DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYversusASHA JAIN & ORS.

626                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT   15 S.C.R. 626               [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A                  DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
                                        v.
                             ASHA JAIN & ORS.
                         (Civil Appeal No. 8088 of 2022)
B                            NOVEMBER 09, 2022
                [M. R. SHAH AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
             Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
      Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2) –
      High Court relying on Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v.
C
      Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors. reported as [2014] 1 SCR 783,
      and observing that as compensation has not been paid and/or
      tendered to the recorded owners/petitioners, declared that the
      acquisition w.r.t the land in question is deemed to have lapsed by
      virtue of s.24(2) – On appeal, held: The case relied upon by High
D     Court has been overruled in the Constitution Bench case of Indore
      Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors. (2020) 8 SCC 129
      wherein it has been held that the deemed lapse of land acquisition
      proceedings u/s.24(2) takes place where due to inaction of
      authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the
      2013 Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor
E
      compensation has been paid – Thus, in case possession has been
      taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse –
      Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been
      taken then there is no lapse – In the present case, possession of the
      land in question was taken over in 2005, as also observed by High
F     Court – Further, according to the original writ petitioner, she
      acquired the right in the land in question pursuant to Agreement to
      Sell dtd. 09.05.05 – Agreement to Sell by itself does not confer any
      right, title, or interest – Original writ petitioner can be said to be
      subsequent purchaser and/or has acquired the right subsequently
      – Subsequent purchaser has no right to claim lapse of acquisition
G
      proceedings – Impugned judgment set aside – Writ petition filed by
      the original writ petitioner before High Court, dismissed – Land
      Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.4.
            Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors.
            (2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.
H
                                       626
 DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ASHA JAIN & ORS.                            627


      Delhi Development Authority v. Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd.              A
      & Ors., Decision of Supreme Court in Civil appeal
      No. 3073 of 2022 – relied on.
      Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v. Harakchand
      Misirimal Solanki and Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014]
      1 SCR 783; Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of                      B
      Delhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 173 and M. Venkatesh &
      Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority
      (2015) 17 SCC 1 : [2015] 11 SCR 454; Shiv Kumar &
      Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 10 SCC 229 –
      referred to.
                                                                            C
                        Case Law Reference
[2014] 1 SCR 783                 referred to               Para 3
[2020] 3 SCR 1                   followed                  Para 3.1
[2015] 11 SCR 454                referred to               Para 4.1         D
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8088
of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 08.08.2017 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 2987 of 2016.
      Ms. Sunieta Ojha, Adv. for the Appellant.                             E

     Aakash Dubey, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Atul Kumar,
Ms. Sweety Singh, Rahul Pandey, Rajiv Ranjan, Advs. for the
Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                            F
      M. R. SHAH, J.
       1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition
(C) No. 2987 of 2016 by which the High Court has allowed the said writ
petition preferred by the respondent No. 1 herein and has declared that     G
the acquisition with respect to the land in question is deemed to have
lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), the Delhi Development
Authority (DDA) has preferred the present appeal.
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628            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A            2. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
      at length.
            3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case
      and even as observed by the High Court, the possession of the land in
      question was taken over in the year 2005, however, observing that as
B     the compensation has not been paid and/or tendered to the recorded
      owners/petitioners, relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of
      Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand Misirimal
      Solanki and Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 183, the High Court has allowed the
      writ petition and has declared that the acquisition with respect to the
      land in question is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the
C     Act, 2013.
             3.1 The decision of this Court in the case of Pune Municipal
      Corporation and Anr. (supra) relied upon by the High Court while
      passing the impugned judgment and order has been subsequently overruled
      by this Court in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case
D     of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. (2020)
      8 SCC 129. In paragraph 365 and 366, the Constitution Bench of this
      Court has observed and held as under:-
                  “365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal
            Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki,
E           (2014) 3 SCC 183] is hereby overruled and all other decisions in
            which Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v.
            Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183] has been
            followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar
            Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State
F           of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353] cannot be said to be laying down
            good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are
            also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra
            [(2018) 3 SCC 412], the aspect with respect to the proviso to
            Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as
            “and” was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision
G           too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present
            judgment.
                  366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the
            questions as under:

H
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ASHA JAIN & ORS.                            629
                [M. R. SHAH, J.]

          366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the      A
   award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of
   the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has
   to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
          366.2. In case the award has been passed within the
   window period of five years excluding the period covered by an          B
   interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as
   provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894
   Act as if it has not been repealed.
          366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between
   possession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”.        C
   The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section
   24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of
   authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the
   said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor
   compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession
   has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no         D
   lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has
   not been taken then there is no lapse.
          366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section
   24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation
   in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso     E
   to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to
   majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on
   the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the
   1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the
   provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section        F
   31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest
   under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of
   compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land
   acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to
   the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under
   the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of       G
   notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
         366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation
   as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to
   him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due
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630            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A           to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The
            obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section
            31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation
            or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim
            that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)
            of the 2013 Act.
B
                   366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to
            be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).
                   366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act
            and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest
C           report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking
            possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in
            State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the
            2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse
            under Section 24(2).

D                  366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a
            deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities
            have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay
            compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came
            into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the
            authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of
E           interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the
            computation of five years.
                   366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to
            new cause of action to question the legality of concluded
            proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding
F           pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014.
            It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen
            concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the
            legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or
            mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court
G           to invalidate acquisition.”
             In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment and order passed
      by the High Court is unsustainable.
             4. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that in the present
      case, the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
H     was issued on 25.11.1980; acquisition was for a public purpose, namely,
 DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. ASHA JAIN & ORS.                                 631
                 [M. R. SHAH, J.]

planned development of Delhi by which the large chunk of land in 13              A
villages of South Delhi including Village Neb Sarai was sought to be
acquired. As per the record, the land in question originally is the part of
Khasra No. 675 recorded in the name of M/s. Laxmichand Bhagaji
Limited - a non-banking company. Therefore, M/s. Laxmichand Bhagaji
Limited was the recorded owner. From the material on record, it appears
                                                                                 B
that even according to the original writ petitioner, she acquired the right
in the land in question pursuant to the Agreement to Sell dated 09.05.2005.
Thus, the original writ petitioner was claiming the right in the land in
question pursuant to the Agreement to Sell dated 09.05.2005.
         4.1 As per the settled position of law, Agreement to Sell by itself
does not confer any right, title, or interest. In any case, the original writ    C
petitioner can be said to be subsequent purchaser and/or has acquired
the right subsequently. In the recent decision of this Court in the case of
Delhi Development Authority Vs. Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. & Ors.,
Civil appeal No. 3073 of 2022 after considering the other decisions
on the right of the subsequent purchaser to claim lapse of acquisition           D
proceedings, i.e., Meera Sahni Vs. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi
& Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 173 and M. Venkatesh & Ors. Vs.
Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, (2015) 17 SCC
1, it is specifically observed and held that subsequent purchaser has no
right to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings. Similar view has been
expressed by the Larger Bench judgment of this Court in the case of              E
Shiv Kumar & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 10 SCC
229.
       4.2 Under the circumstances also, the High Court has erred in
entertaining the writ petition at the instance of the original writ petitioner
being subsequent purchaser, praying for a declaration that the acquisition       F
is deemed to have lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.
Under the circumstances also, the impugned judgment and order passed
by the High Court is unsustainable.
       5. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present
appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High              G
Court, declaring that the acquisition with respect to the land in question
is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, is hereby
quashed and set aside. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the original
writ petitioner before the High Court being Writ Petition (C) No. 2987 of
2016 stands dismissed.                                                           H
632              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A            Present appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
             Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

      Divya Pandey                                                   Appeal allowed.
      (Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)
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