Holding

Respondent No.1 (and respondent No.2) were held guilty of contempt for giving a false undertaking and colluding to defeat the eviction decree, and the Supreme Court ordered possession to be transferred to the appellant.

Summary

The appellant, a landlord, obtained a decree of eviction against B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd. (respondent No.1) but the High Court granted the tenant eight weeks to vacate subject to an undertaking not to part with possession. Respondent No.1, through its director, filed the undertaking without stating that it was in possession, and later clarified that the wording implied possession, a statement later shown to be false. Meanwhile respondent No.2, the chairman of the company, filed a suit claiming sub‑tenancy and obtained an injunction that thwarted execution of the eviction decree. The appellant filed a contempt petition alleging that the false undertaking and collusive conduct amounted to civil contempt, but the High Court dismissed it. The Supreme Court held that the respondents deliberately misled the court, that the false undertaking constituted contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and exercised its Article 142 jurisdiction to order possession be handed to the appellant and award costs.

Issues considered

The false undertaking given by respondent No.1 amounted to contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Whether the standard of proof for civil contempt requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the undertaking implied possession and its breach constituted wilful disobedience of a court order.
Whether the Supreme Court can invoke Article 142(1) to pass a decree for complete justice in contempt proceedings.

Legislation cited

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
Constitution of Indias. Article 142(1)
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2(b)

Subjects

contempt of courtcivil contemptfalse undertakingeviction decreeArticle 142 jurisdictionstandard of proofquasi‑criminal proceedinglandlord‑tenant dispute

Judgment

DR. (MRS.) ROSHAN SAM BOYCE
A
v.
B.R. COTION MILLS LTD. AND ORS.

APRIL 6, 1990

(M.H. KANIA, KULDIP SINGH AND R.M. SAHAI, JJ.] B

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Section 2(b)-Civil Contempt-
Nature of proceeding-Punishment of Contemnor-Standard of proof
required.

,.# Constitution of India, 1950: Article 142( ])-Jurisdiction of
~· _-_ Supreme Court-Exercise of in a contempt proceeding in order to do c
justice.

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act,
1947: Eviction of tenant-Time granted for vacating premises-Under-
taking to give vacant possession filed-Declaratory suit for sub-tenancy D
filed and stay obtained thwarting execution of eviction.Jecree-In order
to do justice, Court directing land/rod to be put in possession of suit
premises pending disposal of declaratory suit.

The appellant-landlord obtained a decree of eviction of respon-
dent No. 1 company from the suit premises. Aggrieved, respondent No. E
1 filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. Dismissing the Petition,
the High Court granted eight weeks' time to respondent No. I for
vacating the suit premises, subject to the filing of an undertaking that it
will not part with the possession of, or create third party interest in, the
suit premises in any manner what..l'ever. After some correspondence

, x
respondent No. 3, by an affidavit, filed the required undertaking on
behalf of respondent No. 1 but without mentioning that the respondent
No. l had not already parted with possession of the suit premises or
created any third party interest therein. Later, counsel for respondent
No. l clarified that when the undertaking stated that respondent No. l
would not part with possession it meant that respondent No. l was in
F

possession. But, in the meantime, respondent No. 2 Chairman of G
respondent No. l Company filed a suit claiming a declaration that he
was the lawful sub-tenant and the decree for possession was a nullity
and obtained an injunction, thus preventing the appellant from execut-
ing the decree. Thereupon, the appellant filed a petition for contempt
before the High Court praying that the respondents should be punished
under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High H
Court rejected the petition..
381
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

In the appeal before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the
A landlord-appellant that the High Court was in error in holding that no
contempt was established against the respondents, that.the undertaking
clearly implied that respondent No. l was in possession of the premises
and was in a position to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the
same after eight weeks, which was also made clear from the clarifica-
B tion given by counsel for respondent No. l that this assurance/under-
taking was false, as by that time respondent No. 2, had already filed
a suit claiming sub-tenancy from respondent, that the record disclosed
that respondents No. l and 2, were acting in collusion with a view to
defeat the decree obtained by the appellant and to prevent the execution
of the decree and that the resolution of the respondent No. l under
which respondent No. 2 was claiming sub-tenancy was fabricated and
c antedated.

It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that before a Court
could take any action for contempt, it must be strictly establis.hed that
the contempt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, as an action
o for contempt was in the nature of a criminal proceeding.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: . I The Proceedings in the contempt are quasi-criminal in
nature, and law of contempt has to be strictly interpreted, and the
E requirements of that law must be strictly complied with before any
person can be committed for contempt. However, where there is patent _,.(
dishonesty writ large on the face of the record, the law does not require
that this Court should sit back with folded hands and fail to take any
action in the matter. In exercise of its jurisdiction under clause (l) of
Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court may pass such decree or
F make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case ~
or matter pending before it. [391G-H; C-DJ

1.2 In the instant case, respondent No. I gave an undertaking X
based on an implication or assumption which was false in its knowledge
and to the knowledge of respondent No 2. Respondent No. 2 was equally
G instrumental in the giving of this undertaking. This implication or
assumption was made explicit by the clarification given by the counsel
for respondent No. l. Respondent No. 2 was equally responsible for
instructing counsel to give this clarification which was false to the
knowledge of both, respondents Nos. I and 2. Both respondent No. I
and respondent No. 2 have tried to deceive the Court and the appellant.
H In view of this, it cannot be said that they are not guilty of contempt.
(MRS.) R.S. BOYCE v. S.R. COTION MILLS 383

Respondent No. 1 is guilty of misconduct amounting to contempt and
must be held to have committed contempt by giving the undertaking A
and instructing its counsel to give the clarification of the meaning of the
undertaking knowing fully well that it was not in possession of the suit
premises, and was not in a position to give possession of the suit pre-
mises, to the appellant in execution of the decree in favour of the appel-
lant or otherwise. There is no doubt that respondent No. 2 was a party B
to this breach of the undertaking being committed aud, in fact, it was at
his instance that respondent No. l committed the breach of the under·
taking. [391H, 392A-B, 39IE-F]
,,.,i'
·-::(-~ 1.3 Respondents No. 1 and 2 cannot be allowed to thwart the
execution of the decree and continue to remain in possession of the suit
premises. No doubt, the claim set up by respondent No. 2 in the c
declaratory suit filed by him to establish that he is a sub-tenant of the
suit premises and entitled to protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 cannot be foreclosed.
However, by reason of any interim order obtained in that suit, the
appellant can no longer be deprived of the possession of the said pre- D
mises pursuant to the decree obtained by her, till the claim in the
declaratory suit is established. [392C, El

1.4 The Court Receiver, High Court, who has already been
appointed should appoint the appellant as his agent in place of the
existing agent, and hand over 11ossession of the suit premises to her on E
such terms and conditions as he may think fit. It would be open to
respondent No. 2 to apply for vacation or variation of the order, in the
event of his being able to establish his right to sub-tenancy. [392G, 393C]

Noorali Babu/ Thanewala v. Sh. K.M.M. Shetty and Ors., J.T.
1989 4 S.C. 573, relied on. F
i
..., '). CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1778
of 1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.7.1988 of the Bombay
High Court in Contempt Petition No. 106 of 1987. G

P. Chidambaram, Ms. Raian Karanjawala, Mrs. Manish Karan-
jawala and Mrs. Meenakshi Arora for the Appellant.

K.S. Cooper, K. Parasaran, Anil B. Divan, A.S. Bhasme, P.H.
Parekh, Sunil Dogra, Gopal Subramaniam, Ms. lndu Malhotra for the H
Respondents.
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A
KANIA, J. Leave granted. The appeal is taken up for final
hearing. Counsel heard.

The short facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as
B follows:

The appellant is the owner of a Bungalow known as "Villa
Hormazd" at 8-A, Carmichel Road, Bombay. The suit premises, com- I.
prising two floors of the said bungalow, were leased to Mayer Mills
Ltd. under a lease deed dated April 16, 1948 for a period of three years :.._~)r
from November 1, 1947. At that time, the bungalow belonged to the · ·
c father of the appellant. On the death of the father of the appellant in
1949, the appellant became the landlady of the said bungalow.
Respondent no. 1, B.R. Cotton Mills. Ltd., is the successor-in-interest
of Mayer Mills Ltd. and at the relevant time was in possession of the /·
suit premises as a tenant. Respondent no. 2 is the Chairman of respon-
D dent no. 1 and the other respondents are some of the Directors of
respondent no. L The appellant filed a suit being R.A.E. No. 763/
6563 of 1966 in the Small Causes Court at Bombay for eviction of
respondent no. 1 from the suit premises and for possession on the
ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. During the pendency
of this suit, another suit for eviction was also filed by the appellant
E against respondent no. 1 for eviction on the gr011nd of default in the '
payment of rent for a period of more than six months. The Trial Court .,_.,f
by its judgment dated September 13, 1975 decreed the aforesaid evic-
tion suit R.A.E. No. 763/6563 of 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the
said suit") but the other suit for eviction filed by the appellant ~as
dismissed in view of the eviction decree passed in the said suit. f
F Respondents nos. 1 and 2 filed an appeal against the decree for evic-
tion but the said appeal was dismissed. In February, 1986, the husband
of the appellant died and after that the appellant is the landlady of the ..,
said bungalow. On the other hand, the appeal of the appellant against .X
the dismissal of her other suit, for eviction on the ground of default in
payment of rent was allowed and that suit was also decreed against
G respondent no. 1. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the High
Court at Bombay challenging the decrees for eviction passed by the
Court of Small Causes as aforestated. On February 27, 1987, respon-
dent no. 2 filed a suit. in the Court of Small Causes for a declaration
that he was the lawful sub-tenant of the suit premises and was not t"
bound by the decrees of eviction passed in respect of the suit premises
H against the tenant, namely, respondent no. 1. The said Writ Petition
(MRS.) R.S. BOYCE v. S.R. COTTON MILLS [KANIA, J.] 385

No. 1066 of 1987 filed by respondent no. 1 challenging the decrees for
A
eviction passed against respondent ·no. 1 in the said suits and con-
firmed in appeal came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge of
the Bombay High Court on March 5, 1983. The learned Judge by his
judgment and order of the same date, dismissed the said writ petition.
The relevant part of the order of the learned Judge reads as follows:
B
"The petitioner requests for time of eight weeks to vacate
the premises. He is granted the said time subject to execut-
ing written undertaking that he shall not part with the pos-
session of the suit premises or create third party interests in
the suit premises in the meantime in any manner what-
soever.''

On March 11, 1987, the matter was brought up again before the
learned Single Judge by learned counsel for the appellant for pointing
out that respondent no. 1 had not filed the requisite undertaking as
directed under the order dated 5.3.1987. It appears that at that stage it
was pointed out to the Court by Mr. Dalvi, learned counsel for the D
appellant that respondent no. 2 had filed a declaratory suit in the
Court of Small Causes as aforestated claiming to be the sub-tenant of
the suit premises. The order of the learned Judge dated March 11,
1987 shows that the learned Judge stated that he did not wish to take
any action at that time on the conduct of respondent no. 1 but, as a last
chance, granted respondent no. 1 time upto March 17, 1987 for fur- E
nishing the undertaking as ordered failing which it would be deemed
that the condition was not fulfilled. Respondent No. 3, as a Director of
respondent no. 1, by his affidavit, affirmed on March 17, 1987, gave an
undertaking merely stating that respondent no. 1 would not commit
any act contrary to or in breach of the order dated March 5, 1987. It
was pointed out by the appellant that this undertaking was not in F
compliance with the orders passed by the learned Single Judge. After
some correspondence, respondent no. 3, by his affidavit affirmed on
March 25, 1987 filed an undertaking on behalf of respondent no. 1
inter alia stating that respondent no. 1 would not part with the posses-
sion of suit _premises or create any third party interest in the suit
premises in any manner whatsoever. The undertaking did not state G
that respondent no. 1 had not, before the undertaking was given
parted with the possession of the suit premises or created any third
party interest therein. When the matter came up on March 31, 1987
before the learned Single Judge who had gi~en time to respondent no
1 to vacate as aforestated, it was pointed out by learned counsel for the
appellant that the undertaking was objected to as it did not state that H

\
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

respondent no. 1 was in possession. Thereupon Shri R.J. Joshi,
A
learned counsel for respondent no. 1 Company, stated that the under-
taking spoke for itself and when it stated that respondent "shall not
part with possession" it meant that respondent no. 1 company was in r
possession. In view of this, the learned Judge did not give any further
clarification. Respondent No. 1 preferred a special leave petition to
B this court against the judgment of the learned Judge dismissing the
said writ petition but the said special leave petition was dismissed.
Thereafter the suit filed by respondent no. 2 in the Court of Small
Causes for a declaration that he was the lawful sub-tenant of the suit :...._
premises was dismissed but he preferred an appeal against the said
decision and in that appeal obtained an interim injuction restraining a:
C the appellant from interfering with his possession of the suit premises.
In view of this, the decree for eviction could not be executed. There-
after in June 1987, the appellant filed Contempt Petition No. 106 of
1987 in the Bombay High Court setting out the facts and praying that
the respondents should be punished under the provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It has been inter alia alleged in the
D contempt petition by the appellant that in spite of the said undertak-
ing, respondent no. 2 had filed a suit, being suit no. 2911of1987 in the
City Civil Court at Bombay claiming a declaration that the decree for
possession was a nullity and for an injunction restraining the appellant
from executing the decree and obtained an ad-interim injunction a few
days after the summary dismissal of the special leave petitions filed by
E thfe respo~dentsfin this Court as aforbestated. The said suit .was thdere- __ _,( -
a ter dismissed or non-prosecution ut, in the meantim·e, respon ent
no. 2 filed the suit in the Court of Small Causes for a declaration that
he was the lawful sub-tenant of the premises as aforestated. It was sub-
mitted by the appellant in the contempt petition that the said under-
taking given by respondent no. 1 clearly implied that on the date of the ~
F undertaking, respondent no. 1 was in possession of the suit premises r .,
and in order to defeat the decree for possession, respondent no. 1 had /'
set up its Chairman, respondent no. 2, to file the aforesaid suit in the " ,.l(
Court of Small Causes claiming sub-tenancy. It was further submitted
by the appellant that although respondent no. 1 continued to be in
possession of the suit premises it had set up respondent no. 2 to file the
G suit on the ground that he was in possession of the suit premises as a
sub-tenant in his own right and continued to be in possession thereof. •
The learned Judge before whom the said contempt petition came up
for hearing took the view that in the order of the learned Single Judge
dated March 5, 1987, he was unable to read any direction to file an
undertaking to give possession. He took the view that the aforesaid
H undertaking given on behalf of respondent no. 1, that it would not part
(MRS.) R.S. BOYCE v. S.R. COTION MILLS [KANIA, J.] 387

with possession or create any third party interest in the suit premises,
A
• did not imply that respondent no. 1 was in actual physical possession of
the suit premises and that the fact that respondent no. 2 was claiming
an independent title in himself as a sub-tenant by virtue of a Resolu-
tion of respondent no. 1 was not sufficient to hold that respondent no.
1 or the other respondents were guilty of contempt. He took the view
that there was no undertaking by respondent no. 1 to deliver posses- B
sion of the suit premises and on the basiS of these conclusions, he
rejected the contempt petition. At the same time the learned Judge did
_ observe that respondent no. 1 may have indulged in sharp practices but
l held that it was not guilty of contempt. The present appeal is directed
against this order.

It was submitted by Mr. Chidambaram, learned counsel for the c
appellant that respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 2 were guilty of
contempt and the learned Single Judge was in error when he took the
. ).__.
view that no contempt was established in the matter against the re-
spondents. It was submitted by learned counsel that on 5th March,
1987 when the writ petition preferred by respondent no. l was D
summarily rejected by Justice Puranik of the Bombay High Court,
learned counsel for respondent no. 1, on instructions, made an appli-
cation to the learned Judge to grant respondent no. 1 time for eight
weeks to vacate the suit premises. This time was granted subject to
respondent no. 1 executing an undertaking that he would not part with
the possession of the prernises or create third party interests therein as E
set out earlier. After delaying the matter for some time, respondent
no. 3 filed on March 25, 1987, an affidavit, as a director of respondent
no. 1 wherein he set out inter alia that respondent no. 1 agreed to give
an undertaking as set out earlier as respondent no. 1 was desirous of
approaching the Supreme Court to challenge the order of the learned
Judge dismissing the writ petition. It was submitted by Mr. Chidam- F
baram that this undertaking clearly implied that respondent no. 1 was
)(_ in possession of the premises and was in a position to hand over the
vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises after eight weeks,
if the special leave petitions preferred by respondent no. 1 were dis-
missed or no interim relief was obtained thereunder. This undertaking
was taken note of by Justice Puranik when the case reached before him G
on March 31, 1987. It appears that an objection was taken to the
language of the said undertaking on the ground that it did not state
that respondent no. 1 was in possession of the suit premises and there-
upon, Mr. R.J. Joshi, learned counsel for respondent no. 1, stated that
the undertaking spoke for itself and that when it stated that respon-
dent no. 1 shall not part with the possession of the suit premises it H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

meant that respondent no. 1 was in possession of the premises. It was
A
submitted that this statement must have been made after taking proper
instructions and that, by instructing its counsel to make the statement,
respondent no. 1 had clearly attempted to mislead the Court and the
r
appellant. It was urged that, m any event, this undertaking clearly
implied that if no interim order was obtained by respondent no. 1 from
B this Court, respondent no. 1 would hand over the possession of the
premises to the appellant. This assurance/undertaking was.false to the
knowledge of the appellant, as by that time, respondent no. 2 had
already filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes claiming sub-tenancy
from respondent no. 1 and had obtained an interim ex parte injunction .
restraining the appellant from executing the decree in her favour. It
was submitted that the record discloses that respondent Nos. 1 and 2
c were acting in collusion with a view to defeat the decree obtained by
the appellant and to prevent the execution of the decree. It was con-
tended on behalf of the appellant that the resolution of respondent no.
I unde~ which respondent no. 2 was claiming sub-tenancy was fabri- /
cated and antedated.
D
It was, on the other hand, contended by Mr. Cooper, learned
counsel for respondent no. 1 that no contempt was made .out by the
appellant in the matter. He vehemently argued that the case for taking
action in contempt, set up by the appellant, was one of civil contempt.
Under the provisions of sub-clause (b} of section 2 of the Contempt of
E Courts Act, 1971, in order to establish civil contempt, the alleged - ../
contemner must be proved to be guilty of wilful disobedience to any
judgment, decree direction, order writ or other process of a Court or
wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. He drew our attention
to the statement contained in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 9
IVth Edition, at para 66 (page 40) that the court will only punish as a If
F contempt a breach of injunction if satisfied that the terms of the
injunction are clear and unambiguous, that the defendant has proper.
notice of the terms and that breach of the injunction has been proved .)(
beyond reasonable doubt. It was further submitted by him that there is
no such thing in law as an implied contempt. Learned counsel urged
that, in the present case, there was no mandatory injunction or order
G given by the court to the effect that respondent no. I must vacate the
premises after eight weeks from 5th March when the undertaking was
agreed to be given. It was submitted that even if a view was taken that,
in these circumstances, respondent no. I must be held to have given an }--
undertaking to give possession of the said suit premises to the appel-
lant after the said period of eight weeks, there was no wilful breach on
H the part of respondent no. I in not complying with that undertaking as
(MRS.) R.S. BOYCE v. S.R. COTTON MILLS [KANIA, J.J 389

it was respondent no. 2 who was claiming to be in possession ot the
said premises in his independent right as a lawful sub-tenant and it was A
he who had obtained an interim injunction from the Small Causes
Court. It was urged by learned counsel that so far as respondent no. 2
was concerned he had not given any personal undertaking to the court.
It was submitted by learned counsel for all the respondents that before
a court could take any action for contempt it must be strictly estab- B
lished that the·contempt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt as
an action for contempt was in the nature of a criminal proceeding.

Mr. Cooper drew our attention to the decision of this Court in
The Aligarh Municipal Board & Ors. v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union
-· and Others, [1970] 3 SCC p. 98 wherein it has been held that "In order
to bring home a charge of contempt of Court for disobeying orders of c
Courts those who assert that the alleged contemners had knowledge of
the order must prove that fact beyond reasonable doubt. In case of
doubt, however, benefit ought to go to the person charged." He
further relied upon the decision of this Court in Babu Ram Gupta v.
Sudhir Bhasin & Anr., [1979] 3 SCR p. 685 wherein a Bench of two D
learned Judges of this Court held that "it is not open to the Court to
assume an implied undertaking when there is none on the record."

We now propose to examine the facts appearing on the record.in
the light of the aforesaid submissions and decisions. What we do find
on the record is that when the writ petitions filed by respondent no. 1 E
in the High Court were dismissed by Puranik, J. by his order dated 5th
March, 1987, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 applied for time for
eight weeks to vacate the premises and the learned Judge gave the said
time to respondent no. 1 to vacate the premises subject to its filing a
written undertaking that it would not part with the possession of the
suit premises or create third party interest in the suit premises. It may F
be that time to vacate was applied for as respondent no. 1 desired to
1-- file an appeal to the Supreme Court. The fact, however, remains that,
if the claim of respondent no. 2 is correct, on that day he was already a
lawful sub-tenant of the suit premises and occupying the same.
Respondent no. 2 was none other than the Chairman of respondent
no. 1 company. It is, therefore, inconceivable that rspondent no. 1 G
could have been unaware of the claim of respondent no. 2. It is,
therefore, apparent that respondent no. 1 clearly tried to mislead the
court when it gave instructions through its officers to learned counsel
appearing for respondent no. 1 to apply for time to vacate the premises
and remained silent when time was given on the condition that a writ-
ten undertaking as aforestated would be filed, suppressing from the H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

court the fact that respondent no. 2 claimed to be the sub-tenant of the
A
said premises and we have no doubt that respondent no. 2 must have
been a party to this course of action. After some hesitation, the written
undertaking was filed as aforestated which clearly implied that respon-
dent no. 1 was in possession of the suit premises andjn a position to
hand over possession of the suit premises to the appellant after the
B period of eight weeks expired. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 knew fully
well that this was not possible unless respondent no. 2 gave up his
claim which he had no intention of doing. Further, on March 31, 1987
learned counsel for respondent no. 1 appeared ir, court and stated that
the undertaking spoke for itself and when it stated that respondent no.
1 would not part with the possession of the premises it meant that
respondent no. 1 was in fact in possession thereof. As we have already
c pointed out respondent no. 2 was and continued to be the Chairman of
respondent no. 1; his nephew, Prem Kumar Gupta, who was residing
in the said premises in 1973, according to the evidence given by him in
the Court of Small Causes, was a Director of respondent no. I com-
_J
pany. After all, respondent no. I is a company and it can have no
D knowledge or intention other than the knowledge and intention of the
people who control it. We have no doubt at all that it was respondent
no. 2 who, along with some of his family members, was in full charge
of the affairs of respondent no. I company. In these circumstan~es, it
appears clear to us that all the actions taken by the legal advisors and
counsel of respondent no. 1 including, in particular, the giving of the
E atoresaid undenaking as well as the clarification given by learned
counsel regarding the meaning of that undertaking as aforestated were
with the fullest knowledge and consent of respondent no. 2. It is
impossible to maintain this dichotomy, for the purposes of the con-
tempt petition, between respondent no. I and respondent no. 2.
Respondent no. 2 knew fully well when he authorised the giving of the
F undertaking on behalf of respondent no. I or consented to its being
given that respondent no. 1 was in no position to hand over posse~sion
of the suit premises in execution of the decree because respondent no.
2 claimed to be in possession of the said premises and claimed sub-
tenancy rights in the same and had no intention whatsoever of giving
up the claim. In fact, the entire course of conduct adopted on behalf ot
G respondent no. 1 was only with one aim in view and that was to frus-
trate or to at least delay indefinitely the execution of the decree which
the appellant had obtained after the lapse of many years and after such
sustained and lengthy legal proceedings which must have caused the
appellant considerable expenses and anguish. It is significant that till
Mr. R.J. Joshi, the learned counsel, who gave the clarification in
H respect of the said undertaking was alive, no contention was ever
(MRS.) R.S. BOYCE v. S.R. COTTON MILLS [KANIA, J.J 391

raised that the clarification was given by him without taking instruc-
tions or that respondent no. 1 or respondent no. 2 were not aware of A
' the same. It was only after the sudden demise of the learned counsel
that this contention was first raised by respondent no. 1. This conduct
speaks volumes for the dishonest attitude adopted by respondents nos.
1 and 2. Raising this contention after the death of Mr. R.J. Joshi can
only be regarded as one more of the tricks which respondents nos. 1 8
and 2 have played throughout the case in order to defeat and delay the
execution of the decree for possession against responent no. 1.

In the circumstances set out earlier, although the learned Judge
of the High Court might have felt constrained by what he considered to
be the limits of his jurisdiction in a contempt proceeding, we feel that
our hands are not so tied and, where there is patent dishonesty on the c
part of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 writ large on the face of the record,
the law does not require that we should sit back with folded hands and
. "\.,_. fail to take any action in the matter.

We find that under clause (1) of Article 142 of the Constitution, D
1
it is provided that this court in exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such
decree or make such,order as is necessary for doing complete justice in
any case or matter pending before it and any decree so passed or order
so made shall be enforced throughout the territory of India in the
manner set out therein. In the circumstances which we have already set
out earlier, we are of the view that respondent no. 1 is guilty of mis- E
conduct amounting to contempt and must be held to have committed
contempt by giving the said undertaking and instructing its counsel to
give the clarification of the meaning of the said undertaking as
aforestated knowing fully well that it was not in possession of the suit
premises and was not in a position to give possession of the suit pre-
mises to the appellant in execution of the decree in favour of the F
appellant or otherwise. It is significan,t that the claim of sub-te'.li\ncy
.' set up by respondent no. 2 is pursuant to an alleged resolution of
respondent no. 1. We have also no doubt that respondent no. 2 was a
party to this breach of the undertaking being committed and, in fact, it
was he at whose instance respondent no. 1 committed the breach of the
undertaking as aforestated. We are, of course, quite conscious of the fact G
that the proceedings in the contempt are quasi-criminal in nature, that
the law of contempt has to be strictly interpreted and that the require-
ments of that law must be strictly complied with before any person can
be committed for contempt. However, as we have pointed out, respon-
dent no. 1 gave an undertaking based on an implication or assumption
which was false to its knowledg_e and to the knowledg_e of respondent
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

no. 2. Respondent no. 2 was equally instrumental in the giving of this
A
undertaking. This implication or assumption was made explicit by the
clarification given by the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 as set
out earlier. Respondent no. 2 was equally responsible for instructing f
counsel to give this clarification which was false to the knowledge of
both, respondents Nos. 1and2. Both respondent no. 1 and respondent
B no. 2 have tried to deceive the Court and the appellant. In view of this,
we fail to see how it can be said that they are not guilty of contempt.
Even assuming that a view were to be taken that no contempt has been
technically. established against respondents Nos 1 and 2 (with which
view we do not agree), we cannot allow the matter to rest there and fail '(:
to take any action and, in particular, we cannot allow respondents
Nos. 1 and 2 to thwart the execution of the decree in this manner at
c this stage and continue to remain in possession of the suit premises. -
We find some support for the course of action which we are taking
from the decision of this Court in Noorali Babu/ Thanewala v.
Sh.K.M.M. Shetty and others, J.T. 1989 4 S.C 573 where, on facts ./
which bear some similarity to the facts of this case, a Division Bench of
D this Court held that "it is settled law that breach of an injunction or
breach of an undertaking given to a court by a person in a civil pro-
ceeding on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of
action is misconduct amounting to contempt." At the same time, we
are conscious of the fact that we cannot altogether foreclose the claim
set up by respondent no. 2 in the declaratory suit filed by him in the
E Court of Small Causes to establish that he is a sub-tenant of the suit _A '
premises and entitled to the protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotel
Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. However, we are firmly of
the view that by reason of any interim order obtained in that suit and
till that claim is finally established, the appellant can no longer be
\(
deprived of the possession of the said premises pursuant to the decree
F for eviction obtained by her. All the necessary parties to that suit are
before us and have had and adeqnate opportunityfo be heard.
)(
,.,
In these circumstances, we allow the appeal and set aside the
impugned order passed by the High Court and pass in its place the
following order:
G
The Court Receiver, High Court of Bombay who has already
been appointed by our order dated January 25, 1990 shall take posses-
sion of the suit premises from the present agent and shall appoint the )"
appellant as his agent in respect of the suit premises and hand over
possession to the appellant of the suit premises on such terms and
H conditions as the Court Receiver may think fit but with the limitation
(MRS.) R.S. BOYCE v. S.R. COITON MILLS [KANIA, J.l 393

that the royalty for use and occupation of the suit premises shall be A
limited to the actual outgoings plus a sum of Rs.200 per month in order
' to meet unforeseen contingencies. This order shall be complied with
within a period of eight weeks from a copy of this order being served
on the Court Receiver. It is clarified that the possession of the pre-
mises will be taken from whoever might be in possession thereof and,
if the Court Receiver finds any difficulty in obtaining possession, he B
shall take the necessary assistance from the police authorities. It is
further clarified that this order shall supersede any interim orders
which might have been passed by the Court of Small Causes or the
Bombay City Civil Court or any other Court excepting this Court. In
the event of respondent no. 2 being able to finally establish his right to
the sub-tenancy of the suit premises as claimed by him in the declarat- c
ory suit in the Court of Small Causes, it shall be open to him to apply
for vacation or variation of this order as he may be advised. Respon-
dents Nos. 1 and 2 to pay the appellant the costs of this appeal fixed at
Rs.20,000 the liability for the payment of the said aggregate amount
being joint and several as between respondents Nos. 1 and 2. As far as
respondent no. 3 is concerned, we do not propose to take any action D
against him.

N.P.V. Appeal allowed.