Holding

The acquisition was made under the 1965 notification which did not exempt evacuee properties; therefore the acquisition stands and the High Court’s setting‑aside was erroneous.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the acquisition of several parcels of land in Delhi that were claimed to be evacuee properties. The petitioners argued that the acquisition, made under the Section 4 notification of 23 January 1965, was invalid because earlier notifications had excluded evacuee lands and because such lands vested in the Custodian, not the Central Government. The Court held that the 1965 notification did not exempt evacuee properties and that evacuee lands vest in a statutory Custodian distinct from the Government, so they can be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Consequently, the High Court’s order setting aside the acquisition was erroneous. The Court directed payment of additional compensation for Khasras 321 and 322, while remitting the remaining Khasras to the High Court for further determination, and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the acquisition of the lands under the Section 4 notification dated 23 January 1965 is valid despite earlier notifications excluding evacuee properties.
Whether evacuee properties vest in the Central Government or only in the Custodian appointed under the Administration of Evacuee Properties Act.
Whether composite properties (evacuee and non‑evacuee interests) can be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act.
Whether delay or latches bars a belated challenge to the acquisition proceedings.
Whether a summary dismissal of a Special Leave Petition precludes filing another petition on the same judgment.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 136
Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954s. 10, s. 12
Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951s. 10, s. 5
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 1, s. 4, s. 6

Subjects

land acquisitionevacuee propertycomposite propertySection 4 notificationdelay and latchesspecial leave petitioncompensationcustodian

Judgment

A DELHI AOMINISTRA TION AND ORS.
·v.
MADAN· LAL NANGIA AND· ORS.

O~_TOBER. 8, 2093

B. [S.N. VARIAVA AND HJ{.;SEMA; JJ.]

·Land Acquisition :
... ,_ .

. 1 Land AcquisitiOn 'Act: 1894-Seclion 4.:...:.Larid acquisition-High
C; Court- setting aside the acquisition· in respect of those lands which were
evacuee properties-High Court proceeding on the ground that acquisition
was pursuant to Notification dated 13-11~1959 which excluded evacuee
properties-Held, High Court fell in error as petitioners lands were
acquired by Notification dated 23-1-1965 which did not exempt evacuee
D properties-Factual basis on which acquisition of evacuee lands was set
aside did not exist-Administration of Evacuee Properties Act, 1950.

Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954-
Sections 10 and 12-Evacuee properties being vested in the Custodian-
Held, merely because a property vests in the custodian does not mean
E that the property vests in the Central Government, Custodian being a
distinct person from the Central Government-Evacuee properties vested
in the custodian not being properties of the Governme._nt, can be acquireq
not just under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act,
1954 but even under the Land Acquisition Act.
F Evacuee ln_terest (Separation) Act, 1951-Section 10-.Composite
property-Interests of Evacuee and non-evacuee being composited under
the Act-By notification dated 7-7-1955, the Central Government acquired
all evacuee properties in St;,,te of Delhi under Section 12 of Displaced
Persons (Compensation <ind Rehabilitation) Act, 1954-Composite
G properties being excluded by such notification-Held, even if the
notification applied to composite properties, what was acquired was the
interest of the evacuee-Therefore, the interest of the non-evacuee/private
person could have been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act-·
Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954-Section
H 12.
360
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA 361

Evacuee Properties-Vested in custodian-Acquisition of-Held, A
·merely because the properties vest in the custodian as evacuee properties
does not mean that the same cannot be acquired for some other public
purpose-Jn such a case, compensation payable under the Land Acquisition
Act would be paid to the custodian who would then distribute it under
the provisions of various Acts. B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Land acquisition-Pre-existing
rights-Status of-Held, once an acquisition takes place under the Land
Acquisition Act all prior rights would stand terminated-Position qua the
Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act wherein interest C
in land continued even after acquisition, distinguished-Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954-Section JO, 12.

Constitution of India, 1950 :

Article 136-Special Leave Petition-Summary dismissal of- D
Held, does not bar other parties from filing a Special Leave Petitiori
against the same judgment-Practice and Procedure.

A number of writ petitions were filed in High Court challenging
the acquisition oflarge tracts ofland, which were acquired for planned E
development of Delhi. Most of the writ petitions were dismissed
upholding the acquisition proceedings. However, a few writ petitions,
wherein the lands were evacuee properties, were allowed and acquisition
in respect of those lands was set aside on the ground that the
acquisition was pursuant to a notification dated 13-11-1959 under F
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act; that this notification did not
cover evacuee lands and therefore further proceedings would not be
valid; that evacuee lands or composite lands belong to the Govt. and
in case the Govt. needed the land for public purpose they could have
easily retained the possession of the land and there was no need to G
resort to Land Acquisition Act for acquiring such land; and that once
it was shown that there was no Notification issued under Section 4
pertaining to the said lands, the subsequent proceedings being void, the
petitioners were not debarred from challenging such proceedings even
belatedly. Hence, the present appeal. H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the Govt.
while issuing the Notification on 13-11-1959 recognised the fact that
evacuee properties were required for a public purpose and that same
position continued even when the Notification dated ·23-1-1965 was
issued and, thus, it must be held that the evacuee properties were
B impliedly excluded from the Section 4 Notification dated 23-1-1965;
that by virtue of the Notification dated 7-7-1955, the Central Govt.
became the owner of these lands and that there could then be no
acquisition by the Central Govt. of its own lands; that evacuee
properties vest in the custodian and that properties which vest in the
C Custodian are properties belonging to the Central Govt; that the
interests of evacuee and non-evacuee were composited under the
Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 and their interests were finally
separated by order dated 16-5-1968 by Court of Competent Officer;
that even though the Notification under Section 12 was issued, such a
Notification did not put an end to rights which were pre-existing; that
D the rights of the respondents continued to exist until there was a
separation of interests under Section 10 of the Evacuee Interest
(Separation) Act, 1951on16-5-1968; that it was not very clear w.hether
all the properties mentioned in the writ petition were comppsite
properties or acquired properties.
E
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
..
HELD : 1. The acquisition of petitioners' lands was_ not u11der
Notification dated 13th November 1959. Petitioners' lands were acquired
F under proceedings pursuant to Section 4 Notification dated 23rd
January 1965. The Notification dated 23rd January 1965 did not
exempt evacuee properties. The High Court fell in error in stating that
Notification dated 23rd January 1965 exempted evacuee lands. Thus
the factual basis on which acquisition of other evacuee lands was set
aside did not exist in this case. [368-D, E)
G
2.1. Merely because a property is an evacuee property does not
mean that it vests in the Central Government. The Custodian is a
statutory authority appointed under the Acts. The Custodian is a
distinct person from the Central Government. Merely beacuse a
H property vests in the Custodian does not mean that the property vests
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA 363

· in the Central Government. It must be noted that the Custodian is A
appointed for each State. Further, if, as contended, the property vests
in the Central Government then there would be no question of Section
12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act
providing that the Central Government could acquire such property.
The Central Government can never acquire its own property. Thus the B
very fact that Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and
Rehabilitation) Act provides for acquisition by the Central Government
clearly indicates that evacuee properties are not properties of the
Central Government. As they are not properties of the Government
they can be acquired, not just under Section 12 of the Displaced
Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, but even under C
the Land Acquisition Act. [378-H, 379:A-C]

Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, (2003) 3 SCC 128, referred to.

2.2. By Notification dated 7th July 1955 the Central Government D
acquired all evacuee properties in the State of Delhi, under Section 12
of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954,
except the categories of properties mentioned therein including any
property which was composite property within the meaning of the
Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. Even ifthe Notification dated E
7th January 1955 applied to these lands, what was acquired was the
interest of the evacuee. A property is a composite property because a
private party has an interest in that property. The scheme of separation,
to be framed under Section 10 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation)
Act, 1951 is for purposes of separating the interest of the evacuee from F
that of the private party. Therefore, even if the evacuees interest was
acquired under Section 12, the interest of the private person could have
been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. (377-B, 379-D-E]

3.1. Undoubtedly, the evacuee properties vested in the Custodian
for the purposes of distribution as per the provisions of the various G
Acts. However, it is to be noted that under the various Acts in lieu of
properties, compensation in terms of money can also be paid. Thus
merely because the properties vest in the Custodian as evacuee
properties does not mean that the same cannot be acquired for some
other public purpose. The moment the property is acquired for another H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A public purpose the compensation payable under the Land Acquisition
Act would be paid to the Custodian who would then distribute it under
the provisions of the various Acts. [380-E-F)

3.2. It cannot be said that impliedly evacuee properties were
B excluded by the Notification dated .23rd January 1965. There can be
no such implied exclusion. It is for the Government to decide whether
or not an evacuee property is to be left with the Custodian for the
purposes of distribution under the various Acts or whether some other
public purpose is more import~nt. It would be open to the Government
to acquire evacuee property and give to the Custodian compensation
C for ,such acquisition. Section 4 Notification dated 23rd January 1965
not having excluded evacuee properties .the respondents can get no
benefit from the fact that in the 1959 Notification evacuee properties
had been excluded. [380-G-H, 381-A]

D , .4. Khasras numbers 321and322 being composite properties, the
Appellants shall pay to the respondents who are ~wners ofKhasras Nos.
321and322 an additional amount of compensation to be calculated with
reference to the market vafoe of these Khasras on the date of Notification
under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. So far as the other Khasras
are concerned, i.e. Khasra Nos. 313, 319, 323, 324 and 329, there appears
E to be doubt as to whether they were, on the date of Notification dated
23rd January, 1965, co.mposite properties and/or whether they were
acquired properties by Notification dated 7th January 1955. Therefore,
so far as these Khasra numbers are concerned, the Writ Petition is sent
back to the High Court. [384-E-F]
F
Murari & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1997] 1 SCC 15, relied
on.

5. Once an acquisition takes place under the Land Acquisition Act
all prior rights would stand terminated. On the other hand, interest
G in the land subsisted even after acquisition of land under Displaced
Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. This is based on
the provision of Section 10 of the Displaced Persons Act, which
specifically provides that even after an acquisition, the displaced
person to whom the property was leased or allotted, could continue in
H possession of that land. (374-C-D]
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NAN GIA [ VARIA VA, I.] 365

State of Punjab v. Sura} Parkash Kapur, [1962) 2 SCR 711, held A
inapplicable.

6. It is settled law that if a special Leave Petition is summarily
dismissed such a dismissal does not bar other parties from filing a
Special Leave Petition against the same judgment. [369-B)
B
Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kera/a, [2000) 6 SCC 359 and
S. Shanmugave/ Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2002) 8 SCC 361,
referred to.

Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, [1993] Supp. 2 SCC 20 and C
Vashwas Nagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers Association v. Under Secretary,
Delhi Administration, [1990) 2 SCC 268, cited.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4722 of
1997.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.95 of the Delhi High Court
in W.P. No. 1543 of 1982.

Mukul Rohtagi, Additional Solicitor General, Kailash Vasudev, Ms.
Rekha Pandey, Y.P. Mahajan, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Ms. Anil Katiyar, D.S. E
Mahra, V .B. Saharya for the Appellants.

Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, Vijay Kumar, S.B.
Upadhyaya and Sujit K. Singh for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F
S.N. VARIA VA, J. : This Appeal is against a portion of the Judgment
dated 14th December 1995 (passed by a Full Bench of the Delhi High
Court). whereunder Writ Petition 1543 of 1982, filed by the Respondents,
has been allowed.
G
Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

Large tracts of land were acquired for the planned development of
Delhi. A large number of Writ Petitions were filed challenging the
acquisition. By the Judgment dated 14th December 1995 the acquisition H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A proceedings were upheld. Appeals against this judgment have been
dismissed by this Court. However, in this judgment a few Writ Petitions,
where the lands were evacuee properties, were allowed and the acquisition
in respect of those lands was set aside on the following reasoning:

"Civil Writ Petition No. 783181
.B
In this Petition, the notification under Section 4 is dated 13th
November 1959 and declaration under Section 6 is dated 2nd
January 1969. The award had been given on 17th January 1983.
The land use prescribed in the Master Plan is zonal park and in
c the revised plan is District Park. In the original notification dated
13th November 1959, it is mentioned that it would not cover the
evacuee land. The petitioner had purchased this property from its
previous owner on 6th August 1962. However, on the date of
notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, this land was
evacuee property and vested in the Custodian and stood excluded
D
from the said notification. The name of the previous owner is
Kailash Chand Gupta.

Reliance is placed on a judgment of Single Bench of this
Court given in Civil Writ Petition No. 155/83, Harbans Kaur v.
E Land Acquisition Collector decided on August 12, 1991 in which,
on similar facts, it was held that as the origL'lal notification issued
under Section 4 excluded its application to the evacuee land, mere
fact that the land ceases to be evacuee after the issuance of
notification under Section 4 of the Act would not validate the
F subsequent proceedings taken under Sections 6 and 11 of the Act
for acquiring the land as notification under Section 4 did not
pertain to the evacuee land.

It is quite evident that if there is no notification issued under
Section 4 of the Act pertaining to a particular land, then any
G declaration issued under Section 6 would be by itself not valid in
respect of the land which was not subject matter of notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act.

It has been urged before us that the writ petition has been
H brought belatedly as Section 6 declaration had been issued in 1969

'•
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA [ VARIA VA, J.] 367
whereas the writ petition had been filed in 1981. It is not the case
where any defect in the Section 4 notification is being highlighted
like that the same was not published jn accordance with the
provisions of the Act. What has been pointed out is that the
notification issued on 13th November 1959 did not at all pertain
to the land in question as it was evacuee land at that time. If the B
notification on the face of it is not applicable to the land in
question, the same is non est and any proceedings taken for
acquiring the land on the basis of such a notification issued under
Section 4, which did not pertain to the land in question, would
be void ab initio and without jurisdiction.
c
In our view, once it is shown that there was no notification
issued under Section 4 'pertaining to the particular land, the
subsequent proceedings being void, the petitioner would not be
debarred from challenging such proceedings even belatedly. So,
this Petition is liable to be allowed. D
C.WP. Nos. 377183, 2256183 & 1543182

In the first two cases, the notification under Section 4 had
been issued on 13th November, 1959 while in C.W.P. No. 1543/ E
82, the notification had been issued on 23rd January 1965 but
notifications themselves excluded the evacuee lands. It is
evidence that on the date of the notifications, the land of these
petitioners was evacuee land and it is only later on that the land
has been auctioned or transferred by the competent officer in F
favour of the petitioners. It is, hence, evident that notification
issued under Section 4 could not possibly apply to the land of
these petitioners when at the time of the notification, the land in
question was evacuee land or composite land. The land obviously
belonged to the Government and in case the Government needed
the land for public purpose, they could have easily retained the G
possession of the land and there was no need to resort to Land
Acquisition Act for acquiring this land. At any rate, when the land
of the petitioners, being evacuee land, was not covered by the
notifications issued under Section 4, any subsequent proceedings
of acquisition taken in respect of the said land on the basis of the H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R:

A said notification under Section 4 were on the face of it illegal. -·

Hence, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land of
these petitioners are liable to the quashed."

B Thus these acquisitions were set aside on the grounds (a) They were
pursuant to a Notification dated 13th November 1959, under Section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act; (b) that this Notification did not cover evacuee
lands and therefore further proceedings would not be valid; ( c) that evacuee
lands or composite lands belong to the Government and in case the
Government needed the land for public purpose they could have easily
C retained the possession of the land and there was no need to resort to Land
Acquisition Act for acquiring this land; (d) that once it was shown that there
was no Notification issued under Section 4 pertaining to these lands, the
subsequent proceedings being void, the Petitioners were not debarred from
challenging such proceedings even belatedly.
D
At this stage it must be noticed that the acquisition of Petitioners lands
was not under Notification dated 13th November 1959. Petitioners lands
were acquired under proceedings pursuant to Section 4 Notification dated
23rd January 1965. The Notification dated 23rd January 1965 did not
E exempt evacuee properties. The High Court fell in error in stating that a
Notification dated 23rd January, 1965 exempted evacuee lands. Thus the
factual basis on which acquisition of other evacuee lands was set aside did
not exist in this case. This aspect appears to have not been noticed by the
High Court. One cannot blame the High Court as there were so many
F matters before it. It is only natural that facts of this particular case may
not have been noticed.

Dr. Dhavan submitted that this Civil Appeal should be dismissed
because Delhi Development Authority had alsp filed a Special Leave
Petition against this portion of the Judgment whereby Writ Petition of the
G Respondents had been allowed. He pointed out that in that Speeial Leave
Petition the Union of India and Delhi Administration were Respondent
Nos. 10 and 13 respectively. He submitted that that Special Leave Petition
was dismissed on 18th November, 1996. He pointed out that the Review
filed by Delhi Development Authority was also dismissed on 7th November,
H 2000. He submitted that in this Special Leave Petition the Union of India

,
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA [ VARIAVA, J.] 369

and the Delhi Development Au.thority have not been made parties obviously A
with an intention of hiding the fact that the Delhi Development Authority's
Special Leave Petition had been dismissed. We are unable to accept this
submission. We have seen the Orders dated 18th November, 1996 whereby
the Delhi Development Authority's Special Leave Petition was summarily
dismissed. It is settled law that if a Special Leave Petition is summarily B
dismissed such a dismissal does not bar other parties from filing a Special
Leave Petition against the same Judgment. No authority is required for
this proposition but if any is required, then the cases of Kunhayammed and
Ors. v. State of Kera/a reported in (2000] 6 SCC 359 and S. Shanmugavel
Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2002] 8 SCC 361 may be looked
at. Even otherwise, the order dated 7th November, 2000 is very clear. On C
this date Delhi Development Authority's Review Petition is being dismissed,
but this order specifically delinks this Civil Appeal along with two other
Civil Appeals. Once this Court has specifically chosen to keep this Appeal
alive, we do not consider it correct or proper to now dismiss this Appeal
only on the ground that .the Special Leave Petition and Review Petition of D
the Delhi Development Authority have been dismissed.

Mr. Rohtagi submitted that the Writ Petition should have been.
dismissed on the grounds of delay and latches. He pointed out that Section
4 Notification was issued on 23rd January, 1965 and Section 6 Notification E
was issued on 13th January, 1969. He submitted that this Writ Petition
was filed only in 1982. He pointed out that the High Court in the Judgment
dated 14th December, 1995 has held as follows:

"It is evident that if challenge is made belatedly to such F
notifications obviously it would become difficult for the authorities
to meet such a challenge as the records of such old notifications
may not be available and also if challenge had been made
expeditiously and some deficiencies were found in publicizing the
notifications, the notifications could have been withdrawn and
fresh notifications could have been issued. By allowing such G
notifications to remain unchallenged for years together the
petitioners had allowed the authorities to proceed on the basis that
there would not be any challenge to such notifications. Mere fact
that in some cases acquisition proceedings have not been completed
and possession had not been taken would not entitle the petitioners H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to get the notifications set aside on such a ground. Even if there
is no counter filed in some of the cases rebutting the factual
avennents with regard to notifications being not published in the
locality as required by law even then the respondents are not
debarred from taking the plea in arguments that the writ petitioners
in challenging these notifications belatedly are guilty of !aches
B
and delay. In the case of Ramjas Foundation & Others v. Union
ofIndia & Others, 50 (1993) DLT 23 SC , on similar grounds the
belated challenge was negatived. So there is no merit in such a
plea and such challenge has to be negatived."

C Mr. Rohtagi submitted that the High Court has thus negatived the challenge
to the acquisition proceedings on grounds of delay and latches and yet
thereafter given relief to the Respondents. He submitted that in view of
the High Court's own findings, on delay and latches, the High Court should
have dismissed this Writ Petition also. Mr. Rohtagi relied upon the case
D of Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India reported in [1993] Supp. 2 SCC
20, wherein this Court has held that if there is no explanation for the delay
or the explanation is unacceptable then the Writ Petition challenging
acquisition proceedings must be dismissed on grounds of delay and latches.
He also relied upon the case of Vashwas Nagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers
E Association v. Under Secretary, Delhi Administration reported in [1990]
.2 SCC 268, wherein again this Court has held that the Writ Petition must
be dismissed on grounds of delay and latches. It must be mentioned that
both the above cases, relied upon by Mr. Rohtagi, were in respect_ of the
same Notifications.

F On the other hand, Dr. Dhavan submitted that whether there is delay ·
and/or latches is a question of fact. He submitted that so far as evacuee
lands are concerned the High Court, in its Judgment dated 14th December,
1995, has held that once the_ Notification under Section 4 did not cover
evacuee lands then all subsequent proceedings are void and that the
G Respondents were thus entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings
even belatedly. He submitted that the factual aspect is not before this
Court, the sµbmissions of Mr. Rohtagi should not be accepted.

In our view, it is not necessary for us to decide this point as, for
H reasons set out hereinafter, we propose to remit the matter back to the High
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA [ VARIAVA, J.] 3 71

Court for a fresh hearing in respect of some of the lands. It will be open A
to the parties to urge their respective contentions before the High Court.
The High Court shall decide this question on merits.

Dr. Dhavan then took this Court through the provisions of the
Administration of Evacuee Properties Act, 1950; the Evacuee Interest B
(Separation) Act, 1951, and the Displaced Persons (Compensation and
Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and the averments made in the Writ Petition
which are as follows:

"5. That the Petitioners are the actual owners and occupants with
physical possession of the land bearing K.hasra Nos. 322(2-17), C
323(2-16), 329/1/1(0-14), 318/2(3-12), 324(4-12) 319/3(2-13)
and 321(2-17), total measuring 20 Bighas, 2 Biswas situated in
the Revenue Estate of Village Pul Pehlad, Tehsil Mehrauli in the
Union Territory of Delhi, hereinafter referred to as "the said
lands". The petitioners are in actual physical possession of the D
said land and are running their stone hot-mix plants on the said
lands for the Jast about I 0 years. The name of the petitioners has
been duly entered in the Revenue record. True English translation
of the latest Khasra Girdawari are filed herewith and marked as
Annexure 'F'.
E
xxx xxx xxx

8. That on the partition of the country in the year 1947, certain
muslims of village Pul Pehlad, Delhi went to Pakistan and left
their land and property. Thus, the whole of the said land was F
declared as Evacuee Land. In fact, there was a joint K.hewat of
land of many persons in village Pul Pehlad, the interests of
evacuee and non-evacuee were composited under the Evacuee
Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. In the year 1950-51, Hamdard
Dawakhana (Wakt), Delhi purchased the said land and thus the G
interest of Non-evacuee and evacuee were composited. Thus, the
said land was initially being a composite evacuee property under
the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act and when the Displaced
Persons (Rehabilitation & Compensation) Act, 1954, by the Govt.
of India on 7-7-1955 by a Notification No. S.R.O. 1535 dated H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 7-7-1955, issued by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and such the
interest of the Evacuee vested in the Government. The Hon 'ble
Supreme Court of India in Collector of Bombay v. Naussorwanji
reported as AIR (1955) S.C. 298 held that "When Govt. possesses
an interest in the land which is the subject of acquisition under
the Act, that interest is itself outside such acquisition, because
B
there can be no question of Govt. acquiring what is its own."

9. That the said land of the petitioner continued to be evacuee
acquired composite property under the Evacuee Interest
(Separation) Act, vide orders dated 24-8-1959 of the Competent
c Officer, Delhi in Case No. 735/C.O. passed according to the order
of Chief Commissioner of Delhi dated 23.12.1958 in Case No.
262 of 1957.

It is respectfully submitted that the interest of evacuee and
D non-evacuee were finally separated by the Court of Competent
Officer, Delhi appointed u/s 4 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation)
Act, 1951, by an Order dated 16 ..5.1968. A true copy of the said
Order is Annexed herewith and marked as Annexure 'G'. Thus
till 16.5.1968, the said land remained as composite evacuee
property or acquired land vesting in Government on the date of
E
issue of Sec. 4 Notification i.e. 23.1.1965, therefore, the said
land could not be legally acquired on the basis of the said
Notification dated 23.1.1965 and as such, any declaration u/s 6
of the Acquisition Act is illegal, invalid and inoperative and void-
ab initio."
F
He pointed out that in reply to these averments all that was stated was as
follows:

"Para 5 : The contents admitted in respect of Petitioner No. l
G to 6. Petitioner No. 7 to 9 are neither the owner nor occupant of
the Land under petition. Petitioners No. 1 to 6 are the occupant
of Kb. Nos. 322, 323/2. Petitioner No. 6 is owner in possession
of Kb. No. 321(2-14), (2-17) (2-16), petitioner No. 3 is owner in
possession ofKh. No. 324/2 (4-13). Petitioner No. 2 is occupant
H ofKh. No. 318/2 (3-12) on behalfofGaon Sabha. Petitioner No.

I
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA [ VARIAVA, J.] 373
1 is owner in possession of Kh. No. 329/1//1(0-4) and petitioners A
No. 4 & 5 are the owners in possession of Kh. No. 319/3(2-12)
possession of the petitioners has been entered in Kh. No. 1980
according to Revenue record.

xxx xxx xxx
B
Para 8 : In reply to the contents of this part, it is submitted that
Kh. No. 304, 305 & 306 belongs to Ham' Oard Dawakhana Waqf
& Kh. No. 310 to Gaon Sabha Pul J;>ahlad as owner according to
the record and tenants have been discussed in Para 5. The legal
submissions are denied. These shall, however, be suitably replied C
at the time of arguments.

Para 9: The contents being mis-conceived are, therefore, denied.
There is no provision in the notification u/s. 4 made on 23-1-1965
that the said notification is not applicable on the evacuee or any D
other specific property. The legal submissions shall be suitable
replied at the time of arguments."

He submitted that therefore there was no denial to the averments in the
Petition. He submitted that the composite lands were required to be
separated under the provision of Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. E
Dr. Dhavan showed to this Court a copy of an Order dated 16th May, 1968
in support of his submission that this separation of interest only took place
on that date. It must immediately be mentioned that a perusal of this Order
shows that except for Khasra Nos. 321 and 322, none of the other lands
set out in Para 5 of the Writ Petition are covered by this Order. F
Dr. Dhavan submitted that even though the Notification under Section
12, was issued such a Notification did not put an end to rights which were
pre-existing. He submitted that the rights of the Respondents continued
to exist until there was a separatioa of interest under Section 10 of the
Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 on 16th May, 1968. In support G
of this preposition he relied upon the case of State of Purifab v. Suraj
Parkash Kapur reported in [1962] 2 SCR 711, wherein the question was
whether on an acquisition under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 the pre-existing rights came
to an end. The facts of this case were that under a Draft scheme, framed H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A by the Consolidation Officer, certain lands allotted to the Respondents
therein were substituted by p_oorer lands. Thus a Writ Petition challenging
the Scheme was filed. Pending the Writ Petition a Notification under
Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
Act was issued, wherein all evacuee properties were acquired. The question
B before the Court was whether the Writ Petition challenging the consolidation
scheme was maintainable after the Notification under Section 12 had been
issued. It was held that even though there was no right to property but
still there was an interest in the land which enabled Respondents (therein)
to maintain the Writ Petition. The observation that the interest in land
continued was based on Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation
C and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 which specifically provided that even after
an acquisition under Section 12 the displaced person to whom the property
was leased or allotted could continue in possession of that land. Thus the
observation relied upon are based on the provision of Section 10 which
permitted retention of possession. There is no such provision in the Land
D Acquisition Act. Thus once an acquisition takes place under the Land.
Acquisition Act all prior rights would stand tenninated. The principles laid
down in Suraj Kapur's case'could thus have no application.

Dr. Dhavan further submitted that there was no denial that on 7th July,
E 1955 there was a Notification under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. A copy of this Notification
was also shown to this Court. Dr. Dhavan submitted that by virtue of the
Notification dated 7th July, 1955 the Central Government became the
owner of these lands. He submitted that there couldthen be no acquisition
F by the Central Government of its own lands. In respect of the submission
that the Central Government cannot acquire its own land_ reliance was
placed on the following observations made in the case of Sharda Devi v.
State of Bihar reported in [2003] 3 SCC 128:

"27 ... , ................. The State does not acquire its own land for
G it is futile to exercise the power of eminent domain for acquiring
rights in the land, which already vests in the State. It would be
absurdity to comprehend the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act being applicable to such land wherein the ownership or the
entirety of rights already vests in the State. In other words, the
H land owned by the State on which there are no private rights or
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA [VARIAVA, J.] 375

encumbrances is beyond the purview of the provisions of the Land A
Acquisition Act. The position of law is so clear as does not stand
in need of any authority for support. Still a few decided cases
in point may be referred since available.

28. Jn Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri, AIR B
( 1955) SC 298 this Court held that when the Government acquires
lands under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, it must
be for a public purpose, and with a view to put them to that
purpose, the Government acquires the sum total of all private
interests subsisting in them. If the Government has itself an
interest in the land, it has only to acquire the other interests C
outstanding thereof so that it might be in a position to pass it on
absolutely for public user. An interesting argument was advanced
before the Supreme Court. It was submitted that the right of the
Government to levy assessment on the lands is an "encumbrance"
and that encumbrance is capable of acquisition. The Court held D
that the word "encumbrance" as occurring in Section 16 can only
mean interests in respect of which a compensation was made
under Section 11 or could have been claimed. It cannot include
the right of the Government to levy assessment on the lands. The
Act does not contemplate the interest of the Government in any E
land being valued or compensation being awarded therefor.

29. In Secy. of State v. Sri Narain Khanna, AIR (1942) PC 35
it was held that where the Government acquires any property
consisting of land and buildings and where the land was the F
subject matter of the government grant, subject to the power of
resumption by the Government at any time on giving one month's
notice, then the compensation was payable only in respect of such
buildings as may have been authorized to be erected and not in
respect of the land.
G
30. In thy matter of the Land Acquisition Act: Govt. of Bombay
v. Esufali Salebhai, ILR (1910) 34 Born 618 : ILR {ATP. 636)
Batchelor, J. held that the Government are not debarred from
acquiring and paying for the only outstanding interests merely
because the Act, which primarily contemplates all interests as held H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A outside the Government, directs that the entire compensation
based upon the market value of the whole land must be distributed
among the claimants. The Government was held liable to acquire
and pay only for the superstructure as it was already the owner
of the land.
B
31. In Dy. Collector, Calicut Division v. Aiyavu Pilay, [9 IC 341:
(1911) 2 MWN 367: 9 MLT 272] Wallis, J. observed that the Act
does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest
which already belongs to the Government in land which is being
acquired under the Act but only for the acquisition of such
c interests in the land as do not already belong to the Government.

32. In Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri the
decisions in Esufali Salebhai case and Aiyavu Pillay case were
cited with approval. Expressing its entire agreement with the said
D views, the Court held that when the Government possesses an
interest in land which is the subject of acquisition µnder the Act,
that interest is itself outside such acquisition because there can be
no question of the Government acquiring what is its own. An
investigation into the nature and value of that interest is necessary
E for determining the compensation payable for the interest
outstanding in the claimants but that would not make it the subject
of acquisition. In the land acquisition proceedings there is no
value of the right of the Government to levy assessment on the
lands and there is no award of compensation therefor. It was,
therefore, held by a Division Bench of Judicial Commissioners in
F Mohd. Wajeeh Mirza v. Secy. of State for India in Council, AIR
. ( 1921) Oudh 31: 24 Oudh Cas 197 that the question of title arising
. between the Government and another claimant cannot be settled
by the Judge in a reference under Section 18 of the Act. When
the Government itself claims to be the owner of the land, there
G can be no question of its acquisition and the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act cannot be applicable. Im our opinion the
statement of law so made by the learned Judicial Commissioners

H
is correct."

There can be no dispute with this proposition. The only question is
I
'
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA [ VARIA VA, J.] 377

whether it has any application to facts of this case. A
At this stage it is necessary to set out that none of these documents
were shown to the High Court or considered by the High Court. However,
as they had been referred to in the Writ Petition we looked at the
documents. The picture which emerges is that by Notification dated 7th B
July 1955 the Central Government acquired all evacuee properties in ~e
State of Delhi, under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation
and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, except the following categories of properties,
viz;

"(I) any such property. c
(i) in respect of which proceedings are pending before any
authority at the date of this notification under the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI
of 1950) in which the question of issue-is whether the D
property is or is not evacuee property; or

(ii) in respect of which the period of limitation, if any,
fixed for an appeal or revision under the said Act for
disputing to vesting of the property in the Custodian as
evacuee property has not expired. E
(2). any such property in respect of which an application for the
grant of a certificate under sub-section ( 1) of Section 16 of
the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of
1950) is pending at the date of this notification or in respect p
of which the period of limitation fixed for making such
application has not expired:

(3) any such property which has been restored under section 16
of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI
of 1950) or in respect of which an application under sub- G
section (2) of that section for its restoration is pending at the
date of this notification, or in respect of which a certificate
under sub-section (1) of that section has been granted but no
application under sub-section (2) of that section for its
restoration has been made; H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A (4) any such property which before the date of this notification
has been transferred and the transfer is effective under
section 40 of the Administration of Evacuee Property
Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950) or in respect of which any
proceedings are pending at the date of this notification under
that section:
B
(5) any such property which is a composite property within the
meaning of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 151
(LXIV of 1951);

c (6) any such property in respect of which any proceedings are
pending in a Civil Court wherein the question at issue is
whether the property is evacuee property or not:

(7) any such property which at the date of this notification is
being treated or is being managed as a trust property for a
D
public purpose of a religious or charitable nature under sub-
section .( l) of section 11 of the Administration of Evacuee
Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950)."

As per the avennents of the Petitioner, which as Dr. Dhavan pointed
E out, are not controverted, all the lands claimed by the Respondents were
composite properties. If that is so then none of the properties mentioned·
in para 5 of the Writ Petition (reproduced hereinabove)·were covered by
the Notification dated 7th July, 1955. They were thus not acquired by this
Notification.
F
Faced with this situation, Dr. Dhavan submitted that evacuee properties
vest in the Custodian. He submitted that the Custodian was appointed by
the Central Government. He submitted that properties which vest in the
Custodian are properties belonging to the Central Government. He pointed
G out that the High Court has accepted this submission. He submitted that
this Court should not interfere with the finding.

We are unable to accept the submission of Dr. Dhavan. Merely
because a property is an evacuee property does not mean that it vest in the
Central Government. The Custodian is a statutory authority appointed
H under the Acts. The Custodian is a distinct person from the Central
DELHI ADMINISTRATIONv. M.L. NANGIA [ VARIAVA, J.] 379

Government. Merely because a property vests in the Custodian does not A
mean that the property vest in the Central Government. It must be noted
that the Custodian is appointed for each State. Further, if, as contended,
the property vests in the Central Government then there would be no
question of Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and
Rehabilitation) Act providing that the Central Government could acquire B
such property. The Central Government can never acquire its own
property. Thus the very fact that Section 12 of the Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act provides for acquisition by the
Central Government clearly indicates that evacuee properties are not
properties of the C::entral Government. As they are not properties of the C
government they can be acquired, not just under Section 12 of the
Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, but even
under the Land Acquisition Act.

Even if the Notification dated 7th January, 1955 applied to these
lands, what was acquired was the interest of the evacuee. A property is D
a composite property because a private party has an interest in that
property. The scheme of separation, to be framed under Section IO of the
Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, is for purposes of separating the interest
of the evacuee from that of the private party. Therefore, even if the
evacuees interest was acquired under Section 12, the interest of the private E
person could have been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Further
ifthe land stood acquired by the Notification dated 7th January, 1955 then
the question would arise as to how the Respondents acquired title to these
lands. If they purchased after the date of Notification dated 7th January,
1955, they would get no title. They then would not be able to maintain
the Writ Petition. Dr. Dhavan submitted that the Appellants had admitted F
the title of the Respondents and thus this question would not arise. We
are unable to accept the submission. It is only a person, who has an interest
in the land who can challenge acquisition. When a challenge is made, to
an acquisition, at a belated stage, then even ifthe Court is inclined to allow
such a belated challenge, it must first satisfy itself that the person G
challenging acquisition has title to the land. Very significantly, in their
_ Writ Petition the Respondents do not state when they ~cquired title.

Dr. Dhavan next submitted that properties which are evacuee properties
vest in the Custodian for the purposes of distribution as per the provisions H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A of the various Acts. He submitted that considering the historical background
and the partition of the country the properties were vested in the Custodian
with the intention of serving a public purpose, i.e. rehabilitation of persons,
who had come to India after leaving all their properties behind in Pakistan.
He submitted that. this was a very important public purpose and as the
B properties were ve5ted for a public purpose there was no question of the
Government acquiring these properties for some other public purpose. He
submitted that it is for this reason that in the Notification dated 13th
November, 1959 e_vac~ee properties were excluded. H~ submitted that the
Government wfiJi~ lssufog the Notification on 13th November, 1959
recognized the .,fact that evacuee properties were required for a public
C purpose. He submitted that the same position continued even when the
Notification dated 23rd January, 1965 was issued. He submitted that there
is no reason to distinguish the cases of evacuees arising out of the 1959
Notification from the cases of evacuees arising out of the 1965 Notification.
He submitted that they were similar cases which should be treated alike
D in q.rder to avoid suspect classification. He submitted that thus it must
be ·h~ld that ~ evacuee properties were impliedly eyeiu,ded from the
S~on 4 Notit¢,ition dated 23rd January, 1965. We are unable to accept
th~s 3Submission of Dr. Dhavan. Undoubtedly, the evacuee properties
v~$ted in the Custodian for the purposes of distribution as per the
E provisions of the various Acts. However, it is to be .noted that under the
vari.ous Acts in lieu of properties, compensation in terms of money can also
be paid. Thus merely because the properties vest in the Custodian as
evacuee properties does not mean that the same cannot be acquired_ for
some other public purpose. The moment that the property is acquired for
F another public purpose the compensation payable under the Land Acquisition
Act would be paid to the Custodian who would then distribute it under the
provisions of the various Acts.

We see no substance in the submission that the cases of evacuees
under the 1959 Notification and under the 1965 Notification must be
G treated similarly. It is not possible to accept the submission that impliedly
evacuee properties were excluded by the Notification dated 23rd January,
1965. There can be no such implied exclusion. In our view, it is for the
Government to decide whether or not an evacuee property is to be left with
the Custodian for the purposes of distribution under the various Acts or
H whether some other public purpose is more important. It would be open
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA [ VARIAVA, J.] 381

to the Government to acquire evacuee property and give to the Custodian A
compensation for such acquisition. Section 4 Notification dated 23rd
January, 1965 not having excluded evacuee properties the Respondents can
get no benefit from the fact that in the 1959 Notification evacuee properties
had been excluded.
B
Dr. Dhavan next submitted that it was not very clear whether all the
properties mentioned in the Writ Petition were composite properties or
acquired properties. He drew the attention of this Court to Para 9 of the
Writ Petition wherein it is averred as follows:

" ....................... the said land remained as composite evacuee c
property or acquired land vesting in Government.. ........ "

He submitted that it was for the Government to clarify the position as all
the documents would be available with the Government. He submitted that
this Court should therefore remit the matter back to the High Court and D
let the High Court decide whether these were composite properties which
remained vested in the Custodian and/or whether they were acquired
properties under the Notification dated 7th January, 1955. Mr. Rohtagi
submitted that since the challenge was at a very belated stage and since
there were a large number of Writ Petitions it was not possible for die E
Government to deal with each case at its own merits. He submitted iliat
old records would now be not available. He submitted that this Court
should act on the avennents of the'.Respondents in their Writ Petitions
which averments had not been denied by the Government. He submitted
that on the basis of those avennents this Court must take it that all these F
properties were composite properties and therefore Notification under
Section 4 could be issued.

As has been set out hereinabove, in the Writ Petition, the Respondents
themselves are not very clear as to whether these lands remained as
composite properties or became the acquired lands vesting in the G
Government. We have, however, seen the Order dated 16th May, 1968.
That Order contains Khasra Nos. 321 and 322. This Order makes it very
clear that Khasra Nos. 321 and 322 were composite properties. As they
were composite properties right upto 16th May, 1968 they could have been
acquired under the Notification dated 23rd January, 1965. Thus, so far as H
382 SUPREME COURTREPORTS[2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R

A these two Khasras are concerned the principles enunciated in the impugned
Judgment dated 14th December, 1995, wherein the acquisition proceedings
have been upheld, must apply and the Writ Petition challenging their
acquisition must stand dismissed.

B In the case of Murari & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in
[1997] I SCC 15, in respect of this very acquisition this Court has held
as follows:-

"In the present case as stated earlier after issuance of $e
notifications and notices under Sections 9 and I 0 of the Act not
c only a large number of objections were filed by the landowners
whose land was sought to be acquired but a number of writ
petitions were filed in the Delhi High Court challenging the
validity of the notification under Section 4 as well as the
declaration under Section 6 in which interim orders of stay were )

D passed by the High Court which resulted in considerable delay.
Thus the authorities alone were not responsible for the delay but
the landowners were equally responsible for the same. In such
circumstances and on consideration of several decisions of this
Court including those rendered in the case of Bihar State Housing
Board v. Ban Bihari Mahato and Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj
E
Kumar Johri this Court in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of
India took the view that in any case there was no justification
for the authorities to make the award in 1980/1981/1983 when the
declaration under Section 6 was made in 1966-69, but at the same
time, in view of the facts of delay caused by the landowners
F themselves in approaching the courts and the developments
already made on the lands for public use, quashing of acquisition
proceedings would not be appropriate. But at the same time in
the said decision this Court also took the view that the landowners
alone were not responsible for the entire delay that was caused
G in completing the acquisition proceedings. This court in the said
decision pointed out that all those writ petitions were dismissed
by this Court on 23.8.1974 in the case of Ajlatoon v. Lt. Governor
of Delhi yet no effective steps were taken by the respondents till
1980-81 and in some cases even till 1983 for which the respondents
H till 1980-81 and in some cases even till 1983 for which the
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. M.L. NANGIA [ VARIAVA, J.] 383

respondents could give no justification for that delay on their part A
in completing the acquisition proceedings even after the judgment
of this Court in Ajlatoon case. this Court having regard to the
fact that the Delhi Administration and Delhi Development Authority
after taking possession of the lands various developments have
been made and third party interest have also been created and, B
therefore, having regard to the larger public interest declined to
quash the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay but at
the same time having regard to the interest of the landowners who
were likely to suffer loss in rating the price of the land with
reference to the date of notification under Section 4, directed C
payment of an additional amount of compensation to be calculated
at the rate of 12 per cent per annum after expiry of two years from
23.8.1974, the date of judgment of this Court in Ajlatoon case till
the date of the making of the awards by the Collector to be
calculated with reference to the market value of the lands in
question on the date of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. D
We do not find any inconsistency in the said decision (Ram Chand
case), and find ourselves in respectful agreement to the view taken
by this Court in the case of Ram Chand. The same principle has
to be applied in those cases in which the possession is not taken
and there is no reason to distinguish such cases from the E \ .
application of the principles laid down in Ram Chand case
merely on the ground that possession is not taken from some of
the landowners. In this connection the fact could not be lost sight
of that the landowners have enjoyed possession all these years and
have taken the benefit of the usufruct and other advantages out F
of the said land and, therefore, they stand even in an advantageous
position than those landowners from whom the possession was
taken earlier. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . After overall consideration of the
issues involved in these transfer cases and the appeals we find no
ground to take a different view than the one taken by the High
Court in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the acquisition G
proceedings could not be quashed on any grounds. We also find
ourselves in respectful agreement with the view taken by this
Court in the case of Ram Chand. Consequently, the appeals fail
and are hereby dismissed. The transfer cases are allowed in terms
of the order made in the case of Ram Chand directing that the H
384 SUPREME COtlRt:REPORTS
......
{2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A transfer petitioners and the appepai:its shall be paid an additional
amount of compensation to be calcblcit;d at the rate of 12 per cent
per annum, after the expiry of two years from the date of decision
of Ajlatoon case i.e. 23.8.1974 till the date of making of the
awards by the Collector, to be calculated with reference to the
market value of the land in question on the date of notification
B
under Section 4 (1) of the Act."

As this order is in respect of the same acquisition proceedings, we
consider it fair and proper that the Respondents also get the benefit on the
same basis. We therefore direct that the Appellants shall pay to the
C Respondents who are owners of Khasras Nos. 32 l and 322 an additional
amount of compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12% per annum,
after the expiry of two years from the date of decision of Aflatoon case
i.e. 23rd August, 1974 till date of making of Award by the Collector, to
be calculated with reference to the market value of these Khasras on the
D date of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.

So far as the other Khasras are concerned, i.e. Khasra Nos. 313, 319,
323, 324 and 329, there appears to be a doubt as to whether they were,
on the date of Notification dated 23rd January, 1965, composite properties
E and/or whether they were acquired properties by Notification dated 7th
January, 1955. If these are acquired properties under this Notification, a
further question would arise as to whether Respondents had acquired title
to these lands before this date or thereafter. In our view, this is a matter
which should have been considered by the High Court. Therefore, so far
as these Khasra numbers are concerned, the Writ Petition is sent back to
F the High Court.

We clarify that it will be open for the parties to file additional
affidavits/documents and urge all contentions available to them in law. The
High Court to decide ·On the principle set out above.
G The Civil Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. There will be no
order as to costs.

M.P. Appeal disposed of.