DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENTversusBIBHU PRASAD ACHARYA, ETC.

                 [2024] 11 S.C.R. 510 : 2024 INSC 843

                      Directorate of Enforcement
                                   v.
                      Bibhu Prasad Acharya, etc.
                 (Criminal Appeal Nos. 4314-4316 of 2024)
                             06 November 2024
           [Abhay S. Oka* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       The appellant filed complaints against the respondents and others
       u/s.44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
       The Special Court took cognizance of the complaints and issued
       summons to the respondents and other accused persons. However,
       the High Court held that it was necessary to obtain prior sanction
       under sub-section (1) of s.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
       1973 and quashed the orders of taking cognizance passed by
       the Special Court on the complaints only as against the said
       respondents.

                                  Headnotes†
       Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – ss.3, 4,
       44(1) (b), 65 and 71 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 –
       s.197 – Respondents contended before the High Court
       that it was necessary to obtain prior sanction under sub-
       section (1) of s.197 of the CrP.C. before taking cognizance
       of the complaints – The High Court upheld the respondents'
       contentions and quashed the orders of taking cognizance
       passed by the Special Court on the complaints only as against
       the said respondents – Propriety:
       Held: There are two conditions for applicability of s.197(1) –
       The first condition is that the accused must be a public servant
       removable from his office by or with the government's sanction –
       The second condition is that the offence alleged to have been
       committed by the public servant while acting or purporting to act
       in the discharge of his duty – The first condition is satisfied in
       the case of both the respondents as they are civil servants – In
       the case of both respondents, the acts alleged against them are
       related to the discharge of the duties entrusted to them – It is not
       the allegation in the complaints that the two respondents were not

* Author
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                             511

       Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, etc.


     empowered to do the acts they have done – There is a connection
     between their duties and the acts complained of – The second
     condition for the applicability of s.197(1) also stands satisfied, and
     therefore, in this case, s.197(1) of CrPC applies to the respondents,
     assuming that s.197(1) of CrPC applies to the proceedings under
     the PMLA – As far as the applicability of s.197 of CrPC to the
     PMLA is concerned, there are two relevant provisions in the form
     of s.65 and 71 of the PMLA – S.65 makes the provisions of the
     CrPC applicable to all proceedings under the PMLA, provided
     the same are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in
     the PMLA – The words ‘All other proceedings’ in s.65 include a
     complaint u/s.44 (1)(b) of the PMLA – There is no provision therein
     which is inconsistent with the provisions of s.197(1) of CrPC –
     Therefore, the provisions of s.197(1) of CrPC are applicable to a
     complaint u/s.44(1)(b) of the PMLA – When a particular provision
     of CrPC applies to proceedings under the PMLA by virtue of s.65
     of the PMLA, s.71 (1) cannot override the provision of CrPC which
     applies to the PMLA – In the instant case, the cognizance of the
     offence u/s.3, punishable u/s.4 of the PMLA, was taken against
     the respondents accused without obtaining previous sanction
     u/s.197(1) of CrPC – Therefore, the view taken by the High Court
     is correct. [Paras 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Object of:
     Held: The object is to protect the public servants from prosecutions –
     It ensures that the public servants are not prosecuted for anything
     they do in the discharge of their duties – This provision is for the
     protection of honest and sincere officers – However, the protection is
     not unqualified – They can be prosecuted with a previous sanction
     from the appropriate government. [Para 6]

                              Case Law Cited
     Prakash Singh Badal and Another v. State of Punjab and Others
     [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 197 : (2007) 1 SCC 1; Centre for Public
     Interest Litigation v. Union of India [2003] Supp. 3 SCR 746 :
     (2005) 8 SCC 202 – relied on.
     S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation Delhi and Others [1981] 3
     SCR 864 : (1981) 3 SCC 431; Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar and
     Another [1998] 3 SCR 22 : (1998) 5 SCC 91; P.K. Pradhan v. State
     of Sikkim [2001] 3 SCR 1119 : (2001) 6 SCC 704 – referred to.
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                                 List of Acts
       Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Code of Criminal
       Procedure, 1973.

                              List of Keywords
       44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Section
       65 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Section 71 of
       Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Section 197 of the
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Prior sanction; Protection of
       public servants; Discharge of duties; Protection of honest and
       sincere officers.

                             Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 4314-
       4316 of 2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 21.01.2019 of High Court for
       the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLP No. 3988 of 2016,
       CRLP No. 11942 of 2018 and WP No. 2253 of 2018
                          Appearances for Parties
       Suryaprakash V Raju, A.S.G., Mrs. Sonia Mathur, Sr. Adv., Arvind
       Kumar Sharma, Kanu Agarwal, Annam Venkatesh, Zoheb Hussain,
       Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Advs. for the appellant.
       Mrs. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., Abhaya Nath Das, Sunil Kumar Das,
       Ms. Vidushi Garg, B.C. Bhatt, Satish Kumar, Advs for the respondents
                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
                                 Judgment
       Abhay S. Oka, J.
       FACTUAL ASPECT
1.     The appellant has filed complaints against the respondents and others
       under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
       2002 (for short, ‘the PMLA’). The complaint is for an offence under
       Section 3 of the PMLA, which is punishable under Section 4. Both
       private respondents are accused in the complaints. They are Bibhu
       Prasad Acharya (described hereafter as the first respondent) and
       Adityanath Das (described hereafter as the second respondent).
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                         513

         Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, etc.


      The Special Court took cognizance of the complaints and issued
      summons to the respondents and other accused persons. Both
      of them filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the
      cognizance taken by the Trial Court and inter alia prayed for quashing
      the complaints on the ground that both of them were public servants
      and, therefore, it was necessary to obtain prior sanction under
      sub-section (1) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
      (for short, ‘the CrPC’). By the impugned judgment, the High Court
      upheld the respondents’ contentions and quashed the orders of
      taking cognizance passed by the Special Court on the complaints
      only as against the said respondents.
      SUBMISSIONS
2.    Shri S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General for India, appeared
      for the appellant-Enforcement Directorate. He submitted that in
      view of Section 71 of the PMLA, the provisions thereof have an
      overriding effect over the provisions of the other statutes, including
      the CrPC. He submitted that considering the object of the PMLA, the
      requirement of obtaining a sanction under Section 197(1) of CrPC
      will be inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA.
3.    He pointed out from the assertions made in the complaints that
      at the relevant time, the first respondent was the Vice Chairman
      and Managing Director of Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure
      Corporation Ltd. (for short, ‘the Corporation’). His submission is that
      he was not a public servant within the meaning of Section 197(1) of
      CrPC, as it cannot be said that while holding the said position, he
      was not removable from the office save by or with the sanction of
      the Government. He relied upon the decisions of this Court in the
      case of S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation Delhi and Others1
      and Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar and Another.2 He submitted
      that the first respondent was not employed in connection with the
      affairs of the State Government at the time of the commission of
      the offence. He submitted that officers of such Corporations are not
      public servants within the meaning of Section 197(1). He also relied
      upon a decision of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal



1    [1981] 3 SCR 864 : (1981) 3 SCC 431
2    [1998] 3 SCR 22 : (1998) 5 SCC 91
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        and Another v. State of Punjab and others.3 He submitted that the
        issue of the requirement of sanction will have to be decided at the
        time of the trial. He submitted that the respondents’ act of money
        laundering cannot be considered to have been done in the discharge
        of their official duties.
4.      Mrs Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents
        accused, invited our attention to the Memorandum and Articles of the
        Association (for short, “the Memorandum”) of the said Corporation
        and, in particular, Clauses 70 and 71 (b) thereof and submitted that
        power to appoint a Director of the Corporation and power to remove
        him vested in the State Government. Therefore, the first respondent
        continued to be a public servant as contemplated by Section 197(1)
        of CrPC. She submitted that the plea of absence of sanction can
        be raised at any stage of the proceedings, and it is not necessary
        to wait till the final hearing of the complaint.
        CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
5.      Section 197 (1) of CrPC (which corresponds to Section 218 of
        Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) reads thus:
               “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.—
               (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate
               or a public servant not removable from his office save by
               or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any
               offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting
               or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no
               Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with
               the previous sanction —
               (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
               case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged
               offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the
               Union, of the Central Government;
               (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
               case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged
               offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State,
               of the State Government:



3      [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 197 : (2007) 1 SCC 1
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                          515

         Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, etc.


             [Provided that where the alleged offence was committed
             by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period
             while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356
             of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b)
             will apply as if for the expression “State Government”
             occurring therein, the expression “Central Government”
             were substituted.]
             [Explanation.—For the removal of doubts it is hereby
             declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a
             public servant accused of any offence alleged to have
             been committed under section 166A, section 166B,
             section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C,
             section 354D, section 370, section 375, section 376
             [section 376A, section 376AB, section 376C, section 376D,
             section 376DA, section 376DB] or section 509 of the Indian
             Penal Code (45 of 1860).]
6.    The object of Section 197(1) must be considered here. The object
      is to protect the public servants from prosecutions. It ensures that
      the public servants are not prosecuted for anything they do in the
      discharge of their duties. This provision is for the protection of honest
      and sincere officers. However, the protection is not unqualified. They
      can be prosecuted with a previous sanction from the appropriate
      government.
7.    The expression “to have been committed by him while acting or
      purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” has been
      judicially interpreted. A bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court
      in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of
      India,4 in paragraph no 9, observed thus:
             “9………………….. This protection has certain limits
             and is available only when the alleged act done by
             the public servant is reasonably connected with the
             discharge of his official duty and is not merely a
             cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his
             official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there
             is a reasonable connection between the act and the


4    [2003] Supp. 3 SCR 746 : (2005) 8 SCC 202
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           performance of the official duty, the excess will not be
           a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from
           the protection. The question is not as to the nature of
           the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained
           an element necessarily dependent upon the offender
           being a public servant, but whether it was committed by
           a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the
           discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can
           be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned
           was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed
           by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge
           of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires
           examination so much as the act, because the official act
           can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty
           as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the
           scope and range of the official duties of the public servant
           concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important
           and the protection of this section is available if the act
           falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There
           cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there
           is a reasonable connection between the act done and the
           official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule.
           One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider
           if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant
           to commit the act complained of could have made him
           answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty.
           If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may
           be said that such act was committed by the public servant
           while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there
           was every connection with the act complained of and the
           official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear
           that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately
           attracted on institution of the complaint case.”
                                                     (emphasis added)
8.     In the decision of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal
       and Another,3 in paragraph 38, this Court held thus:
           “38. The question relating to the need of sanction
           under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                      517

       Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, etc.


          be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and
          on the allegations contained therein. This question
          may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question
          whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be
          determined from stage to stage.”
                                                  (emphasis added)
     In the present case, after completing the investigation, the appellant
     has filed exhaustive complaints under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA.
     Cognizance has been taken based on the complaints. Therefore, the
     issue of the absence of sanction will arise at this stage.
9.   The second respondent was at the relevant time holding the post of
     Principal Secretary, I&CAD Department of the Government of Andhra
     Pradesh. It is not disputed that even the first respondent was a civil
     servant but was appointed on deputation as the Corporation’s Vice
     Chairman and Managing Director during the relevant period. It is
     undisputed that as far as the second respondent is concerned, he was
     removable from his office by or with the sanction of the Government.
10. As far as the first respondent is concerned, we find from clause 71(a)
    of the Memorandum that the power to appoint Directors of the
    Corporation by nomination is vested in the Government of the erstwhile
    State of Andhra Pradesh. Under Clause 81 of the Memorandum, the
    State Government was empowered to appoint any of the Corporation’s
    Directors to be the Corporation’s Managing Director. Thus, the
    appointment of the first respondent as a Director and subsequently
    as the Managing Director has been made by the State Government.
    Sub-clause (b) of Clause 71 of the Memorandum provides that the
    Government shall have the power to remove any Director, including
    the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Managing Director. Therefore, at
    the relevant time, the State Government had the power to remove
    the first respondent from the post of Vice Chairman and Managing
    Director of the Corporation.
11. There are two conditions for applicability of Section 197(1). The first
    condition is that the accused must be a public servant removable
    from his office by or with the government’s sanction. The second
    condition is that the offence alleged to have been committed by the
    public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
    his duty.
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12. We have perused the decisions relied upon by learned ASG. In
    the case of Mohd. Hadi Raja,2 this Court took the view that the
    protection of Section 197 of CrPC will not be available to the officer
    of the Government Companies or Public Sector Undertakings. The
    first respondent is a civil servant. As such, the State Government
    appointed him as the Corporation’s Vice Chairman and Managing
    Director on deputation. Therefore, the decision in the abovementioned
    case will not apply to the first respondent.
13. The first condition is satisfied in the case of both the respondents
    as they are civil servants. The allegation in the complaint against
    the first respondent is that he, in conspiracy and connivance with
    Shri Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy (the then Chief Minister of the state),
    another accused, allotted 250 acres of land for the SEZ project to
    M/s. Indu Tech Zone Private Ltd. by violating the existing norms,
    regulations and procedures. Further allegation against the first
    respondent is that he was indirectly involved in the offence of money
    laundering by knowingly assisting M/s. Indu group of companies in
    the creation of vast proceeds of crime. The allegation against the
    second respondent, who was at the relevant time Principal Secretary,
    I & CAD Department of the State Government, is that in conspiracy
    with Shri Y.S.Jagan Mohan Reddy, he extended favour to India
    Cement Limited by allotting an additional 10 lakh litres of water
    from River Kagna without referring the matter to Interstate Water
    Resources Authority and by violating the existing norms, regulations
    and procedures.
14. A Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in the case of
    P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim,5 in paragraphs 5 and 15 held thus:
            “5. The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1)
            of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance
            of an offence except with the previous sanction of
            the Government concerned in a case where the acts
            complained of are alleged to have been committed by a
            public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting
            to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public
            servant is not removable from office save by or with the
            sanction of the Government, touches the jurisdiction of the


5   [2001] 3 SCR 1119 : (2001) 6 SCC 704
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                         519

       Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, etc.


          court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by the statute from
          taking cognizance. Different tests have been laid down
          in decided cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of
          the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code:
          “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while
          acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
          duty”. The offence alleged to have been committed
          must have something to do, or must be related in
          some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No
          question of sanction can arise under Section 197, unless
          the act complained of is an offence; the only point for
          determination is whether it was committed in the
          discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable
          connection between the act and the official duty.
          It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is
          strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as
          this question will arise only at a later stage when the
          trial proceeds on the merits. What a court has to find
          out is whether the act and the official duty are so
          interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that
          it was done by the accused in the performance of
          official duty, though, possibly in excess of the needs
          and requirements of the situation”
          “15. Thus, from a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions, it
          will be clear that for claiming protection under Section 197
          of the Code, it has to be shown by the accused that there
          is reasonable connection between the act complained of
          and the discharge of official duty. An official act can be
          performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in
          dereliction of it. For invoking protection under Section 197
          of the Code, the acts of the accused complained of must
          be such that the same cannot be separated from the
          discharge of official duty, but if there was no reasonable
          connection between them and the performance of those
          duties, the official status furnishes only the occasion or
          opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required.
          If the case as put forward by the prosecution fails or the
          defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in
          discharge of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped.
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            It is well settled that question of sanction under
            Section 197 of the Code can be raised any time after
            the cognizance; maybe immediately after cognizance
            or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion
            of trial and after conviction as well. But there may be
            certain cases where it may not be possible to decide
            the question effectively without giving opportunity
            to the defence to establish that what he did was in
            discharge of official duty. In order to come to the
            conclusion whether claim of the accused that the act
            that he did was in course of the performance of his
            duty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor
            fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial
            by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In
            such an eventuality, the question of sanction should
            be left open to be decided in the main judgment which
            may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial.”
                                                   (emphasis added)
       Thus, there is no embargo on considering the plea of absence
       of sanction, after cognizance is taken by the Special Court of the
       offences punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA. In this case, it is
       not necessary to postpone the consideration of the issue.
15. We have carefully perused the allegations against the respondents
    in the complaint. The allegation against the second respondent is of
    allocating an additional 10 lakh litres of water to India Cement Ltd.
    Taking the averments made in the complaint against him as it is, the
    act alleged against him has been committed by him while purporting
    to act in the discharge of his official duties. The allegation against
    the first respondent is of the allotment of land measuring 250 acres
    to M/s. Indu Tech Zone Private Ltd. Taking the averments made
    in the complaint as correct, the act alleged against him has been
    done by him purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties.
    In the case of both respondents, the acts alleged against them
    are related to the discharge of the duties entrusted to them. It is
    not even the allegation in the complaints that the two respondents
    were not empowered to do the acts they have done. There is a
    connection between their duties and the acts complained of. The
    second condition for the applicability of Section 197(1) also stands
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                           521

       Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, etc.


     satisfied, and therefore, in this case, Section 197(1) of CrPC applies
     to the respondents, assuming that Section 197(1) of CrPC applies
     to the proceedings under the PMLA.
16. As far as the applicability of Section 197 of CrPC to the PMLA is
    concerned, there are two relevant provisions in the form of Section
    65 and 71 of the PMLA which read thus:
          “65. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to apply.--
          The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
          (2 of 1974) shall apply, in so far as they are not inconsistent
          with the provisions of this Act, to arrest, search and seizure,
          attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and all
          other proceedings under this Act.”
          “71. Act to have overriding effect.-- The provisions
          of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything
          inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the
          time being in force.”
17. Section 65 makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to all
    proceedings under the PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent
    with the provisions contained in the PMLA. The words ‘All other
    proceedings’ include a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the
    PMLA. We have carefully perused the provisions of the PMLA. We
    do not find that there is any provision therein which is inconsistent
    with the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC. Considering the object
    of Section 197(1) of the CrPC, its applicability cannot be excluded
    unless there is any provision in the PMLA which is inconsistent
    with Section 197(1). No such provision has been pointed out to us.
    Therefore, we hold that the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC
    are applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA.
18. Section 71 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the PMLA
    notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other
    law for the time being in force. Section 65 is a prior section which
    specifically makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to PMLA,
    subject to the condition that only those provisions of the CrPC will
    apply which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA.
    Therefore, when a particular provision of CrPC applies to proceedings
    under the PMLA by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 71(1)
    cannot override the provision of CrPC which applies to the PMLA.
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       Once we hold that in view of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 197(1)
       will apply to the provisions of the PMLA, Section 71 cannot be
       invoked to say that the provision of Section 197(1) of CrPC will not
       apply to the PMLA. A provision of Cr. P.C., made applicable to the
       PMLA by Section 65, will not be overridden by Section 71. Those
       provisions of CrPC which apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65
       will continue to apply to the PMLA, notwithstanding Section 71. If
       Section 71 is held applicable to such provisions of the CrPC, which
       apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65, such interpretation will
       render Section 65 otiose. No law can be interpreted in a manner
       which will render any of its provisions redundant.
19. In this case, the cognizance of the offence under Section 3, punishable
    under Section 4 of the PMLA, has been taken against the respondents
    accused without obtaining previous sanction under Section 197(1)
    of CrPC. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court is correct.
    We must clarify that the effect of the impugned judgment is that
    the orders of the Special Court taking cognizance only as against
    the accused B.P. Acharya and Adityanath Das stand set aside. The
    order of cognizance against the other accused will remain unaffected.
    However, it will be open for the appellant to move the Special Court
    to take cognizance of the offence against the two respondents if a
    sanction under Section 197(1) of CrPC is granted in future. This
    liberty will be subject to legal and factual objections available to the
    respondents. Hence, the appeals must fail and are dismissed subject
    to what is observed above.

       Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan