DENTAL COUNCIL OF !NOIAversusDR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI RUGNA SEVA MANDAL, HINGOLI &ORS.

                                                     ·.,')



                             [2017] 2 S.C.R. 840


A                     DENTAL COUNCIL OF !NOIA
                                      v.
    DR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI RUGNA SEVA MANDAL, HINGOLI
                        &ORS.

B                      (Civil Appeal No. 4926of2017)
                               APRIL) I, 2017
                   [DIPAK MISRA AND MOHAN M.
                      SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.)
           Interlocutory order - In admission matters, when Institutions
c   not accorded approval - On facts, communication. by the Government
    of India as regards, non-approval of Scheme submitted by Dental
    College for starting MDS course in two specialties - Challenge to
    - Interim order passed by the High Court - Stay of the
    communication until next date, observing that admission process
D   undertaken by the institution would be at its own risk and the college
    would intimate the students intending to take admission to MDS
    course about the said order - On appeal, held: Court should not
    pass such interim orders in the matters of admission, more so, when
    the institution had not been accorded approval - Such interi1i1 orders
    likely to cause chaos, anarchy and uncertainty - High Court may
E
    feel that while exercising power u!Art. 226, it can pass such orders
    with certain qualifiers as has been done by the impugned order, but
    it really does not save the .situation - By virtue of interim order, the
    court granted approval in a way which was the subject matter of
    final adjudication before it - Institution might be directed io inform
F   the students that the matter is sub judice, but the career oriented
    students get into the college with the hope and aspiration that in
    the ultimate eventuate everything would be correct for them and
    they would be saved - In view thereof. order passed by the High
    Court unsustainable - To strike a balance, students who were
    admitted by virtue of the interim order, are prosecuting their studies,
G
    to be allowed to continue their courses, but their seats to be adjusted
    from the academic session 2017-2018 - Respondent-college cannot
    be allowed to get a premium - .. Thus, apart from the adjustment of
    seats for the next academic sessi011, college to deposit a sum of Rs.
    30 Lakhs before the Registry of this Court within the stipulated.
    period.
                                   840
  DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. DR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI                           841
       RUGNA SEVA MANDAL, HINGOLI & ORS.

      Precedent - Binding precedelll - Held: Judge to constantly            A
remind himself about the precedents in the field and not to be swayed
away by his own convictions - Purpose to follow precedent is to
have consistency - In the instant case, the precedents are clear and
luculent - It does not allow any space for any kind of equivocation
- No reason to have passed an interim order.
                                                                            B
      Disposing of the appeal, the Court
         HELD: 1.1 The court should not pass such interim orders
 in the matters of admission, more so, when the institution had
·not been accorded approval. Such kind of interim orders are likely
 to cause chaos, anarchy and uncertainty. And, there is no reason           c
 for creating such situations. There is no justification or
 requirement. The High Court may feel that while exercising
 power u/Art. 226 of the Constitution, it can pass such orders
 with certain qualifiers as has been done by the impugned order,
 but it really does not save the situation. It is because an institution
 which has not been given approval for the course, gets a premium.          D
 That apart, by virtue of interim order, the court grants approval
 in a way which is the subject matter of final adjudication before it.
 The anxiety of the students to get admission reigns supreme as
  they feel that the instit!Jtion is granting admission on the basis of
 an orlkr passed by the High Court. The institution might be                E
 directed to inform the students that the matter is sub judice, but
  the career oriented students get into the college with the hope
 and aspiration that in the ultimate eventuate everything shall be
 correct for them and they will be saved. It can be thought of from
 another perspective, that the students had deliberately got into
 such a situation. But it is seemly to note that it is the institution      F
  that had approached the High Court aild sought a relief of the
  present nature. By saying that the institution may give admission
  at its own risk invites further chaotic and unfortunate situations.
  [Para 19) [852-H; 853-A-D)
        1.2 The High Court has to realize the nature of the /is or          G
 the controversy. It is quite different. It is not a construction which
 is built at the risk of a plaintiff or the defendant which can be
 demolished or redeemed by grant of compensation. It is a situation
 where the order has the potentiality to play with the career and
 life of young. One may say, " .•• life is a foreign language; all mis-     H
842            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     pronounce it", but it bas to be borne in mind that artificial or
      contrived accident is not the goal of life. [Para 20] [853-E]
             1.3 There is no reason to invite a disaster hr way of an
      interim order. A Judge has to constantly remind himself about
      the precedents in the field and not to be swayed away by his own
B     convictions. The purpose to follow precedent ls to have
      consistency. In the instant case, the precedents are clear and
      luculent. It does not allow any space for any kind of equivocation.
      In Priya Gupta case, the Court had requested the High Courts to
      ensure strict adherence to the prescribed time schedule, process
      of selection and role of merit and except in very exceptional cases, ·
c     to decline interim orders. The Court had added the words
      "humility at our command". The ...grammar of humility in law" in
      the hierarchical system basically means to abide by the precedents
      unles.s distinguishable but not tO" ignore them and pass orders
      because of an individual notion or perception. Adjudication in
D     accordance with precedents is cultivation of humility. As long as
      a precedent is binding under the constitutional scheme, it has to
      be respected by all. However, this Court intends to add that the
      meaning behind the words, namely, "humility", and "request" as
      used by this Court, has to be appositely understood by tlie High
      Courts. It requires attention. And attention in the context is
E     disciplined and concerned awareness. Nothing more nttd be said.
      [Paras 21, 22, 24 and 25] [853-F; 854-A, F-G; 855-B]
            Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh & others (2012) 7
            SCC 433 : [2012] 5 SCR 768; Government of Andhra
            Pradesh & others v. A.P. Jaiswal and others (2001) 1
F           SCC 748; Arusmeta Captive Power Company Private
            Limited and anr v. Lafarge India Private Limited (2013)
            15 SCC 414 : [2013] 17 SCR 496; Chandra Prakash
            and others v. State of UP. and anr (2002) 4 SCC 234 :
            [2002] 2 SCR 913 - relied on.
G           FRANKFURTER, Felix, in CIArk, Tom C., "Mr.
            Justice .Frankfurter: 'A Heritage for all Who Love the
            Law"', 51 A.B.A.J. 330, 332 (1965) - referred to.
           1.4 In view thereof the impugned order passed by the Single
      Judge of the High Court is absolutely unsustainable. But the
H
  DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. DR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI                      843
       RUGNA SEVA MANDAL, HINGOLI & ORS.

co~troversy does not end tber}l. It is the admitted position that     A
the respondent-college has been granted approval for the
academic session 2017-2018. By virtue of the interim order
passed by the High Court, three stndents had been admitted and
they are prosecuting their studies. There is an intention to strike
a balance. The students who have been admitted shall be allowed
                                                                      B
to continue their courses, but their seats shall be adjusted from
the academic session 2017-2018. The respondent-college cannot
be allowed to get a premium. The grant of bounty is likely to
allow such institutions to develop an attitude of serendipity. Such
a culture is inconceivable. Therefore, apart from the adjustment
of seats for the next academic session, the respondent-college is      c
directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 30 Lakhs before the Registry of
this Court within the stipulated period. The said costs shall in no
manner be recovered from the students who had been admitted
 nor shall it be collected from the students who will be admitted
 to the course in the next year. That apart, the respondent-college
shall not think of any kind of adjustment. [Para 26) (855-C-F)
       Royal Medical Trust (Registered) and another v. Union
       of India and another (2015) 10 SCC 19; Ashish Ranjan
       and others v. Union of India and others (2016) 11 SCC
       225; Union of India v. Era Educational Trust and
       another (2000) 5 SCC 57 : (2000) 2 SCR 1001; Krishna            E
       Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow (1984) 1 SCC
       307 : [1984] 1 SCR 302; Medical Council of India v.
       Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences and others
       (2004) 6 SCC 76: [2004) 3 SCR 1119; Medical Council
       of India v. JSS Medical College and another (2012) 5            F
     . SCC 628 : [2012) l SCR 136; Medical Council Qf India
       v. MGR. Educational & Research Institute University
       & another (2015) 4 SCC 580 : [2015) 5 SCR 579;
       Medical Council of India v. Kalinga Institute of Medical
       Sciences (KJMS) and others (2016) 11 SCC 530 : [2016)
       4 SCR 403 - referred to.                                        G

                       Case Law Reference
c2015) 10 sec 19                referred to            Para3
(2016) n sec 225                referred to            Para4
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844            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        (2017) 2 S.C.R.


A     [2000) 2 SCR1001                referred to              Para9
      [1984) 1 SCR 302                referred to              Para9
      [2004) 3 SCR 1119               referred to              Para 11
      [2012) 1 SCR 136                 referred to             Para 12
B     (2012) 5 SCR 768                 relied on               Para 13
      [2015) 5 SCR 579                referred to              Para.14
      [2016) 4 SCR 403                 referred to             Para 16
      (2001) r sec 748                 relied on               Para 22
c     [2013) 17 SCR 496                relied on               Para 23
      [2002) 2 SCR 913                 relied on               Para 23
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4926
      of2017.
D           From the Judgment and Order dated 27.05.2016 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in W. P. No. 4529 of
      2016.
           Gaurav Sharma, Dhawal Mohan, Prateek Bhatia, Ms. Vara Gaur,
      Ms. Amandeep Kaur, Advs. for the Appellant.
E
           S. M. Jadhav (For M/s. S. M. Jadhav and Company), Suhas
      Kadam (For Mis. Lemax Lawyers & Co.), Advs. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
           DIPAK MISRA, J. I. Though this Court ordinarily is loath to
F   interfere with interim orders or directions issued by the High Cou:t, yet
  . the impugned order dated 27.05.2016 passed in Writ Petition No. 4529
    of2016 by the learned Vacation Judge of the High Court of Judicature
    at Bombay, Bench atAurangabad, constrains, in a way, obliges us to pen
    a verdict with some concern, for abandonment to write a decision in the
    obtaining circumstances would tantamount to playing possum with the
G precedents, which need to be recapitulated by the High Courts.

              2. The facts are simple. The respondent, a dental college, vide
      letter dated 26.05.2015, submitted its scheme on 29.07.2015 for grant of
      permission to start post-graduate course of Orthodontics and Dentofacial
      Orthopaedics along with four other specialties. A team of Dental Council
H
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. DR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI                                  845
RUGNA SEVA MANDAL, HINGOLI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

 oflndia (for short, 'the Council'), the appellant herein, conducted a pre-       A
.PG assessment of the respondent-college on l 7'h and 18"' November,
 2015 and submitted its report to the Council. The assessment report
 submitted by the said team was placed before the Executive Committee
 of the Council in its meeting held on 03.12.2015 whereupon the
 Committee found many a deficiency relating to infrastructure, teaching
                                                                                  B
 faculty and other physical facilities in the respondent-college. The
 Committee decided to call upon the respondent-college to rectify the
 deficiencies and submit its compliance within seven days. The said
 decision was communicated vide letter dated 08.12.2015. The respondent"
 college vide its letter dated 17.12.2015 submitted its compliance report
 whereafter the assessors of the Council carried out a compliance                 c
 verification assessment of the respondent-co11ege on 21.12.2015. The
 case of the respondent-college was placed before the Executive
 Committee for consideration, which found that the respondent-college
 fulfilled the eligibility criteria at the undergraduate level. On 29.01.2016,
 the Council decided to carry out the physical assessment of the dental
                                                                                  D
 college in order to ascertain the infrastructure, clinical material, teaching
 faculty and other physical facilities in respect of four postgraduate
 specialties and in accordance with the decision, inspection was conducted
 on 28'h and 29'h January, 2016. The assessment report was considered
 by the Executive Committee in its meeting held on 12.02.2016 and it
 observed that there were deficiencies and the college was required to            E
  submit compliance.
         3. As is evident from the materials brought on record the decision
 of the Committee was communicated to the college on 18.02.2016
 whereupon the respondent-college communicated that the defects had
 been removed. The Council proceeded to verify the compliance made                F
 by the college and keeping in view the various facilities and regard being
 had to the decision of this Court in Roy11f MediC<tf Trust (Registered)
 and 11notfler v. Union of lndi11 11nd anotfler1, decided to recommend
 to the Government of India not to grant permission to the respondent-
 college for starting the post-graduate courses. The Government oflndia,
 after affording an opportunity of hearing to the respondent-college, vide        G
 letter dated 21.03 .2016, required the Council to verify/review the schemes
 and further desired to furnish its revised recommendation.
          4. The communication received from the Government of India

 1
     (2015) w sec 19                                                              H
846            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     was placed before the Committee and the Committee keeping in view
      the cut-off date, postulated in Royal Medical Trust (supra) and Asliish
      Ranjan and others v. Union ofIndia and others', decided to reiterate
      its earlier stand and accordingly it was communicated to the Government
      oflndia on 28.03.2016. The Government oflndia after considering the
      recommendation of the Council, vide letter dated 31.03.2016, disapproved
B
      the scheme of the respondent-college for starting MDS course in the
      specialty of Orthodontics and Dentofacial Orthopaedics for the academic
      session 2016-2017.
             5. Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Government oflndia
      which is based on the recommendation of the Council, the respondent-
c     college knocked at the doors of the High Court by filing a writ petition
      and the learned Vacation Judge upon hearing the learned counsel for
      the parties, passed the following order:-
            "The controversy or the issue involved in the matter requires
            consideration and due to paucity of time, this Court is unable to
D           decide this matter finally. In such circumstances the impugned
            communication dated 31" March, 2016 is hereby stayed until next
            date i.e. 06.06.2016. The admission process undertaken by the
            petitioner is atthe risk of the petitioner. The petitioner shall intimate
            the order passed by this Court to the students who are intending
            to take admission for M.D.S. course in Orthodontics and
E           Denotfacial Orthopaedics."
            After passing the said direction, the Court adjourned the matter to
      06.06.2016.
           6. Assailing the said order, it is submitted by Mr. Gaurav Sharma,
    learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court could not have, in
F
    the absenceofapproval of the scheme submitted by the college, passed
  · an order of the present nature by staying the order and observing that
    the admission process undertaken by the institution would be at its own
    risk. Learned counsel would submit that though the learned Single Judge
    has opined that the college shall intimate the students who are intending
G to take admission to MDS course in the Orthodontics and Dentofacial
    Orthopaedics about the order passed by the Court, yet such an order is
    impermissible as it brings in anarchy and chaos in the process of admission
    to medical courses. He has referred to certain authorities, which we
    shall refer to in the course of the judgment.
H     '(2016) 11 sec 225
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. DR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI     847
RUGNA SEVA MANDAL, HINGOLI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.)

       7. Mr. S.M. Jadhav, learned counsel for the respondent-college        A
would contend, in his turn, that decision of the Council was primafacie
erroneous and, therefore, the High Court was justified in staying the said
order. It is further canvassed by him that the High Court, while staying.         ..
the order, had imposed the conditions and hence, there is no justification
or warrant on the part of the Council to invoke the jurisdiction of this
                                                                             B
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and it would have been
advisable for it to wait for the final decision of the High Court.
Additionally, it is urged by him that the respondent-college has been
granted due approval for the academic session 2017-2018 and that would
make the non-denial of the approval for the earlier order illegal and, in
any case, the three students who have been admitted by virtue of the         c
order passed by the High Court should not put in a state of suffering and
predicament.
        8. The narration of facts is absolutely telling that the scheme
submitted by the respondent-college for starting the MDS course in the
two specialties had been disapproved by the Government oflndia. The o·
justifiability of the said non-approval was the subject matter of the /is
before the High Court. The High Court was expected to adjudicaie under
Article 226 ofthe Constitution within its parameters as regards the nature
of deficiencies pointed out by the Council, steps ta.ken by the college
with regard to removal of such deficiencies and whether there had been
any perversity in the decision making process of the Council while not E
recommending for approval to the Government of India and further
declining to review the decision after the Government oflndia required
it to verify/review the scheme and furnish the revised recommendation.
As is evident, the Council keeping in view the cut-off date prescribed by
this Court in Royal Medical Trust (supra) and Asliisll Ranj£ln (supra) F
reiterated its earlier recommendation. Thus, the ultimate result was ·
disapproval of the scheme by the Governme~t oflndia .. Hence, the writ
court observed, as is demonstrable from the order which we have
reproduced hereinbefore, that the controversy required consideration
and as the matter could not be finally adjudicated, the circumstances
required interim direc(Wn and stay of the impugned communication. True G
it is, the High Court !fas qualified its order by stating that the admission
process shall be at the risk of the college and the students shall be
 intima.ted, but the heart of the matter is, whether the High Court should   •·
have stayed the order with such conditions. Basically, the order amounts
                                                                             H
848             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A     to granting permission for the admission of students in certain courses in
      a college which had not received approval. There may be a case where
      the court may ultimately come to the conclusion that the recommendation
      is unacceptable and eventually the decision of disapproval by the
      Government of India is unsustainable. But the issue is whether before
      arriving at such conclusions, should the High Court, by way of interim
B
      measure, pass such an order.
             9. Such a controversy has not arisen for the first time. A two-
      Judge Bench in Union oflm/i(I v. Em Educ"tio1w/ Trust (Inc/ <motlter3
      stated that normally this Court would hesitate to interfere with an
      interlocutory order, but was compelled to do so where prima facie it
c     appeared that the said order could not be justified by any judicial standard,
      the ends ofjustice and the need to maintain judicial discipline required
      the Court to do so and to indicate the reasons for such interference. The
      Court, adverting to the aspects of passing of orders relating to provisional
      admission, quoted a passage from Kris/tn(I Priy" G(lnguly v. University
D     ofLucknow' which reads thus:-
             "[T]hatwhenever a writ petition is filed provisional admission should
             not be given as a matter of course on the petition being admitted
             unless the court is fully satisfied that the petitioner has a cast-iron
             case which is bound to succeed or the error is so gross or apparent
E            that no other conclusion is possible."
            The Court also thought it appropriate to reproduce further
      observations from Kris/i11(1 Priy(I G"11gu/y (supra):-
             "Unless the institutions can provide complete and full facilities for
             the training of each candidate who is admitted in the various
F            disciplines, the medical education will be incomplete and the
             universities would be turning'out doctors not fully qualified which
             would adversely affect the health of the people in general."
             IO. Adverting to the facts in the case before it, the Court held:-
             "9. In the present case, this type of situation has arisen because
G
             of the interim order passed by the High Court without taking into
             consideration various judgments rendered by this Court for exercise
             of jurisdiction under Arti_cle 226. It is apparent that even at the
             final stage the High Court normally could not have granted such a
      ' (2000J s sec 57
H     '(1984) I SCC307
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. DR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI                                 849
RUGNA SEVA MANDAL, HINGOLI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      mandatory order. Unfortunately, mystery has no place in judicial           A
      process. Hence, the impugned order cannot be justified by any
      judicial standards and requires to be quashed and set aside."
      The aforesaid passage is quite vivid and reflects the surprise
expressed by the learned Judges.
      11. In Medic(I/ Council of lntlia v. R(ljiv G(lnt/hi U11iversity of        B
He(l/t/z Sciences (lilt/ others.< the three-Judge Bench referred to the
authority in Er(I Etluc(lfion(I/ Trust (supra) and emphatically reiterated
the law declared therein. The reiteration is as follows:-
      "4. We once again emphasise that the law declared by this Court
      in Union of India v. Era Educational Trust (supra) that interim            c
      order should not be granted as a matter of course, particularly in
      relation to matter where standards of institutions are involved and
      the permission to be granted to such institutions is subject to certain
      provisions of law and regulations applicable to the same, unless
      the same are complied with. Even if the High Comt gives certain            D
      directions in relation to consideration of the applications filed by
      educational institutions concerned for grant of permission or manner
       in which the same should be processed should not form a basis to
      direct the admission of students in these institutions which are yet
      to get approval from the authorities concerned or permission has
       not been granted by the Council."                                         E

       The aforesaid pronouncement, as is manifest, rules that issue of
an interim order in respect of an institution which has not received the
approval is not countenanced in law.
       12. In Metliclll Council of bttlia v. JSS Metlic(I/ College {I/It/
                 • had arisen with regard to passing of interim orders by
(lnotltet' the issue
                                                                                 F

the High Court relating to permission for increase of seats. The anguish
expressed by the Court is reflectible from the following passage:-
       " 12. Without adverting to the aforesaid issues and many other
       issues which may arise for determination, the High Court, in our
                                                                                 G
       opinion, erred in permitting increase in seats by an interim order.
       In normal circumstances the High Court should not issue interim
       order granting permission for increase of the seats. The High
       Court ought to realise that granting such permission by an interim
' (2004 l 6 sec 76
'(2012) s sec 62s                                                                H
850            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A           order has a cascading effect. By virtue of such order students
            are admitted as in the preseni case and though many of them had
            taken the risk knowingly but few may be ignorant. In most of
            such cases when finally the issue is decided against the College
            the welfare and plight of the students are ultimately projected to
            arouse sympathy of the Court. It results in a very awkward and
B
            difficult situation. lfon ultimate analysis it is found that the College's
            claim for increase of seats is untenable, in such an event the ·
            admission of students with reference to the increased seats shall
            be illegal. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the
            rule oflaw than a direction by the Court to allow continuance of
c           such students, whose admissions is found illegal in the ultimate
            analysis,"
            13. In Priya Gupta v. State of Clilwttisgar/1 and others' dealing
      with various aspects, the Court was in pain and thought it appropriate to
      request the High Courts with humility. The lucid sta~ement is extracted
D     below:-
            "78.4. With all the humility at our command, we request the High
            Courts to ensure strict adherence to the prescribed time schedule,
            process of selection and to the rule of merit. We reiterate what
            has been stated by this Court earlier, that except in very exceptional
E           cases, the High Court may consider it appropriate to decline interim
            orders and hear the main petitions finally, subject to the convenience
            of the Court.... "
             14. In Metlica/ Council of Imlia v. M.G.R. Etlucational &
      Researclt Institute University & anotlter' treating the admission as
F     unauthorized as there had been no approval by the MCI, the Court
      imposed costs of Rs. 5 crores on the respondent institution therein, for it
      had created a complete mess insofar as the students were admitted to
      the second batch of M BBS course in the college. There has been a
      further direction that the amount of costs that was directed to be deposited
      before the Registry of this Court was not to be recovered in any manner
G     from any student or adjusted against the fees or provision for facilities
      for students of subsequent batches.
            15. The three-Judge Bench in Royal Metlica/ Trust (supra), while
      dealing with time schedule, stated thus:-
      ' (201217 sec 433
H     '(2015) 4 sec sso
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. DR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI                                851
RUGNA SEVA MAl'fDAL, HINGOLI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

       "33. The cases in hand show that the Central Government did not          A
       choose to extend the time-limits in the Schedule despite being
       empowered by Note below the Schedule. Though the Central
       Government apparently felt constrained by the directions in Priya
       Gupta (supra) it did exercise that power in favour of government
       medical colleges. The decision of this Court in Priya Gupta (supra)
                                                                                B
       undoubtedly directed that the Schedule to the Regulations must
       be strictly and scrupulously observed. However, subsequent to
       that decision, the Regulations stood amended, incorporating a Note
       empowering the Central Government to modify the stages and
       time-limits in the Schedule to the Regulations. The effect of similar
       such empowerment and consequential exercise of power as                  c
       expected from the Central Government has been considered by
       this Court in Priyadarshini9• The Central Government is thus
        statutorily empowered to modify the Schedule in respect of class
        or category of applicants, for reasons to be recorded in writing.
        Because of subsequent amendment and incorporation of the Note
                                                                                D
        as aforesaid, the matter is now required to be seen in the light of
        and in accord with Priyadarshini (supra) wl1ere similar Note in
        pari materia Regulations was considered by this Court. We
        therefore hold that the directions in Priya Gupta (supra) must
        now be understood in the light of such statutory empowerment
      . and we declare that it is open to the Central Government, in terms      E
        of the Note, to extend or modify the time-limits in the Schedule to
      ·_the Regulations. However the deadline, namely, 30th of September
        for making admissions to the first MBBS course as laid down by
     · this Court in Madhu Singh" and Mridul Dhar (5}' 1 must always
        be observed."
               •                                                                F
       16. The question of tenability of an interim order passed by the
High Court in matters of admission came for consideration in a recent
decision in Me<lic11/ Council of India v. Kalinga Institute ofMedical
Sciences (KIMS) 1111<1 o.tlters 12 • The Cou1t found that after the MCI
and the Central Government having twice considered the inspection report,
the matter ought to have been given a quietus by the High Court for the         G
academic year 2015-2016. It has been further observed that the High
'(201IJ4 sec 623
10
   (2002 l 7 sec 258
11
   (2005) 2 sec 65
11 (2016) II SCC530
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852             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017) 2 S.C.R.


A     Court ought to have been more circumspect in directing the admission
      of students and there was no need for the High Court to rush into an
      area that MCI feared to tread. It was further observed that:-
            "27 .... Granting admission to students in an educational institution
            when there is a serious doubt whether admission should at all be
B           granted is not a matter to be taken lightly. First of all the career of
            a student is involved - what would a student do if his admission
            is found to be illegal or is quashed? ls it not a huge waste ohime
            for him or her? ls it enough to say that the student will not claim
            any equity in his or her favour? Is it enough for student to be told
            that his or her admission is subject to the outcome of a pending
c           litigation? These are all questions that arise and for which there is
            no easy answer. Generally speaking, it is better to err on the side
            of caution and deny admission ·to a student rather than have the
            sword ofDamocleshanging over him or her. There would at least
            be some certainty."
D            We respectfully concur with the said observations.
              17. It is worthy to note that the Court thought it appropriate to
      observe that for the fault of the institution, the students should not suffer
      nor should the institution get away scot-free. It issued certain directions
      to the institution that it should not have entered into adventurist litigation
E     and costs of Rs. 5 crores were imposed for playing with the future of
      the students and the mess that the institution had created for them. Certain
      other directions were issued in this case which we need not advert to.
              18. In Asliisli Ranjm1 (supra), the Court after hearing the Union
      oflndia, MCI and all the States, had fixed a time schedule and directed
F     as follows:-
             "3. Regard being had to the prayer in the writ petition, nothing
             remains to be adjudicated. The order passed today be sent to the
             Chief Secretaries of l!ll the States so that they shall see to it that
             all the stakeholders follow the schedule in letter and spirit and not
G            make any deviation whatsoever. Needless to say AllMS and PG!
             (for the examination held in July) shall also follow the schedule in
             letter and spirit."
            19. From the aforesaid authorities, it is perspicuous that the court
      should not pass such interim orders in the matters of admission, more so,
H     when the institution had not been accorded approval. Such kind ofi~terim
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. DR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI                                     853
RUGNA SEVA MANDAL, HINGOLI & ORS. [bIPAK MISRA, J.]

orders are likely to cause chaos, anarchy and uncertainty. And, there is             A
no reason for creating such situations. There is no justification or
requirement. The High Court may feel that while exercising power under
Article 226 of the Constitution, it can pass such orders with certain
qualifiers as has been done by the impugned order, but it really does not
save the situation. It is because.an institution which has not been given
                                                                                     B
approval for the course, gets a premium. That apart, by virtue of interim
order, the court grants approval in a way which is the subject matter of
final adjudication before it. The anxiety of the students to get admission
reigns supreme as they feel that the institution is granting admission on
the basis of an order passed by the High Court. The institution might be
directed to inform the students that the matter is sub judice, but the               c
career oriented students get into the college with the hope and aspiration
that in the ultimate eventuate everything shall be correct for them and
they will be saved. It can be thought of from another perspective, that
is, the students had deliberately got into such a situation. But it is seemly
to note that it is the institution that had approached the High Court and
                                                                                     D
sought a reliefofthe present nature. By saying that the institution may
give admission at its own risk invites further chaotic and unfortunate
situations.
       20. The High Court has to realize the nature of the /is or the
controversy. It is quite different. It is not a construction which is built at
the risk of a plaintiff or the defendant which can be demolished or                  E
redeemed by grant of compensation. It is a situation where the order
has the potentiality to play with the career and life of young. One may
say," ... life is a foreign language; all mis-pronounce it", but it has to be
borne in mind that artificial or contrived accident is not the goal of life.
       21. There is no reason to invite a disaster by way of an interim              F
order. A Judge has to constantly remind himself about the precedents in
the field and not to be swayed away by his own convictions. In this
context, the oft-quoted passage from Felix Frankfurter" would be apt to
remember:-
       "For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to subordinate one's            G
       personal pulls and one's private views to the law of which we are
       all guardians - those impersonal convictions that make a society
       a civilized community, and notthe victims of personal rule."
" FRANKFURTER, Felix. in Clark, Tom C., "Mr. Justice Frankfurter: •A Heritage for
all Who Love the Law'," 51 A.B.A.l. 330, 332 ( 1965)
                                                                                     H
854             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 2 S.C.R.


A           22. That leads us to say something about following the precedents.
      The purpose is to have consistency. A three-Judge Bench in Government
      ofAndlira Pradesh and otl1ers v. A.P. Jaiswal a11d otflers" observed:-
            "24. Consistency is the cornerstone ofthe administration ofjustice.
            It is consistency which creates confidence in the system and this
B           consistency can never be achieved without respect to the rule of
            finality. It is with a view to achieve consistency in judicial
            pronouncements, the courts have evolved the rule of precedents,
            principle of stare decisis, etc. These rules and principle are based
            on public policy .... "'
              23. In Arasmeta Captive Power Company Private Limited and
c     anotfler v. Lafarge India Private Limited,.., dealing with the matter
      that related to the field of arbitration, the Court emphatically observed
      that it is an "endeavour to clear the maze, so that certainty ·remains "A
      Definite" and finality is "Final"". In this regard, we may travel a decade
      and a half back. In Cflandra Prakasfl and others v. State of U.P. a11d
D     <motlier", it has been held:-
              "22 .... The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance
              in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty
              and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes
              confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for
              consistency in the enunciation oflegal principles in the decisions
E
              of this Court."
             24. In the instant case, the precedents are clear and luculent. It
      does not allow any space for any kind of equi'vocation. In Priya Gupta
      (supra), the Court had requested the High Courts to ensure strict
      adherence to the prescribed time schedule, process of selection and role
F     of merit and except in very exceptional cases, to decline interim orders.
      The Court had added the words "humility at our command". The
      "grammar of humility in law" in the hierarchical system basically means
      to abide by the precedents unless distinguishable but not to ignore them
      and pass orders because of an individual notion or perception.
G     Adjudication in accordance with precedents is cultivation of humility.
      As long as a precedent is binding under the constitutional scheme, it has
      to be respected by all. It has been said by Simone Wei1 17 :-
      14(2001) 1sec748
      "(2013) 15 sec 414
      " (2002) 4 sec 234
H     17 Simone Weil, 1909·1943 Grarity and Grace. 1947
 DENTAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. DR. HEDGEWAR SMRUTI                                  855
RUGNA SEVA MANDAL, HINGOLI & ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

       "In the intellectual order, the virtue ofhumility is nothing more nor     A
       less than the power of attention"
       25. We reiterate the concept of humility as stated in Priya Gupta
(supra). However, we intend to add that the meaning behind the words,
namely, "humility", and "request" as used by this Court, has to be
appositely understood. by the High Courts. It requires attention. And             B
attention in the context is disciplined and concerned awareness. Nothing
more need be said.
       26. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we cannot but hold that the
impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
is absolutely unsustainable. But the controversy does not end there. It is        c
the admitted position that the respondent-college has been granted
approval for the academic session 2017-2018. By virtue of the interim
order passed by the High Court, three students had been admitted and
they are prosecuting their studies. We intend to strike a balance. The
students who have been admitted shall be allowed to continue their
courses, but their seats shall be adjusted from the academic session              D
2017-2018. The respondent-college cannot be allowed to get a premium.
The grant of bounty is likely to allow such institutions to develop an
attitude of serendipity. Such a culture is inconceivable. Therefore, apart
from the adjustment of seats for the next academic session; we also
direct the respondent-college to deposit a sum of Rs. 30 Lakhs before             E
the Registry of this Court within eight weeks hence and to ensure such
compliance, the matter shall be listed in the third week ofJuly, 2017 for
 further directions. After the amount is deposited, it shall be determined
how to deal with the sum: The costs that has been directed to be deposited
before the Registry of this Court shall in no manner be recovered from
the students who had been admitted nor shall it be collected from the             F
 students who will be admitted to the course in the next year. That apart,
 the respondent-college shall not think of any kind ofadjustment.
        27. The appeal stai1ds disposed of in above terms.

Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeal qisposed of    G