DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYversusDAMINI WADHWA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 1174
- Decided
- 4 November 2022
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- M R SHAH
Holding
A subsequent purchaser has no right to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, and lapse cannot be declared solely because possession or compensation is pending due to litigation.
Summary
The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) appealed a Delhi High Court order that had declared the acquisition of certain lands to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The original writ petitioner, Damini Wadhwa, relied on an Agreement to Sell dated 22 May 2016 to claim a right, title or interest in the lands, which had been notified for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in 1980 and awarded in 1987. The Supreme Court held that an Agreement to Sell does not confer ownership, making the petitioner a subsequent purchaser who cannot invoke Section 24(2) to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings. The Court also affirmed that lapse cannot be declared merely because possession or compensation was delayed due to pending litigation, citing Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside and the writ petition dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether a subsequent purchaser can invoke Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings.
- Whether failure to take possession or pay compensation due to pending litigation triggers lapse under Section 24(2).
- Whether the High Court erred in not examining the locus of the original writ petitioner.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
602 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 16 S.C.R. 602 [2022] 16 S.C.R.
A DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
DAMINI WADHWA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7962 of 2022)
B NOVEMBER 04, 2022
[M. R. SHAH AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2) –
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.4, 6 – High Court declared that the
C acquisition w.r.t the lands in question is deemed to have lapsed by
virtue of s.24(2) – On appeal, held: Respondent-original writ
petitioner claimed the right, title, or interest in the lands in question
on the basis of the Agreement to Sell of year 2016 – Agreement to
Sell by itself does not confer any right, title, or interest – Even the
appellant doubted the genuineness of the transaction of the
D Agreement to Sell and a specific plea was taken on the locus of the
original writ petitioner, however, the High Court did not deal with
the said issue – Further, notification u/s.4, 1894 Act was issued in
1980 and the Agreement to Sell was of the year 2016– Thus, the
original writ petitioner allegedly derived the interest in the lands in
E question much after the acquisition proceedings were initiated and
therefore, can be said to be a subsequent purchaser – Subsequent
purchaser has no right to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings–
Thus, being a subsequent purchaser and/or having acquired the
interest in the lands in question subsequently, the original writ
petitioner did not have any right to claim lapse of acquisition
F proceedings u/s.24(2) – Furthermore, as held in Indore Development
Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors., there cannot be any lapse of
acquisition u/s.24(2),2013 Act on the ground that possession was
not taken and/or compensation was not deposited/tendered due to
the pending litigations– Thus, on merits also, the High Court erred
G in declaring lapse of acquisition– Impugned judgment set asid–
Writ petition filed before High Court is dismissed.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
Held: 1.1 The respondent No.1–original writ petitioner filed
the writ petition and claimed the right, title, or interest in the
H lands in question on the basis of the Agreement to Sell dated
602
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. DAMINI WADHWA & 603
ORS.
22.05.2016. Agreement to Sell by itself does not confer any right, A
title, or interest. Even in the counter affidavit, the appellant
doubted the genuineness of the transaction of the Agreement to
Sell dated 22.05.2016. A specific plea was taken on behalf of the
DDA on the locus of the original writ petitioner. However, the
High Court has not at all dealt with and/or considered the issue
B
with respect to the locus of the original writ petitioner. Even
considering the fact that the Agreement to Sell was of the year
2016 and considering the fact that the notification under Section
4 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 25.11.1980, therefore, it is
apparent that the original writ petitioner allegedly derived the
interest in the lands in question much after the acquisition C
proceedings were initiated and therefore, the respondent No. 1
original writ petitioner can be said to be subsequent purchaser.
Subsequent purchaser has no right to claim lapse of acquisition
proceedings. Under the circumstances and even accepting the
case on behalf of the original writ petitioner that she might have
D
acquired some interest on the basis of the Agreement to Sell
dated 22.05.2016, being a subsequent purchaser and/or having
acquired the interest in the lands in question subsequently, she
was not having any right to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings
under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. Under the circumstances,
the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition preferred E
by the respondent No.1 – original writ petitioner claiming lapse
of acquisition proceedings under the Act, 2013. [Paras 7,
7.1][607-G-H; 608-A-F]
1.2 Even otherwise on merits also, the High Court has erred
in declaring / ordering lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of F
the Act, 2013. The High Court has not at all appreciated the fact
that the large parcels of the lands were acquired, which were
under the same notification/ different notifications. The acquisition
proceedings under the Act, 1894 were the subject matter of
litigations and the acquisition proceedings came to be confirmed
by this Court. The possession of some parcels of the land could G
not be taken over because of the pending litigations and even
the compensation could not be deposited due to pending
litigations. Under the circumstances and as observed and held
by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority, there
cannot be any lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act, H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.
A 2013 on the ground of possession could not be taken over by the
authority and/or the compensation could not be deposited/tendered
due to the pending litigations. Under these circumstances also,
the High Court has erred in allowing the writ petition and declaring
that the acquisition with respect to the lands in question is deemed
to have 8 lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. The
B
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is
unsustainable both on facts as well as on law. The impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court is quashed and set
aside. The writ petition before the High Court being Writ Petition
(C) No.11735 of 2016 is dismissed. [Para 7.2, 8][608-F-H; 609-
C A-B, C]
Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors.
(2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.
Delhi Development Authority Vs. Godfrey Phillips (I)
Ltd. & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3073 of 2022 – relied
D on.
Om Parkash Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2010) 4 SCC
17 : [2010] 2 SCR 447; Meera Sahni Vs. Lieutenant
Governor of Delhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 173, M.
Venkatesh & Ors. Vs. Commissioner, Bangalore
E Development Authority, (2015) 17 SCC 1 : [2015] 11
SCR 454; Shiv Kumar & Anr. Vs. Union of India &
Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 229– referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2010] 2 SCR 447 referred to Para 2.3
F
[2020] 3 SCR 1 followed Para 3.1
[2015] 11 SCR 454 referred to Para 7
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7962
of 2022.
G From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2017 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 11735 of 2016.
Ms. Manika Tripathy, Ashotosh Kaushik, Advs. for the Appellant.
N S Vasisht, M P Bhargava, Varun Kapur, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava,
H Advs. for the Respondents.
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. DAMINI WADHWA & 605
ORS.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ
Petition(C) No. 11735 of 2016 by which the High Court has allowed the
said writ petition preferred by the private respondents herein – original B
writ petitioners and has declared that the acquisition with respect to the
lands in question has lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”),
the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) has preferred the present C
appeal.
2. That the respondent No. 1 herein – original writ petitioner filed
a writ petition before the High Court seeking declaration that the
acquisition with respect to the suit lands, i.e., Khasra No. 589 (1-8), 1
bigha and 8 biswas (out of 4 bighas) situated in the Revenue Estate of D
Village Maidan Garhi, NCT of Delhi, is deemed to have lapsed by virtue
of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.
2.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the lands in question
alongwith other agricultural lands were notified to be acquired under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as E
“Act, 1894”) on 25.11.1980; declaration under Section 6 of the Act,
1894 was issued on 07.06.1985; and award came to be declared by the
Collector on 17.06.1987.
2.2 There were number of litigations initiated by various
landowners with respect to the acquisition in question. The acquisition F
proceedings initiated by the aforesaid notification/declaration were
challenged by the interested persons by filing various writ petitions wherein
interim protection was granted by the High Court.
2.3 Various rounds of litigations were fought in respect of the
above-mentioned notifications. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions
G
vide judgment and order dated 25.11.2004 and upheld the acquisition
proceedings. It appears that in one set of writ petitions, there was
difference of opinion and these cases were referred to the third Judge,
which came to be dismissed on 11.05.2007. These cases were decided
in favour of the landowners and the notification under Section 6 and
subsequent acquisition proceedings were quashed. However, H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.
A subsequently, by reported judgment in the case of Om Parkash Vs.
Union of India and Ors., (2010) 4 SCC 17, this Court upheld the
acquisition proceedings. Thus, the acquisition qua the lands in question
attained finality. That thereafter the private respondent herein – original
writ petitioner filed the present writ petition before the High Court for
the aforesaid reliefs.
B
2.4 A detailed counter was filed on behalf of the Delhi
Development Authority – the appellant herein inter alia challenging the
locus of the original writ petitioner. It was the case on behalf of the
Delhi Development Authority that the possession at the relevant time
could not be taken over due to the various litigations pending with respect
C to the notification / declaration. Though, it was also the case on behalf of
the Delhi Development Authority that the substantial possession with
respect to most of the lands to be acquired were taken over, however,
with respect to some portion of the acquisition, the possession could not
be taken over due to the pending litigations. Despite the above and even
D without considering the objections on the locus of the original writ
petitioner, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has
declared that the acquisition proceedings with respect to the lands in
question is deemed to have been lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the
Act, 2013, as neither the compensation has been paid nor the possession
of the lands in question has been taken over. The impugned judgment
E and order passed by the High Court is the subject matter of present
appeal.
3. Ms. Manika Tripathy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant – DDA has submitted that as such the original writ petitioner
had no locus at all to file the writ petition before the High Court
F challenging the acquisition and/or praying for declaration. It is submitted
that the original writ petitioner filed the writ petition on the basis of the
Agreement to Sell dated 22.05.2016, which does not inspire any
confidence. It is submitted that even otherwise the said Agreement to
Sell was much after the acquisition proceedings were initiated under the
G provisions of the Act, 1894. It is submitted that therefore as held by this
Hon’ble Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority Vs.
Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. & Ors., Civil appeal No. 3073 of 2022,
subsequent purchaser is not entitled to claim lapsing of acquisition
proceedings under the Act, 2013. It is submitted that therefore the
aforesaid aspect has not been at all considered and/or dealt with by the
H High Court while passing the impugned judgment and order.
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. DAMINI WADHWA & 607
ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
3.1 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on A
behalf of the appellant – DDA that even on merits also, the Hon’ble
High Court has erred in holding and/or declaring that the acquisition with
respect to the lands in question has lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of
the Act, 2013. It issubmitted that the Hon’ble High Court has not at all
appreciated the fact that the possession of the substantial portion of the
B
lands acquired was taken over. However, with respect to small parcels
of lands, the possession could not be taken over because of the pending
litigations challenging the acquisition proceedings. It is submitted that as
observed and held by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Indore
Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. (2020) 8 SCC
129,once the authority could not take the possession due to pending C
litigations, there is no question of attracting Section 24(2) of the Act,
2013.
3.2 Making above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.
4. Shri N.S. Vasisht, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the D
original writ petitioner – respondent No. 1 while opposing the present
appeal has vehemently submitted that considering the fact that neither
thepossession was takenover nor the compensation was paid/tendered,
as rightly observed and held by the Hon’ble High Court, Section 24(2) of
the Act, 2013 shall be attracted and, therefore, there shall be deemed E
lapse of the acquisition. It is submitted that therefore, no error has been
committed by the Hon’ble High Court in allowing the writ petition.
5. Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 has supported the appellant.
6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the F
respective parties at length.
7. At the outset, it is required to be noted that from the counter
filed on behalf of the DDA, which is on record, it appears that the
respondent No.1 – original writ petitioner filed the writ petition and
claimed the right, title, or interest in the lands in question on the basis of G
the Agreement to Sell dated 22.05.2016. As per the settled position of
law, Agreement to Sell by itself does not confer any right, title, or interest.
Even in the counter affidavit, the appellant doubted the genuineness of
the transaction of the Agreement to Sell dated 22.05.2016. A specific
plea was taken on behalf of the DDA on the locus of the original writ
H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 16 S.C.R.
A petitioner.However, the High Court has not at all dealt with and/or
considered the issue with respect to the locus of the original writ petitioner.
Be that it may, even considering the fact that the Agreement to Sell was
of the year 2016 and considering the fact that the notification under
Section 4 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 25.11.1980, therefore, it is
apparent that the original writ petitioner allegedly derived the interest in
B
the lands in question much after the acquisition proceedings were initiated
and therefore, the respondent No.1 – original writ petitioner can be said
to be subsequent purchaser. In the recent decision of this Court in the
case of Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. & Ors. (supra) after considering
the other decisions on the right of the subsequent purchaser to claim
C lapse of acquisition proceedings, i.e., Meera Sahni Vs. Lieutenant
Governor of Delhi& Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 173 and M. Venkatesh
& Ors. Vs. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority,
(2015) 17 SCC1, it is specifically observed and held that subsequent
purchaser has no right to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings. Similar
view has been expressed by the Larger Bench judgment of this Court in
D
the case of Shiv Kumar & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019)
10 SCC 229.
7.1 Under the circumstances and even accepting the case on
behalf of the original writ petitioner that she might have acquired some
interest on the basis of the Agreement to Sell dated 22.05.2016,being a
E subsequent purchaser and/or having acquired the interest in the lands in
question subsequently, she was not having any right to claim lapse of
acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. Under the
circumstances, the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition
preferred by the respondent No. 1 – original writ petitioner claiming
F lapse of acquisition proceedings under the Act, 2013.
7.2 Even otherwise on merits also, the High Court has erred in
declaring/ ordering lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act,
2013. The High Court has not at all appreciated the fact that the large
parcels of the lands were acquired, which were under the same
G notification/ different notifications. The acquisition proceedings under
the Act, 1894 were the subject matter of litigations and the acquisition
proceedings came to be confirmed by this Court. The possession of
some parcels of the land could not be taken over because of the pending
litigations and even the compensation could not be deposited due to
pending litigations. Under the circumstances and as observed and held
H
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. DAMINI WADHWA & 609
ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), A
there cannot be any lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the Act,
2013 on the ground of possession could not be taken over by the authority
and/or the compensation could not be deposited / tendered due to the
pending litigations. Under these circumstances also, the High Court has
erred in allowing the writ petition and declaring that the acquisition with
B
respect to the lands in question is deemed to have lapsed under Section
24(2) of the Act, 2013. The impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court is unsustainable both on facts as well as on law.
8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present
appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court dated 25.07.2017 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 11735 of 2016 is C
hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the writ petition before the
High Court being Writ Petition (C) No. 11735 of 2016 stands dismissed.
Present appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. D
Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)
E
F
G
H
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