Supreme Court of India

DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANRversusTHE CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY & ORS.

Citation: 2023 INSC 1032
Decided: 30 November 2023
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: D Y CHANDRACHUD

Holding

Re‑appointment of a Vice‑Chancellor is permissible for a tenure post, the sixty‑year age limit does not apply to re‑appointments, the re‑appointment need not follow the fresh‑appointment procedure, and the Chancellor’s decision was invalid due to abdication of his statutory discretion.

Summary

The Chancellor of Kannur University re‑appointed Dr. Gopinath Ravindran as Vice‑Chancellor for a second four‑year term after the expiry of his first term, despite a pending selection process and a statutory age limit of sixty years. The petitioners challenged the re‑appointment on grounds that (i) re‑appointment is not permissible for a tenure post, (ii) the sixty‑year age ceiling should apply to re‑appointments, (iii) the same selection‑committee procedure as a fresh appointment must be followed, and (iv) the Chancellor had abdicated his statutory power by acting on the State Government’s recommendation. The Supreme Court held that re‑appointment is permissible for tenure posts, the age limit in Section 10(9) applies only to initial appointments and not to re‑appointments, and the legislature did not intend the re‑appointment process to follow the fresh‑appointment procedure. It further found that the Chancellor’s decision was vitiated by undue influence from the State Government, amounting to abdication of his statutory discretion. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and quashed the notification re‑appointing the Vice‑Chancellor.

Issues considered

Whether re‑appointment is permissible in respect of a tenure post
Whether the outer age limit of sixty years for appointment of Vice‑Chancellor under Section 10(9) applies to re‑appointment
Whether re‑appointment must follow the same selection‑committee process as a fresh appointment under Section 10(1)
Whether the Chancellor abdicated or surrendered his statutory power of re‑appointment

Legislation cited

Kannur University Act, 1996s. 10(10), s. 10(9)
University Grants Commission Act, 1956s. 26(1)(e), s. 26(1)(g)

Subjects

re‑appointmentvice‑chancellortenure postage limitstatutory powerpurposive constructionadministrative lawquo warrantouniversity governanceUGC regulations

Judgment

[2023] 16 S.C.R. 377 : 2023 INSC 1032

CASE DETAILS

DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR.
v.
THE CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7700 of 2023)
NOVEMBER 30, 2023
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, CJI,
J.B. PARDIWALA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: The respondent No. 4 herein was appointed
as the Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University, his tenure was for a
period four years. As the tenure of the respondent No. 4 was coming to an
end, the Chancellor initiated steps for selection and appointment of a new
Vice-Chancellor. The Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education, State
of Kerala issued notiﬁcation inviting applications from eligible candidates.
However, the respondent no. 4 herein was re-appointed as Vice-Chancellor
of the Kannur University after the Minister for Higher Education and Social
Justice addressed a letter to the Governor/Chancellor dated 22.11.2021
recommending re-appointment of the respondent No. 4 herein for a second
term. (i) Whether re-appointment is permissible in respect of a tenure
post; (ii) Whether the outer age limit of sixty years for the appointment of
Vice-Chancellor as stipulated under sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the
Kannur University Act, 1996 is to be made applicable even in the case of
re-appointment of the Vice-Chancellor for one more term of four years (iii)
Whether the re-appointment of the Vice-Chancellor has to follow the same
process as a fresh appointment by setting up a selection committee under
Section 10(1) of the Act 1996 (iv) Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender
his statutory power of reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor.
Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Whether
reappointment is permissible in respect of a tenure post:
Held: The ordinary meaning that can be ascribed to the term
“reappointment” is the act or process of deciding essentially that someone
should continue in a particular job – Ordinarily, the object behind providing
377
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

for reappointment is twofold – First is “retention” i.e., where the incumbent
to the oﬃce/post during his term is found to be extraordinary and has
established himself or herself to be an asset to the institution, then in such
circumstance, such person is retained with a view to allow him to continue
on the same post for one more term – Secondly, having regard to the nature
of the post the organization or institution may not be in a position to ﬁll up
the post in a time bound manner and in such circumstances, the provision
for reappointment may enable the organization or institution to relieve itself
of the tedium of going through the entire selection process afresh every time
the post becomes vacant – Therefore, the reappointment is permissible even
in case of a tenure post. [Paras 46 and 47]
Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Whether the
outer age limit of sixty years for the appointment of Vice-Chancellor
as stipulated under sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act, 1996 is
to be made applicable even in the case of reappointment of the Vice-
Chancellor for one more term of four years.
Held: On a plain reading of sub-section (9) of Section 10 of
the Act 1996, it appears that the person sought to be appointed as a
Vice-Chancellor must not be more than sixty-years of age at the time
of appointment i.e., it provides the outer age limit for appointment –
While sub-section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 provides that upon
appointment, the term of the Vice-Chancellor would be for four years
and that he shall be eligible for reappointment – The proviso attached
to sub-section (10) stipulates that no person shall be appointed as Vice-
Chancellor for more than two terms – Sub-section (9) of Section 10
of the Act 1996 will apply only at the stage of appointment of Vice-
Chancellor and would have no application whatsoever when it comes
to reappointment of Vice-Chancellor under sub-section (10) – This is
reinforced from the words “shall be eligible for reappointment” occurring
in sub-section (10) which connotes that the same is an enabling provision
whereby the Vice-Chancellor by virtue of holding his oﬃce is deemed
eligible for reappointment irrespective of the other provisions – If
the outer age limit provided in sub-section (9) would apply even to
reappointment, then the same would eﬀ ectively mean that only those
persons who are appointed as Vice-Chancellor at the age of ﬁfty-ﬁve or
below could be considered for reappointment – Such an interpretation
would result in conditions being read into sub-section (10) which have
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 379
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY

not been prescribed by the legislature – Had the intent of legislature
been otherwise, sub-section (10) or the words “shall be eligible for
re-appointment” would have been speciﬁcally qualiﬁ ed by or made
subject to the words “sub-section (9)” or “provisions of this section”
– If sub-section (9) is interpreted so as to be made applicable even to
reappointment as provided in sub-section (10), then the result would be
that any person who is appointed as Vice-Chancellor at the age of ﬁfty-
six or more would not be eligible for reappointment, thereby rendering
sub-section (10) and its proviso completely otiose and meaningless in
such cases – A purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the
purpose of giving full eﬀect to the statutory provisions – Thus, the outer
age limit of sixty years provided in sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the
Act 1996 will not apply, when it comes to reappointment under sub-
section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996. [Paras 48, 50, 52, 53, 56, 57]
Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Whether the
reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor has to follow the same process as
a fresh appointment by setting up a selection committee under Section
10(1) of the Act 1996.
Held: Reappointment of Vice-Chancellor has been provided under sub-
section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 – The proviso to sub-section (10)
of the Act 1996 further makes the intention of the legislature to provide for
reappointment more clear – The legislature has not thought ﬁt to prescribe
any particular procedure or any particular mode or manner of reappointment
– The UGC Regulations are also silent as regards the reappointment of
Vice-Chancellor – In the case at hand, sub-section (10) of Section 10 of
the Act, 1996, provides for reappointment and does not even contain the
words “subject to provisions of this section” – This is as good as to reﬂect
the legislature’s intention of permitting reappointment without following
the ordinary process of appointment of Vice-Chancellor – Thus, it is not
necessary to follow the procedure of appointment as laid down in Section
10 of the Act 1996 for the purpose of reappointment. [Paras 58, 65, 66]
Kannur University Act, 1996 – s. 10(9) and s.10(10) – Did the
Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power of reappointment
of the Vice-Chancellor.
Held: The facts make it abundantly clear that there was no independent
application of mind or satisfaction or judgment on the part of the Chancellor
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

and the respondent No. 4 came to be reappointed only at the behest of the
State Government – Although the notiﬁcation reappointing the respondent
No. 4 to the post of Vice-Chancellor was issued by the Chancellor yet the
decision stood vitiated by the inﬂuence of extraneous considerations or to put
it in other words by the unwarranted intervention of the State Government
– It is the Chancellor who has been conferred with the competence under
the Act 1996 to appoint or reappoint a Vice-Chancellor – No other person
even the Pro-Chancellor or any superior authority can interfere with the
functioning of the statutory authority and if any decision is taken by a
statutory authority at the behest or on a suggestion of a person who has no
statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal – Thus, it is the
decision-making process, which vitiated the entire process of reappointment
of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor – The decision making
process because in such a case the exercise of power is amenable to judicial
review – As a consequence, the notiﬁcation dated 23.11.2021, reappointing
the respondent no.4 as the Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University is
quashed. [Paras 81,84, 85,86,87,90]
Words and Phrases – ‘Tenure’ and ‘Tenure post’ – Discussed.
Interpretation of Statutes – Doctrine/Principle – Doctrine of
Purposive construction:
Held: The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse
to for the purpose of giving full eﬀect to the statutory provisions, and
the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than
rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not
inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be unworkable –
The rules of interpretation require that construction which carries forward
the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the
remedy alive, should be preferred looking into the text and context of the
statute – Construction given by the court must promote the object of the
statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not eﬀace
its very purpose – The courts strongly lean against any construction which
tends to reduce a statute to futility – The provision of the statute must be
so construed as to make it eﬀective and operative – The court must take a
pragmatic view and must keep in mind the purpose for which the statute
was enacted as the purpose of law itself provides good guidance to courts
as they interpret the true meaning of the Act and thus legislative futility
must be ruled out. [Para 56]
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 381
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY

Administrative Law – Principle:
Held: It is a well settled principle of administrative law that if a statute
expressly confers a statutory power on a particular body or authority or
imposes a statutory duty on the same, then such power must be exercised
or duty performed (as the case may) by that very body or authority itself
and none other – If the body or authority exercises the statutory power or
performs the statutory duty acting at the behest, or on the dictate, of any
other body or person, then this is regarded as an abdication of the statutory
mandate and any decision taken on such basis is contrary to law and liable
to be quashed – It is important to keep in mind that, in law, it matters not
that the extraneous element is introduced (i.e., the advice, recommendation,
approval, etc. of the person not empowered by the statute is obtained
or given) in good faith or for the advancement of any goal or objection
howsoever laudable or desirable – The rule of law requires that a statutory
power vests in the body or authority where the statute so provides, and
likewise, the discharge of the statutory duty is the responsibility of the
body or authority to which it is entrusted – That body or authority cannot
merely rubberstamp an action taken elsewhere or simply endorse or ratify
the decision of someone else. [Para 71]
Writ – Writ of Quo Warranto:
Held: Quo warranto is a remedy or procedure whereby the State
inquires into the legality of the claim which a party asserts to an oﬃce
or franchise, and to oust him from its enjoyment if the claim be not well
founded, or to have the same declared forfeited and recover it, if, having
once been rightfully possessed and enjoyed; it has become forfeited for
mis-user or non-user – It is now well settled that a writ of quo warranto
lies if any appointment to a public oﬃce is made in breach of the statute
or the rules – In the case on hand, this Court is not concerned with the
suitability of the respondent No. 4 – The “suitability” of a candidate for
appointment to a post is to be judged by the appointing authority and not
by the court unless the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules/
provisions. [Paras 30, 84]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
The University of Mysore and Anr. v. C.D. Govinda Rao and Anr,
[1964] 4 SCR 575 – followed.
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

High Court of Gujarat and Another v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor
Panchayat and Ors, [2003] 2 SCR 799: (2003) 4 SCC 712; B.
Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage
Board Employees’ Assn, [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 462:(2006) 11 SCC
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and Ors., [2013] 14 SCR 621: (2014) 1 SCC 161; J.S. Yadav v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Another, [2011] 5 SCR 460: (2011) 6 SCC 570;
Union of India v. Kuldeep Singh, (2004) 2 SCC 590: [2003] 6 Suppl.
SCR 526; Clariant International Ltd. and Another v. Securities &
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524; Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots’ Association of India
(ALPAI) and Others v. Director General of Civil Aviation and Others,
[2011] 5 SCR 1019: (2011) 5 SCC 435 – relied on.
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, [1982] 2 SCR 365 :(1981) Supp SCC
87:; State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das, (2022) SCC OnLine SC
1382; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, [1992] 1
SCR 917 :(1992) Supp (2) SCC 351; Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of
Gujarat, (2022) 5 SCC 179; Professor (Dr.) Sreejith P.S. v. Dr. Rajasree
M.S., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1473; Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India
and Others, [1992] 3 SCR 567: (1992) 3 SCC 526; Dept. of Commerce
v. US House of Representatives, 1999 SCC OnLine US SC 10; State of
U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2 SCR 679; Express Newspaper
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India, [1959] SCR 12; U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v.
NTPC Ltd., (2009) 6 SCC 235: [2009] 3 SCR 1060; Udai Singh Dagar
v. Union of India, (2007) 10 SCC 306: [2007] 6 SCR 707; State of T.N. v.
Hind Stone, [1981] 2 SCR 742: (1981) 2 SCC 205; Hotel Balaji v. State
of A.P., [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 182: 1993 Supp (4) SCC 536; Yogendra
Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, [2015] 14 SCR 1037:(2016) 3 SCC 183;
State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah, [1967] 2 SCR 361; Municipal Corpn.
of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101: [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 929;
State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., [1991] 3 SCR 64; B.R.
Kapur v. State of T.N. and Another (2001) 7 SCC 231: [2001] 3 Suppl.
SCR 191; Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2018) 6 SCC
162: [2018] 3 SCR 137; P. Venugopal v. Union of India,[2008] 8 SCR
1; M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa [1961] 2 SCR 295; S.P. Jain
v. Krishna Mohan Gupta [1987] 1 SCR 411; RBI v. Peerless General
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 383
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY

Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., [1987] 2 SCR 1; Tinsukhia Electric
Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, [1989] 2 SCR 544 :(1989) 3 SCC 709:;
UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2008) 5 SCC 257: [2008] 5 SCR
775; Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys,
[2010] 10 SCR 779:(2011) 11 SCC 334; Bhuri Nath and Others v. State
of J&K and Others, [1997] 1 SCR 138: (1997) 2 SCC 745 – referred to.
Hardwari Lal, Rohtak v. G.D. Tapase, Chandigarh and others, AIR
1982 Punjab and Haryana 439 – referred to.
Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 1 WLR
1155 : (1982) 3 All ER 141 (HL) - referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL APPEAL NO.7700
OF 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2022 of the High Court of
Kerala at Ernakulam in WA No.1698 of 2021.
Appearances:
Dama Seshadri Naidu, George Poonthottam, Sr. Advs., Atul Shankar
Vinod, Hiresh Choudhary, Ms. Surbhi Sharma, Kannan Gopal Vinod, K.
Sai Teja, M.P. Vinod, Advs. for the Appellants.
R. Venkataramani, AG, K. K. Venugopal, Basavaprabhu S. Patil, Sr.
Advs., Venkita Subramoniam T.R., Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K.
Joy, Alim Anvar, Shailesh Madiyal, Vaibhav Sabharwal, Akshay Kumar,
Ms. Divija Mahajan, Anirudh Sanganeria, Samarth Kashyap, Advs. for the
Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

JUDGMENT

J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
For the convenience of the exposition, this judgement is divided in
the following parts: -
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

INDEX*
A. Factual Matrix ...................................................................... 4
i) Notiﬁcation dated 27.10.2021 constituting the Selection
Committee...................................................................... 5
ii) Notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021 inviting applications for
selection of Vice-Chancellor.......................................... 6
iii) Letter of the Minister for Higher Education / Pro-Chancellor
dated 22.11.2021 recommending reappointment of the
Respondent No. 4........................................................... 7
iv) Notiﬁcation dated 22.11.2021 withdrawing the Notiﬁcation
dated 01.11.2021 inviting applications from the elligible
candidates ...................................................................... 9
v) Letter of the Minister for Higher Education / Pro-Chancellor
proposing reappointment of Vice-Chancellor ................ 9
vi) Reappointment Notiﬁcation dated 23.11.2021 ............ 10
B. Relevant observations made by the Ld. Single Judge ..... 11
C. Relevant observations made by the Division Bench in
Appeal .................................................................................. 13
D. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant(s)........................ 15
E. Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 2 - State of
Kerala .................................................................................. 21
F. Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 3 - Kannur
University............................................................................. 26
G. Submissions on behalf of Respondent No. 4 - Vice-
Chancellor ........................................................................... 28
H. S u b m i s s i o n s o n b e h a l f o f R e s p o n d e n t No . 1 -
Chancellor………… ........................................................... 29
I. Relevant Provisions of the Kannur University Act, 1996 and
the UGC Regulations, 2018................................................ 35
J. Writ of Quo Warran to ...................................................... 39
*Ed Note : Pagination is as per original judgment.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 385
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

K. Questions of Law Formulated ........................................... 45
L. Analysis ................................................................................ 46
(i) Whether reappointment is permissible in respect of a Tenure
Post? ............................................................................. 46
(ii) Whether the outer-age limit stipulated under sub-section
(9) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 is applicable in the case
of reappointment of Vice-Chancellor? ......................... 48
(iii) Whether the reappointment of Vice-Chancellor has to
follow the same process as a fresh appointment under
Section 10 of the Act 1996? ......................................... 54
(iv) Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power
of reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor? ................... 58
M. Final Conclusion ................................................................. 70
“ ‘Intention of the Legislature’ is a common but very slippery phrase,
which, popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied
in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature
probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact
it. In a Court of Law or Equity, what the Legislature intended to be done or
not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has
chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary
implication.”
[Lord Watson in Salomon v. Saloman & Co., (1897) AC 22, 38]
1. We are tempted to preface our judgment with the aforesaid
observations of Lord Watson in Soloman (supra), as we need to keep in mind
the principle of law as explained therein for the purpose of interpretation of
Section 10(9) and Section 10(10) respectively of the Kannur University Act,
1996 (for short, “the Act 1996”). In other words, the object or the intention
behind enacting the two provisions referred to above.
2. This appeal is at the instance of two unsuccessful original writ
petitioners before the High Court. The appellant No. 1 herein in his capacity
as the elected member of the Senate of Kannur University and the appellant
No. 2 herein in his capacity as the member of the Academic Council of the
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

said University together questioned the legality and validity of reappointment
of the respondent No. 4 herein, namely, Dr. Gopinath Ravindran as the
Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University by ﬁling Writ Petition (C) No.
26975 of 2021 in the High Court of Kerala, primarily on the ground that the
respondent No. 4 was not eligible for reappointment as the Vice-Chancellor
of the Kannur University. The writ application referred to above came to be
rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide the judgment
and order dated 15.12.2021. The judgment rendered by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court was challenged before a Division Bench of the
High Court by ﬁling the Writ Appeal No. 1698 of 2021. The challenge in
the appeal also failed. The Division bench dismissed the appeal vide the
judgment and order dated 23.02.2022 thereby aﬃrming the judgment and
order passed by the learned Single Judge declining to issue a writ of Quo
Warranto.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The facts are jejune. The respondent No. 4 herein was appointed as
the Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University vide the Notiﬁcation dated
24.11.2017 duly issued by the Chancellor of the Kannur University. The
tenure of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor was for a period of four
years. As the tenure of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor of the
University was coming to an end, the Chancellor initiated steps for selection
and appointment of a new Vice-Chancellor in the said University. The ﬁrst
step in the said process was the issue of a Notiﬁcation dated 27.10.2021
constituting a Selection Committee of three members. The Notiﬁcation
dated 27.10.2021 reads thus:
“No.G53 1283/2021 Governors Secretariat
Kerala Raj Bhavan
Thiruvananthapuram
27th October 2021
NOTIFICATION
In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 10, read
with sub sections (1)(2) and (3) of the Kannur University Act,
1996, the Chancellor of the University is pleased to constitute a
Selection Committee comprising of the following members to make
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 387
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

recommendation (s) towards the selection and appointment of a new
Vice Chancellor in the said University.
1. Dr. B. Ekbal - (Nominee of the University Senate)
(Former Vice Chancellor, University of Kerala and former Member,
State Planning Board)
2. Prof. B. Thimme Gowda - (Nominee of the University Grants
Commission)
Vice Chairman, Karnataka State Higher Education Council
(Former Vice Chancellor, Bangalore University & Karnataka State
Rural Development and Panchayat Raj University
3. Prof. VK Ramachandran (Nominee of the Chancellor)
Vice Chairperson, Kerala State Planning Board
(Former HoD, Economic Analysis Unit, Indian Statistical Institute,
Bengaluru)
I, Prof. VK Ramachandran shall be the Convener of the Committee and
the Committee shall tender its recommendation within three months
from the date of this order as laid down in sub section (4), Section 10
of the Kannur University Act, 1996.
By Order of the Governor/Chancellor
Sd/-
(Dr. Devendra Kumar Dhodawat, IAS)
Principal Secretary to Governor/Chancellor”
4. Thereafter, Notification dated 01.11.2021 was issued by the
Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education, State of Kerala inviting
applications from eligible candidates. The Notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021
reads thus:
“B2/88/2021/H. EDN Dated: 1.11.2021
NOTIFICATION
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19(1) (2) and (3) of
the Kannur University Act,1996, the Chancellor, Kannur University
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

has constituted a Selection Committee to make recommendations for
the appointment of a new Vice Chancellor, in the Kannur University.
Applications are invited by the Selection Committee for the selection
of Vice Chancellor, Kannur University from eligible candidates. The
qualiﬁcation and experience are as prescribed in Clause 7.3(i) of
the UGC notiﬁcation dated 18.7.2018. Applicants should not have
completed sixty years of age as on the date of notiﬁcation, as provided
in section 10 of Kannur University Act, 1996.
Applications in hard copy and soft copy (by e mail only) with bio data,
proof of experience, qualiﬁcations etc., in the attached format should
reach the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Higher Education
Department, Government Secretariat, Annexe II. Fourth Floor,
Thiruvananthapuram - 695001 and highereducationbdepartment@
gmail.com on or before 5 PM on 30.11.2021.
Sd/-
Dr. Venu, IAS
Additional Chief Secretary
Higher Education, Environment
Archaeology, Archives & Museum Departments.”
5. It appears that in the meantime, the Minister for Higher Education
and Social Justice in her capacity as the Pro-Chancellor addressed a letter
to the Governor/Chancellor dated 22.11.2021 recommending reappointment
of the respondent No. 4 herein for a second term as the Vice-Chancellor of
the University. The letter dated 22.11.2021 reads thus:
“D.O. LETTER NO. 401/2021/M (H.Edn & SJ) DATED
22/11/2021
Honourable Governor,
Kind attention of Honourable Governor is invited to the fact that the
term of oﬃce of Ex. Vice Chancellor of Kannur University is ending
on November 23,2021 Notiﬁcation for the selection of new Vice
Chancellor was issued on November 1.2021.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 389
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Dr. Gopinath Raveendran is currently holding the post of Vice
Chancellor. He is an eminent academician and able administrator. He
has ushered the University to greater heights. A learned professor with
an excellent academic record, he was Professor of History of Jamia
Millia Islamia, Delhi. He has also been Academic Visitor, Dept. of
Social Police, London School of Economics and Political Science and
has administrative experience as Honorary Director, Nelson Mandela
Centre for Peace and Conﬂict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia and
as Member secretary, ICHR. He has indeed been an asset to Kannur
University, an institution still in its infancy.
The remarkable achievements of the university in academic rating
is the result of the hard work put in by the faculty and staﬀ of the
University under the able leadership of Dr. Gopinath Raveendran.
The NAAC has upgraded the status of the University from B to B. He
was instrumental in digitizing the University by introducing Digital
Document Filling System (DDFS) and enthusiastically directed the
University to amend its status in tune with UGC Regulations, 2018.
He also initiated steps for starting a separate Research Directorate
with the aim of improving research standards in the University.
During his tenure, the University signed several MOUs with reputed
national and international organization. Under his stewardship, the
University also started a Business incubation Centre and established
an Institution’s Innovation Council to encourage the innovative
potential of researchers and students.
Kannur University under his able leadership, rose to eminence as one
of the premier university in the country. It is therefore my considered
opinion that Dr. Gopinath Raveendran may be allowed to continue
for another term as Vice Chancellor. Its continuation will immensely
beneﬁt Kannur University Section 10 (10) of Kannur University Act
provides for the reappointment of incumbent Vice Chancellor for a
second term and· does not stipulate any restriction on age.
I request your Excellency to be pleased to cancel the notiﬁcation dated
27.10.20 appointing a Search-cum-Selection committee for identifying
the person to be appointed as Vice Chancellor. I also request Your
Excellency’s pleasure in cancelling the notiﬁcation dated 1.11. 2021
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

and in re-appointing Dr. Gopinath Raveendran for a continuous second
term as Vice Chancellor of Kannur University. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Dr. R. Bindu
Minister for Higher Education and
Social Justice and Pro-Chancellor
Sri Arif Mohammed Khan
Excellency The Governor of Kerala Bhavan”
6. It is pertinent to note that on the very same day and date i.e.,
22.11.2021, the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government, recalled
the Notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021 referred to above. The Notiﬁcation dated
22.11.2021 recalling the earlier Notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021 inviting
applications from the eligible candidates reads thus:
“ NOTIFICATION
DATED: 22.11.2021
The notiﬁcation no. B2/88/2021/H.EDN dated 01/11/2021 inviting
application for the selection of Vice-Chancellor to Kannur University
is withdrawn.
Dr. V. Venu, IAS
Additional Chief Secretary to Government.
Higher Education Department.”
7. On 22.11.2021, the Pro-Chancellor/Minister for Higher Education
addressed one another letter to the Chancellor which reads thus:
“D.O. LETTER NO. 406/2021/M (H.Edn & SJ) DATED
22/11/2021
Honourable Chancellor,
The term of Dr. Gopinath Raveendran, Vice Chancellor of Kannur
University will cease on 23 November 2021.
As per D.O. No. GS3-1283/2021 dated 22.11.2021 from the oﬃce of
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 391
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

your Excellency, steps have been taken to withdraw notiﬁcation inviting
applications to select a Vice Chancellor for Kannur University. As
Pro Chancellor of Kannur University. I consider it my privilege to
propose the name of Dr. Gopinath Raveendran, the present incumbent
Vice Chancellor to be re-appointed as Vice Chancellor of Kannur
University for a second continuous term beginning from 24.11.2021.
Thank you,
Sincerely,
Dr. R. Bindu
Pro-Chancellor, Kannur University
Minister for Higher Education
Sri Arif Mohammed Khan
His Excellency, The Governor of Kerala
Chancellor, Kannur University.”
8. Ultimately the ﬁnal notiﬁcation came to be issued dated 23.11.2021
by order of the Governor/Chancellor reappointing the respondent No. 4
herein as Vice-Chancellor of the Kannur University for a period of four
years w.e.f. 24.11.2021. The Notiﬁcation dated 23.01.2021 reads thus:
“GOVERNMENT’S SECRETARIAT
KERALA RAJ BHAVAN
NOTIFICATION
No.GS3.1283/2021(3)
Dated: Thiruvananthapuram 23rd November, 2021
In exercise of the powers conferred under the Kannur University
Act, 1996 and the UGC Regulations, 2018, the Chancellor of the
University is pleased to re-appoint Dr. Gopinath Ravindran (Professor,
Department of History, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi) as the Vice
Chancellor of the Kannur University, for a period of four years, with
eﬀect from 24th November, 2021.
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

By order of the Government/Chancellor
(Dr. Davendra Kumar Dhodawat, IAS)
Principal Secretary to Government/Chancellor.”
9. The above referred Notiﬁcation dated 23.11.2021 was made the
subject matter of challenge by the appellants herein before a learned Single
Judge of the High Court. The challenge to the notiﬁcation referred to above,
reappointing the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor for a further term
of four years was essentially on two grounds. First, in view of Section
10(9) of the Act 1996, no person who is more than sixty years of age can be
appointed as Vice-Chancellor. In other words, the outer age limit for being
appointed as the Vice-Chancellor of the University being sixty years, the
respondent No. 4 could not have been reappointed as the Vice-Chancellor
having crossed the age of sixty years. Secondly, even for the purpose of
reappointment, the entire procedure necessary for being appointed as the
Vice-Chancellor for the ﬁrst time should have been undertaken. In other
words, the procedure prescribed in Section 10 of the Act 1996 ought to have
been followed even at the time of reappointment.
B. RELEVANT OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE LD. SINGLE
JUDGE
10. As noted above, the challenge before the learned Single Judge
failed. The writ petition came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge
holding as under:
“6. From the perusal of the provisions of Section 10, it is evident
that Vice-Chancellor can be appointed by Chancellor on the
recommendation of the committee appointed by him which consists
of three members with one elected by Senate, another by Chairman of
the University Grants Commission and third by the Chancellor. The
chancellor shall appoint one of the members of the committee to his
convenience and committee shall make its recommendation within a
period of three months of appointment. University is not precluded
to unanimously recommend the name of only one person and in that
process, Chancellor shall appoint that person to be Vice- Chancellor,
but, it may submit a panel of three names within the period and the Vice-
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 393
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Chancellor shall be appointed from among the persons in the panel.
The aforementioned procedure at the time of the initial appointment,
for a period of four years, in 2017 was followed. The ﬁrst term was
expiring after the completion of four years and it is in that background,
notice Ext.P2 was published but the Secretary of Department of Higher
Education notiﬁed of withdrawal with immediate eﬀect, for as per
provisions of Sub section (10), Vice-Chancellor can be re-appointed,
but the term is restricted to two (2).
It is now to be seen as to whether on the basis of statutory procedure
provided in the Act ibid and on analysis of judgments cited, can this
Court interfere in the process of appointment or not.
xxx xxx xxx
10. The expression ‘appointment’ and ‘re-appointment’ have
different connotation; for undergoing the re-appointment the
qualifications are prescribed under Clause 7.3 of the UGC
regulations ibid and there is no age bar and for reappointment,
criteria of age would not be applicable. No doubt, for
appointment, the entire procedure prescribed under Section 10
is to be followed. At the time of the initial appointment, in the
year 2007, all the parameters were considered for appointment
as per the procedure laid down therein but for re-appointment
as per proviso to sub-Section (10) there is no requirement for
undertaking the task of constitution of a Selection Committee as
was done during the initial appointment. As per the pleading and
submissions, there has not been any incident or lack of integrity,
transparency as provided in the UGC regulations. Considering
the provisions of applicable laws to my mind, notice Ext.P2 was
withdrawn vide Ext.P3 on 22.11.2021 for the simple reason the
party respondent i.e., the 4 th respondent was not disqualified at
the time of initial appointment. It cannot be said that there was
any violation of the statutory provisions for reconsideration for
the purpose of re-appointment, thus, in such circumstances, writ
of quo-warranto cannot be issued.”
(Emphasis supplied)
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

C. RELEVANT OBSERVATIONS MADE BY THE DIVISION
BENCH IN APPEAL.
11. The writ appeal ﬁled by the appellants herein before the Division
Bench of the High Court also failed. The Division Bench in its impugned
judgment held as under:
“20. On an analysis of the said provision, it is clear that the Vice-
Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor on the recommendation
of a committee appointed by him for the purpose. In the case on hand,
the appointment of the 4th respondent in the year 2017 for a period
of 4 years in contemplation of sub-Section 10 of Section 10, and in
contemplation of law is admitted. It is also an ·admitted fact that the
eligibility and qualiﬁcation of the 4th respondent at the initial stage of
appointment is undoubted. It is also quite clear and evident from the
provisions of Section 10 that a clear cut procedure and modalities are
prescribed in the said provision to select the Vice Chancellor.
21. One of the important aspects that is to be noted is that as per sub-
Section 9 of Section 10, it is clearly speciﬁed that no person who is more
than sixty years of age shall be appointed as Vice-Chancellor. But, when
it comes to sub-Section 10 of Section 10, it is made explicit that the Vice-
Chancellor shall hold oﬃce for a term of four years from the date on which
he enters upon his oﬃce and shall be eligible for re-appointment. However,
interdiction is made as per the proviso thereto, by making it clear that, a
person shall not be appointed as Vice Chancellor for more than 2 terms.
It is signiﬁcant to note that sub-Section 10 of Section 10 of Act, 1996 is
conjunctive in nature and not distinctive. Which thus means, the statute
itself has made a clear cut procedure with respect to the re-appointment
and has made it clear that the Vice Chancellor who holds the oﬃce for
a term of 4 years consequent to the initial appointment, shall be eligible
for re-appointment.
22. No doubt, if there is any manner of shortcomings on the part of
the Vice Chancellor initially appointed, so as to aﬀect the academic
excellence, moral issues or otherwise to have any adverse consequence
to hold the post of Vice Chancellor, it would be diﬀerent. But, this
is a case where the appellants have not raised any sort of such
allegations against the 4th respondent. Merely because a notiﬁcation
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 395
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

was issued to conduct a selection, that by itself will not dissuade the
Government/Chancellor to recommend and re-appoint the existing
Vice Chancellor.”
xxx xxx xxx
30. Therefore, after assimilating the factual and legal situations and
understanding the issues, we are of the considered opinion that in the
matter of re-appointment, the age bar prescribed under Section 10(9)
for appointment of the Vice Chancellor would not come into play,
because the Vice Chancellor who has appointed before attaining the
age of 60 years, is entitled to continue for a term of four years and
shall be eligible for re-appointment.
31. Taking into account all the above intrinsic aspects with regard to
the appointment of the Vice Chancellor, eligibility, qualiﬁcation etc.,
and also the relevant inputs of the UGC Regulations, 2018, we have no
hesitation to hold that the learned single Judge was right in dismissing
the writ petition. Even though various contentions were advanced
and several judgments were cited by the respective Senior Counsel
in regard to the intricacies of issuance of a writ of quo warranto, we
are not inclined to go into that question, since we ﬁnd that the re-
appointment of the 4th respondent was made in accordance with law,
and therefore he can never be said to be an usurper to the post. Having
rendered the ﬁndings as above, the arguments advanced strenuously
by the learned Senior Counsel Sri. George Poonthottam, relying upon
the term ‘eligibility’, contained under Section 10(10) of the Act 1996
in the matter of making reappointment by referring to various legal
dictionaries, we do not ﬁnd much force in the same.
32. Before we part with the judgment, it is only appropriate that the
Press release issued by the oﬃce of the Chancellor (Honourable
Governor) of the University is discussed. On a perusal of Annexure
A2 Press Release dated 03.02.2022, it is clear that right from the
publication of selection notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021 issued on behalf
of the selection committee uptill the reappointment are narrated.
33. Be that as it may, it is clearly speciﬁed in the Press Release that
on 23rd November, 2021, Kerala Raj Bhavan issued a notiﬁcation re-
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

appointing the 4th respondent as the Vice Chancellor of the Kannur
University. Other aspects are also dealt with in the Press Release,
which we do not propose to traverse through, being unnecessary.
34. Taking into account the factual and legal circumstances deliberated
above, we are of the clear and considered opinion that the appellants
have not made out any case of jurisdictional error or other legal
inﬁrmities susceptible to be interfered with in the judgment of the
learned single Judge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants (original
writ petitioners) are here before this Court with the present appeal.
D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT(S)
13. Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu and Mr. George Poonthottam, the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants made the following
submissions: -
a. The impugned judgment proceeds on an erroneous assumption
that once an appointment to the post of Vice-Chancellor is
made through proper channel, the reappointment of the same
incumbent to such oﬃce upon expiry of the ﬁrst term can be
made bypassing the original procedure prescribed, including the
constitution of a Search-cum-Selection Committee as mandated
by the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualiﬁcations
for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in
Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of
Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018 (for short, ‘the
UGC Regulations’). While doing so the High Court has assumed
that there is a distinction in procedure for ‘appointment’ and
‘reappointment’, whereas there is no such distinction recognised
under the service law jurisprudence.
b. If the impugned judgment is to be upheld, then for reappointment
as a Vice-Chancellor under the proviso to Section 10(10) of the
Kannur University Act, there is no requirement for undertaking
the exercise of forming and consulting the Selection Committee
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 397
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

as mandated under the UGC Regulations and as was done during
the initial appointment. Going by this rationale, a person can be
reappointed, even though there may be better qualiﬁed and more
deserving candidates eligible and qualiﬁed to hold the oﬃce. This
obviously is not the letter and spirit of the Kannur University Act
and the UGC Regulations, which aims at providing the highest
standards of education. In such circumstances, it is essential to follow
the entire selection process, even in cases of reappointment.
c. On the date of reappointment i.e., 24.11.2021, the respondent
No. 4 had crossed the age of 60 years which is the outer age
limit for being appointed to the post of Vice-Chancellor under
Section 10(9) of the Kannur University Act. Therefore, the
respondent No. 4 was not eligible for being reappointed as the
Vice-Chancellor in 2021.
d. The notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021 was withdrawn only with a
view to overcome the hurdle of the age limit, and thereby, bypass
the prescribed procedure for appointment.
e. Section 10(10) of the Kannur University Act is very speciﬁc
and clear. The language of the provision unequivocally
spells out the legislative intent that if a person is once given
an appointment, it would only enable him an opportunity to
be considered for fresh appointment for one more term. The
express language of the provision does not grant a candidate,
who is already appointed as the Vice-Chancellor, to evade
the mandatory eligibility criteria and to be appointed as the
Vice- Chancellor again. The distinction drawn by the High
Court between the terms “appointment” and “reappointment”
relying on Section 10(10) is totally perverse.
f. The High Court erred in proceeding on the premise that since
the respondent No. 4 was eligible for appointment on the ﬁrst
occasion, he was also entitled for reappointment and thus
the entire process for appointment need not be undertaken
afresh. This appears to be the logic behind the withdrawal of
Notiﬁcations calling for fresh applications.
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

g. The High Court ought to have appreciated that the constitution of
the Select Committee and preparation by the panel is prerequisite
for the appointment of Vice-Chancellor of University. If the
contention that the UGC Regulations do not impose any age
restriction for appointment as the Vice-Chancellor is accepted,
then the UGC Regulations do not provide for the reappointment
of the Vice-Chancellor as well.
h. Section 10(10) of the Kannur University Act contemplates
reappointment and not an extension of the term of the Vice-
Chancellor. For this reason, the notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021
was issued calling for applications from eligible candidates for
the post of Vice-Chancellor. The said notiﬁcation stipulated that
the candidate must satisfy the eligibility criteria mentioned in
Clause 7.3(i) of the UGC Regulations, and should not be more
than 60 years of age on the date of issuing the notiﬁcation. When
appointment is made by virtue of Section 10(10), the law does not
provide an exemption to be followed in the case of an incumbent
who is holding the post of Vice-Chancellor.
i. The reliance placed by the High Court on the decisions of the
Rajasthan High Court and Jammu & Kashmir High Court, in its
impugned judgment is not correct as the two High Courts had
failed to take into consideration the UGC Regulations which
provides for the method and procedure for appointment of the
Vice-Chancellor. The appointment of the Vice-Chancellor can
only be done in accordance with the procedure as laid therein
and the central legislation fully occupies the issue.
j. The reappointment was based on the request of the State
Government and not on any independent evaluation. Such a
request is wholly unwarranted as the State Government has no
say in the appointment or reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor.
k. The initial appointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-
Chancellor was also contrary to the provisions of the UGC
Regulations 2010 more particularly Clause 7.3, which stipulates
that the appointment shall be made after following the due process
of identiﬁcation of 3 to 5 names by the Search-cum-Selection
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 399
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Committee. However, the minutes of the Search-cum-Selection
Committee dated 20.11.2017 indicates that only one single name,
i.e., the name of respondent No. 4, was recommended. Hence, the
initial appointment itself being void ab initio, the reappointment
is also void.
14. With a view to fortify the aforesaid submissions the learned Senior
Counsel placed reliance on the following decisions:
(i) S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (First Judges Case), 1981 Supp
SCC 87,
(ii) State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das, 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 1382,
(iii) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, 1992
Supp (2) SCC 351,
(iv) Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, (2022) 5 SCC 179,
(v) Professor (Dr.) Sreejith P.S. v. Dr. Rajasree M.S., 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1473,
(vi) Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, (1992) 3 SCC
526,
(vii) Dept. of Commerce v. US House of Representatives, 1999 SCC
OnLine US SC 10,
15. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned Senior Counsel
prayed that there being merit in the appeal, the same may be allowed and
the Notiﬁcation reappointing the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor
of the Kannur University be set aside.
E. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 2 - THE
STATE OF KERALA
16. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
State of Kerala made the following submissions:
a. The seminal issue which arises in the present case is the conﬂict
between the provisions of the UGC Regulations, which is a
subordinate legislation made under Section 26(1)(e) and (g)
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

respectively of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956
(‘UGC Act’), and the State laws made under Entry 25 of List
III dealing with education.
b. The UGC Regulations make express provisions for the manner
in which a selection has to be made for the appointment of a
Vice-Chancellor through a Search-cum-Selection Committee
consisting of persons of eminence in the sphere of higher
education and who are not connected in any manner with the
University concerned or its colleges. The Visitor/Chancellor
shall appoint the Vice-Chancellor out of the Panel of three-ﬁve
names recommended by the Search-cum-Selection Committee.
c. The diﬀerent state laws made under Entry 25 of List III dealing
with the same subject have provisions which give a dominant
status to the State Governments, and do not provide for the
identical procedure provided for by the UGC Regulations.
d. It has been held recently, in a judgment of this Court in
Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) (2 Judges) which is followed
in Anindya Sundar Das (supra) (2 Judges), that the UGC
Regulations form a part of the UGC Act, 1956 for the reason
that it requires that the regulations made under the Act shall be
laid before the Parliament. Even though Section 26 of the UGC
Act does not provide for these regulations being part of the Act,
nevertheless the Court held that the mere fact of laying would
result in the regulations being made part of the Act.
e. A catena of judgments of this Court have held to the same eﬀect.
What has been missed in holding so is that the subordinate
legislation, whether of rules or regulations, could be read as
part of the Act, but, for diﬀerent purposes. The real eﬀect of
this statement of the law is that Article 254 of the Constitution
would have to be read as – where a law made by Parliament as
well as the regulations or rules made under any Central Act is
repugnant to the provisions of a law made by the legislature of
a State, the law made by Parliament as well as the regulations or
rules made under any Central Act will prevail. The provision will
now mean that the law made by Parliament, or the regulations or
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 401
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

rules made under any Central Act, if repugnant to the law made
by the legislature of a State, then the law made by the State, to
the extent of the repugnancy, shall be void.
f. By reading as aforesaid, the consequences would be far reaching.
For this purpose, one should look at the very nature and source
of making regulations or rules under the Central Act. The
Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961
would allocate the particular subject of the Act to a particular
minister, who would then have to decide on what the rule should
be. It is possible, as in the case of the UGC Act, that many of the
provisions made in the rules or regulations may not ﬁnd a place
in the body of the Act, and, the only provision, which could be
possibly invoked would be the main provision of sub-section
(1) of the rule making section, in which it would be stated that
the regulations or rules may be made for the purposes of the
Act. In the case of the UGC Act, the regulation making power
is conferred upon the UGC, a statutory body acting under the
Government, and not on the Government itself.
g. The result is that a vast unbridled arbitrary power is vested in
the executive where no deﬁnite guidelines are provided for in
any particular section of the Act, and where the Act is totally
silent on the aspects that are covered by the legislations. Such
an arbitrary unguided power by itself would violate Article 14
of the Constitution of India, and the regulation making power
would have to be struck down.
h. Additionally, the procedure and method of making regulations
or rules which have to be laid before the House is contained in
Rule 235 of “the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business
in Lok Sabha”, which states: “The Speaker shall, in consultation
with the Leader of the House, ﬁx a day or days or part of a day
as the Speaker may think ﬁt for the consideration and passing of
an amendment to such regulation, rule, sub-rule, bye-law etc.,
of which notice may be given by a member:”
i. In ‘Parliamentary Procedure: Law Privileges Practice and
Precedents’ by Subhash C. Kashyap, Third Edition Page 596,
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

it is stated that where a statute provides that rules shall be laid
before Parliament and shall be subject to a modiﬁcation made
by Parliament, if a member gives a notice for modiﬁcation of the
Rules, the Government is bound to ﬁnd time for discussion of the
motion. The motion for modiﬁcation contains a recommendation
to the Rajya Sabha for concurrence, and the eﬀect of the passing
of the motion by both the Houses is that the Government is bound
to amend the rules accordingly.
j. It has been held in the judgment in Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra)
that the UGC regulations, though not so stated in the UGC Act,
are part of the UGC Act, and hence, would prevail over the
repugnant sections of the State Act, which would be rendered
void to the extent of the repugnancy.
k. A series of judgments of this Court state that subordinate
legislation becomes a part of the Act, even though the section
itself does not say so. These include State of U.P. v. Babu Ram
Upadhya, (1961) 2 SCR 679, Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India, 1959 SCR 12, U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. NTPC
Ltd., (2009) 6 SCC 235, Udai Singh Dagar v. Union of India,
(2007) 10 SCC 306, and State of T.N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2
SCC 205.
l. On the other hand, there is a line of judgments which states that
unless the Act provides that the rules be deemed as enacted in
the Act, a provision of the rule cannot be read as a part of the
Act. This includes Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P., 1993 Supp (4)
SCC 536, Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, (2016) 3
SCC 183, and State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah, (1967) 2 SCR
361.
m. None among these aspects which are crucial to the interpretation
of Article 254 of the Constitution have been considered anywhere
in the judgments on this issue, of whether the UGC Regulations
are equivalent to the laws made by Parliament or not. This being
so, the judgments being sub silentio, would not have any binding
precedent.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 403
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

n. The judgments of this Court relating to the UGC Act in
Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi (supra) and Anindya Sundar Das (supra)
are sub silentio and would not have any binding precedent, as
great violence is being done to the Constitution, far beyond the
intention of the founding fathers of the Constitution.
The reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Municipal
Corpn. of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101, para 12 and State of
U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, para 41.
F. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.
3 - KANNUR UNIVERSITY
17. Mr. Shailesh Madiyal, the learned counsel appearing for the Kannur
University made the following submissions:
a. The High Court has rightly observed that the age bar prescribed
under Section 10(9) for appointment of the Vice-Chancellor
would not be applicable at the time of reappointment as the
Vice-Chancellor who was appointed before attaining the age of
60 years, is entitled to continue for a term of four years and shall
be eligible for reappointment under Section 10(10) of the Act
1996.
b. Section 10(9) of the Act 1996, clearly speciﬁes that no person
who is more than sixty years of age shall be appointed as Vice-
Chancellor. But, when it comes to Section 10(10) of the Act 1996,
it states that the Vice-Chancellor shall hold oﬃce for a term of
four years from the date on which he enters upon his oﬃce and
shall be eligible for reappointment. However, the proviso makes
it clear that a person shall not be appointed as Vice-Chancellor
for more than 2 terms. Section 10(10) of the Act should be read
conjunctively and not distinctively. The statute itself has provided
for the procedure with respect to the reappointment and has made
it clear that the Vice-Chancellor holding oﬃce shall be eligible
for reappointment. The other eligibility criteria prescribed do not,
therefore apply to ‘reappointment’ under Section 10(10). Hence,
the reappointment is not to be considered as a fresh appointment
upon completion of the ﬁrst term.
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

c. The age limit has been ﬁxed even in the matter of reappointments
in the Mahatma Gandhi University Act, 1985; Kerala Agricultural
University Act, 1971; APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University
Act, 2015; and the Thunchath Ezhuthachan Malayalam University
Act, 2013. Therefore, the statute would explicitly specify the age
limit in case of reappointments and when the statue does not
provide for it, the age limit prescribed for appointment cannot
be applied even in the case of reappointments.
G. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.
4 – VICE CHANCELLOR.
18. Mr. Basavaprabhu S. Patil, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the respondent No. 4 made the following submissions:
a. The questions of law, as formulated by the appellants are
procedural in nature.
b. This Court in Anindya Sundar Das (supra) on similar facts
concerning reappointment of Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta
University, clariﬁed that reappointment does not entail the
same procedural formalities as appointment and there is a clear
distinction in law between the two.
c. The High Court proceeded on the correct premise that Section
10(10) read with Clause 7.3 of the UGC Regulations only
prescribes the procedure for the initial appointment to the post
of Vice-Chancellor. The respondent No. 4 at the time of initial
appointment fulﬁlled all the necessary qualiﬁcations required to
be appointed, and therefore, even at the time of reappointment
such eligibility conditions stood fulﬁlled. Clause 7.3 does not
talk of reappointment and thus would not be applicable to
the respondent No. 4 since the reappointment was not a fresh
appointment by any stretch of imagination.
d. Section 10(9) and Section 10(10) respectively are two separate
& distinct provisions and as such should be read conjunctively
and not disjunctively.
e. Neither Section 10(10) nor the UGC Regulation prescribe for
any limitation on reappointment of a person as Vice-Chancellor.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 405
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Section 10 (9) only speciﬁes that no person shall be ‘appointed’
as Vice- Chancellor above the age of 60. The term reappointment
has, in the wisdom of the legislature, not been used in the Statute
for the express purpose that Section 10(10) existed and to
facilitate the continuation of eligible, qualiﬁed and experienced
person on such post.
H. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.
1- CHANCELLOR
19. The learned Attorney General for India appearing for the Chancellor
made the following submissions:
a. The plain reading of regulation 7.3, indicates that the selection
of Vice- Chancellor should be through proper scrutiny of merit
by a panel of 3 to 5 persons (Search-cum-Selection Committee)
through a public notification. The Search-cum-Selection
Committee should be of persons of eminence in the sphere of
Higher Education and the members should not be in any manner
connected with the university concerned or its colleges. The
Regulations further mandate that one of the members of the
Search-cum-Selection Committee shall be nominated by the
UGC for selection of Vice-Chancellor of State. In the present
case, Regulation No. 7.3 of the UGC Regulations has not been
complied with at all and therefore on this ground alone the
reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor
should be cancelled by a writ of quo-warranto.
b. The State Government having adopted the UGC Regulations, the
Regulations made by the Parliament under Entry 25 of List III
shall prevail over the State legislation. Once the UGC Regulations
prescribe the procedure and method for appointment of Vice-
Chancellor, the University has to comply with the Regulations,
which has not been followed in the present case. Therefore, the
High Court erred in not following the UGC Guidelines.
20. The learned Attorney General invited the attention of this Court
to a press release issued by the Kerala Raj Bhavan dated 03.02.2022 which
is at Annexure P-18 at page 136:
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

“03 February 2022
PRESS RELEASE
Kannur Varsity: Facts grossly distorted.
Kerala Raj Bhavan strongly refutes the claim in some news reports
that it was on the direction of Hon’ble Governor that the name of
Dr. Gopinath Ravindran was suggested for reappointment as Vice
Chancellor, Kannur University. The truth is that the same was initiated
by the Chief Minister and Higher Education Minister.
To set the record straight, Raj Bhavan would like to place the
chronology of events on the 21st, 22nd and 23rd of November, 2021.
The tenure of the Vice Chancellor, Kannur University was to end
on the 23rd of November. A selection committee had already been
constituted vide notiﬁcation dated 27.10.2021 to select and appoint
a new Vice Chancellor.
The Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education Department,
Government of Kerala had also issued a notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021
on behalf of the Selection Committee to invite the applications to the
post of the Vice Chancellor.
While this process was on 21st November 2021, as deputed by Chief
Minister, Shri K.K. Raveendranath, Legal Adviser to Chief Minister,
met Hon’ble Governor at Kerala Raj Bhavan at 11.30 am. He conveyed
to Hon’ble Governor, the Government’s desire to reappoint Dr.
Gopinath Ravindran as Vice Chancellor and informed that a formal
request to this eﬀect from the Minister for Higher Education was on
the way to Raj Bhavan.
Hon’ble Governor, who had a diﬀerent view on the matter, informed
him that the proposal appeared legally untenable since the due process
of selection was already in motion. On this, the Legal Advisor informed
that the Government has examined the matter in detail and that the
request was legally sound to withstand any legal scrutiny. He informed
that Government had the legal advice and produced some typed papers.
Hon’ble Governor inquired about its source, as it was unsigned.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 407
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

The Legal Advisor to the Chief Minister said it was the opinion of the
Advocate General of Kerala and repeated the plea to consider the
request of the Government to reappoint Dr. Gopinath Ravindran as
Vice Chancellor, Kannur University.
At this juncture, Hon’ble Governor said the instant opinion said to
be from Advocate General but without his signature and seal, was of
no signiﬁcance.
To this, the Legal Advisor said that he will produce the legal opinion
bearing the signature and seal of Advocate General without delay.
As submitted by Legal Advisor to the Chief Minister earlier, a letter
written by Dr. R. Bindu, Minister for Higher Education reached Raj
Bhavan at 01.30 pm on 22.11.2021. The letter had highlighted Dr.
Gopinath Ravindran’s capabilities and desirability to be appointed
for another term as Vice Chancellor.
In this letter, she had clearly requested Hon’ble Chancellor to “be
pleased to cancel the notiﬁcation dated 27.10.2021 appointing a
Search-Cum-Selection Committee for identifying the person to be
appointed as Vice Chancellor”.
She also requested Hon’ble Chancellor’s “pleasure in cancelling
the notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021 and in re-appointing Dr Gopinath
Ravindran for a continuous second term as Vice Chancellor of Kannur
University”.
On 22nd November by 12.10 pm, Shri R. Mohan, Oﬃcer on Special
Duty to Chief Minister and the Legal Advisor to Chief Minister had met
the Hon’ble Governor, repeated their request and in support, submitted
the signed legal opinion of the Advocate General which was addressed
to the Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education Department.
This opinion of the Advocate General substantially endorsed the
request made earlier by Legal Advisor to Chief Minister in the personal
meeting with the Governor and the request of the Higher Education
Minister in her letter.
The eight-page opinion of the Advocate General which is addressed
to the Additional Chief Secretary, Higher Education Department says
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

that there was no legal bar in reappointing Dr. Gopinath Ravindran as
Vice Chancellor, Kannur University, and that the age bar of 60 years
ﬁxed in the Kannur University Act, in as much as the same is contrary
to the UGC Regulations, is without the authority of law and as such,
inapplicable. The Advocate General summed up his opinion as under:-
“1. If the Hon’ble Chancellor accepts this recommendation, the
notiﬁcation dated 27.10.2021, appointing a Search Committee for
identifying the person to be appointed as Vice Chancellor of the Kannur
University may be withdrawn.
2. Pro-Chancellor may be permitted to submit necessary proposal
for the re-appointment of the present incumbent of the post of Vice-
Chancellor of the Kannur University as Vice Chancellor of the said
University for a further continuous term of four years”.
This opinion of the Advocate General was also forwarded separately
to Kerala Raj Bhavan by the Minister for Higher Education on
22.11.2021 itself.
In the light of the legal opinion thus received from the Advocate
General, the ﬁle was processed and Hon’ble Governor agreed to
accept the proposal of the Higher Education Minister.
At 04.30 pm, Principal Secretary to Governor wrote to Additional
Chief Secretary, Higher Education, conveying the decision of
the Hon’ble Chancellor “to withdraw the Notification dated
27.10.2021 and subsequent Corrigendum dated 03.11.2021” and
“to permit the State Government to submit necessary proposal
for the reappointment of the present incumbent in the post of Vice
Chancellor Kannur University”.
At 10.10 pm on the same day Kerala Raj Bhavan received the next
letter from the Minister for Higher Education, informing that “steps
have been taken to withdraw notiﬁcation inviting applications” and
that as Pro Chancellor, she was proposing the name of Dr. Gopinath
Ravindran, the present incumbent Vice Chancellor to be re-appointed
as Vice Chancellor of Kannur University for a second continuous term
beginning from 24.11.2021.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 409
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

Accordingly, on 23rd November, 2021, Kerala Raj Bhavan issued
notiﬁcation reappointing Dr. Gopinath Ravindran as Vice Chancellor,
Kannur University.
Thus, the argument in the news reports that the ‘Minister had only
proposed a name in response to the Governor’s letter’, is far from the
truth, which is clear from the chronology of events (which was also
mentioned in Hon’ble Governor’s letter to Chief Minister on 08 th
December 2021).
In brief, the process of selection of Vice Chancellor, Kannur University
which was set in motion vide Kerala Raj Bhavan notiﬁcation dated
27.10.2021 came to an end consequent to the request from the Minister
Higher Education, OSD to Chief Minister and Legal Advisor to the
Chief Minister duly supported by the legal opinion of the Advocate
General, Kerala, culminated in the reappointment of Dr. Gopinath
Ravindran as Vice Chancellor, Kannur University.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. In such circumstances, the learned Attorney General for India
prayed that the reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor
being contrary to the UGC guidelines, the same deserves to be set at naught
by issue of writ of quo warranto.
I. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE KANNUR UNIVERSITY
ACT, 1996 & THE UGC REGULATIONS, 2018
22. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side,
we must look into the relevant provisions of the Kannur University Act as
well as the relevant regulations of the UGC.
23. Section 10 of the Kannur University Act reads thus:
“(1) The Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor on
the recommendation of a committee appointed by him for the purpose
(hereinafter referred to as the committee).
(2) The committee shall consist of three members, one elected by the
Senate, one nominated by the Chairman of the University Grants
Commission and the third nominated by the Chancellor.
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

(3) The Chancellor shall appoint one of the members of the committee
to be its convener.
(4) The committee shall make its recommendation within a period
of three months of its appointment or within such further period, not
exceeding one month, as the Chancellor may specify in this behalf.
(5) In case the committee unanimously recommends the name of only
one person, the Chancellor shall appoint that person to be the Vice-
Chancellor.
(6) In the case the committee is unable to recommend a name
unanimously, it may submit a panel of three names to the Chancellor
within the period specified in or under sub-section (4) and the
Chancellor shall appoint one of the persons in the panel to be the
Vice-Chancellor.
(7) In case the committee fails to make a unanimous recommendation
as provided in sub-section (5) or to submit a panel as provided in sub-
section (6), each member of the committee may submit a panel of three
names to the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed
from among the persons mentioned in the panels.
(8) Non-submission of a panel under sub-section (7) by any member
of the committee shall not invalidate the appointment of the Vice-
Chancellor.
(9) No person who is more than sixty years of age shall be appointed
as Vice-Chancellor.
(10) The Vice-Chancellor shall, hold oﬃce for a term of four years
from the date on which he enters upon his oﬃce and shall be eligible
for re-appointment:
Provided that a person shall not be appointed as Vice-Chancellor
for more than two terms.”
24. Section 10 of the Act 1996 referred to above, envisages distinct
situations namely:
(a) Appointment of a Vice-Chancellor by the Chancellor out of a
panel of three names recommended by the search committee
constituted by the State Government;
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 411
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

(b) No person above sixty years of age is eligible to be appointed as
a Vice-Chancellor;
(c) Reappointment in respect of which, the power is vested in the
Chancellor under Section 10(10); and
(d) The proviso attached to sub-section (10) of the Section 10
stipulating that a person shall not be appointed as Vice-Chancellor
for more than two terms.
25. Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations deals with Vice-Chancellors
and reads as follows:
“7.3. VICE CHANCELLOR:
A person possessing the highest level of competence, integrity, morals
and institutional commitment is to be appointed as Vice-Chancellor.
The person to be appointed as a Vice-Chancellor should be a
distinguished academician, with a minimum of ten years’ of experience
as Professor in a University or ten years’ of experience in a reputed
research and / or academic administrative organisation with proof of
having demonstrated academic leadership.
ii. The selection for the post of Vice-Chancellor should be through
proper identiﬁcation by a Panel of 3-5 persons by a Search-cum-
Selection-Committee, through a public notiﬁ cation or nomination
or a talent search process or a combination thereof. The members of
such Search-cum-Selection Committee shall be persons’ of eminence
in the sphere of higher education and shall not be connected in
any manner with the University concerned or its colleges. While
preparing the panel, the Search cum-Selection Committee shall
give proper weightage to the academic excellence, exposure
to the higher education system in the country and abroad, and
adequate experience in academic and administrative governance,
to be given in writing along with the panel to be submitted to
the Visitor/Chancellor. One member of the Search cum Selection
Committee shall be nominated by the Chairman, University Grants
Commission, for selection of Vice Chancellors of State, Private and
Deemed to be Universities.
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

iii. The Visitor/Chancellor shall appoint the Vice Chancellor out of the
Panel of names recommended by the Search-cum-Selection Committee.
iv. The term of oﬃce of the Vice-Chancellor shall form part of the
service period of the incumbent making him/her eligible for all service
related beneﬁts.”
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Few salient features of the Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations
referred to above are thus:
(a) The selection of the Vice-Chancellor should be through proper
identiﬁcation by a panel of 3-5 persons by constituting a Search-
cum-Selection Committee through a public notification or
nomination or a talent search process or a combination of all the
four.
(b) The members of the Search-cum-Selection Committee should be
persons of eminence in the ﬁeld of higher education and they shall
not be connected in any manner with the university concerned
or its colleges.
(c) The Selection Committee for the purpose of preparing the panel
shall give proper weightage to the academic excellence, exposure
to the higher education system in the country and abroad and
adequate experience in academic and administrative governance.
The panel shall place its recommendation before the Chancellor.
(d) One member of the Selection Committee would be nominated
by the Chairman, UGC.
J. WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO
27. Quo warranto is a judicial remedy against an intruder or usurper of
an independent substantive public oﬃce or franchise or liberty. The usurper
is asked ‘by what authority’ (quo warranto) he is in such oﬃce, franchise,
or liberty. A writ of quo warranto thus poses a question to the holder or
occupier of a public oﬃce, and that question is: “Where is your warrant
of appointment by which you are holding this oﬃce?” If the answer is not
satisfactory, the usurper can be ousted by this writ.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 413
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

28. The writ of quo warranto is an ancient Common Law remedy of a
prerogative nature. It was a writ of right used by the Crown against a person
claiming any oﬃce, franchise, or liberty to inquire by what authority he was
in the oﬃce, franchise of liberty. In case his claim was not well founded or
there was non-use, neglect, misuse, or abuse of the oﬃce, he was to be ousted.
29. Quo warranto is a writ that lies against a person who usurps any
franchise, liberty, or oﬃce.
In Corpus Juris Secundum, quo warranto is deﬁned thus;
“Quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right to the exercise
of a franchise or oﬃce and to oust the holder if his claim is not well
founded, or if he has forfeited his right.”
Blackstone, states: “The ancient writ of quo warranto was in the
nature of a writ of right for the King against any oﬃce, franchise or liberty
of the Crown to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order
to determine the right.”
30. Quo warranto is a remedy or procedure whereby the State inquires
into the legality of the claim which a party asserts to an oﬃce or franchise,
and to oust him from its enjoyment if the claim be not well founded, or
to have the same declared forfeited and recover it, if, having once been
rightfully possessed and enjoyed; it has become forfeited for mis-user or
non-user.
31. In B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N. and Another reported in (2001)
7 SCC 231, after referring to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Words and
Phrases and leading decisions on the point, it was observed that a writ of quo
warranto is a writ which lies against the person who is not entitled to hold
an oﬃce of public nature and is only a usurper of the oﬃce. Quo warranto
is directed to such person who is required to show by what authority he is
entitled to hold the oﬃce. The challenge can be made on various grounds,
including the ground that the possessor of the oﬃce does not fulﬁll the
required qualiﬁcations or suﬀers from any disqualiﬁcation, which debars
him to hold such oﬃce. It was further stated that on being called upon to
establish valid authority to hold a public oﬃce, if such person fails to do so,
a writ of quo warranto shall be directed against him. It shall be no defence
by the holder of the oﬃce that the appointment was made by the competent
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

authority, who under the law is not answerable to any court for anything
done in performance of duties of his oﬃce. The question of fulﬁlling legal
requirements and qualiﬁcations necessary to hold a public oﬃce would be
considered in the proceedings independent of the fact as to who made the
appointment and the manner in which the appointment was made.
32. Any person may challenge the validity of an appointment of a
public oﬃce, whether any fundamental or other legal right of his has been
infringed or not. But the court must be satisﬁed that the person so applying
is bona ﬁde and there is a necessity in public interest to declare judicially
that there is a usurpation of public oﬃce. If the application is not bona ﬁde
and the applicant is a mere pawn or a man of straw in the hands of others,
he cannot claim the remedy. Though the applicant may not be an aspirant
for the oﬃce nor has any interest in appointment, he can apply as a private
relator, or an ordinary citizen.
33. These rival submissions would need to be analyzed. However,
before we enter into a substantive analysis of the submissions, it would be
appropriate to deal with the procedural objection regarding the limits of the
writ of quo warranto.
34. Through a line of cases, this Court has laid out the terms on which
the writ of quo warranto may be exercised. In The University of Mysore and
Anr. v. C.D. Govinda Rao and Anr., a Constitution Bench of this Court,
speaking through Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was), held that: (1964)
4 SCR 575
“Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding aﬀords a judicial remedy
by which any person, who holds an independent substantive public
oﬃce or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he
holds the said oﬃce, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be
duly determined, and in case the ﬁnding is that the holder of the oﬃce
has no title, he would be ousted from that oﬃce by judicial order.
In other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the judiciary a
weapon to control the Executive from making appointments to public
oﬃce against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public
oﬃce to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect
the public from usurpers of public oﬃce, who might be allowed to
continue either with the connivance of the Executive or by reason of
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 415
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

its apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can eﬀectively
claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy the Court that the oﬃce
in question is a public oﬃce and is held by a usurper without legal
authority, and that inevitably would lead to the enquiry as to whether
the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance
with law or not.
(Emphasis supplied)
35. In High Court of Gujarat and Another v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor
Panchayat and Ors. reported in (2003) 4 SCC 712, in his concurring opinion
in a three-Judge Bench, Justice SB Sinha, held that:
“22. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of
this nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case
has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of quo
warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo
warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ, the Court merely
makes a public declaration but will not consider the respective impact
on the candidates or other factors which may be relevant for issuance
of a writ of certiorari. (See R.K. Jain v. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC
119 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1128 : (1993) 25 ATC 464], SCC para 74.)
23. A writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the appointment
is contrary to the statutory rules. (See Mor Modern Coop. Transport
Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy. to Govt. of Haryana (2002)
6 SCC 269.)”
36. In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply &
Drainage Board Employees’ Assn. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 731, the
limitations of the writ of quo warranto were elaborated upon by a two-Judge
Bench of this Court. The court observed:
“49. … The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo
warranto is a limited one which can only be issued when the
appointment is contrary to the statutory rules.
xxx xxx xxx
51. It is settled law by a catena of decisions that the court cannot sit
in judgment over the wisdom of the Government in the choice of the
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

person to be appointed so long as the person chosen possesses the
prescribed qualiﬁcation and is otherwise eligible for appointment. This
Court in R.K. Jain v. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 119 : 1993 SCC
(L&S) 1128 : (1993) 25 ATC 464] was pleased to hold that the
evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates would not be
gone into a public interest litigation and only in a proceeding initiated
by an aggrieved person, may it be open to be considered. It was also
held that in service jurisprudence it is settled law that it is for the
aggrieved person, that is, the non-appointee to assail the legality or
correctness of the action and that a third party has no locus standi
to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Further, it was
declared that public law declaration would only be made at the behest
of a public-spirited person coming before the court as a petitioner…”
(Emphasis supplied)
37. In Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo
and Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 161, another two-Judge Bench of this
Court reiterated that:
“21. …the jurisdiction of the High Court while issuing a writ of quo
warranto is a limited one and can only be issued when the person
holding the public oﬃce lacks the eligibility criteria or when the
appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. That apart, the concept
of locus standi which is strictly applicable to service jurisprudence
for the purpose of canvassing the legality or correctness of the action
should not be allowed to have any entry, for such allowance is likely
to exceed the limits of quo warranto which is impermissible. The basic
purpose of a writ of quo warranto is to confer jurisdiction on the
constitutional courts to see that a public oﬃce is not held by usurper
without any legal authority.
(Emphasis supplied)
38. More recently, in Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka and Others
reported in (2018) 6 SCC 162, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, of which
one of us (Justice D.Y. Chandrachud) was a part, noted the line of precedent
clarifying the remit of the writ of quo warranto.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 417
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

39. Through these decisions, the Court has settled the position that
the writ of quo warranto can be issued where an appointment has not been
made in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the rival contentions must be
analyzed by dealing with the scheme of the statutory provisions governing
the appointment and reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor.
K. QUESTIONS OF LAW FORMULATED.
40. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record the following questions of law
fall for our consideration:
(i) Whether reappointment is permissible in respect of a tenure post?
(ii) Whether the outer age limit of sixty years for the appointment of
Vice-Chancellor as stipulated under sub-section (9) of Section
10 of the Act 1996 is to be made applicable even in the case of
reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor for one more term of four
years?
(iii) Whether the reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor has to follow
the same process as a fresh appointment by setting up a selection
committee under Section 10(1) of the Act 1996?
(iv) Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power of
reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor?
L. ANALYSIS
i) Whether reappointment is permissible in respect of a Tenure
Post?
41. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that in the case of a tenure
post such as the post of Vice-Chancellor, there can be no reappointment. In
other words, at the end of the tenure the appointment automatically comes
to an end and there can only be a fresh appointment and not reappointment.
42. In the aforesaid context, it is necessary to understand what is meant
by a “tenure post”. The word “Tenure” is derived from the Latin word tenere
which means “to hold”. The Black’s Law Dictionary deﬁnes “tenure” in
the context of a post or oﬃce as follows [See: Henry Campbell Black on
“Black’s Law Dictionary”, 1968, 4th Edition Pg. 1639]: -
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

“TENURE IN OFFICE. Right to perform duties and receive
emoluments thereof.”
43. This Court in its decision in Dr. L.P. Agarwal (supra), while
examining what is meant by a “tenure post” held that it is a post where the
person appointed to it is entitled to continue in it till his term is complete
unless it is curtailed for justiﬁable reasons. The relevant observations read
as under: -
“16. …Tenure means a term during which an oﬃce is held. It is a
condition of holding the oﬃce. Once a person is appointed to a tenure
post, his appointment to the said oﬃce begins when he joins and it
comes to an end on the completion of the tenure unless curtailed on
justiﬁable grounds. Such a person does not superannuate, he only goes
out of the oﬃce on completion of his tenure. …”
44. A similar view as aforesaid was taken by this Court in P. Venugopal
v. Union of India reported in (2008) 5 SCC 1.
45. In another decision of this Court in J.S. Yadav v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another reported in (2011) 6 SCC 570, it was held that a person
appointed to a tenure post only goes out once the tenure is completed. The
relevant observations are reproduced below: -
“17. An employee appointed for a ﬁxed period under the statute is
entitled to continue till the expiry of the tenure and in such a case there
can be no occasion to pass the order of superannuation for the reason
that the tenure comes to an end automatically by eﬄux of time….”
46. We are not impressed with the submission canvassed on behalf
of the appellants that the post of the Vice-Chancellor being a “tenure
post” reappointment is not permissible. The statute itself has provided for
reappointment with some object in mind. The ordinary meaning that can
be ascribed to the term “reappointment” is the act or process of deciding
essentially that someone should continue in a particular job. Ordinarily, the
object behind providing for reappointment is twofold. First is “retention”
i.e., where the incumbent to the oﬃce/post during his term is found to be
extraordinary and has established himself or herself to be an asset to the
institution, then in such circumstance, such person is retained with a view
to allow him to continue on the same post for one more term. Secondly,
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 419
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

having regard to the nature of the post the organization or institution may
not be in a position to ﬁll up the post in a time bound manner and in such
circumstances, the provision for reappointment may enable the organization
or institution to relieve itself of the tedium of going through the entire
selection process afresh every time the post becomes vacant.
47. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that reappointment is permissible
even in case of a tenure post.
ii) Whether the outer-age limit stipulated under sub-section (9) of
Section 10 of the Act 1996 is applicable in case of reappointment
of the Vice-Chancellor?
48. On a plain reading of sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act
1996, it appears that the person sought to be appointed as a Vice-Chancellor
must not be more than sixty-years of age at the time of appointment i.e.,
it provides the outer age limit for appointment. While sub-section (10) of
Section 10 of the Act 1996 provides that upon appointment, the term of
the Vice-Chancellor would be for four years and that he shall be eligible
for reappointment. The proviso attached to sub-section (10) stipulates that
no person shall be appointed as Vice-Chancellor for more than two terms.
49. A close reading of the statutory provisions of Section 10 of the
Act 1996 would reveal that sub-section (9) deals with a situation prior to
or leading upto the appointment of Vice-Chancellor whereas sub-section
(10) contemplates a situation after the appointment of Vice-Chancellor has
been made. This is discernible from a very ﬁne but pertinent distinction
between the language of the two provisions. Sub-section (9) which provides
the outer age limit for appointment uses the word “person”. This connotes
that the Vice-Chancellor is yet to be appointed whereas sub-section (10)
uses the word “Vice-Chancellor” which connotes that it is applicable to the
incumbent holding the oﬃce of Vice-Chancellor or simpliciter the Vice-
Chancellor after having been appointed.
50. Thus, in our view sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 will
apply only at the stage of appointment of Vice-Chancellor and would have no
application whatsoever when it comes to reappointment of Vice-Chancellor
under sub-section (10). This is reinforced from the words “shall be eligible
for re-appointment” occurring in sub-section (10) which connotes that the
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

same is an enabling provision whereby the Vice-Chancellor by virtue of
holding his oﬃce is deemed eligible for reappointment irrespective of the
other provisions.
51. We are conscious of the fact that, the proviso to sub-section (10)
which provides that the Vice-Chancellor shall not be appointed for more than
two terms also uses the word “person” which in our opinion is a deliberate
choice. We say so because the proviso deals with a situation where the Vice-
Chancellor has demitted oﬃce by virtue of lapse of his tenure.
52. The aforesaid aspect may be looked at from one another angle. If
we were to hold that the outer age limit provided in sub-section (9) would
apply even to reappointment, then the same would eﬀectively mean that only
those persons who are appointed as Vice-Chancellor at the age of ﬁfty-ﬁve or
below could be considered for reappointment. Such an interpretation would
result in conditions being read into sub-section (10) which have not been
prescribed by the legislature. Had the intent of legislature been otherwise,
sub-section (10) or the words “shall be eligible for re-appointment” would
have been speciﬁcally qualiﬁed by or made subject to the words “sub-section
(9)” or “provisions of this section”.
53. If sub-section (9) is interpreted so as to be made applicable even
to reappointment as provided in sub-section (10), then the result would be
that any person who is appointed as Vice-Chancellor at the age of ﬁfty-six
or more would not be eligible for reappointment, thereby rendering sub-
section (10) and its proviso completely otiose and meaningless in such cases.
54. This would also severely curtail the scope of the selection
committee while considering candidates for the post of Vice-Chancellor,
as the selection committee in such case would be inclined to consider
younger candidates over older and possibly more qualiﬁed and experienced
ones who may be more suitable considering the coveted nature of the post
and the duties expected to be discharged. Moreover, it would inhibit a
Vice-Chancellor who has already held oﬃce and proven himself to be a
valuable asset during his tenure from being reappointed if he happens to be
of more than sixty-years of age. This would frustrate the very purpose of
‘reappointment’ which given the nature of the post of Vice-Chancellor is all
the more important as it is the Vice-Chancellor who is responsible for the
day-to-day functioning as well as the overall performance of the University,
its faculty, students etc.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 421
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

55. Even otherwise, the interpretation as sought to be placed by the
appellants would lead to a very absurd situation, where a Vice-Chancellor
of sixty-one years age cannot be reappointed to hold the oﬃce of Vice-
Chancellor, however, at the same time another person would still be able to
hold the oﬃce of Vice-Chancellor at the very same age of sixty-one years
only by reason of him being appointed at the age of ﬁfty-nine years. This
appears to be bereft of any logic, more particularly when sub-section (9) does
not say that a person shall hold oﬃce of Vice-Chancellor till he attains the
age of sixty years and rather uses the expression “No Person who is more
than sixty years of age shall be appointed as Vice-Chancellor”.
56. The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse
to for the purpose of giving full eﬀect to the statutory provisions, and
the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than
rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative
and not inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be
unworkable. The rules of interpretation require that construction which
carries forward the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the
parties and keeps the remedy alive, should be preferred looking into
the text and context of the statute. Construction given by the court must
promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has
been enacted and not eﬀace its very purpose. The courts strongly lean
against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The
provision of the statute must be so construed as to make it eﬀective and
operative. The court must take a pragmatic view and must keep in mind
the purpose for which the statute was enacted as the purpose of law itself
provides good guidance to courts as they interpret the true meaning of
the Act and thus legislative futility must be ruled out. A statute must be
construed in such a manner so as to ensure that the Act itself does not
become a dead letter and the obvious intention of the legislature does
not stand defeated unless it leads to a case of absolute intractability in
use. The court must adopt a construction which suppresses the mischief
and advances the remedy and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico. The court must give eﬀect to the
purpose and object of the Act for the reason that legislature is presumed
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

to have enacted a reasonable statute. (Vide M. Pentiah v. Muddala
Veeramallappa [AIR 1961 SC 1107], S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan
Gupta [(1987) 1 SCC 191], RBI v. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. [(1987) 1 SCC 424], Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co.
Ltd. v. State of Assam [(1989) 3 SCC 709], SCC p. 754, para 118, UCO
Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2008) 5 SCC 257] and Grid Corpn. of
Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys [(2011) 11 SCC 334].)
57. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, we hold that the outer age limit of
sixty years provided in sub-section (9) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 will
not apply, when it comes to reappointment under sub-section (10) of Section
10 of the Act 1996.
iii) Whether the reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor has to
follow the same process as a fresh appointment under Section 10
of the Act 1996?
58. Reappointment of Vice-Chancellor has been provided under sub-
section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996. The proviso to sub-section (10)
of the Act 1996 further makes the intention of the legislature to provide for
reappointment more clear. The legislature has not thought ﬁt to prescribe
any particular procedure or any particular mode or manner of reappointment.
The UGC Regulations are also silent as regards the reappointment of Vice-
Chancellor.
59. The language of sub-section (10) of Section 10 of the Act 1996 is
plain and simple. The provision does not confer right to seek reappointment.
There is only one way of reading the provision, which is, that a Vice-
Chancellor once appointed, subject to the proviso to sub-section (10)
of Section 10, is eligible to be considered for reappointment. What this
implies is that an incumbent Vice-Chancellor may not have to reapply
along with other candidates and compete for the same position once again.
Reappointment essentially means the incumbent Vice-Chancellor would
receive another term of four years if the Chancellor deems ﬁt without
reopening the position for new applications or without constituting a select
committee. “Re” means again, and is freely used as preﬁx. It gives colour
of “again” to the verb with which it is placed. “Reappointment” is an act or
process of being appointed again.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 423
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

60. Where the appointment is to be made for the ﬁrst time or where
the same person is being appointed as a Vice-Chancellor for the second
time, but not in continuation of the ﬁrst term, the procedure provided under
Section 10 of the Act 1996 must be gone through. However, in the case of
reappointment immediately upon the tenure of the ﬁrst term coming to an
end, there is no requirement to initiate the entire process of appointment as
provided under Section 10 of the Act 1996.
61. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this Court
in the case of Anindya Sunder Das (supra), authored by one of us Dr.
D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI. In the said case, the High Court at Calcutta had
allowed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ
of quo warranto against the Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University. The
High Court held that the State Government had no authority to appoint or
reappoint the Vice-Chancellor under Section 8 of the Calcutta University
Act, 1979 (for short, “the Act 1979”) or by taking recourse to the
residuary provisions of Section 60 of the Act 1979. As a consequence, the
order issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of West Bengal
reappointing the incumbent Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University was
set aside. The High Court held that the Vice-Chancellor had no authority
to hold that oﬃce on the basis of the order of appointment. The judgment
of the Calcutta High Court was challenged before this Court in Civil
Appeal No. 6706 of 2022. One of the issues that fell for consideration
of this Court in the said case was, whether the same procedure which
was provided for appointment of a Vice-Chancellor under Section 8(1)
was required to be followed at the time of reappointment.
62. It was argued that there is a distinction in law between appointment
and reappointment because in the case of the latter the zone of consideration
is restructured to persons already holding posts and in such case the
suitability of the incumbent which was assessed at the time of initial
appointment need not be reassessed.
63. This Court in the aforesaid case took the view that reappointment
of the Vice-Chancellor need not follow the same process as a fresh
appointment by setting up a selection committee. We may reproduce the
relevant observations made by this Court.
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

“45. It would be appropriate to also analyze whether the re-
appointment of the VC has to follow the same process as a fresh
appointment, by setting up a selection committee under Section 8(1)
of the Act, as indicated by the Chancellor.
46. Section 8(6) stipulates the manner in which a vacancy in the oﬃce
of the VC which occurs by reason of death, resignation, expiration of
the term of oﬃce, removal or otherwise shall be ﬁlled up. The provision
indicates that such vacancy shall be ﬁlled up in accordance with the
provisions of sub-Section (1) of Section 8 of the Act. Section 8(6) has
to be read in conjunction with Section 8(1) since the former expressly
refers to the latter. The reference to the provisions of sub-Section (1)
for ﬁlling up a vacancy on the expiration of the term of oﬃce will not
obviously apply to a case of reappointment because the procedure
contemplated by Section 8(1)(b) of a search committee would not
attach to a reappointment. On this aspect, the High Court has correctly
disagreed with the petitioner before it and noted that amended Section
8(2)(a) which provides for the re-appointment of a VC for another term
does not require that the procedure prescribed in Section 8(1) has to
be followed for re-appointment”
(Emphasis supplied)
64. We are conscious of the fact, that in Anindya Sundar Das (supra)
the afore-stated line of reasoning was adopted by this Court in view of the
amendment that was carried out whereby the original expression “subject to
provisions of this section” in the provision dealing with reappointment was
deleted, in other words, by virtue of such amendment the reappointment was
no longer subject to the provision / section detailing the ordinary procedure
for appointment of Vice-Chancellor, and thus, this Court had no hesitation
in holding that the legislature’s intent was to allow reappointment by the
Chancellor itself without following the ordinary process of appointment.
65. In the case at hand, sub-section (10) of Section 10 of the Act, 1996,
provides for reappointment and does not even contain the words “subject
to provisions of this section”. This in our opinion is as good as to reﬂect the
legislature’s intention of permitting reappointment without following the
ordinary process of appointment of Vice-Chancellor.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 425
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

66. Thus, we hold that it is not necessary to follow the procedure of
appointment as laid down in Section 10 of the Act 1996 for the purpose of
reappointment.
iv) Did the Chancellor abdicate or surrender his statutory power
of reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor?
67. Before we proceed to answer the question whether the Chancellor
abdicated or surrendered his statutory power of reappointment, we must
try to understand the stance of the Chancellor in the present litigation as
discernible from the counter-aﬃdavit ﬁled by him. We are quite perplexed
with the stance of the Chancellor. The Chancellor wants this Court to allow
the appeal and declare that the reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as
Vice-Chancellor is not sustainable in law. The Chancellor says so because
according to him the reappointment of the respondent No. 4 is in conﬂict
with the UGC Regulations.
68. The UGC Regulations are enacted by the UGC in exercise of powers
under Sections 26(1)(e) and 26(1)(g) of the UGC Act 1956. The Regulations
framed under the said Act, are laid before each House of the Parliament.
Therefore, being a subordinate legislation, the UGC Regulations becomes
a part of the Act. In case of any conﬂict between the State legislation and
the Central Legislation, the Central Legislation shall prevail by applying the
rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in Article 254 of the Constitution
as the subject “Education” is in the Concurrent List (Entry No. 25 of List
III) of the VII Schedule of the Constitution. Therefore, any appointment or
reappointment as a Vice-Chancellor contrary to the provisions of the UGC
Regulations could be said to be in violation of the statutory provisions.
However, the moot question is whether in the present case, there is any
conﬂict between the State Legislation and the UGC Regulations? The UGC
Regulations more particularly the Regulation 7.3 which, we have referred
to in the earlier part of our judgment only talks about appointment of Vice-
Chancellor. The UGC Regulations provide for the procedure to be adopted
for appointment of Vice-Chancellor. The UGC Regulations are silent in so
far as reappointment of the Vice-Chancellor is concerned. There is no speciﬁc
procedure prescribed by the UGC under its regulations for the purpose of
reappointment of Vice-Chancellor. The entire focus of the Chancellor is
on the aforesaid. However, nothing has been said in the counter-aﬃdavit
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

ﬁled on behalf of the Chancellor as regards Chancellor’s own independent
satisfaction or judgment for the purpose of reappointment of the respondent
No. 4 as Vice-Chancellor.
69. It is in such circumstances that we have thought ﬁt to pose a
question whether the Chancellor abdicated his statutory power?
70. It has been stated by Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th
Edn. at pp. 358-59 under the heading “Surrender, Abdication, Dictation”
and sub-heading “Power in the wrong hands” as below:
“Closely akin to delegation, and scarcely distinguishable from it in
some cases, is any arrangement by which a power conferred upon one
authority is in substance exercised by another. The proper authority
may share its power with someone else, or may allow someone else to
dictate to it by declining to act without their consent or by submitting
to their wishes or instructions. The eﬀect then is that the discretion
conferred by Parliament is exercised, at least in part, by the wrong
authority, and the resulting decision is ultra vires and void. So strict
are the courts in applying this principle that they condemn some
administrative arrangements which must seem quite natural and proper
to those who make them….
Ministers and their departments have several times fallen foul of the
same rule, no doubt equally to their surprise….”
(Emphasis supplied)
71. It is a well settled (and indeed, bedrock) principle of administrative
law that if a statute expressly confers a statutory power on a particular
body or authority or imposes a statutory duty on the same, then such power
must be exercised or duty performed (as the case may) by that very body
or authority itself and none other. If the body or authority exercises the
statutory power or performs the statutory duty acting at the behest, or on the
dictate, of any other body or person, then this is regarded as an abdication
of the statutory mandate and any decision taken on such basis is contrary
to law and liable to be quashed. It is important to keep in mind that, in law,
it matters not that the extraneous element is introduced (i.e., the advice,
recommendation, approval, etc. of the person not empowered by the statute
is obtained or given) in good faith or for the advancement of any goal or
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 427
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

objection howsoever laudable or desirable. The rule of law requires that a
statutory power vests in the body or authority where the statute so provides,
and likewise, the discharge of the statutory duty is the responsibility of the
body or authority to which it is entrusted. That body or authority cannot
merely rubberstamp an action taken elsewhere or simply endorse or ratify
the decision of someone else.
72. The concept of discretionary power and the mode of its exercise
by statutory functionaries was an issue considered by this Court in Union of
India v. Kuldeep Singh reported in (2004) 2 SCC 590, where in paragraphs
20, 21 and 22, it was held thus;
“20. When anything is left to any person, judge or Magistrate to be
done according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with
sound discretion, and according to law. (See Tomlin’s Law Dictionary).
In its ordinary meaning, the word “discretion” signiﬁes unrestrained
exercise of choice or will; freedom to act according to one’s own
judgment; unrestrained exercise of will; the liberty or power of acting
without control other than one’s own judgment. But, when applied to
public functionaries, it means a power or right conferred upon them
by law, of acting oﬃcially in certain circumstances according to the
dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the
judgment or conscience of others. Discretion is to discern between right
and wrong; and therefore, whoever hath power to act at discretion, is
bound by the rule of reason and law. (See Tomlin’s Law Dictionary.)
21. Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and
proper. It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which
enables a person to judge critically of what is correct and proper
united with caution; nice discernment, and judgment directed by
circumspection; deliberate judgment; soundness of judgment; a
science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between
wrong and right, between shadow and substance, between equity and
colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to the will
and private aﬀections of persons. When it is said that something is to
be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to
be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according
to private opinion; according to law and not humour. It is to be not
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be
exercised within the limit, to which an honest man, competent to the
discharge of his oﬃce ought to conﬁne himself (per Lord Halsbury,
L.C., in Sharp v. Wakeﬁeld [(1891 AC 173: (1886-90) All ER Rep
651 (HL)]. (Also See S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India (AIR 1967
SC 1427).
22. The word “discretion” standing single and unsupported by
circumstances signiﬁes exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as
distinguished from folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a
discretion cannot be arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking.
The word in it implies vigilant circumspection and care; therefore,
where the legislature concedes discretion it also imposes a heavy
responsibility….”
(Emphasis supplied)
73. Again, in Clariant International Ltd. and Another v. Securities
& Exchange Board of India reported in (2004) 8 SCC 524, this Court
reiterated these principles thus;
“27. In Kruger v. Commonwealth of Australia [(1997) 146 Aus LR
126] it is stated:
“Moreover, when a discretionary power is statutorily conferred on a
repository, the power must be exercised reasonably, for the legislature
is taken to intend that the discretion be so exercised. Reasonableness
can be determined only by reference to the community standards at
the time of the exercise of the discretion and that must be taken to be
the legislative intention.....”
28. The discretionary jurisdiction has to be exercised keeping in view
the purpose for which it is conferred, the object sought to be achieved
and the reasons for granting such wide discretion (See Narendra Singh
v. Chhotey Singh [(1983) 4 SCC 131 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 788].
xxx xxx xxx
29. A discretionary jurisdiction, furthermore, must be exercised within
the four corners of the statute. [See Akshaibar Lal (Dr.) v. Vice-
Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University [(1961) 3 SCR 386 : AIR 1961
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 429
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

SC 619] and also para 9-022 of de Smith, Woolf and Jowell: Judicial
Review of Administrative Action, 5th Edn., p.445].”
74. Similar are the principles laid down in Joint Action Committee
of Air Line Pilots’ Association of India (ALPAI) and Others v. Director
General of Civil Aviation and Others reported in (2011) 5 SCC 435, where
it has been held that:
“26. ... It is a settled legal proposition that the authority which
has been conferred with the competence under the statute alone
can pass the order. No other person, even a superior authority,
can interfere with the functioning of the statutory authority. In
a democratic set-up like ours, persons occupying key positions
are not supposed to mortgage their discretion, volition and
decision-making authority and be prepared to give way to carry
out commands having no sanctity in law. Thus, if any decision is
taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on suggestion of
a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would be
patently illegal. (Vide Purtabpore Co. Ltd. v. Cane Commr. of
Bihar [(1969) 1 SCC 308 : AIR 1970 SC 1896], Chandrika Jha v.
State of Bihar [(1984)2 SCC 41 : AIR 1984 SC 322], Tarlochan
Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab [(2001) 6 SCC 260 : AIR 2001
SC 2524] and Manohar Lal v. Ugrasen [(2010) 11SCC 557 :
(2010) 4 SCC (Civ)524 : AIR 2010 SC 2210].
27. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Commr. of
Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16), Bahadursinh
Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia [(2004) 2 SCC 65 :
AIR 2004 SC 1159] and Pancham Chand v. State of H.P. [(2008) 7
SCC 117 : AIR 2008 SC 1888] observing that an authority vested
with the power to act under the statute alone should exercise
its discretion following the procedure prescribed therein and
interference on the part of any authority upon whom the statute
does not confer any jurisdiction, is wholly unwarranted in law. It
violates the constitutional scheme.
28. In view of the above, the legal position emerges that the authority
who has been vested with the power to exercise its discretion alone
can pass the order. Even a senior oﬃcial cannot provide for any
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

guideline or direction to the authority under the statute to act in a
particular manner.”
(Emphasis supplied)
75. In Hardwari Lal, Rohtak v. G.D. Tapase, Chandigarh and
others reported in AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 439 (Full Bench) the
powers of the Governor with respect to the appointment/removal of the
Vice-Chancellor of Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak under the
Maharshi Dayanand University (Amendment) Act, 1980 were considered
wherein a direction was sought with regard to the renewal of the term of
the Vice-Chancellor of the said University. Certain promises had been
made in connection with the same while making such appointment.
The Court held that as the Governor was the ex oﬃcio Chancellor of
the University, therefore, by virtue of his oﬃce, he was not bound to
act under the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Under Article
154 of the Constitution, the executive powers of the State are vested in
the Governor which may be exercised by him either directly, or through
oﬃcers subordinate to him, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution. Article 161 confers upon the Governor, a large number of
powers including the grant of pardon, reprieves, respites or remissions of
punishment, etc. Such executive power can be exercised by him only in
accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Article
162 states that the executive power of the State shall extend to all such
matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has the power
to make laws. Therefore, the said provision widens the powers of the
Governor. Article 166(3) of the Constitution further bestows upon the
Governor the power to make rules for more convenient transactions
of business of the Government of the State and also for the purpose of
allocating among the Ministers of State such business. There are several
ways by which, a power may be conferred upon the Governor, or qua the
Governor, which will enable him to exercise the said power by virtue of
his oﬃce as Governor. Therefore, there can be no gainsaying that all the
powers that are exercisable by the Governor by virtue of his oﬃce can
be exercised only in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council
of Ministers except insofar as the Constitution expressly, or perhaps by
necessary implication, provides otherwise.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 431
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

76. Thus, in such a situation, the statute makes a clear-cut distinction
between two distinct authorities, namely, the Chancellor and the State
Government. When the legislature intentionally makes such a distinction,
the same must also be interpreted distinctly, and while dealing with the
case of the Vice-Chancellor, the Governor, being the Chancellor of the
University, acts only in his personal capacity, and therefore, the powers
and duties exercised and performed by him under a statute related to the
University, as its Chancellor, have absolutely no relation to the exercise and
performance of the powers and duties by him while he holds oﬃce as the
Governor of the State.
77. Hardwari Lal (supra) has been referred to and relied upon by this
Court in Bhuri Nath and Others v. State of J&K and Others reported in
(1997) 2 SCC 745. In the said case, the question that arose was in relation
to whether the Governor was bound to act in accordance with the aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers, or whether he could exercise his own
discretion, independent of his status and position as the Governor, by virtue
of him being the ex oﬃcio Chairman of the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine
Board under the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988. The Shrine Board
discharges functions and duties, as have been described under the Act in the
manner prescribed therein, and thus, after examining the scheme of the Act,
this Court held that, “In Hardwari Lal case [AIR 1982 P&H 439 : (1982)
1 SLR 39] , a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was to
consider whether the Governor in his capacity as the Chancellor of Maharshi
Dayanand University was to act under Maharshi Dayanand University Act,
1975 (Haryana Act No. 25 of 1975) in his oﬃcial capacity as Chancellor
or with aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The Full Bench, after
elaborate consideration of the provisions of the Act and the statutes, came
to observe in para 121 at p. 476 that the Act and the statutes intended that
the State Government would not interfere in the aﬀairs of the University.
The State Government is an authority quite distinct from the authority of
the Chancellor. The State Government cannot advise the Chancellor to act
in a particular manner. The University, as a statutory body, autonomous
in character, has been given certain powers exercisable by the Chancellor
in his absolute discretion without any interference from any quarter. In
the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor or the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, the
Chancellor is not required to consult the Council of Ministers. Though by
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

virtue of his oﬃce as Governor, he becomes the Chancellor of the University,
but while discharging the functions of his oﬃce, he does not perform any duty
or exercise any power of the oﬃce of the Governor individually. However,
while discharging the functions as a Chancellor, he does every act in his
discretion as Chancellor and he does not act on the aid and advice of his
Council of Ministers. The performance of the functions and duties under the
Constitution with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers is distinct
and diﬀerent from his discharge of the powers and duties of his oﬃce as
Chancellor of the University. Under the Act and the statute, the Chancellor
has independent existence and exercises his powers without any interference
from any quarter. Therefore, the oﬃce as a Chancellor held by the Governor
is a statutory oﬃce quite distinct from the oﬃce of the Governor. Same view
was taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kiran Babu case [AIR 1986
AP 275 : (1986) 1 An LT 36].”.
78. Bearing the aforesaid principles of law in mind, we proceed
to consider whether there was any independent application of mind or
satisfaction on the part of the Chancellor in reappointing the respondent
No. 4 as Vice-Chancellor. The facts narrated by us in the earlier part of
our judgment speak for themselves. The Chancellor had already initiated
the steps for appointment of a new Vice-Chancellor and this is evident by
the fact that a selection committee was also constituted vide Notiﬁcation
dated 27.10.2021. It appears that at that point of time reappointment of the
respondent No. 4 as Vice-Chancellor in accordance with sub-section (10)
of Section 10 of the Act 1996 was not in the mind of the Chancellor.
79. The State of Kerala issued Notiﬁcation dated 01.11.2021 inviting
applications from eligible candidates. All of a sudden, the Minister for Higher
Education and Social Justice in his capacity as the Pro-Chancellor addressed
a letter to the Chancellor dated 22.11.2021 recommending reappointment
of the respondent No. 4 herein for a second term as Vice-Chancellor. It
is also pertinent to note that on 22.11.2021 itself the notiﬁcation inviting
application from the eligible candidates was withdrawn. On the same date,
the Minister addressed one another letter to the Chancellor stating that the
respondent No. 4 be reappointed as Vice-Chancellor of Kannur University.
On the very same day i.e., on 23.11.2021, the notiﬁcation reappointing the
respondent No. 4 as Vice-Chancellor was issued.
DR. PREMACHANDRAN KEEZHOTH & ANR. v. THE 433
CHANCELLOR KANNUR UNIVERSITY [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

80. It appears from the press release issued by the Kerala Raj Bhavan
dated 03.02.2022 that the opinion of the Advocate General was also sought
for in connection with reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as Vice-
Chancellor. The very ﬁrst para of the press release states that “Kerala Raj
Bhavan strongly refutes the claim in some news reports that it was on the
direction of Hon’ble Governor that the name of Dr. Gopinath Ravindran
was suggested for reappointment as Vice Chancellor, Kannur University.
The truth is that the same was initiated by the Chief Minister and Higher
Education Minister.” The last part of the report is also relevant. It states
that the process of selection of Vice-Chancellor which was set in motion
vide Notiﬁcation dated 27.10.2021 came to an end consequent to the request
from the Minister of Higher Education and the opinion of the Advocate
General, State of Kerala.
81. The aforestated facts make it abundantly clear that there was no
independent application of mind or satisfaction or judgment on the part of
the Chancellor and the respondent No. 4 came to be reappointed only at the
behest of the State Government.
82. Under the scheme of the Act 1996 and the statutes, the Chancellor
plays a very important role. He is not merely a titular head. In the selection
of the Vice-Chancellor, he is the sole judge and his opinion is ﬁnal in all
respects. In reappointing the Vice-Chancellor, the main consideration to
prevail upon the Chancellor is the interest of the university.
83. The Chancellor was required to discharge his statutory duties in
accordance with law and guided by the dictates of his own judgment and
not at the behest of anybody else. Law does not recognise any such extra
constitutional interference in the exercise of statutory discretion. Any such
interference amounts to dictation from political superior and has been
condemned by courts on more than one occasions.
M. FINAL CONCLUSION
84. It is now well settled that a writ of quo warranto lies if any
appointment to a public oﬃce is made in breach of the statute or the
rules. In the case on hand, we are not concerned with the suitability of the
respondent No. 4. The “suitability” of a candidate for appointment to a post
is to be judged by the appointing authority and not by the court unless the
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 16 S.C.R.

appointment is contrary to the statutory rules/provisions. We have reached
to the conclusion that although the notiﬁcation reappointing the respondent
No. 4 to the post of Vice-Chancellor was issued by the Chancellor yet the
decision stood vitiated by the inﬂuence of extraneous considerations or to put
it in other words by the unwarranted intervention of the State Government.
85. It is the Chancellor who has been conferred with the competence
under the Act 1996 to appoint or reappoint a Vice-Chancellor. No other
person even the Pro-Chancellor or any superior authority can interfere with
the functioning of the statutory authority and if any decision is taken by a
statutory authority at the behest or on a suggestion of a person who has no
statutory role to play, the same would be patently illegal.
86. Thus, it is the decision-making process, which vitiated the entire
process of reappointment of the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor.
The case on hand is not one of mere irregularity.
87. We emphasise on the decision-making process because in such a
case the exercise of power is amenable to judicial review.
88. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans reported in
(1982) 1 WLR 1155 : (1982) 3 All ER 141 (HL), Lord Brightman observed
thus: (WLR p. 1174 G)
“… Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a
decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made.”
89. In view of the aforesaid, we allow this appeal.
90. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court dated
23.02.2022 is hereby set aside. As a consequence, the Notiﬁcation dated
23.11.2021, reappointing the respondent No. 4 as the Vice-Chancellor of
the Kannur University is hereby quashed.
91. Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Appeal allowed.
Ankit Gyan

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