord relationship.
                                                                                         ./

                  Thus, the imperative language, the beneficent purpose and
              impm:tance of these provisions for efficacious implementation of the
              general scheme of the Act,-all unerringly lead to the conclusion that
   E          they were intended to be mandatory. Neglect of any of these statutory
              requisites would be fatal. Disobedience of even one of these mandates
              would render the surrender invalid and ineffectual."

             It was, therefore, held that if the procedure was not followed, surrender
   F   was invalid and the effect of non-compliance would result in all proceedings
       being vitiated.

            Recently, this Court reiterated the law laid down in Ramachandra in
       Babu Parasu Kaikadi v. Babu, [2004] I SCC 681.

   G         In our opinion, however, from the statement of Ganpat recorded on
       November 15, 1959, ofVitthal recorded on the same day and the order passed
       by the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, it was clear that the
       requisite procedure had been followed. The tenant was told about his rights
       and the effect and consequences of his unwillingness to purchase the land
       and surrender of tenancy. Thereafter an order was passed by the authority
   H   on November 16, 1959. It is also clear that even in 1962 when the possession

.'\.
           DAYANDEOGANPATJADHA Vv. MADHAVVJTHALBHASKAR[THAKKER,J.]             453

  was handed over to the landlord, again statement of the tenant was recorded         A
  ahd he reiterated what he had stated in 1959. He had stated that on 'second
  thought' also, he was not willing to purchase the land. In the circumstances,
  in our opinion, the appellate and revisional authorities were not right in
  ignoring the order of 1959 and in passing the order directing the Mamlatdar
  and Agricultural Lands Tribunal to fix purchase price. In our judgment, the         B
  tenant had already surrendered his tenancy rights and since it was in
  consonance with law and after following proper procedure, an order was
  passed by Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, it was legal and
  lawlful. It is also clear that since 1962, the respondent-landlord was in
  possession of the land. No proceedings were taken by the appellate for more
  than a decade. It is further clear from the affidavit-in-reply filed by the         C
  landlord that in 1983, the appellant filed Regular Civil Suit No. 222 of 1983 in
  the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Khed for perpetual injunction under
  Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 but it was dismissed. An appeal
  filed against the said order was also dismissed by the IXth Additional District
  Judge, Pune on October 4, 1999. It is thus clear that the action was in
  consonance with law and the High Court was right in setting aside both the          D
  orders passed by the appellate authority and revisional authority. We, therefore,
  see no substance in the appeal which deserves to be dismissed.

      For the foregoing reasons, the order passed by the High Court of
, Bombay does not suffer from any infirmity and the appeal is dismissed,              E
  however, with no order as to costs.

  V.S.S.                                                       Appeal dismissed.