Holding

Section 3 must be read to require that only temporary lecturers appointed on or before 25 June 1975 and who were continuously in service on 12 June 1978 are eligible for screening, and the date choice is a valid, non‑arbitrary classification.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered appeals by temporary lecturers who challenged the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Act, 1979. The Act allowed absorption of temporary lecturers appointed on or before 25 June 1975, provided they were still in service on 12 June 1978. The petitioners argued that the cut‑off date was arbitrary and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and that the phrase "were continuing" did not require continuous service. The Court held that the proper construction of Section 3 requires continuous employment from before 25 June 1975 up to the Ordinance’s commencement on 12 June 1978, and that the date was a reasonable classification with a rational nexus to the purpose of regularising long‑standing temporary lecturers. Consequently, the Act was not unconstitutional and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

The true meaning of Section 3 of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Act, 1979 – whether eligibility requires continuous service from before 25 June 1975 to 12 June 1978.
Whether fixing 25 June 1975 as the eligibility cut‑off date creates an invidious classification violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16
Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Act, 1979s. 3, s. 5, s. 6, s. 8
Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978s. clause 3
Rajasthan Universities Teachers and Officers (Special Conditions of Service) Act, 1974s. 3, s. 4, s. 5
University of Rajasthan Act, 1946s. 20A

Subjects

temporary lecturersabsorptioncontinuous serviceclassificationArticle 14Article 16Rajasthan Universities Teachers Actstatutory interpretationeligibility criteriadiscrimination

Judgment

243
DR. (MRS.) SUSHMA SHARMA ETC. ETC

v.

/'\, STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
. '
--...,) March 12, 1985 B

I [E. s. VENKATARAMIAH AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.]

~Act 1979,Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers)
Section 3 Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary
Lecturers) Ordinance 1978, Clause 3 & The Rajasthan Universities Teachers
and Offfcers (Special Condition~' of Service) Act! 1974. C

Temporary Lecturer~· in the service of the University for long years-
June 25, 1975 fixed as the date of appointffzent, to be eligible for absorptioil
in permanent service·-Choice o] date-Whether arbitrary and discriminatory.

Constitution of India 1950 Articles 14 & 16.
D
June 25, 1975 fixed as the date of appointment for temporary lecturer~
to be eligible for permanent appointn1ent-Presciption of date-Whether has«
prescribed rational nexus or arbitrary.

The Rajasthan Universities Teachers and Officers (Special Conditions of
Service) Act, 1974 provided for an elaborate procedure for recruitment of tea-
chers and officers in the universities but no selection had been made on the basis
0 E
of that Act and all ap pointment.s were made on a temporary basis. Section 3
of the Act provided that no stop gap or part-time arrangement can be made for
more than six months. The temporary appointments of lecturers-by the Vice-
Chancellor .could not be made for more than one academic year. It further
provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any other Jaw, no teacher
or officer in any University in Rajasthan should be appointed except on the
recommendation of the Selection <;:ommittee constituted under section 4. F

For a long time since the inception of the University, there had been no
regular selections and appointments of lecturers in the University and the
teachers' organisations were pressing for absorption on subst~tive posts, of
temporary -lecturers who were working· ~or_ long y~rs. The Government of
Rajasthan therefore promulgated the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absor-
ption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978. Clause 3 of the said Ordi- · G
nance had an English version as well as a Hindi ·version. Hindi version in
Roman script read as follows :

"Samast asthai pradhyap)c<.o ke siimbandh me jo is roop me 25 .June,
1975 ko ya usse purve niyukat k~ye gaye the a._ur jo Rajasthan
Vishvavidhyalay Adhyapak (Asthai Pradhyapki Ka Amelan)
H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [! 985] 3 S.C.R.

A Adhyadesh, 1978 (1978 ka Adhyadesh s. 5) ke prarambh ke
samaya is roop me karya kar rahe he in, unki apni, apni. ........... ,
The English version of the Ordinance reads as follows :-

"All temporary lecturers as were appointed as such on or before the
25th day of June, 1975 and are continuing as such at the commence-
ment of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of
B Temporary Lecturers Ordinance, 1978 Ordinance No. 5 of 1978),"

· ·On 18th April, 1978 the Ordinance was replaced by an Act namely the~
Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) ·Act,
1979 in which identical language was used, .

c The appellants in the appeals who were temporary lecturers and teachers,
were appointed temporarily by the Vice·Chancellor by virtue of section 20A of
the Universities of Rajasthan Act, 1946.

It was the contention of the appellants in their writ petitions that lecturers
had been temporarily appointed and continued from time to time but there were
D no rules for their absorption into permanent cadre. The services of the lectu-
rers were, terminated from time to time before vacation and they were re-
appointed so as to deprive them of the continuity of service which would have
entitled them to permanent absorption or regularisation of their service.

' The Single Judge allowed the writ petitions holding that (I) the
E judgment in Yogendra Kumar Tiwari v. University of Rajasthan and Others
had become final as no appeals had been preferred therefrom. and (2) clause 3
of the 1978 Ordinance means that in drder to be eligible for screening for
absorption a lecturer must be in the appointment of the University any time or
for any period before 25-6-1975 and must be a temporary teacher on 12-6-1978
even though in between he or she n1ight not have been at all in service.

F The Single Judge followed the interpretation of Section 3 as made in
Tiwari' s -case a'nd, was of the opinion that a clear differentiation had been made
between pre-emergency and post-emergency appointees of teachers and there
was no basis or nexus for such differentiation with the object of the Act and
such differentiation amounted to discrimination and violated Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution. The Single Judge struck down the consequential part of
Sections 6 and 7 of the Act.
G
The Universities of Rajasthan preferred appeals against the aforesaid
judgment. The State Government did not. The Division Bench was of the
opinion that what was required was continuous employment from pr.ior to 25th
June, 1975 to 12th June, 1978 to be eligible for screening for absorption and
that 25th June, 1975 was chosen such as any other date and there was no diffe-
rentiation between pre-emergency and post-emergency appointees for absorption
as lecturers. The Division Bench set aside the decision of the Single Judge.
·suSHMA SHARMA v. RAJASTI!AN 245
In the Appeals to this Court on the question : (i) what is the true A
meaning of Section 3 of the Act of 1979, and (ii) whether by choice of the
date of 25th June, 1975, an invidious distinction has been made between pre-
emergency and post-emergency appointees, which has no :nexus with the purpose
of the Act, and as such that Act is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.

Dismissing the Appeals, B
• HELD : 1. The object of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absor-
ption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978 which was replaced by the
Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Act 1979
was to provide for absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing-. So there-
~·
' ~ . fore experience and continous employment were necessary ingredients. The
Hindi version of the Ordinance used the expression "Ke prara111!Jli. ke samay~ c
:;;>'- is roop me karya kar rahe hein" is capable of meaning "and are continuing"
to work as such at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance.
Keeping the background of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the
proper construction and if that is the proper construction which is it). consonance
with the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object
of the Act, then the Act and the Ordinance should be construed to mean that
only those would be eligible for screening who were appointed prior to 25.6.1975 D
and were continuing at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e.
12.6.1978 i.e. approximately about three years. [259B-D1

2. The English version of clause (3) presents no difficulty. Those who
are appointed before 25.6.1975 and "are continuing" on the date when the
Ordinance came into effect i.e. 12.6.1978. So therefore "were continuing as
such ... .'..••.... " in the Act must mean that to be eligible for absorption these E
temporary lecturers should have been in continuous employment from a date
prior to 25.6.1975 to the date of the comn1encemcnt of the Ordinance of 1978
i.e. 12.6.1978. [258H; 259A]

3. The interpretation of clause (3) of the Ordinance of 1.978 in Tiwari's
case could not in the facts and circumstances be treated to be such an author-
itative pronouncement which will bind the courts in subsequent decisions in the F
interpretation of an Act which was passed soon thereafter, if on a proper con.-
struction of the subsequent enactment, it appears that the expression had not
been correctly interpreted. [2589-H]

The criterion fixed for screening for absorption was not. an irrational
criteria a criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. There-
• fore, the criticism that a teacher who was working even for two or three months G
only before 25.6.1975 and then with long interruptions was in employment of
the University at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance would be
eligible but a teacher who had worked continuously from 26.6.1975 i.e. <;lfter the
date fixed i.e. 25th June, 1975 for three years would be in-eligible and as such
that will be discrimination against long experience, cannot be accepted. Such a
construction would be an unreasonable construction unwarranted by the language
used in the provisions cotlcerned. [260A-Cl
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19851 3 s.c.R.

A . S(i) If a particular period of experience is fixed for screening or for
absorption, it is within the wisdom of the legislature, and what period should
be sufficient for a particular job or a particular employment is not subject to
judicial review. [260C]

(ii) Improper application of law in certain cases does not make the law
had per se. Useless law similarly is not always arbitrary law. [261A]
B
(iii) Wisdom or lack of wisdom in the action of the Government or
. legislature is not justiciable by court. To find fault with a law is not to
demonstrate its invalidity. Mere errors of Governrrient are not subject to judicial
review. What is best is not always discernible.

Metropolis Theater Company v. City of Chicago and Ernest J. Mage-
c rstadt, 57 Lawyers' Edition 730., Prag Ice·& Oil Mills & Anr. Etc. v. Union
of India, [1978] 3 SCR 293 at 333., D.S. Nakara and Others v. Union of India
[1983] 2 SCR 305=[1983] 2 SCR 165 referred to ..

6. If 25th June, 1975 was taken in order to differentiate between pre-
emergency and post-emergency appointeesrfor consideration for absorption then
there cannot be any doubt that such a differentiation would amount to an
D arbitrary discrimination. Because the fact whether one was pre-emergency
appointee and another a post-emergency was wholly irrelevant to the object of
the Act and the Ordinance i.e. absorption of temporary lecturers of long stand-
ina: working in the university. Therefore to the question of absorption of tem-
porary lecturefs of loni: standing imposition of emergency in the country and
appointment prior or subsequent thereto is wholly irrelevant and has no nexus.
'
Differentiation on a ground which is irrelevant amounts to discrimination.
r
E [261B-D]

In Re The Special Courts Bill 1978, [1979] 2 SCR 476 Gopalan vs. State
of Madras [1950] SCR 88., State of Travencore Cochin vs. Bombay Company
Limited, [1052] 11 !2., State of West Bengal vs. Union of India, [1964] 1 SCR
371, referred to.

F 7. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Ordinance
and bearing in mind the preamble of the Act, the main object was to make a
specific provision for the selection of teachers and officers in the universities
-
-)' "--
which had not been done for a long time. Temporary appointments against
vacant posts had been made by the universities and such posts had been con-
tinuing in some cases for ten years. The preamble to the Act of 1979 is a key
to unfold the intention of the legislature to make this law. It lays doWn that
G the Act was to provide for the absorption of temporary lecturers of long stand- •
ing working in the universities ofRajasth~n. [264C-D]

8. A certain tenure of service for the purpose of absorption was the
object to be achieved and this has a rational nexus with the object. The pre- \..
scription of the date from which the period should begin and the date on which
H it should end were merely incidenta1 to the purpose. Any date perhaps could
SUS!IMA SHARMA v. RAJASTllAN 247
/
have served the purpose ·which took into consideration long tenure. What was A
intended by the use of the expression 'appointed on or before 25.6.1975' and
·must have continued until 12.6.1978 being the date of coming into force of the
Ordinance indicated that there should have been near-abotit three years experie-

-
nce for being eligible for absorption. The date was a handy date. Handy in
the sense it came quickly in the minds of some people. At least there is no
evidence that there was any attempt to separate or penalise pre-emergency
appointee and no decision was taken by any appropriate authority and no B
• such evidence is there to make a distinction between pre-emergency and post-
emergency appointees. Being in the employment at the time of coming into
'operation- of the Ordinance was the pre-condition i.e. 12th June, 1978. Naturally
some day anterior to that date had to be indicated to ensure long tenure of
experience and 25th June, 1975 was chosen because it \Vas as good a date as any
other. [266B·Dl
..:ol c
9. It may be that 25th June, 1975 has some odour to some people. It
may be that it revised many attitudes but this is whoJly irrelevant. Any other
date might .have been chosen. A particular period was taken to make a person
eligible for being screened for absorption and regularisation and if the beginning
date happens to coincide with a particular date about which some people have
some memories, the law would not become bad. That would be taking too
~ensitive a view of human expressions. [267B-C] D

10. For the iegularisation of teachers, experience was the object to be
found out. Certain period of experience was necessary for the basis for making
the regularisation. The period of experience would be how much and the date
of experience should begin from what time are within the legislative wisdom and
there is nothing in this case to indicate that the starting point i.e. to be in
E
service.on or before 25.6.1975 was an arbitrary.choice, [269D-E]

State of Mysore & Anr. v. S.V. Narayanappa, [1967] 1 SCR 128, referred
to.

OVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3285, 3284,
F
3286 & 3287-89/82

From the Judgment dated 17.2.1982 of the High Court of Judi-
cature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in D.R- Special Appeal
Nos. 192/81, 191/81, 196/81,194/81, 193/81, 195/81 respectively .
•
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Sobhagmal Jain and S.K. Jain for the · G
Appellants.

X_ G.L. Sanghi, R.K. Garg, Manoj Swarup, Ms. La/ita Kohli, B.D.
Shar11;1a and Aruneshwar Gupta for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by : It
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R.

A SABYASACHI MuKHARll, J. These appeals by special leave arise
out of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High
Court. The appeals are by the original petitioners before the learned
single judge of the Rajasthan High Court and who having succeeded
before the learned single judge became respondents in the appeals
filed by the University before the Division Bench. The appellants in
B these appeals and other connected appeals were temporary lecturers
and teachers on various subjects. They were appointed temporary
lecturers by the Vice-Chancellor by virtue of section 20A of the
University of Rajasthan Act, 1946.
Section 4 of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers and Officers
(Special Conditions of Service) Act, 1974 hereinafter referred to as
c 1974 University Act provides for regular selection by Selection
Committees. Section 3 of the 1974 Act provides that no stop gap
or part-time arrangement can be made for more than six months.
The temporary appointments of lecturers by the Vice-Chancellor
cannot be made for more than one academic year. Further sub-
D section (I) of section 3 of the said Act provides that notwithstanding •
anything contained in the relevant law as from the commencement of
the said Act, no teacher or officer in any University in Rajasthan
should be appointed except on the recommendation of the Selection,
Committee constituted under section 4. Section 4 of the Act provi-
ded for the constitution of the Selection Committee for selection of
E lecturers and officers in the University, and dealt with certain o.ther
aspects and section 5 provides for the procedure to be followed by
the Selection Committee. The other provisions of the said Act are
not necessary to be referred to. It appears that for a long time,
indeed since the inception of the University, there have not been
regular selections and appointments of lecturers in the University
F and as such the teachers' organisations were pressing fpr absorption
on substantive posts of temporary lecturers who were working for
long years. It is not necessary to deal in detail on -this position.
One Shri Y.K. Tiwari filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High
Court. The case was disposed of by a learned single judge of the
Rajasthan High Court on 30th August, L97Rbeing Civil Writ
G Petition No. 446 of 1978-Yogendra Kumar Tiwari v. University of
Rajasthan aod Others. The petitioner in that case was appointed as
a lecturer in Law on temporary basis after being selected by the Selec-
tion Committee by an earlier order dated 10th of January, 1975. The
said petitioner had worked upto 19th June, 1975 but he was allowed
his salary upto 29th May, 1975 as his term was not extended there-
H after. He was not allowed any salary for vacation also as he had
·"
SUSllMA SHARMA "· RAJASTHAN (S. Mukharji, J.) 249

not completed six months' service on the last day of the session. The A
petitioner was reappointed as a lecturer on a temporary basis by an
order dated 13th September, 1975. As mentioned hereinbefore, ..
there was long standmg grievance of the temporary lecturers and.
therefore the Government of Rajasthan promulgated The Rajastl,an
Universities - Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers)
Ordinance, 1978 which is hereinatter referred to as the Ordinance of B
1978. It was the case of the petitioner that he was eligible for
screening. It was further contended that the previous Vice·Chancellor
before handing over charge of his office had passed an order dated
2nd July, 1977 condoning the break in service of about 25 temporary
lecturers in University belonging to the various departments inclu-
ding the faculty of law. Para or clause 3 of the said Ordinance of c
1978 had an English version as well as Hindi version. In view of the
fact that certain controversy iis there, it is necessary to set out toth
these versions. Hindi version written in Roman script reads as·
follows:

'· "Samast asthai pradhyapko ke sambandh me jo is roop me D
25 June, 1975 ko ya usse purve niyukat kiya gaye the aur jo
Rajasthan Vishvavidhyalay Adhyapak (Astbai Pradhyapko
Ka Amelan) Adhyadesh, 1978 (1978 ka Adhyadesh S'S) ke
prarambh ke samaya is roop me karye kar raha hein, unki
apni apni asthai niyukatiyo ki tarikho ko lagoo susangat · •
vidhi ke adhin sambandhit vishvavidhyalaya dwara vihit E
nuntam ahartaon ko sammilit karte hue patrta ki sharto ki
unke dwara purti ke adhyadhin aur sambandhit vibhag me
pradhyapko ki adhishthai riktiyon ki uplabhyata ki bhi
adhyadhin rehte hue, dhara 4 ke anhin gathit anuveekshan
samiti ki sifarish per unke amelan aur adhishthai niyukti F
per sambandhit vishvidhyalay dwara vichar kiya jayega." ·
(underlined by us) . ·

English version of the Ordinance reads as follows :-

• "All temporary lecturers as were appointed as such on or . G
before the 25th day of June, 1975 and are continuing as such
at the commencement of the Rajasthan Universities
q'eachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance',
1978 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1978) shall be considered by the
University concerned for their absorption and substantive
appointment on the recommendation of the Screening II
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [! 985] 3 S.C.R.

A Committee constituted under section 4 subject to their ful-
filing the conditions of eligibility including minimum
qualifications prescribed by the University concerned under
the relevant law as applicable on the respective dates of
their trmporary appointments and subject also to the avail-
ability of substantive vacancies of lecturers in the
department concerned."
.,i....
(underlined by us) (

The learned single judge in his judgment out of which appeals
were taken to the Division Bench and from which appeals arise came
c to the conclusion that (i) the judgment in Tiwari's case had become
final as no appeal had been preferred therefrom and (ii) clause 3 of
the 1978 Ordinance means that in order to be eligible for screening
for absorption a lecturer must be in the appointment of the Univer-
sity any time or for any period before 25.6.1975 and then again she
or he must be a temporary teacher on 12.6.1978 even though in

• between he or she might not have been at all in service .

fhe learned judge found that if Hindi version of clause 3 be
given effect to then, to he eligible onem ust have been appointed
before 25th June, 1975 and must have been in the employment as such
at the commencement of the Ordinance. In the English version of
E this Ordinance, the words used are "and are continuing." ·This,
according to the learned judge, was not the correct translation of the
Hindi version and according to his reading, instead of the words
used as "and are continuing as such", words such as "and are con-
tinuously in service or have been continuously in service" should
have been used if continuous employment from prior .to 25th June,
F 1975 to the 12th of June, 1978 was required. The learned judge
came to the conclusion that in the Hindi version of the Ordinance,
only two conditions were required to be fulfiled for absorption i.e.
appointment before 25th June, 1975 and continuing as such at the
time of the commencement of this Ordinance i.e. 12th June, 1978.
Taking that in view, the learned judge made the rule absolute and
G directed the respondents to appoint the petitioner to his substantive
post as the screening had already been done. This decision was not •
appealed from and it has been contended on behalf of the appellants
before us that 106 lecturers who were working temporarily have all
beco.me permanent. On 18th of April, 1978 the Ordinance was re-
placed by an Act namely The Rajasthan Universities Teachers
H (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Act, 1979 in which indentical
SUSllMA SHARMA v, RAJASTHAN (S. Muk'f,~ rji, J.) 251

language was used. It was contended that interpretation given in A
Tiwari's case was accepted by the legislature as correct. We shall
deal with this contention la'ter. But the fact that there was no appeal
preferred by the State from judgment in Tiwari's case might be that
the judgment was delivered by the learned single judge on 30th
August, 1978 and the Ordinance expired on 3l•t August, 1978. On
18th of April, 1979 however the Ordinance was replaced by 1979 B
Act.

So far as the present appeals before us are concerned, the
following questions fall for our consideration :

(I) whether, fixing of the date here namely 25.6.1975 which c
happens to be the date on which emergency was clamped, for
considering the lecturers of the University. as eligible for· screen'ing
under section 3 of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption
of lemporary Lecturer•) Act, 1979 makes the Act invalid on the
ground 1 of differentiation between pre-emergency and ·post-
emergency appointments, in other words whether the date 25th D
June, 1975 when the emergency was clamped on the country had
any nexus with the purpose of this Act '!
,. (2) what is true meaning of ithe expression used in section 3
of 1h·e Act ?
E
The short facts are that there were irregular appointments in
the Rajasthan University as lecturers for a very long time. In
other words, lecturers had been temporarily appointed and
continued from ~ear to year but theie were no rules for
their absorption into permanent cadre. Furthermore it is
undisputed that the services of the lecturers were terminated F
from time to time before vacation and they were reappointed so
as to deprive them of the continuity of service which would have
entitled them to permanent absorption or regularisation of their
services.

• The Rajasthan Universities' Teachers and Officers (Special G
Conditions of Service)_ Act, 1974-hereinafter referred to. as the 1974
Act had provided elaborate procedure for recruitment of teachers
and officers in the universities. But no selections had been made on
the basis of that Act and all appointments were made on temporary
basis. In 1978 as noted before the Ordinance of 1978 was promul-
gated with the object to provide for the absorption of temporary H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R

A lecturers of long standing working in the universities of Rajasthan.
Aecording to the University only those who had been appointed
before 25th June, 1975 and continued to be in service on the date
of the coming into operation of the Ordinance i.e. 12th June, 1978
were eligible. As the practice of the University, it was alleged, was
to break the service, one Tiwari moved the High Court and the
B decision of the High Court and the basis of the said decision have
been set out hereinbefore.

The learned single judge in this case on examination of the
materials came to the conclusion that the original petitioners, the
appellants herein had succeeded in establishing the fact that the
c date of 25th June, 1975 was arbitrarily fixed which had no nexus
with the object or the purpose of the said Act. Therefore he made
the rules absolute. The learned single judge came to the conclusion
that under the said Ordinance and under the said Act, the date of
25th June, 1975 offended Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

D The learned single judge had dealt in his judgment with the
petition of Dr. Rukmani. He has set out the facts in detail. It
is not necessary to set these out in detail but briefly these are : She
passed her M.A. in Hindi in 1969, she did her Ph.D. in Hindi
in 1973 from the University of Rajasthan. On 28th June, 1976 l
she was appointed tutor in Hindi on a temporary basis for a period y
of three months in the University of Rajasthan. She was permit··
ted to work as tutor on account of various extensions and ultimataly
she became lecturer. A Selection Committee of the University
selected her for lecturer. She was appointed as such with effect from
9th October. 1977. Her services were terminated with effect
from J 5th August, 1979 by an order of the Vice·Cbancellor.

The screening done as per order of the High Court in Tiwari's
case resulted in absorption of about l 06 lecturers who were working .
temporarily. Orders to this effect were issued on 17th August,
1978. Since the present appellants being the petitioners before the
High Court were not appointed as lecturers on or before 25th June,
G J975, they were treated as ineligible for being screened under the •
provisions of the OrJinance of 1978. It may be mentioned that I \·
some of them appeared in the selection subsequently and
were found eligible except two of them, who have been absorbed as
lecturers. The said Ordinance of 1978 as mentioned hereinbefore
expired on 31st August, 1978 and a Bill was introduced
H .and which after having undergone some amendments became the Act
SUSHMA SHARMA v. RAJASTHAN (S. Mukharji, J.) 253

of 1979 and is known as Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption A
of Temporary Lecturers) Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act of 1979). Having received the assent of the Governor on 17th
April, 1979 it was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 18th
April, 1979. The main alteration and amendment was that whereas
the entire process of screening of appointment had to be finished by
31st August, 197~, the time was thereafter extended till 31st B
August, 1979.

Dr. Rukmaoi and others applied in pursuance of the adverti-
sement issued by the University. The Selection Committee held the
interviews on 16th and 17th July, 1979. She was considered by the
Selection Committee. The Selection Committee did not select the c
said petitioner and she was accordingly rejected by the Selection
Committee. Dr. Rukmani had challenged the Ordinance of 1978 arid
the Act of 1979 on the one hand and also the Selection Co=it-
tee's decision by which sbe was assessed on the other and the
respondents were selected under the Act, of 1974.
u
The point that was canvassed mainly on behalf of the petitioners
before the learned single judge related to the validity of the Ordin-
ance of 1978 and the Act of 19H, sine' both the Ordinance as well
' as the Act had got common feature of making a teacher eligible for
consideration by the Screening Committee, only if he or she was
in the service of the University on or before 25th June. 1975 and E
further that he or she was also in the service ot the University on
12th June, 1978, the date when the Ordinance became effective by
publication in the Gazette.

Section 3 of the Act of 1979 reads as follows :-
F
'·3. Substantive appointmen·t of temporary lecturers.-
• All temporary lecturers as were appointed as such on or
before the 25th day of June, 1975 and were continuing as
such at the commencement of the Rajasthan Universities
Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance,
1978(0rdinance No. 5 of 1978) shall be considered by the G
University concerned for their absorption and substantive
appointment on the recommendation of the Screening Com-
mittee constituted under section 4 or section 5, as case may
be· subject to their fulfilling the condition of eligibility
including minimum qualificrrtions prescribed by the Univer-
sity concerned under the relevant law as applicable on the
254 SVPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 s.c.R.

A respective dates of their temporary appointments and
subject also to the availability of substantive vacancies of
lecturers in the department concerned."

Sections 5 and 6 were as follows:-

B "5. Re-Screening.-(!) Notwithstanding any-thing conta-
ined in section 7 or any other provision of the Rajasthan
Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers)
Ordinance, 1978 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1978), the services
of temporary lecturer, who was considered for substantive
· appointment by a Screening Committee but was not found
c suitable, shall be deemed not have terminated and he shall
continue to be a temporary lecturer till he is again consid-
ered for substantive appointment under section 3 after his
rescreening under sub-section (2) of this section.

(2) A temporary lecturer who was considered for substan-
D tive appointment by the ~Screening Committee referred to
in section 4, but was not found suitable shall be again consi-
dered by the Screening Committee reconstituted in the
same manner as is provided in that section.

6. Appointment to be. under the Act No. 18 of 1974.-
E
The lectures appointed to the substantive posts in pursuance
of the provisions of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers
(Absorption of Temporary Lectures) Ordinance, 1978
(Ordinance No. 5 of 1978) or of this Act shall be deemed
to have been appointed under the provisions of the Rajas-
F than Univerisities Teachers and Officers (Special Conditions
of Service) Act, 1974 (Act No. 18 of 1974)."

Section 8 "provides for the termination of the services
of the temporary lecturers not substantively appointed and
stated thatthe services of a temporary lecturer who was considered •
G for substantive appointment under sections 3, 4 and 5 but was not
substantively appointed on or before the 31st day of August, 1979
would stand terminated on the expiry of that day.

The learned single judge was of the 'iew that the Act had
application to all the temporary lecturers who were working in the
H various universities. in Rajasthan on the relevant dates and unless
SUSHMA SHARMA v. RAJASTHAN (S. Mukharji, J.) 255

they were selected by the screening com.mittee under the said Act, A
their services were to be terminated by 31st August, 1978. The
object of the Act, according to the learned.judge, was to regularise
the services of those who were found suitable after screening and to
fulfil the conditions of section 3 and then terminate the services of
all other temporary teachers on expiry of 31st August, 1978'.
B
The main controversy raised befor~ the learned single judge of
the High Court related. to the fixation of the two dates namely 15th
June, 197 5 and secondly the date of the commencement of the
~ Ordinance namely 12th June. 1978. But what was pressed was about
I the validity of the date fixed as 25.th June, 1975 as thedate on or C
J<.. before which the teacher should have been functioning as a teacher
in a particular University. Was this date arbitrary?

It is stated by the learned judge ihat the court enquired from
the Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the State and from
the learned counsel of the ·Rajasthan University as to what bad D
prompted the fixing of the date as 25th June, 1975.
. '

It may be mentioned as it is .well-known that 25th June, J975
was the date on which last emergen~y was introduced in the country.
Af The learned Advocate-General had submitted before the learned
single judge .that it was at the ins.tance of the Rajasthan University
and the Vice-Chancellor that the date was so selected. The standing
counsel, the learned judge recorded, took the stand that so far as the
University was concerned, it had never wggested the above date and ·
he had got no reason to justify the fixing of that date. The learned
. ~_judge summone~ the secretariat file. It was revealed that the date F•
. .r 1 was fixed precisely on account of the suggestion of the Vice-
• Chancellor of the Rajasthan University. The learned judge extracted
from a portion of a letter dated 30th January, 1978 from the file of
the University which reads as follows :-

"It is proposed that all the temporary lecturers appointed
on or before 25.6. 1975 be screened by a Screening Com-
mittee appointed by the University concerned and on the
recommendation of screening committee they be absorbed
subject of course to the availability of the vacancies in the
department and the candidate fulfilling the prescribed
qualifications. 25th day of June, 1975 has been suggested
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R.

A as crucial date taking into account the fact that we could
take care of all appointments made before the national
emergency which was clamped with effect from 25.6.1975."

The two drafts of the Ordinance which were sent with the
Jetter also contained the alteration in the date which had been
B changed from 1st day of September, 1973 to 25th June, 1975. This
was also noted by the learned single judge. It was submitted before
the learnecl single judge that certain representations were made by
the University teachers and their associations to change the date
from 1973 to 1975 and to substantiate that allegation, the above file
was placed before the Court. However, the recommendations
c contained in the file, according to the learned Single judge, nowhere
contained 25th June, 1975 as the date of the Ordinance. In their
representations there was a demand that the earlier Government
decision to fix the date of eligibility as !st of September, 1973 should
be altered to a date so as to cover cases of all other lecturers who
had been appointed later . on also. It is evident, therefore, in view
D
ot the history of appointment of temporary lecturers, that the inten-
tion was to regularise the appointments taking into consideration
certein tenure of experience or office into consideration, It was
Initially suggeeted that 1973 should be taken as the date to begin
with i.e. who should be on the roll of lecturers on that date in 1973
E but due to representations on behalf of the associations of teachers
so as to include subsequent appointees, it was changed. Why this
particular date was chosen, there is no specific answer but there is
a letter from the Vice-Chancellor which indicated that such date
'should be taken, because 25th June, 1975 was the date of emergency,
that date should be taken as he said "we should take care of all
F appointments before the national emergency". In order to appreciate
the problem of regularisation, the learned single judge noted that
the Univenity of Rajasthan had been adopting a practice of appoint-
ing temporary· lecturers for a fixed period and after a gap to
reappoint. It had created a controversy and several teachers were
found ineligible on account of this break in service and this had
G led to the earlier writ petition which we have mentioned hereinbe- ,
fore.

The earlier writ petition (Tiwari's) had interpreted clause (3)
now section 3 of the Act to mean that continuity of service between
25.6.1975 to 12.6.1978 was not necessary and aU that was required
H was that one must be in service on or before 25.6.1975 and then
SUSHMA SHARMA v, RAJASTHAN (S. Mukharji, J.) 257

again on 12.6.1978. This is a point on which we wc:mld have to A
express our opinion as to whether the learned single judge was correct
in his interpretation.
On the basis of the interpretation of section 3 of the Act as
made by Tiwari's case (supra) by which the learned single judge felt
himself bound and with which the learned single judge agreed, he B
accordingly made the rule absolute. The learned single judge was
of the opinion that a clear differentiation had been made between
pre-emergency and post-emergency appointees of teachers and there
was no basis or nexus for such differentiation with the object of the
Act and such differentiation amounted to discrimination and
violated Articles !4 and 16 of the Constitution. The ]earned single c
judge also struck down the consequential part of section 6 and 7 of
the Act as mentioned hereinbefore.
The universities of Rajasthan preferred appeals against the
judgment and order of the learned single judge. The State Govern-
ment did not. The Division Bench was unable to accept the interpreta- D
tion of section 3 of the Act as made by the learned single judge and
was of the opinion that what was required was continuous employ- ·
ment from prior to 25th June, 1975 to 12th June, 1978 to be
f
eligible for screening for absorption and the Division Bench was of
the view that 25th June, 1975 was chosen such as any other date
and there was no differentiation between pre-emergency and post- E
emergency appointees for absorption as lecturers. The Division
Bench therefore set aside the decision of the learned single judge.

Being aggrieved by the said decision, the original petitioners
have preferred these appeals by special leave to this Court.
F
As mentioned hereinbefore two points require consideration
• by us - (i) what is the true meaning of section 3 of the Act of J979
and (ii) whether by choice of the date of 25th June, 1975, an-invidious
distinction has been made between pre-emergency appointees and
post-emergency appointees, which has no nexus with the purpose
of the Act and as such the Act is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of G
the Constitution.

As mentioned herein before,, the learned single judge of the
Rajasthan High Court in these appeals had relied heavily on the
interpretation made in Y. K. Tiwari's case (supra) of clause (3) of
1>78 Ordinance, B_efore us also in these appeals this was reiterated. H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R.

A It was contended that that was the only possible construction of clause
(3) of 1978 Ordinance and necessarily of section 3 oft979 Act. We
shall presently deal with this con ten ti on. It was further contended
that this clause (3) of 1978 Ordinance having received judicial
interpretation and when the legislature enacted the 1979 Act, the
legislature bad before it this interpretation and when a particular ).
B form of legislative enactment had received authoritative interpreta- j
tion whether by judicial decision or by a long course of practice is
again adopted in framing of a later statute, it is sound rule of
construction. to bold that the words so adopted were intended by
the legislature to bear the meaning which had been so put upon
them. (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition p. 139).
c
This argument, however, cannot in this case be accepted. As
we have noted before, the fact that there was no appeal perferred
from the learned single judge's decision in Y.K. Tiwari's case is of
not much significance in the facts and circumstances of this case
because the Ordinance which was the subject matter of interpretation
D by the judgJllent expired within two days of the delivery of the
judgment and perhaps on this ground it was not thought necessary
to pursue this matter. Secondly, the new Act came very soon there-
after within a period of about six months. Therefore it could uot
be said that there was any long practice or of any judicial interpre-
tation oflong standing, Indeed this aforesaid rule of interpretation
E which we have noted hereinbefore should be used in a careful manner
It was observed by Lord Scarman in the case of R v. Chard (1984
A.C. p. 295) that the theory which has been noted hereinbefore was
not a canon of construction of absolute obligation but only a
presumption in the circumstances to be taken in judicial interpreta-
F tion. This proposition, according to Lord Scarman, is well-settled.

In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that
the interpretation of clause (3) of the Ordinance of 1978 in Tiwari's
case could not in the facts and circumstances be treated to be such
an authoritative pronouncement which will bind the courts in
G subsequent decisions in the interpretation of an Act which was
passed soon thereafter, if on a proper construction of the subsequent
enactment, it appears that the expression had not been correctly
interpreted. We have noted the Hindi version of clause (3) as well
as the English version. The English version presents no difficulty
namely those who are appointed before 25.6.1975 and "are continu-
H !ng" on the date when the Ordinance came into effect i.e. 12.6.1978.
§uSm.IA SHARMA v. RAJASTHAN (S. Mukhar)i, }.) 259
So therefore "were continuing as such ...... " in the Act must mean A
that to be eligible for absorption these temporary lecturers should
have been in continuous employment from a date prior to 25.6.1975
to the date of the commencement of the Ordinance of J 978 i.e.
12.6.1978.

The object of this legislation was to provide for absorption of B
temporary lecturers of long standing. So therefore experience and -
continuous employment were necessary ingredients. The Hindi

·r- version of the · Ordinance used the expression "ke prarambh kl
samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein" is capable of meaning uand
are continuing" to work as such at the time of the commencement
of the Ordinance. Keeping the background of the purpose of the
c
Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the
proper construction which is in consonance with the English version
of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object of the Act
then in our opinion the Act and the Ordinance should be construed
to mean that only those would be eligible for screening who were D
appointed pr.ior to 25.6.1975 and were continuing at the time of the
commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 12.6.197!S i.e. approximately
about three years. If that is the correct reading, then we are unable
to accept the criticism that those who were for a short period
appointed prior to 25.6.1975 then again with interruption were wor-
king only at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. E
12.6.1978 would also be eligible. In other words people with very
short experience would be eligible for absorption. That cannot be
the purpose of the Act. It cannot be so read reasonably. Therefore
on a proper construction it means that all temporary lecturers who
\.. were appointed as such on or before 25.6.1975 and were continuing
, ./- as such at the commencement of the Ordinance shall be considered 11
·-~
by the University for screening for absorption. The expression
"were continuing" is significant. This is in consonance with the
object of the Act to en.sure continuity of experience and service as
one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary
lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers,
• certain continuous experience is necessary. If a legislature considers G
a particular period of experience to be necessary, the wisdom of such
a decision is not subject to judicial review. Keeping the aforesaid
reasonable meaning of clause (3) of the Ordinance and section 3 of
the Act in view, we are of the opinion that the criterion fixed for
screening for absorption was not an irrational criterion not having H
any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the ~riticism that
· t1985l 3s.c.k .
A . a teacher who was'wo.rking even for two o! three months only.before
25.6.197.5 and . then with long interru.ptions was in employment of
... th·e. University at the tirr.e of the commencement of the Ordinance
would be eligible but a teacher who had worked continuously from
26.6.1975 i.e. after the date fixed i.e. 25th June, 1975 for three years
would be ineligible and as such that will be discrimination against
'!orig experience, cannot be accepted. Such a construction· would be
an unreasonable construction unwarranted by the language used in
•
the provisions concerned. It is well-settled that if a particular period
of experience is ' fixed ' for screening or for absorption, it is within
·the wisdom of the legislature, and what period should be sufficient
for. a particularjob or a particular employment ·is not subject to
•
judicial review.' ·We need not refer to a large number of decisions
·'on this point. ·

·· '·' · Another contention was urged before us that if it was held that
D ··the ..proper interpretation of section 3 of the Act of 1979 is that in ,__
order to be ·eligible for screening for ·absorption ·one should be
~ppointed before the 25th June, 1975 and continued to be a teacher
on the day. of the coming into operation of the Ordinance i.e.
'12.'6.1978 i.e. continuously for a period of about three years then the
•, Act cannot apply to anyone. It was .submitted that in Rajasthan
E universities there. was the practice to keep temporary teachers with
. breaks and nobody could continuously bold the post for a continuous
' 'period of three years -:- indeed not more than six months. It was
. urged that the practice prevalent in the universities was to break the
service of the temporary lecturers and not to allow them continously
.• to work. The proper interpretation would be that these breaks i.e. r
·.: F '·'~a break for a month or so during •vacation should be considered as
' ' 'functional gaps and temporary teachers who had f~nctional gaps.
but were in fact in continuous service should be treated for all
. practical purposes to be in continuous service. It was submitted on .
.behalf of the universities as well as 1 the State Government before us·
· , ·that the universities as well as the State Government ·bad always
G -: taken the stand that continuous service was covered by the. Act and
ntinuous service included those temporary· teachers who.bad. 'func-
. ~~nal gaps" but. were in fact in . conti?uous service. Loo~ed at from t-
., that point of view there was no questton of the Act not berng of:. any
use. It was further submitted that none of the respondents who
· ;, H :; had been ahsorbed had that qualification .. If .that is so, the· appoint-
. roents may be bad and these facts may be looked into if appropriate
siJSHMA SHAl\MA v. ll.AIASTHAN (S. Mukhar)i, J.) ~61

applications are made by the appellants aqd others. Improper appli- A
cation of law in certain cases does not make the law bad per se.
Useless law similarly is not always arbitrary law.

Next comes the question whether the choice of 25th June, 1975
~ as the date prior to which temporary teachers must have been in
• employment to be eligible for screening is bad as such. If 25th June, B
1975 was taken in order to differentiate between pre-emergency and
post-emergency appointees for consideration for absorption then
there cannot be any doubt that such a differentiation would amount
')lo an arbitrary discrimination. Because the fact whether one was a
pre-emergency appointee and another a post-emergency appointee c
~ was wholly irrelevant to the object of the Act and the Ordinance i.e.
absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing working in the
university. Therefore to the question of absorption of temporary
lecturers of long standing. imposition of emergency in the country
and appointment prior or subsequent thereto is wholly irrelevant and
bas no nexus. Diffetentiation ·on a ground which is irrelevant D
amounts to discrimination. This is well-settled by numerous decisions
of this Court. It is not necessary to refer to these decisions. It is
sufficient if we mention the decision of this Court In Re · The Spel:ial
Courts Bill. 1978(1) where at page 534 the learned Chief Justice inter
--t' alia laid down the following principles to judge validity under Article
14 of the Constitution :- E

I. The first part of article 14, which was adopted from the
. Irish Constitution, is a declaration of equality of the
civil rights of all persons within the territories of India.
It enshrines a basic principle of republicanism. The
second part, which is a corollary of the first and is based F
on the last clause of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the American Constitution, enjoins that
equal protection shall be secured to )ill such persons in
.the enjoyment of their rights and' liberties without
discrimination of favouritism. It is a pledge of the pro-
• G
tection of equal laws, that is, laws that operate alike on
all persons under like circumstances.

2. , The State, in .the exercise of iti governmental power,
has of necessity to make !aws opera tin~ differently on
------------- H
(I) [19791 2 S.C R. 476.
,,,._ r . , .
~62 SUPREME COURT REPORtS u~ssi j s.c.lt.
A different groups or classes of persons within its territory
to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies,
and it must possess for that purpose large powers of
distinguishing and classifying persons or things to be
subjected to such laws.

B 3. The Constitutional command to the State to afford equal
protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable· by the
invention and application of a precise formula. There-
fore, classification need not be constituted by an exact
or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things.
The Courts should not insist on delusive exactness or
c apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of
classification in any given case. Classification is justified
if it is not palpably arbitrary.

4. The principle underlying the guarantee of article 14 is
D not that the same rules of law should be applicable to
all persons within the Indian territory or that the same
remedies should be made available to them irrespective
of differences of circumstances. It only means that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike
both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
E Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same
situation, and there should be no discrimination bet-
ween one person and another if as regards the subject-
matter of the legislation their position is substantially
the same.

F 5. By the process of classification, the State has the power
of determining who should be regarded as a class for
purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted
a
on particular subject. This power, no doubt, in some
degree is likely to produce some inequality ; but if a
law .deals with the liberties of a number of well-defined
G classes, it is not open to the charge of denial or equal
protection on the ground that it has no application to
other persons. Classification thus means segregation
classes which have a systematic relation, usually found
in common properties and characteristics. It postulates
H a rational basis and does not mean herding together of
certain persons and classes arbitrarily.
SUSHMA SHARMA v. RAJASTI!AN (S. Mukharji, J.) 263

. 6. The law can make and set apart the classes according A
. _,·, to the needs and exigencies of the society and as sugge~ i .

.sted by. experience. It can recognise· even degree of'
evil, but the classification should never he arbitrary,
. artificial or evasive.

7. · The classification· must not be ·arbitrary but ·must be B
• rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on
some qualities or'i::haracteristics which are to be found.
in all the persons grouped together and not in others
· ·who are let out but those qualities or characteristics
• must have . a reasonable relation to theobjeCt of the
lei;slation. In order to· pass the test, two conditions'. ' c
must be fulfilled, namely,= (If.that the clas~ification:
must ·be' founded ·on an intelligible differentia which.
distiilguishes those" that are grouped together from·
.. others and. (2) that differentia. must have a rational
relation to the object' sought to· be achieved by the D
Act.'' ' ,. ·'

In support of the cont~ntion ;that 25th .Trine, 1975 was chosen
because of the emergency. reliance was. placed on certain com';n~ni
cations from the Vfoe:Chan~ellor ',Vhich ,hav.e been noticed by the
learned single judge. . The learned single judge came to the., conclu- E
.J
sion that was the basis i.e. to differentiate between. pre 'and post
emergency appointees. The Division Bench· did not. accept this
view,·• W~ are in agreement
~ . wi\li \he vi~w~ . \>f\lic; Pivision.Bc;nch,
. .

·1t appears to us that the primary object .of •the Ord!nanc~ as
well a~ofthe Act was to provide for the absorption and .regnlari•a• .JI
.,
tion or temporary lecturers of long ·standing . Jn· the universities In
Rajasthan. What was Intended was that the ·temporary teachers or
long· standing should be screened end· 25th June. 1975 was taken ·
because it was as convenient a date as any other. · While interpreting
the provisions of any Act, what is necessary Is the Intention of the -G
legislature and that has to be found out from the ·language used, it "
is not the view of the Vice-Chancellor or of an officer or authority
who might or might not have put a· note ·to. the Bill. :_was there
anything to spell out the intention of the legislature in fixing a
particular date? It Is well-settled that speeches. of the' Mer;,bers of ,.,
the House could at best be indici.itive of the ·subjective. Intention of I 1.H
-the speakers but wouk! i;\Q\;r~l!~~t the1 inartic11late' mental'proceises
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R.

A lying behind the majority of those who voted which carried the
hill to become an Act. The objective must be seen. The objective
was to fix some tenure to make temporary teachers eligible for
screering for absorption. 1n this connection reference may be made
to the observations of this Court in Gopalan v. State of Madras. (1)
The same view was also reiterated in the case of (2) State of Travan-
B core Cochin v. Bombay Company Limited and State of West Bengal v.
Union of India.(S)

It appears tolus that according to the statement of objects and
reasons of the Ordinance and bearing in mind the preamble of the .
.c .Act, the main object was to make a specific provision for the selec- '<(
tion of teachers and officers in the universities which had not been ~
done for a long time. T~!nporary appointments against vacant posts
.had been made by the universities and such posts had been continu-
ing in some cases for ten years. The preamble to the Act of 1979
is a key to unfold the intention of the legislature to make this law.
D It lays down that the ·Act was to provide for the absorption of
temporary lecturers of long standing working in the universities of
Rajasthan. The objects and reasons of the Ordinance of 1978 read
as follows :-

"An Ordinance to provide for the absorption of tem-
E porary lecturers of Icing standing working in the Univer-
sities in Rajastan.
In the Rajashan Universities Teachers and Officers
(Special Conditions of Service) Act, 1974 (Rajasthan Act
No. 18 of 1974) specific provisions have .been made for
F the selection of teachers and officers in the Universities.
But for one reason or the other, regular selection com-
mittees in the Universities should not meet to hold regular
selections before and after the commencement of the
Act. Therefore, temporary appointments against such
vecant posts were made by the Universities. Such appoint-
G ,
ments have been continuing in some cases for the last
ten years with a view to solve this long standing problem,

(I) (19501 S.C.R. 88.
(2) (1952] S.C.R. 1112.
H . (3) [1964) I S.C.R. 371.
SUSHMA SHARMA v. RAJASTHAN (S. Mukharji, J.) 265

it was considered necessary to regularise the appointments A
through specially constituted Screening Commiitees-

·Since, the academic session was about to commence and
since ·the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly was not in
session and the Governor was satisfied that circunistances .
existed which rendered it necessary for him to take B
immediate action, he· made and promulgated the Raja· ·
sthan University Teachers (Absorption of Temporary
Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978 on 8th day of .June, 1978."

If the intention of the ·legislature in fixing 25th June, 1975 in
the impugned section of the Act was to make differentiation on the·. c
"basis of pre-emergency and post-emergency temporary lecturers then
there was no difficulty in agreeing with the view taken by the learned ,
single judge of the Rajasthan High Court an~ accepting .the sub-
missions advanced on behalf of the appellants before us. However,
as noted before, the division Bench of the High Court could not spell
'out such an intention from any of the provisions of the Ordinance D
as well as the Act. We respectfully agree. The Court can only
search for the objective intent of the legislature primarily in the words
used in the enactment aided by such historical ·material ·as· reports
of the statutory committees, preamble etc. It was laid down in the
case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India (supra) that a statute, E
as passed by the Parliament, is the expression of the collective inten'
tion of the legislature as a whole. It may be borne in mind that in
this case there was no particular point of view in mind of the
University: We have noted the objects and reasons of the Ordina·
nee.
F
The problem, for the solution of wnich tni<'Ordinance was
passed and this Act was enacted, wa< to regufarise the appointments
tcrougn specially constituted Screening Committees for temporary
teacners of Jong standing. There is a further fact which is important
that initially it was proposed to cover the cases of temporary lec-
turers· appointed on or before June, f973 but representation was G
made by the temporary . lecturers that would depriv.e many sub·
sequent appointees and tnerefore the benefit was extended to those
temporary teachers who were appointed on or before 25-6-1975.
Tt appears that the intention was that those who had continued from
a date prior to 1975 upto June 1978 snould get tne benefit. Such
H
benefit had to be fixed giving a particular period and from the mere
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R.

A fact that 25th June, 1975 was fixed which also happens to be the
date on which emergency was clamped <in the country, it cannot be
said that emergency was the nexus. A certain tenure of service for
the purpose of absorption was the object to be achieved and this
bas a rational nexus with the object. The prescription of the date
from which the period should begin and the date on which it should
B
end were merely ·incidental to the purpose. Any date perhaps could
have served the purpose which took into consideration long tenure.
What was intended by the use of the expression ;appointed on or
before 25-6-1975' and must have continued until 12-6-1978 being
th.e date of coming into force of the Ordinance indicated that there~
c should have been near about three ye_ars experience for being
eligible for absorption. The date was a handy date. Handy in the
sense it came quickly in the minds of some people. At least there is
no evidence that there was any attempt to separate pre-emergency
appointees and no decision was taken by any appropriate authority
and no such evidence is there to make a distinction between pre-
D emergency and post-emergency appointees. Being in the employ-
ment at the time of coming into operation of the Ordinance was the
pre-condition that is I 2th June, 1978. Naturally, some day anterior
to that date had to be indicated to ensure long tenure of experience
and 25th June, 1975 was chosen because it was as good a date as
any other.
E
. It may be borne in mind that wisdom or lack of wisdom in the
action of the Government or legislature is not justiciable by court.
See in this connection the observations of the U.S. Supreme Court in
the case of Metropolis Theater Company v. City of Chicago and
F Ernest J. Magerstadt. 1 To find fault with a law is not to demonstrat~
its invalidity. There the learned judge Mr. Justice Mckenna obser···\- t
ved as follo.ws ::_ ·

"It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judi·
cial interference. The problems of government are practical
G ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough recom•
mendations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But eveQ
such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What i~
best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may
·be disputed or condemned, Mere errors 9f sovernment
H -------------=
SUSHMA SHARMA. v. RAJASTHAN (S. Mukharji, J.) . 267

are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably:·-· A
arbitrary exercises which can be declared void ............ "".
This passage has been quoted with approval by Chier Justice
Chandrachud in Prag Ice & Oil· Mills &. Anr. Etc. Vs.'
Union of India.
• We musi bear in mind that mere errors of Government· are not B
subject to judicial review. What is best is not always discernible: It
may be that 25th Jun•, 1975 has some odour to some people. It may
be that it revised many attitudes but •his is wholly, irrelevant. Any·
other date might have been chosen. A particular period was taken
to make a person eligible for being screened for abscirpiion and
regularisation and if the beginnings date happens to coincide with
c
particular date about which some people have some memories, the
law would not. become bad. It seems that would be taking too
sensitive a view of human expressions.

Great deal of reliance was placed on a five judges' Bench
D
decision of this Court iii the case of D.S. Nakara and Others v.
Union of India. (1) There it was found that the Central Government
-servants on retirement' from service 'were entitled to-receive· pension
under the Central Civil Services (Pension Rules, 1972. Under the ear-
. lier pension scheme the pension was related to th'e average" emolu-
. ments during 36 months just preceding retirement. On.25th May, E
1979, the Government of India, Ministry of Finance issued Office
. Memorandum whereby the formula for computation of pension was
liberalised but made it applicable to government servants who were
in service on or after that specified date. By another Memoran·
dum of the Ministry of Defence dated 28th September, 1979,. the
liberalised pension formula introduc'ed for the government servants F
governed by the 1972 Rules was extended to the Armed
' . Forces
personnel subject to limitations set out in the memorandum with a
condition that the new rules of pension would be effeciive from 1st
April, 1979 and miyht be applicable to all service officers who
become/became non·effective or on after that date. The liberalised
scheme introduced a slab system for computation of pension, raised·
·(;
pension ceiling and provided for. average emoluments with reference
··to last ten months' service. Consequently, the pensioners who retired
prior to the specified date had to.earn pension on the average emolu-
• ' . t - , • ~

(1) [1978) 3 S.CR. 293 at 333.
(2) [198311 s.c.c;. ~Q~ - 119831 2 S.C.R. 16S,
•
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 3 S.C.R.
A ments of 36 months' salary just preceding the date of retirement.
Thus they suffered triple jeopardy viz. lower average emoluments,
absence of slab system and lower ceiling, and being so aggrieved they
filed the writ petitions in this Court contending that the memoranda
were in violation of Article 14. Petitioners l and 2 were retired pen-
sioners of the Central Government who had retired prior to the speci-
B
fied date and petitioner 3 was a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860, formed to ventilate the legitimate public
problems and consistent with its objective it was espousing the cause
of the petitioners all over the country.

c This Court held that pension was neither a bounty nor a matter
of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer, nor an ex
gratia payment. It was a payment for the past service rendered. The
most practical raison d'etre for pension is the enability to provide for
one self due to old age. It created a vested right and was governed
by the statutory rules such as the Central Civil Services (Pension)
,o Rules which were enacted in exercise of power conferred by Articles
309 and 148(5) of the Constitution.

The expression 'pensioner' was generally understood in con-
tradistinction to the one in service. In that case Article 14 was wholly .,
violated inasmuch as the pension rules being statutory in character,
E the amended rules, since the specified date, accord differential and
· discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of commutation of
pension. Pensioners being all equal, no date could be chosen to
separate one group getting more benefit than other. If a particular
• benefit is to be given to all then making a classification between them
is discriminatory. Pension was the right of all retired persons. A
F
particular date was chosen by the Government and that date bad no
nexus with the purpose of the Act i.e. give relief to them.
I
There are some cases where choice of date has not been
questioned. For instance Union of India & Anr. v. M/s.
Parameswaran Match Works Ltd, (1) wherein by notification dated
G
21st July, 1967, benefit to.a concessional rate of duty was made
available if a manufacturers of matches made·.a declaration that the
total clearance of matches from a factory would not exceed 75 million
during a financial year. There the date chosen was 21st July, 1967.
It was contended before this Court by the Union of India that the
H
(I) [1975] 2 S.C.R. 573,
SUSHMA SHARMA v, RAJASTHAN (S. Mukharji, J.) 269

concessional rate of duty was inte.nded for small bona fide units who A
were in the field when the notification dated 4th September, 1967
was issued. The concessional rate of duty was not intended to· bene-
fit the large units which had split up into smaller units to earn the
.;
concession. There this Court observed at a page 579 as follows :-
•
"The choice of a 'date as a basis for classification cannot B
always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason
is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be
capricious or whimsical in the circumstances.· When it is
seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no
mathematical· or logical way of fixing it precisely, the deci-
sion of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted c
unless we can say that it is very wide of the reasonable
mark."

But as we have mentioned hereinbefore; Nakara's case (supra)
dealt with the problem of benefit to all pensioners. The choice of
D
the date of lst April, 1979 had no nexus with the purpose and object
of the Act. The facts in the instant case are, however, different.
For the regularisation of teachers, experience was the .object to be
found .out. Certain period of experience was necessary for the basis
for making the regularisation. The period of experience would be
how much and the date of experience should begin from what time E
are within the legislative wisdom and there is nothing in this case to
indicate that the starting point i.e., to be in service on or before
. 25.6.1975 was an arbitrary choice.

Reliance in this connection may also be placed on the case of
State of Mysore & Anr. v. S. V. Narayanappa. (1 ) For the purpose of F
the instant case it is not necessary to set out in detail all the facts of
that case. The facts of that decision have a ring of familiarity v.ith
the facts of the present case. There also choosing a particular date
did not make the Act bad for the purpose of regularisation of the
appointments in the Mysore Government.
G
Various submissions. and some other decisions were placed
before us in aid of rival submissions. In the view we have taken as
indicated hereinbefore, it is not necessary to refer to these.
-----...,.------
(I) [196711 s.c.R. 12s. H
•

270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R.

A For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the lear-
ned judges of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court were
right. The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed. There will be
no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.

We are told that except two, all other appellants have already
.B been absorbed. It has also to be borne in mind that in considering
whether lecturers are eligible or not those who are functioning since
prior to 25.6.1975 until 12.6.1978, functional gaps as we have indi-
cated hereinbefore should be ignored and if possible some arrange-
ments be made where after appropriate screening or selection as
the case may be, those who have been functioning as temporary
c teachers for long period might be absorbed including the appellants,
subject to the rules of the University.

N.V.K.
Appeals dismissed