DIDIGAM BIKSHAPATHI & ANR.versusSTATE OF AP.
- Citation
- 2007 INSC 1205
- Decided
- 29 November 2007
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The suicide note clearly implicated the accused, so the High Court was correct in rejecting the petition and the appeal is dismissed.
Summary
The deceased, Budida Krishnamurthy, committed suicide after alleged harassment and financial disputes with the appellants, Didigam Bikshapathi and others. In his suicide note he implicated the appellants, leading to charges of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. The appellants filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking to quash the criminal proceedings, which the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the suicide note constituted sufficient basis for abetment and whether the High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the case. The Court held that the note clearly referred to acts of the accused, satisfying the test for abetment, and that Section 482 should be used sparingly, not to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether the suicide note provides sufficient evidence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC to deny quashing under Section 482 CrPC.
- Whether the High Court erred in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to reject the petition for quashing the proceedings.
- Whether Section 482 CrPC can be invoked to quash criminal proceedings where the FIR alleges abetment of suicide.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
A DIDIGAM BIKSHAPATHI & ANR.
v.
STATE OF AP.
NOVEMBER 29, 2007
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYA T AND T ARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.) (_
Code a/Criminal Procedure. 1973:
c s.482-Criminal Proceedings-For offence u/s 306 IPC--On the
basis of suicide noteLPetition for quashing of proceedings-
Dismissed-On appeal, held: Petition rightly rejected-Case is clearly
made out from suicide note.
s. 482-lnherent jurisdiction-Scope and purpose of-Held: Such
D powers are providedfor administration a/justice-They are wise, but ,..
it should be exercised sparingly in rarest ofrare cases.
Maxims-Maxim 'quando lex aliauid alicui condedit, concedere
videtur et id sine guo res ipsae esse non potest'
E Proceedings were initiated against the appellants before
Sessions Judge for offences punishable u/s 306 IPC. The deceased
in a suicide note had held the appellants responsible for the suicide
clearly narrating the circumstances under which he committed
suicide. Appellants filed an application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. seeking
F quashing of the proceedings. High court dismissed the petition in view 'r'
of the suicide note. Hence, the present appeal. ,.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The suicide note clearly refers to the background in
G which the victim took the extreme step of taking away his own life
by committing suicide. It is not a case where there is no reference to
any act by the accused. Therefore, High Court rightly rejected the •
prayer of exercise for power under Section 482 Cr.P .C.
[Paras 11and12) [701-H; 702-A, CJ
H 694
DIDIGAMBIKSHAPATHiv. STATE 695
-""'
Netai Dutta v. State of West Bengal, (2005) AIR SCW 1326, A
distinguished.
2.1. Courts have inherent powers apart from express provisions
oflaw which are necessary for proper discharge offunctions and
duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds
B
- j expression in Section 482 Cr.P.C. which merely recognizes and
preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether
civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision,
as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary
to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of
justice on the principle "quando lex aliauid alicui concedit, concedere c
videtur et id sine guo res ipsae esse non potest'' (when the law gives
a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot
exist). [Para 7) [698-F, H]
-), 2.2. Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High D
Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed
before the enactment ofCr.P.C. It envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i)
to give effect to an order under Cr.P.C. (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It E
is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which
would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may
possibly arise. [Para 7) (698-D, E]
~ 2.3. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the F
High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether
the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable
appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained, that is the
function of the trial Judge nor does it function as a court of appeal
or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has G
'\,.. ' to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when
such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts
exist. [Para 7 and 9) (698-H; 699-A, B; H; 7Ga-A) H
f
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.
A 2.4. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires
great caution in its exercise. The power should be exercised
sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The Court must be
careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on
B sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle
a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of
a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision
in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so
when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the
c Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without
sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down
in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any
D stage. [Paras 9 and 10] (700-D; 701-D; E-G)
State of!!aryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1335, relied on.
R.P. Kapur v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1960) SC 866; State ofOrissa
v. Saro} Kumar Sahoo, (2005) 13 SCC 540 and Minu Kumari v. State
E ofBihar, AIR (2006) SC 1937, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1643 of2007.
From the Judgment & Order dated 29.3.2006 of the High Court of
F Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No. 2758/
2002.
G.V. Choudhari and K. Shivraj Choudhuri for the Appellants.
P. Vinay Kumar and D. Bharathi Reddy for the Respondent.
G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned
Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, dismissing the petition
H
DIDIGAMBIKSHAPATHI v. STATE [PASA YAT,J.] 697
filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal A
Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code'). Prayer was to quash the
proceedings in SC No.498 of 2001 on the file of VII Additional
Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, initiated against them for
commission of offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'). B
3. Accusations which led to the institution of the proceedings are
essentially are as follows:
Budida Krishnamurthy (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') had
close friendship with the appellant (Al). About four years back he C
appointed deceased and others as field officers in his finance firm namely;
Uma Hire Purchase and Finance. While so, the appellant no. I joined as
a partner in Kanaka Mahalaxmi Real Estate Ventures run by Mekala Ravi
• and Mekala Venu. The deceased and two other field officers namely;
,; Budida Laxmaiah (L.W. 7) and Thandra Mallaiah (L.W.8) sold about 15 D
plots in that group to Kommaipalli villagers and collected various amounts
from them and handed over the same to the appellant no. I. As he did
not pay the money to the Kanaka Mahalaxmi Real Estate Ventures, the
other partners did not register the plots in favour of the persons, who paid
the money to the deceased. Since the deceased demanded for registration E
of the plots in favour of the prospective purchasers, he (appellant no. I)
escaped with his family from Jangaon and was staying at his in-laws house.
The deceased went there and demanded registration of the plots, but the
appellants abused him in filthy language and the accused neither registered
the plots nor returned the amount. Due to the mental harassment and unable F
to bear the pressure from the purchasers of the plots, the deceased
committed suicide by falling under an un-known train in the night of
17.4.2001 leaving a suicide note narrating the reasons for his committing
suicide.
4. Before the High Court the stand was that the ingredients necessary G
to constitute offence under Section 306 IPC are absent. There is no
element of abetrnent. The High Court did not accept the contention taking
note of the statement made in the suicide note. The High Court felt that
this was not a fit case where the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code is to be exercised. H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.
A 5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that there was no question of abetment. Merely because the
person committed suicide having been insulted and humiliated due to the
comments or utterances made by the accused, that does not constitute
an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. Therefore, the High Court
B ought to have quashed the proceedings. Strong reliance was placed on a >
decision of this Court in Netai Dutta v. State of West Bengal, (2005)
AIR SCW 1326. Further it was submitted that there was only a vague
reference to appellant no.2 wife of appellant no.1, and on that score, the
appeal deserves to be allowed so far as she is concerned.
c 6. In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that
the suicide note clearly refers to various acts of the appellants due to which
the unfortunate step of committing suicide was taken by the victim and in
any event it is not a fit case where jurisdiction under Section 482 is to be
exercised.
D
7. Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High Court.
It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the
enactment of the Code. lt envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order
E under the Code (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable
to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide
for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent
F powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for
proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That
is the doctrine which finds expression in the section w~ich merely
recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,
whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision,
as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do
G the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on
the principle "quando lex aliauid alicui concedit, concedere videtur
et id sine guo res ipsae esse non potest'' (when the law gives a person
anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising
powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal
H
-+
DIDIGAMBIKSHAPATHI v. STATE [P ASAYAT,J.] 699
or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be A
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice
for the administration of which alone courts exist Authority of the court
exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse B
~
that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court, to allow any action
which would result in injustice and prevent promotion ofjustice, in exercise
of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds
that initiation/continuance of it amounts to 'abuse of the process of court c
or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it
is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has
~ alleged and whether any offence is made out even ifthe allegations are
D
accepted in toto.
8. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR (1960) SC 866 this
Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can
and should be exercised to quash the proceedings.
E
._ (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the
institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint
taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not
constitute the offence alleged; F
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal
evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly
fails to prove the charge.
9. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind G
".'--! the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where
there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made,
and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or
may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code the High Court would not ordinarily embark H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 12 S.C.R.
A upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should
not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should
be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
B relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the
section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of
C power under Section 482 of the Code. and the categories of cases where
the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable
offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992] Supp I 335. A note of caution was,
D however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that ,k
too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court
are as follows:
"(!) Where the allegations made in the first infonnation report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
E accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused. •
(2) Where the allegations in the first infonnation report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
F under Section 156 (I) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
G not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is pennitted by a police officer without an order of a
H
DIDIGAMBIKSHAPATHiv. STATE[PASAYAT,J.] 701
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. A
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or "complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
B
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code. or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in
the Code. or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the c
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with ma/a
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
/
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." D
10. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code. are very wide and the very plenitude of the
power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see
that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. E
The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should
normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the
entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not
been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, F
whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule
can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise
its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See
State of Orissa v. Saro) Kumar Sahoo, [2005] 13 SCC 540 and Minu G
Kumari v. State of Bihar, AIR (2006) SC 1937)
11. The suicide note clearly refers to the background in which the
victim took the extreme step of taking away his own life by committing
suicide. It is not a case where there is no reference to any act by the
H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.
A accused. In Netai Dutta 's case (supra) para 6 it was observed as follows:
"6. In the suicide note, except referring to the name of the
appellant at two places, there is no reference of any act or incidence
whereby the appellant herein is alleged to have committed any
willful act or omission or intentionally aided or instigated the 1 •
B deceased Pranab Kumar Nag in committing the act of suicide.
There is no case that the appellant has played any part or any role
in any conspiracy, which ultimately instigated or resulted in the
commission of suicide by deceased Pranab Kumar Nag."
c 12. In the instant case the suicide note clearly refers to the acts of
the accused-appellants and the roles played by them. Therefore, the High
Court rightly rejected the prayer of exercise of power under Section 482
of the Code. We make it clear that any observation made by the High
Court and by us while dismissing of the present appeal shall be construed
D to be determinative factor in the trial.
K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.
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