DINESH CHANDRA PANDEYversusHIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.

                     (2010] 8 S.C.R. 37


               DINESH CHANDRA PANbEY                            A
                              V.
               HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.
              (Civil Appeal No. 2622 of 2005)

                       JULY 8, 2010                             B
 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

     Service Law - Judicial officer - Departmental Enquiry -
Charge for possessing disproportionate assets - A Judge
appointed as Presenting Officer - Application of delinquent C
for appointing legal practitioner for his. defence dismissed -
Found guilty in enquiry - Dismissal from service - Appeal,
writ petition as well as LPA dismissed - On appeal, plea _that
denial to engage legal practitioner violative of principles of
natural ,'ustice and Civil Services Rules and that evidence was D
not appreciated in its correct perspective - Held: Denial of
engagement of legal practitioner was not violative of the
principles of natural justice or the Rules - Permission for
engagement of legal practitioner was not mandatory -
Engagement of 'legal practitioner' is permissible for delinquent E
only if the Presenting Officer is a legal practitioner - A judge
in service cannot be termed as a legal practitioner - Non-
production of witnesses and documents by the delinquent in
support of his case leads to drawing adverse inference against
him - On facts, delinquent has not approached the court with F
clean hands - Judges are expected to apply stringent social
and moral values to their standard of living - Finding of facts
arrived at by authorities/courts below cannot be interfered with
in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 - M.P. Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 - G
r. 14(8) - Principles of natural justice - Interpretation of
Statutes - A,9vocates Act, 1961 - s. 2(i) - Central
Administrative -Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 - r. 2(e) -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 - Judiciary.
                             37                                 H
    38      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (201 O] 8 S.C.R:


A        Interpretation of Statutes - Contextual interpretation -
    Expression 'may' in a statute - Not essential, that it is always
    directory - It can be read as 'shall' in view of the legislative
    intent - However, in the instant case, expression 'may' in r.
    14(8) to be construed as directory - M.P. Civil Services
B   (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 - r. 14 (8).
         Words and Phrases - 'Legal practitioner' - Meaning of.

        Appellant-a Civil Judge was charged for possessing
    disproportionate assets to his known source of income.
c   In the course of departmental enquiry, he made an
    application for permission to engage a legal practitioner,
    which was declined. Enquiry Officer found him guilty of
    the charge. Disciplinary Authority imposed punishment
    of removal from service. Appeal against the order was
0   dismissed by the Governor. Writ petition as well as
    Letters Patent Appeal were dismissed.
        In the instant appeal, the impugned order was
    challenged mainly on two grQunds viz. denial of
    assistance of legal practitioner was in violation of
E   principles of natural justice as well as M.P. Civil Services
    (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966; and that
    Disciplinary Authority and the courts had not appreciated
    the evidence in its correct perspective.
         Dismissing the appeal, the Court
F
      HELD: 1.1 The bare reading of Rule 14(8) of M.P. Civil
  Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966
  shows that the Government servant may take the
  assistance of any other Government servant to represent
G his case but may not engage a legal practitioner for the
  purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the
  authority is a 'legal practitioner' or the disciplinary
  authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case,
  so permits. The expression 'may' cannot be read as
H 'shall'. The normal Rule is that a delinquent officer would
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF                   39
                M.P. & ANR.
 be entitled to engage another officer to present his case.      A
 But if the Presenting Officer is a 'legal practitioner', he
 may normally be permitted to engage a legal practitioner.
 The third category is where the disciplinary authority
 having regard to the circumstances of the case so
·permits. It is, therefore, not absolutely mandatory that the    B
 disciplinary authority should permit the engagement of
 a legal practitioner irrespective of the facts and
 circumstances of the case. There is some element of
 discretion vested with the authority which, has to be
 exercised properly and in accordance with the settled           c
 principles of service jurisprudence. [Para 7) (50-D-H]
      1.2 Where expression 'shall' has been used it would
not necessarily mean that it is mandatory. It will always
depend upon the facts of a given case, the conjunctive
reading of the relevant provisions along with other              D
provisions of the Rules, the purpose sought to be
achieved and the object behind implementation of such
a provision. Where the word 'may' shall be read as 'shall'
would depend upon the intention of the legislature and
it is not to be taken that once the word 'may' is used, it       E
per se would be directory. The expression 'may', used in
Rule 14(8) of 1966 Rules would have to be construed as
directory and not absolutely mandatory with reference to
the facts and circumstances of a given case. [Para 7) (50-
H; 51-A-E]                                                       F
     Sar/a Goel v. Kishan Chand (2009) 7 SCC 658;
 Malaysian Airlines Systems BHD (II) v. Stic Travels (P.) Ltd.
 (2001) 1 sec 509, relied on.
      1.3. In the instant case the Presenting Officer was an     G
 Additional District Judge. He possessed similar
 qualification, professionally or otherwise, as was the
 appellant himself. The appellant could have asked for
 permission to engage and take assistance of any other
 judicial officer of that rank or of any rank that Ile wanted,   H
    40      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 8 S.C.R.

A which request ought to have been considered by the
   Disciplinary Authority. It will be entirely uncalled for, that
  an Additional Judge should be termed as a legal
  practitioner and, therefore, vesting in the appellant a right
  to engage a legal practitioner or an advocate for
B defending him in the departmental proceedings. It will be
  rather appropriate to apply the principles of contextual
  interpretation in the facts and circumstances of the case.
  A judge in service cannot be termed as a legal
  practitioner, as it will mean and include only an Advocate
c or a Vakil of court practicing in a court, may even be a
  Barrister, Special Pleader, Solicitors depending on the
  facts of a given case. Rule 2(e) of the Central
  Administrative Rules, 1987 also defines the word 'legal
  practitioner'. However, it, in turn, requires that this
  expression shall have the same meaning as is assigned
0
  to it under the Advocates Act, 1961. In that Act the word
  'legal practitioner' has been defined u/s. 2(i) to mean an
  Advocate or Vakil of any High Court, a pleader Mukhtar
  or Revenue Agent. The 'legal practitioner' is an
E expression of definite connotation and cannot be granted
  an extended or inclusive meaning, so as to include what
  is not specifically covered. A Judge may be law graduate
  holding a Bachelor Degree in Law from any University
  established by law in India but this by itself would not
  render him as a 'legal practitioner'. On the contrary, there
F is a definite restriction upon the Judge from practicing
  law. Such an implied inclusion, would not only lead to
  absurdity but would even offend the laws in force in India.
  [Paras 7 and 8) [51-F-H; 52-A-B; G-H; 53-A-D]
G        Muddada Chayanna vs. K. Narayana AIR 1979 SC 1320,
    relied on.
        Bhavnaqar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd.
    AIR 2003---SC 51{,_ referred to.
H        P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon; 'Principles of the
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF                41
                M.P. & ANR.
Common Law' by John lndermaur, .169 (Edmund H.                 A
Bennett ed., 1st Am.ed. 1878), referred to.
     1.4. Even on principle of fairness, the order cannot
be said to have caused any prejudice to the appellant.
The appellant could have asked for appointment of any
colleague whose assistance he wanted to take and who           8
would have been as well qualified and experienced as the
presenting officer. The request of the appellant has been
rightly rejected by the disciplinary authority. Furthermore,
the appellant took no steps whatsoever to challenge the
order of the Disciplinary Authority declining assistance       C
of an advocate. On the contrary, he participated without
any further protest in the entire departmental enquiry and
raised no objections. The Enquiry Officer conducted the
proceedings in a just, fair manner and in accordance with
rules. In fact, there is no challenge to that aspect of the    D
matter. The appellant himself was fully capable of
defending himself in the departme~tal enquiry. In the
alternative he could easily ask for assistance of any
senior colleague from the service if he was under
 pressure of any kind that the Presenting Officer was          E
senior to him and belonged to Higher Judicial Service. He
did not exercise this choice, at any stage, for reasons
 best known to him. However, he made an application
 praying for permission to engage an advocate and
 nothing else. Charge against the appellant was not of a       F
very complicated nature, which a person having
qualification and experience of the appellant would not
 be able to defend. In these circumstances, no prejudice
 whatsoever has been caused to the interest of the
 delinquent officer. [Para 9] [53-F-H; 54-A-F]                 G
    J.K. Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds pevelopment
Corporation Ltd. 1991 (2) SCC 283; Board of Trustees of the
Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni
1983 (1) SCR 828, distinguished.
                                                               H
    42      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010) 8 S.C.R.


A        2.1. So far as the plea regarding perversity in
    appreciation of the evidence in the impugned judgment
    under appeal is concerned, the finding of facts arrived at
    by the enquiry officer was not interfered with by the
    Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High
B   Court. It is hardly permissible for this Court to disturb
    such findings of fact in exercise of its jurisdiction under
    Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [Para 11] [57-F-G]
       2.2. The conduct of the appellant can hardly be
  appreciated in regard to deposit of money in the Bank
C regularly during the entire period of the relevant year. The
  Department had showed that the deposits have been
  made and the bank balance of the appellant, on a
  particular date, was beyond the known sources of his
  income to which, the appellant has raised a defence that
D he owned the land and the income received was an
  agricultural income. However, he produced no evidence
  during the departmental enquiry to show that some
  person was making payment to him and/or some person
  was depositing the money in the Bank so received from
E agricultural activity in every 2-3 days. Non-examination of
  witnesses viz. persons carrying on the agricultural
  activity, harvesting and selling the same; and the persons
  purchasing the crop etc. and non-production of
  necessary documents must lead to draw an adverse
F inference against the appellant. In any case, the appellant
  cannot take advantage of that fact and contend that the
  inquiry officer has failed to appreciate evidence in its
  correct perspective. [Para 11] [57-G-H; 58-A-E]
      2.3. In the property return for the relevant year, the
G appellant is shown to have 1/3rd share in the agricultural
  land located at two different places. There is a specific
  column relating to income from agriculture. In that form
  it was filled in by the appellant as 'uncertain'. Thus, for
  the substantial period, he was fully aware of his income
H received from agricultural activity but he still chooses to
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF               43
                M.P. & ANR.
keep it vague and not declare his true income in the A
return. Now, in the departmental proceedings and in the
reply to the charge-sheet, he submitted that there was an
income of more than Rs.50,000/- p.a. and that he owned
37.53 acres of land at two different places. It is again
strange that he did not disclose in his reply that this was B
a land jointly owned with his brothers and family
members and what was the extent of his holding
individually. In the return, he himself claimed one-third
share in the property. The total land indicated at two
different places being 26 acres + 18 comes to 44 acres c
and one third of which, merely 14 acres approximately,
would be the land owned by hi'm and not 37 acres as
claimed. This, itself shows that the appellant has not
approached the court with clean hands and has not
disclosed true facts which were known to him alone. D
[Para 11] [58-F; 59-A-D]
     2.4. In the departmental proceedings, he took
incorrect defence contrary to his return and failed to
discharge the onus placed upon him. In the departmental
enquiry, the appellant produced no income tax returns to E
show that in addition to his salary, he had other sources
of income and what was the extent of income from these
sources. In his written statement of defence he never took
up the plea that any such returns were filed and he made
no effort to bring on record t~e copies of such income- F
tax returns, if at all filed. It was obligatory on the part of
the delinquent officer to disclose all such relevant facts
which were only within his personal knowledge. He
belongs to a service which is looked upon by the public
at large as a\ service cadre of high integrity and G
professional values. The Judges are expected to apply
stringent social and moral values to their standard of
living. It was expected of the appellant to disclose all true
and correct information and documents in his power and
                                                            H
    44       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   possession before the Enquiry Officer. It was not required
    of him to with-hold relevant material and take such a
    defence which could not be substantiated during the
    course of departmental enquiry. Having failed to produce
    relevant documentary evidence as well as examine the
B   witnesses, the appellant cannot argue that the
    Disciplinary Authority or the courts have not appreciated
    the evidence in its correct perspective. [Para 11] [59-D;
    60-A]
                          Case Law Reference:
c
          (2009) 1 sec 658        Relied on.           Para 7
          (2001) 1 sec 509        Relied on.           Para 7
          AIR 1979 SC 1320        Relied on.           Para 7
D         AIR 2003 SC 511         Referred to.         Para 7
         · 1991 (2) sec 283       Distinguished.       Para 9
          1983 (1) SCR 828        Distinguished.       Para 10
E       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    2622 of 2005.
        From the Judgment & Order dated 17.12.2004 of the High
    Court of Judicature M.P. at Jabalpur in LPA No. 606 of 2003.
F        C.N. Sreekumar, T.G. Narayanan Nair, Dushyant Parashar,
    P.R. Nayak for the Appellant.
          B.S. Banthia for the Respondents.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G       SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Dinesh Chandra Pandey,
    appellant herein, was appointed to the post of Civil Judge in
    the M.P. Judicial Service (Class II) on 27th January, 1982. On
    completion of the training period, he joined as Civil Judge,
    Dhamtari on 12th September, 1982. During his tenure as Civil
H   Judge, certain irregularities were noticed by the competent
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF                     45
      M.P. & ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

authority and on 7th December, 1988, a charge-sheet was             A
served upon him, primarily, on the ground that he was
possessed of disproportionate money/assets to his known
sources of income. He was served with a charge sheet
containing two articles of charges. One out of them (Charge 2)
had not been proved while other Charge (Charge 1) stood             B
proved against the delinquent officer. Article 1 which had been
established reads as under:

    "That the said Shri D.C. Pandey while his posting as Civil
    Judge, Class-II and J.M.F.C. Raipur had a Bank account
    in State Bank of India Account No. SB/8833, the balance         C
    whereof swelled from Rs.2170.01 to Rs.35036.92 paise
    within the period from January 1984 to 6th May, 1985, his
    explanation in this behalf having been found unconvincing
    considering the disproportionateness of the said increase
    in his bank balance to his salary income and pattern and        D
    frequency of deposits the said increase in balance is
    capable of no other reasonable explanation than that of
    illicit gains as the source of money which renders his
    integrity gravely doubtful."
                                                                    E
     2. The ~!legations were denied by him and on 30th
January, 1989 he submitted that he owns 37 acres of land in
Bilaspur and has agricultural income to the extent of Rs. 50,000/
- p.a. It is out of this agricultural income that he has been
depositing amounts in the bank and has not committed any            F
violation of service regulations or other offence which would
attract disciplinary action against him. The competent authority
decided to conduct a regular departmental enquiry and
appointed Shri G.R. Pandya, District & Sessions Judge, Raipur
as enquiry officer. Besides appointing an enquiry officer, the      G
High Court also appointed Shri Ram Krishna Behar, Addi.
Judge as Presenting Officer. During the course of enquiry, the
appellant made an application for permission to engage a legal
practitioner to assist him in the departmental enquiry. This
request was declined by the High Court vide order dated 4th
                                                                    H
    46       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2010) 8 S.C.R.


A   December, 1989. The appellant participated in the enquiry and
    the enquiry officer submitted his report on 4th April, 1990 and
    returned the finding of guilt against the appellant. The
    concluding paragraphs of the report read as under:

         "Shri Pandey was saving Rs.600/- p.m. out of his salary
B
         and, therefore, this amount was quite insufficient for
         making such a large saving. Mere saying of Shri Pandey
         received the amounts frequently from his mother is not
         sufficient. Something more was required to explain the
         deposits. This type of explanation was already given by
c        Shri Pandey during the preliminary inquiry and was already
         found unsatisfactory, hence further opportunity was given
         to Shri Pandey, by holding this inquiry to give reasonable
         and convincing explanation regarding the source of his
         income. I am sorry to say that Shri Pandey could not
D        assess the seriousness of the matter and went on
         repeating that the money was sent by his mother. The
         mother of Shri Pandey as well as the customers who had
         purchased the produce of the messenger who used to
         bring the money frequently from Bilaspur to Raipur have
E        not been examined. Under these circumstances, bald
         statement of Shri Pandey that money was received by him
         from his mother does not appear to be correct. Thus, I
         come to the conclusion that charge no. 1 regarding the
         frequent deposits made by Shri Pandey within a span of
F        short period is proved against him.

        3. Disciplinary authority, after receiving the said report,
  issued show cause notice to the appellant on 16th March, 1991
  informing the appellant that finding of the enquiry officer on
G Article (1) had been accepted and as to why punishment should
  not be imposed upon him to which he submitted a detailed
  reply. The disciplinary authority vide its order dated 10th June,
  1992, opined that the stand taken by the appellant was not
  satisfactory and consequently, imposed the punishment of
  removal from service. The appellant preferred an appeal
H
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF                    47
      M.P. & ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
against this order before the Governor which also came to be A
dismissed vide order dated 3rd February, 1993. The order of
removal from service, as confirmed by the appellate authority,
was challenged by the appellant by filing a Writ Petition being
Misc. Petition No. 3847 of 1992 in the High Court which also
came to be dismissed by the Ld. Single Judge vide its order B
dated 1st July, 2003. Still dissatisfied with the judgment of the
Court, Letter Patent Appeal was filed which also met the same
fate and was dismissed by the Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court vide order dated 17th December, 2004.
The legality and correctness of this order has been challenged   c
by the appellant in the present appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution.

 '· 4. As would be evident from the above narrated facts, the
charge against the appellant was a very limited one. In fact, the
deposit of the amount in the bank was not disputed by the D
appellant. However, he rendered the explanation that he had
agricultural land from where he was getting Rs. 50,000/-p.a. as
income and had, therefore, deposited these amounts in the
bank during the period stated in the charge sheet i.e. between i
January, 1984 to May, 1985. He had also taken up the stand E
before the Courts that while he was functioning as a Civil Judge
(Class II), Dhamtari in December, 1982, a crime had taken
place in which one Shri Pandri Rao Pawar, Advocate and     pne
of his nephew were involved. They had caused serious injuries
to the brother of Shri H.L. Warda, the then Judicial Magistrate, F
1st Class, Dhamtari who had lost his one eye in the assault. A
case under Sections 294, 3-25, 5068 of IPC was registered.
The appellant herein had rejected their bail application and did
 not succumb to the pressure brought in by the advocate which
 resulted ihenmity between the parties. It was also alleged that · G
the said advocate filed a complaint on 9th December, 1982
against the appellant stating therein that one witness Dayaram
 Sahu in Criminal Case No. 1153 of 1986 under Section 325/
 34 IPC was directed to be handcuffed without any justification
 and later on the appellant was transferred from Dhamtari and H
    48       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   posted to Raipur. As such there was a different motive for
    taking disciplinary action against the appellant than what was
    apparent from the record of the disciplinary proceedings.
    According to the appellant, he was possessed by sufficient
    means as he had income from salary as well as agricultural
s   activity. In light of the facts given by him, there was no occasion
    to frame any charge against the appellant. Further, the
    contention is that none of the article of charges have been
    proved against the delinquent in accordance with law.

       5. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the
C respondents contended that this Court should not re-appreciate
  the evidence. The enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority, the
  learned Single Judge and even the Division Bench have
  accepted the fact that the appellant had been rightly charged
  with Article 1, which stands proved and, as such, no interference
D is called for on merits or even on the question of quantum of
  punishment. It is also stated by him that in terms of Govt.
  Servant Conduct Rules, 1985, which are applicable to the
  members of the Judicial Service in the State of Madhya
  Pradesh, a Government servant who either fails to file a return
E prescribed in sub-rule (i) or files a return for any year, which
  does not fully disclose all the property that is required to be
  indicated or otherwise conceals any such property, would
  amount to misconduct. Further, the argument raised is that the
  Enquiry Officer has examined all the relevant aspects and after
F being satisfied that there was no plausible explanation for
  depositing the money in the bank at such short intervals, no fault
  can be found with the finding of the Enquiry Officer. Referring
  to the behaviour of a common prudent person/agriculturist, the
  income from agriculture could hardly be on day-to-day basis. It
G was nobody's case that vegetable or allied crop was being
  grown on the land in question. In normal course, the money
  would be available to agriculturist only when the crop is
  harvested and sold in the market. No such evidence had been
  produced by the appellant during the course of enquiry. Thus,
H no interference is called for.
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF                       49
      M.P. & ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
       6. The challenge to the impugned order is, primarily, on       A
two grounds. Firstly, the appellant had asked for assistance of
a legal practitioner which had been unfairly denied to him.
Denial of assistance of a legal practitioner tantamount to
violation of principles of natural justice as well as MP. Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for        B
short "1966 Rules"), and, as such, the entire departmental
proceedings as well as the impugned order of punishment are
vitiated. Secondly, the enquiry officer as well as the High Court
have not appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective and
has failed to accept plausible defence raised by the appellant        c
in regard to deposit of money in the bank. The order of removal
from service, thus, is based on no evidence and is required to
 be set aside. In support of this contention learned counsel
 referred to Rule 14(8) of the 1966 Rules as well as Judgment
 of this Court in the case of J.K. Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds          D
 Development Corporation Ltd. [(1991) 2 SCC 283] and Board
 of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar
 Raghavendranath Nadkarni, [(1983) 1 SCR 828]. The 1966
 rules are applicable to the member of judicial services of the
 State of Madhya Pradesh as the Government, in consultation
 with the High Court, has only framed one set of Rules i.e. M.P.      E
 Judicial Service (Classification, Recruitment and Conditions of
 Service) Rules, 1955 ( which primarily deal with the eligibility,
 methodology relating to appointment to the judicial services of
 the States and its cadre etc. As far as the disciplinary rules are
 concerned, it is a common case of the parties that the above         F
 1966 Rules are the Rules applicable to the members of judicial
 services. These Rules came into force from the date of their
 publication. They deal with power to suspend, conduct
 departmental enquiry, the procedure which is to be adopted in
 a departmental enquiry and punishments which can be inflicted        G
 upon an officer by the Competent Disciplinary Authority. While
 Rule 10 deals with the punishment and penalties which can be
 imposed on the member of the service, Rules 12 and Rule 13
 deal with the Disciplinary Authority and the authority who ca11
  institute the proceedings. While Rule 14 deals not' only with       Hi
    50       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   imposition of punishment but also gives the entire procedure
    which is required to be followed by the Enquiry Officer as well
    as the Disciplinary Authority before inflicting any punishment
    upon the charged officer, Rule 14(8) deals with providing of
    legal assistance or engagement of a legal practitioner during
B   the course of a departmental enquiry. As the reliance has been
    placed by both the parties on this Rule, it will be useful to
    reproduce the same here:

         "Rule 14(8): The Government servant may take the
         assistance of any other Government servant to present the
c        case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner
         for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by
         the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner, or, the
         disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances
         of the case, so permits."
D
        7. The bare reading of this Rule shows that the
  Government servant may take the assistance of any other
  Government servant to represent his case but may not engage
  a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the presenting officer
E appointed by the authority is a 'legal practitioner' or the
  disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the
  case, so permits. The expression 'may' cannot be read as
  'shall'. The normal Rule is that a delinquent officer would be
  entitled to engage another officer to present his case. But if the
F presenting officer is a 'legal practitioner', he may normally be
  permitted to engage a legal practitioner. The third category is
  where the disciplinary authority having regard to the
  circumstances of the case so permits. It is, therefore, not
  absolutely mandatory that the disciplinary authority should
G permit the engagement of a legal practitioner irrespective of
  the facts and circumstances of the case. There is some element
  of discretion vested with the authority which, of course, has to
  be exercised properly and in accordance with the settled
  principles of service jurisprudence. The Courts have taken a
  view that where expression 'shall' has been used it would not
H
DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. 51
        & ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
 necessarily mean that it is mandatory. It will always depend A
 upon the facts of a given case, the conjunctive reading of the
 relevant provisions along with other provisions of the Rules, the
 purpose sought to be achieved and the object behind
 implementation of such a provision. This Court in the case of
  Sar/a Goel v. Kishan Chand [(2009) 7 SCC 658], took the view B
 that where the word 'may' shall be read as 'shall' would depend
  upon the intention of the legislature and it is not to be taken that·
 once the word 'may' is used, it per se would be directory, In
 other words, it is not merely the use of a particular expression
 that would render a provision directory or mandatory. It would     c
  have to be interpreted in light of the settled principles, and while
  ensuring that intent of the Rule is not frustrated. Further, in the
  case of Malaysian Airlines Systems BHD (II) v. Stic Travels
  (P.) Ltd., [(2001) 1 sec 509]. this Court took the Vi!3W that word
  'may' in Section 11 (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, D
  1996 is not to be construed as 'must' or 'shall', as the word
  'may' has not been used in the sense of 'shall', the provision
  is not mandatory. In the light of these principles, we are of the
  considered view that the expression 'may', used in Rule 14(8)
  of 1966 Rules would have to be construed as directory and not
  absolutely mandatory with reference to the facts and ·E
  circumstances of a given case. Of course, it would be desirable
  that wherever the presenting officer is a legal practitioner, the
  delinquent officer should be given the option and may be
  permitted to engage a legal practitioner if he so opts. But this
  Rule is hardly of any assistance and help to the appellant in the F
  present case. The Presenting Officer was an Additional District
  Judge. He was possessed of similar qualification, professionally
  or otherwise, as was the appellant himself. The appellant could
  have asked for permission to engage and take assistance of
  any other judicial officer of that rank or of any rank that he G
· wanted which request ought to have been considered by the
  Disciplinary Authority. It will be entirely uncalled for that an
  Additional Judge should be termed as a legal practitioner and,
  therefore, vesting in the appellant a right to engage a legal
   practitioner or an advocate for defending him in the · H
    52       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   departmental proceedings. It will be rather appropriate to apply
    the principles of contextual interpretation in the facts and
    circumstances of the case. In the case of Muddada Chayanna
    vs. K. Narayana [AIR 1979 SC 1320], it was held by this Court
    that interpretation of statute, contextual or otherwise, must
B   further and not frustrate the object of the statute. In other words,
    the expression 'medical practitioner' appearing in the
    Maharashtra Nurses Act, 1966 should be given a meaning in
    the context in which it is sought to be applied to achieve the
    real object of the statute. It is also to be kept in mind that while
c   dealing with the provisions of the statute, the Court would not
    adopt an approach or give meaning to an expression which
    would produce unintelligible, absurd and unreasonable result
    and would render the legislative intent unworkable or totally
    irreconcilable with the provisions of the statute (Bhavnagar
    University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. [AIR 2003 SC
0
    511 ]). The learned counsel for the appellant referred to P.
    Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon to emphasise that the
    expression 'legal practitioner' appearing in Rule 14(8) would
    cover even a judicial officer. He relied upon the following
    explanations given to this expression:
E
         "Legal practitioner" defined (See also Advocate of a High
         Court; Barrister; Government pleader; Pleader; Public
         Prosecutor; Recognized agent) Act 18, 1879, S. 3; Act 18,
         1881, S. 4(2); Act 16, 1887, S.4(16); Act 17, 1889, S
F        3(13); Act 23.• 1923, S.2; Act 21, 1926, S.2

         'Legal Practitioner' means an advocate vakil or attorney
         of any High Court, a pleader, mukhtaro revenue agent. Act
         XVIII of 1879 (Legal Practitioners), S.3]"

G        8. The above referred explanations clearly show that a
    judge in service cannot be termed as a legal practitioner, as it
    will mean and include only an Advocate or a vakil of Court
    practicing in a Court, may even be a Barrister, Special Pleader,
    solicitors depending on the facts of a given case. Rule 2 (e) of
H   the Central Administrative Rules, 1987 also defines the word
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF                       53
      M.P. & ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

'legal practitioner'. However, it, in turn, requires that this A
expression shall have the same meaning as is assigned to it
under the Advocates Act, 1961. In that Act the word 'legal
practitioner' has been defined under Section 2(i) to mean an
advocate or vakil of any High Court, a pleader mukhtar or
revenue agent. In other words, this is an expression of definite B
connotation and cannot be granted an extended or inclusive
meaning, so as to include what is not specifically covered. A ·
Judge may be law graduate holding a Bachelor Degree in Law
from any University established by law in India but this by itself ·
would not render him as a 'legal practitioner'. On the contrary,      c
there is a definite restriction upon the Judge from practicing law.
Such an implied inclusion, as argued by the appellant, would
not only lead to absurdity but would even offend the laws in force
in India. John lndermaur, Principles of the Common Law 169
(Edmund H. Bennett ed., 1st Am.ed. 1878 explains the term D
a~.follows :

    . "Legal practitioners may be either barristers, special
      pleaders not at the bar, certified conveyancers, or
      solicitors. The three latter may recover their fees, but the
      first may not, their acting being deemed of a voluntary         E
      nature, and their fees merely in the light of honorary
      payments; and it follows from this, that no action lies
      against them for negligence or unskilfulness:"

     9. Thus, the expression 'legal practitioner' is a well defined   F
and explained term. It, by any stretch of imagination, cannot
include a serving Judge who might have been appointed as a
presenting officer in the departmental proceedings. Besides this
legal aspect of the matter, even on principle of fairness we do
not think that the order has caused any prejudice to the              G
appellant. The appellant could have asked for appointment of
any colleague whose assistance he wanted to take and who
would have been as well qualified and experienced as the
presenting officer. The request of the appellant has been rightly
rejected by the disciplinary authority. Furthermore, the
                                                                      H
application was made on 7th December, 1988 itself and
    54       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A thereafter the appellant took no steps whatsoever to challenge
    the order of the Disciplinary Authority declining assistance of
    an advocate. On the contrary, he participated without any further
    protest in the entire departmental enquiry and raised no
    objections. The Enquiry Officer conducted the proceedings in
s   a just, fair manner and in accordance with rules. In fact, there
  'is no challenge to that aspect of the matter. In the application,
    the appellant had stated "that the complainant neither has
    necessary experience nor the required skill to handle his
    defence in such circumstances." This statement ex facie is not
c correct. The appellant must have dealt with variety of cases
    during his tenure as a Judge. He was fully capable of defending
    himself in the departmental enquiry. In the alternative he could
    easily ask for assistance of any senior colleague from the
    service if he was under pressure of any kind that the Presenting
   Officer was senior to him and belonged to Higher Judicial
0
   Service. He did not exercise this choice, at any stage, for
    reasons best known to him. However, he made an application
   praying for permission to engage an advocate and nothing
   else. Charge against the appellant was not of a very
E complicated nature, which a person having qualification and
   experience of the appellant would not be able to defend. In
   these circumstances, we are of the considered view that no
   prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the interest of the
   delinquent officer. These are the rules primarily of procedure,
   an element of prejudice would be one of the necessary features,
F before departmental proceedings can be held to be vitiated on
   that ground. The reliance placed upon the case of J.K.
   Aggarwal (supra) is totally unwarranted. In that case, the Court
   came to the conclusion that refusal to sanction the service of
   lawyer in the inquiry proceedings was not a proper exercise of
G discretion under the Rule resulting in failure of justice. The Court
   held that the discretion was vested in the disciplinary authority
   in terms of Rule 7(5) of the relevant Rules. The language of that
   Rule was entirely different and permission to engage a legal
   practitioner was relatable to the nature of the punishment which
H could be imposed upon the delinquent officer in the
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF                     55
      M.P. & ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
departmental proceedings. If the charges were likely to result A
in dismissal of the person from service, in that event, that officer
may with the sanction of the Enquiry Officer be permitted to be
represented through a counsel. Language of this Rule is entirely
different from the language of the Rule in question in the present
case. On the basis of the facts of that case and Rule 7(5) of B
the said Rules the Court held:

    'The right of representative by a lawyer may not in all cases
    be held to be a part of natural justice. No general principle
    valid in all cases can be enunciated. In non~statutory
    domestic tribunals, Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal C
    in England favoured such a right where a serious charge
    had been made which affected the livelihood or the right
    of a person to pursue an avocation and observed:

    "I should have thought, therefore, that when a man's · D
    reputation or livelihood is at stdke, he not only has a right
    to speak by his own mouth. He also has a right to speak
    by counsel or solicitor."                                     ·

     But this was not followed by Lyell, J. in Pett case (No.2)
                                                                  E
    It would appear that in the inquiry, the respondent-
    Corporation was represented by its Personnel and
    Administration Manager who is stated to be a man of law.
    The rule itself recognizes that where the charges are so
    serious as to entail a dismissal from service the inquiry F
    authority may permit the services of a lawyer. This rule vests
    a discretion. In the matter of exercise of this discretion one
    of the relevant factors is whether there is likelihood of the
    combat being unequal entailing a miscarriage or failure of
    justice and a denial of a real and reasonable opportunity G
    for defence by reasons of the appellant being pitted
    against a presenting officer who is trained in law. Legal
    Adviser and a lawyer are for this purpose somewhat
    liberally construed and must include ''whosoever assists or
    advises on facts and in law must be deemed to be in the H
    56      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010) 8 S.C.R.


A        position of a legal adviser". In the last analysis, a decision
         has to be reached on a case to case basis on the
         situational particularities and the special requirements of
         justice of the case. It is unnecessary, therefore, to go into
         the larger question "whether as a sequel to an adverse
B        verdict in a domestic enquiry serious civil and pecuniary
         consequences are likely to ensue, in order to enable the
         person so likely to suffer such consequences with a view
         to giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself,
         on his request, should be permitted to appear through a
c        legal practitioner" which was kept open in Board of
         Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar. However,
         it was held in that case (SCC p. 132, para 12)

                " ... In our view we have reached a stage in our
         onward march to fair play in action that where in an enquiry
D        before a domestic tribunal the delinquent officer is pitted
         against a legally trained mind, if he seeks permission to
         appear through a legal practitioner the refusal to grant this
         request would amount to denial of a reasonable request
         to defend himself and the essential principles of natural
E        justice would be violated .... "

         On a consideration of the matter, we are persuaded to the
         view that the refusal to sanction the service of a lawyer in
         the inquiry was not a proper exercise of the discretion
         under the rule resulting in a failure of natural justice;
F
         particularly, in view of the fact that the Presenting Officer
         was a person with legal attainments and experience. It was
         said that the appellant was no less adept having been in
         the position of a Senior Executive and could have
         defended, and did defend, himself competently; but as was
G
         observed by the learned Master of Rolls in Pett case that
         in defending himself one may tend to become "nervous"
         or "tongue-tied". Moreover, appellant, it is claimed, has
         had no legal background. The refusal of the service of a
         lawyer, in the facts of this case, results in denial of natural
H        justice."
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF                      57
      M.P. & ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
     10. Thus, the appellant can hardly take any help from that A
case. Even· in the case of Dilipkumar Raghavendranath
Nadkami (supra), the Board of Trustees had appointed its law
officer as a presenting officer. The Presenting Officer wa.s
legally trained and experienced in handling departmental
enquiries, it was in those circumstances that this Court found, B
as a matter of fact, that there was violation of principles of
natural justice and that a legally expert person has been
permitted to be engaged by the delinquent worker. In that case
the provisions similar to the present provisions also came into
force during the pendency of the departmental proceedings. c
The Court remanded the matter and directed re-conducting of
the departmental enquiry with specific liberty to the workman
to cross-examine all the witnesses afresh in accordance with
law. The facts of that case are thus entirely different from the
case in hand wherein no such ground is' made out. Firstly, the D
petitioner himself was equally qualified and trained as the
presenting officer and/or he could even ask for assistance for
a fellow colleague with similar experience and status as that
of the presenting officer which he choose not to do. Having
given up the right, he cannot now be permitted to turn back and
raise a grievance in that regard. This contention of the appellant E
is without any merit.

     11. Coming to the other aspect of the case, that there is
perversity in appreciation of the evidence in the impugned
judgment under appeal, we may notice that the finding of facts F
arrived at by the enquiry officer was not interfered with by the
learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the
 Madhya Pradesh High Court, it is hardly permissible fOr this
Court to disturb such findings of fact in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Besides that, we G
must notice that the conduct of the appellant can hardly be
 appreciated in regard to deposit of money in the Bank regularly
during the entire period of 1984-85. The Department had
 showed that the deposits have been made and the bank
 balance of the appellant, on a particular date, was beyond the H
    58       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 8 S.C.R.


A   known sources of his income to which, the appellant has raised
    a defence that he owned the land and the income received was
    an agricultural income. However, he produced no evidence
    during the departmental enquiry to show that some person was
    making payment to him and/or some person was depositing
B   the money in the Bank so received from agricultural activity in
    every 2-3 days. Once a person is carrying on agricultural
    activities like the appellant, the obvious result thereof would be
    that there would be persons who would be carrying on
    agricultural activities on the land on his behalf, would be
c   harvesting the crops and then selling the same on his behalf
    and that there would be persons who would be buying such
    crops and disposing the crops in the open market directly or
    indirectly. Thus, these persons would have been easily
    available to the appellant to be produced in departmental
    enquiry to substantiate his defence. No such effort was ever
0
    made by the appellant. Non-examination of these witnesses
    and non-production of necessary documents must lead to draw
    an adverse inference against the appellant. In any case, the
    appellant cannot take advantage of that fact and contend that
E   the inquiry officer has failed to appreciate evidence in its correct
    perspective. At this stage, we may also notice that during the
    course of hearing, we had called for the original personal file
    of the officer where he had filed property returns to the
    Department. In the property return for the year 1984-85 (copy
    of which is stated to have been produced before the Enquiry
F   Officer), which is the relevant year, the appellant is shown to
    have 1/3rd share in the agricultural land located at two different
    places: There is a specific column relating to income from
    agriculture. In that form it was filled in by the appellant as
    'uncertain' (anishchit). This return had been filed on 27th March,
G   1985. In other words, on that date he did not know whether he
    had earned any amount from the agricultural income or not. The
    period in question was January, 1984 to May 1985, thus, for
    the substantial period, he was fully aware of his income
    received from agricultural activity but he still chooses to keep
H   it vague and not declare his true income in the return. Now, in
  DINESH CHANDRA PANDEY v. HIGH COURT OF                       59
      M.P. & ANR. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the departmental proceedings and in the reply to the charge-          A
sheet, he submitted that there was an income of more than
Rs.50,000/- p.a. and that he owned 37.53 acres of land in
village Bilaspur at two different places. It is again strange that
he did not disclose in his reply that this was a land jointly owned
with his brothers and family members and what was the extent          B
of his holding individually. In the return, he himself claimed one-
third share in the property. The total land indicated at two
different places being 26 acres + 18 comes to 44 acres and
one third of which, merely 14 acres approximately, would be
the land owned by him and not 37 acres as claimed. This, itself       c
 shows that the appellant has not approached the Court with
 clean hands and has not disclosed true facts which were known
to him alone. In the departmental proceedings, he took incorrect
defence contrary to his return and failed to discharge the onus
placed upon him. In the departmental enquiry, the appellant           D
produced no income tax returns to show that in addition to his
 salary, he had other sources of income and what was the extent
 of income from these sources. In his written statement of
 defence he never took up the plea that any such returns were
 filed and he made no effort to bring on record the copies of
 such income-tax returns, if at all filed. The delinquent officer     E
 could have stated in his statement if he was not filing any return
 and reason thereof. We are certainly of the considered view
 that it was obligatory on the part of the delinquent officer to
 disclose all such relevant facts which were only within his
 personal knowledge. He belongs to a service which is looked          F
 upon by the public at large as a service cadre of high integrity
 and professional values. The Judges are expected to apply
 stringent social and moral values to their standard of living. It
was expected of the appellant to disclose all true and correct
 information and documents in his power and possession before         G
the Enquiry Officer. It was not required of him to with-hold
 relevant material and take such a defence which could not be
 substantiated during the course of departmental enquiry. Having
 failed to produce relevant documentary evidence as well as
 examine the witnesses, the appellant cannot argue that the           H
    60       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 8 S.C.R.

A   Disciplinary Authority or the Courts have not appreciated the
    evidence in its correct perspective. We are unable to accept
    the contention of the appellant that the findings are based on
    no evidence or are perverse in any manner whatsoever.

         12. For the reasons afore stated, we find no merit in this
8
    appeal. The same is dismissed however, without any order as
    to costs.

    K.K.T.                                     Appeal dismissed.