DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ANR.versusKIDARNATH MOHINDERNATH & ANR,

                             (2017] 3 S.C.R. 510


A                  DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ANR.
                                      v.
                KIDARNATH MOHINDERNATH & ANR,
                        (Civil Appeal No.1888 of2008)
B                             MARCH 30, 2017
            [ARUN MISHRA AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.!
          Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
          ss. 4, 5A and 6 - Notification by appellant uls. 4 for acquiring
C. lands in several villages, including the land of respondent no. I -
   Notification also carved out exceptions inter ali{l with respect to lands
    in respect of which building platJS were sanctioned by MCD before
   5.11.1980 - Respondent No. l's land covered under .such exemption
   '-- Enquiry by appellant uls.5A seeking objections claiming
    exemption of land from acquisition on the basis of afnresaid
D
    exception -" No exemption claimed by respondent no. 1 - Final
    declaration issued u/s. 6 acquiring lands including respbndent ,10.l s
    land - Writ petition by respondent no. 1 before High Court, afiowed
    - Plea of appellant that it was incumbent upon respondent no. l to
   file objections u/s.5-A to claim exemption and since no such
E exemption was claimed, the same was deemed to have been waived
    - Plea of respondent no. I that since its land was exempted in the
   .notification u!s.4, it remained under the impression that there was
    no requiremenuo file any objection seeking exemption u/s.5-A -
    On appeal, held: Notification issued u/s.4 was with respect to the
    large chunk of area, comprised in several villages - Thus, it was
F
    necessary to claim exemption by filing objections uls.5A - Otherwise,
    there was no other mechanism available to ascertain as to which
    particular piece of I.and out of the lands so notified were granted
    sanction for building plan before 05.11.1980 - However, admittedly,
    respondent no. J did not file any objection uls. 5-A to seek exemption
G from acquisition on the basis of the aforesaid sanction - Thus, having
   failed to do so, respondent no. I waived its rights.
          ·s. 6 - Declaration under - Dispute as to whether declaration
    issued u/s.6 was time barred as per proviso to s.6(1) - Computation
    of periods referred to in the first prpviso - Held: The period. during
H
                                      510
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. KIDARNATH MOHINDERNATH                           511


which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the           A
notification issued u/s. 4(1), is stayed by an order of a Court, shall
be excluded.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 The notification issued under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was with respect to the large chunk           B
of area, comprised in several villages, approximately 50,000
bighas was proposed to be acquired. The notification issued under
Section 4 intended to exempt the land, with respect to which
building plans, had been sanctioned before 05.11.1980. However,
the notification under Section 4 was with respect to the entire          c
area in villages, hence, it was necessary to claim exemption and
there was no other mechanism available with respect to the
ascertainment of the sanction of the building plan before
05.11.1980, with respect to the particular piece of land, it was to
be claimed by filing objections under Section SA of the Act. [Para
11][515-A-CI                                                             D
      2.1 In the instant case, inquiry under Section 5-A had been
held and the lands in question were proposed to be acquired and
certain other lands were to be excluded as per notification. The
report under Section 5-A had been accepted by appropriate
Government and thereafter declaration under Section 6 had been           E
issued. According to the report under Section 5-A, the land of
Respondent No.1 came to be included in the acquisition by virtue
of the final declaration issued under Section 6. [Para 121(515-C-
DI
       2.2 Admittedly, Respondent No.1 did not file any objection F
under Section 5-A to seek exemption from acquisition on the
basis of the aforesaid sanction. It was incumbent upon
Respondent No.1 to have claimed such an exemption from
acquisition, otherwise the land of the entire village was notified
under Section 4 for the purpose of acquisition. Having failed to G
do so, it is apparent that he has waived his rights on the basis of
so called sanction. Thus, when the claim had not been raised for
exemption of land, inquiry under Section 5-A cannot be termed
as illegal and consequently declaration under Section 6. Otherwise
several complications and piquant situations may arise if it is held
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512         -- SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 3 S.C.R.


A that it was' not necessary to participate in inquiry to claim
  exemption then it would not be. possible to give finality to
  declaration under Section 6 and it would have to be quashed time
  and again on such claims for exemptions not set forth at the stage
  of inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. [Para 13)(515-E-G]
 B          2.3 The only purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain which
      land is to be excluded from acquisition. In such circumstances,
      when the land was so to be excluded from acquisition on the basis
      of exceptions mentioned in the notification under Section 4, it
      had to be claimed. [Para 14)(515-H]
 C         Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others
            (2000) 7 SCC 296 : [2000) 2 Suppl. SCR 496 - relied
            on.
            Om Parkash v. Union of India and .others (2010) 4 SCC
            17 : [2010) 2 SCR 447 - referred to.
 D                           Case Law Reference
             [2000) 2 Suppl. SCR 496           relied on        Para 1"'
             [2010) 2 SCR 447                  referred to      Para lf.
         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1888
   of2008.
 E       From the Judgment and Order dated 10.03.2006 of the High Court
   of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition No. 2019of1986.
          Ms. Rachana Srivastava, Sukrit R. Kapoor, Ms. Nitya
   Madhusoodanan, Advs. for the Appellants.
 F         Ramesh Singh, A. Y. Patra, (for Ms. Bina Gupta), Advs. for the
      Respondents.
          The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
           1. The respondents questioned the land acquisition proceedings
   initiated by virtue of issuance of Notific!ltion under Section 4 of the
 G Land Acquisition Act, 18.94 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and
   also declaration issued on 07.06.1985 under Section 6 of the Act.
             2. Mis. Kidarnath Mohindemath filed Writ Petition (C) No.2019/
   1986 in the High Court with respect to land bearing Khasra Nos.1619,
    16~0, 1615/2 and 161{)/2 situated in revenue estate of village Chhalarpur,
  DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. KIDARNATH MOHINDERNATH                                   513


  Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi. It was averred by the petitioner in the said writ A
· petition that he had purchased the land and that the predecessor-in-
  interest of the petitioner had submitted a building plan to the Municipal
  Corporation of Delhi for the construclion of a farm house on the aforesaid
  agricultural land vide file No.34/A/ijQ/74 dated 30.03.1974 which was
  sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred B
  to as 'MCD') on 16.07.1974.
        3. The Delhi Administration issued a Notification under
       Section 4 of the Act which carved out certain exceptions with
 respect to the following lands :
        A) Government lands;                                                       c
        B) Land earlier notified either under Section 4 or under Section 6
 of the Act;
       C) Land in respect of which lay out plans/building plans were
 sanctioned by MCD before 05.11.1980.            ·
                                                                                   D
        4. Thus, Respondent No.1 herein claimed that the land was
 exempted from the acquisition as per the Notification issued under Section
 4 and ought not to have been included in declaration under Section 6 of
 the Act. Since, the land of the petitioner had been exempted; it was not
 necessary to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act, as such E
 petitioner did not file any objection. However, land had been illegally
 included in the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act for the
 purpose of' Planned development of Delhi'..
         5. It was also averred that it was necessary to issue Notification
 under Section 4, which was not issued with respect to the petitioner's
 _land, as such declaration under Section 6 could not have been issued.            F
 The declaration issued under Section 6 was beyond the time, as prescribed
 in proviso contained under Section 6( 1) of the Act.
          6. The Writ Petition was not resisted by Delhi Administration by
  filing a reply for the reasons best known to Delhi Administration, neither
  reply was filed to the writ application before the High Court nor the            G
  decisions rendered by this Court in same acquisition were cited.
          7. The High Court had opined that since exceptions were carved
  out in the Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, as such declaration
  issued under Section 6 of the Act did not include the land of the petitioner
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514            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 3 S.C.R.


A and it had allowed the Writ Petition without quashing the declaration
   issued under Section 6 of the Act, though, land had been included in
   declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act,. Aggrieved thereby, the
 ' Delhi Administration and Land Acquisition Collector had preferred the
   appeal.
 B         8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants urged
   that it was incumbent upon the Respondent No. I to file objections under
   Section 5-A of the Act to claim exemption of the land from acquisition
   on the basis of sanction of building plan granted in the year 1974,
   otherwise the entire area of the village was covered in Notification issued
   under Section 4 for the purpose of acquisition. Since no such exclusion/
 C exemption was claimed on the basis of the sanction of building plan of
    1974, the same is deemed to have been waived. Thus, the inquiry held
   under Section 5-A, on the basis of which appropriate government directed
   the acquisition of the land, as indicated in the Report could not be faulted.
   Declaration issued under Section 6 could not be said to have suffered
 D with any illegality.
          9. It was further urged by learned counsel appearing on behalf of
   the appellants that question of delay of three years has been considered
   by this Court in same acquisition and was rejected in Om Parkash versus
   Union of India and others (20 I0) 4 SCC 17, and other reasoning er:1ployed
 E by the High Court has been squarely dealt with by this Court in its decision
   in Delhi Administration versus Gurdip Singh Uban and Others (2000) 7
   sec 296, which also arose out of the same acquisition process.
          I0. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. I
   has strenuously submitted that since land had been exempted in the
 F N_otification under Section 4, Respondent No.I remained under the
   impression that there was no requirement to file any objection seeking
   exemption under Section 5-A of the Act. It was further submitted by
   him that since Notification under Section 4 excluded the land by making
   out exemption, it could not be included in declaration under Section 6.
   There was no notification under Section 4 with respect to land of the
 G respondent(s). Thus, the declaration under Section 6 was illegal: He has
   further submitted that since Respondent No. I succeeded in the High .
   Court only on the one ground, the other ground is required to be pressed
   ,with respect to belated issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the
   Act. He has contended that it was barred by time as per proviso under
 H Section 6( I) of the Act.
  DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. KIDARNATH MOHlNDERNATH                             515


         l L After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the A
  considered opinion that notification issued under Section 4 of the Act
  was with respect to the large chunk of area, comprised in several villages,
  approximately 50,000 bighas was proposed to be acquired. Though, it
. is true that notification issued under Section•.
                                                     4 of the Act iritended to
  exempt the land, with respect to which building plans, had.been sanctioned B
  before 05 .11.1980. The notification under Section 4 was with respect to
  the entire area in villages, it was necessary to claim exemption and there
  was no other mechanism available with respect to the ascertainment of
  the sanction of the building plan before 05 .11.1980, with respect to the
  particulafpiece of land, it was to be claimed by filing objections under
  Section 5 'A' of the Act.                                                    C
         12. In' the instant case, inquiry under Section 5-A had been held
  and the lands in question were proposed to be acq1iired and certain other
 1andswere to be excluded as per notification. The Report under Section
  5-A had been accepted by appropriate Government and thereafter
  declaration under Section 6 had been issued. According to the report D
  under Section 5-A, the land of Respondent No. I came to be included in
  the acquisition by virtue of the final declaration issued under Section 6.
         13. Admittedly, Respondent No. I did not file any objection under
  Section 5-A to seek exemption from acquisition on the basis of the
  aforesaid sanction, It was incumbent upon Respondent No. I to have E
  claimed such an exemption from acquisition, otherwise the land of the
  entire village was notified under Section 4 for the purpose of acquisition.
  Having failed to do so, it is apparent that he has waived his rights on the
  basis of so called sanction as it was not made the basis for claiming
  exemption and in the circumstances when the claim had not been raised
 ·for exemption of land, inquiry imder Section 5-A cannot be termed as F
  illegal and consequently declaration under Section 6. Otherwise several
  complications and piquant situations may arise if it is held that it was not
  necessary to participate in inquiry to claim exemption then it would not
  be possible to give finality to declaration under Section 6 and it would
  have to be quashed time and again on such claims for exemptions not G
  set forth at the stage of inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act.
        14. The only purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain which land is to
  be excluded from acquisition. ln such circumstances, when the land
  was so to be excluded from acquisition on the basis of exceptions
  mentioned in the Notification under Section 4, it had to be claimed. It H
516           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2017] 3 S.C.R.


A would not follow automatically, such exceptions as reflected in Notification
  under Section 4 find place in other schemes also. However, such
  exemptions have to be claimed either on the basis of scheme or on the
  basis of notification in the course of inquiry. Having failed to do so, the
  final declaration under Section 6 of the Act which had been issued could
B not be termed illegal. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Delhi
  Administration versus Gurdip Singh Uban and Others (Supra), considering
  the same notification and also the factual matrix that no objection was
  taken for exemption in the course of inquiry under Section 5-A. This
  Court has laid down as under :
           "30. The crucial question therefore is whether in a situation where
c          each of the seventy odd writ petitioners of 1985 covered specific
           areas and the brief order dated 14-10-1988 allowed the writ
           p~titions, the said order could be treated as one affecting the entire
           notification under Section 6 and even cases where objections were
           not filed under Section 5-A as in the case before us. Question
D          also arises whether the final order dated 18-11-1988 containing
           reasons as reported in B.R. Gupta v. Union of India could have
           covered the entire area in the 12 villages, about 50,000 bighas
           even with regard to the other claimants whose writ petitions were
           not before the Division Bench and even other cases where no
           objections were filed in Section 5-A inquiry?
 E
            53. Now objections under Section 5-A, if filed, can relate to the
            contention that (i) the purpose for which land is being acquired is
            not a public purpose, (ii) that even ifthe purpose is a public purpose,
            the land of the objector is not necessary, in the sense that the
            public purpose could be served by other land already proposed or
 F          some other land to which the objector may refer, or (iii) that in
            any event, even if this land is necessary for the public purpose,
          . the special fact-situation in which the objector is palced, it is a fit
            case for omitting his land from the acquisition. Objection (ii) is
            personal to the land and Objection (iii) is personal to the objector.
 G         54. Now in the (ii) and (iii) types of objections, there is a personal
           element which has to be pleaded in Section 5-A inquiry and if
           objections have not been filed, the notification must be conclusive
           proof that the said person had "waived" all objections which were
           personal and which he could have raised. However, so far as
 H         Objection (i) is concerned, even in case objections are not filed,
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. KIDARNATH MOHINDERNATH                               517


   the affected party can challenge in Court that the purpose was            A.
   not a public purpose.
   55. Learned Solicitor.General Shri Salve rightly argued tbat in
   respect of each landowner whose land is acquired, the Section 4
   notification if it is sought to be avoided on personal grounds as
   stated in (ii) and (iii) above, it is necessary that objection be filed   B
   to avoid a voidable notification. Otherwise, the notification which
   is not avoided on any personal grounds, remains operative and
   personal objections are deemed to be waived.
    56. ln the extracts from the Division Bench judgment set out earlier,
    it will be seen that two different concepts are unfortunately mixed c
    up. Satisfaction regarding public purpose, it was said must be
    expressed in respect of each "particular land". This view, as
    already stated, is not correct. If the entire land is needed for a
    public purpose, it is not necessary for1he- Government (or here
    the Ld. Governor) to say in the Section 6 declaration that each
    piece ofland is required for the public purpose. The Division Bench .D
    then mixed up this question with individual objections in each writ
    petition. Obviously, these individual objections of types (ii) and
    (iii) mentioned above can only be personal to each writ petitioner
    or peculiar in respect of each of the pieces of land owned. In that
    event, the rejection of the objections by the Land Acquisition E
    Officer and the "satisfaction" of the Government/Lt. Governor
    can relate only to each of these pieces of land and not the whole.
    Therefore, there is no question of the Division Bench holding in
     its order dated 18-11-1988 that the satisfaction of the Lei. Governor
    in respect of the entire land is. vitiated. As already stated, the
     s~tisfaction regarding public purpose was never in issue.
                                                                           F
    57. It was then argued that satisfaction.under Section 6 for the
    rest of the land not covered by the 73 writ petitioners or even
    where no objections are filed under Section 5-A, must be•held
    vitiated because the objections filed in certain other cases were
    not properly considered by the officer and hence Section 6               G
    satisfaction of the. Ld. Governor for the rest of the land is also
    vitiated.
    58. We are unable to agree that in the cases not before the Division
    Bench and in particular in cases where no objections are filed, the
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518             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 3 S.C.R.


A         . satisfaction under Section 6 is vitiated because in some other cases,
          , the objections'which were filed were not properly disposed of. As
            to rejection of personal grounds of each writ petitioner, - other
            than the 73 writ petitions - there was n9 occasion for the Lt.
            Governor to apply his mind if objections were not indeed filed.
            The only question then could have been about the public purpose.
B
            59. In the present cases there is no dispute that the purpose is a
            public purpose. The applicant had not filed objections on grounds
            personally applicable to him or to this land seeking exclusion from
            acquisition, and the objections in that behalf must be deemed to
            have been waived. Such a person cannot be allowed to file a writ -
c ,         petition seeking the quashing of Section 5-A inquiry and Section 6
            declaration on personal grounds if he had not filed ob1ections.
            Points 4 and 5 are decided accordingly against the applicants.;,
                                                           (Emphasis supplied)
D            15. In view of the aforesaid decision, it is clear that the decision
      of the High Court is not correct and impugned order passed by the High
      Court can not be sustained. Though, aforesaid binding decision was
      available but it was not placed before the High Court.
          16. Coming to the next submission raised by learned counsel for
E Respondent No. l with respect to the declaration under Section 6 whether
  it was issued after requisite period prescribed under proviso of Section 6
  (1) of the Act. Section 6 (I) of the Act makes it clear that in computing
  any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which
  any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification
  issued under Section 4(1 ), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be
F excluded and this aspect has been taken into consideration in respect to
  the same notification by this Court in the case of Om Parkash (supra) in
  which it has been laid down :
            "71. It is also worth mentioning that each of the notifications issued
            under Section 4 of the Act was composite in nature. The
0           interim order of stay granted in one of the matters i.e. Munni Lal
            and confirmed subsequently have been reproduced hereinabove.
            We have also been given to understand that similarorders of stay
            were passed in many other petitions. Thus, in the teeth of such
            interim orders of stay, as reproduced hereinabove, we are of the
            opinion that during the period of stay the respondents could not
H
DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. KIDARNATH MOHINDERNATH                                519


      have proceeded further to issue declaration/notification under A
      Section 6 of the Act. As soon as the interim stay came to be
      vacated by virtue of the· main order having been passed i:i the
      writ petition, the respondents, taking advantage of the period of
      stay during which they were restrained from issuance of
      declaration under Section 6 of the Act proceeded further and issued. B
      notification under Section 6 of the Act.
      72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in one
      of the matters of the landowners would put complete restraint on
      the respondents to have proceeded further to issue notification
      under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said notification
      during the period when the stay was operative, !lien obviously · C
      they may have been hauled up for committing contempt of court.
      The language employed in the interim orders of stay is also such
      that it had completely restrained the respondents from proceeding
      further in the matter by issuing declaration/notification under
      Section 6 of the Act."                                             D
       17. Thus submission is liable to be rejected. Apart from that we
find that this objection had not been pressed rightly, in view of the
afores(lid decision, before the High Court. We are of the opinion that no
case for interference is made out on this ground also.
        18. It was submitted by the learned counsel for Respondent No.I E
that in one such other case, Delhi Administration has accepted a judgment
of Delhi High Court thus could not have questioned the order passed
by the High Court in the case of the Respondent No.I only. We are not
inclined to accept the submission raised by the learned counsel for
Respondent No.I, firstly, forthe reason that there is no concept ofnegative F
equality, secondly, apart from that, this Court has already decided the
matter in the decisions mentioned above which were binding and not .
brought into the notice of the High Court. Thus, illegal order cannot be
permitted to survive:
        19. The appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order passed         G
by the High Court is set aside. Writ Petition is dismissed. Parties are
directed to bear their own costs.


Divya Pandey                                                Appeal allowed.