DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY AND ORS.versusRAJU, THROUGH MEMBER, JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD AND ANR.

                         [2013] 8 S.C.R. 520 -


A            DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY AND ORS.
                                   V.
    RAJU, THROUGH MEMBER, JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD
       .                   AND ANR.
         (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1953 of 2013)
B                        AUGUST 22, 2013

      [P. SATHASIVAM," CJI, RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI
                 AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.]

C       Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 136 - Special Leave
  Petition - Criminal proceedings - third party intervention -
   Maintainability - Held: Law does not recognize right of a third
  party/stranger to participate or came to aid of State in a
  criminal proceeding - In the instant case, the petitioner (a third
D party), is not seeking impleadment in the inquiry against the
  juvenile accused, pending before the Juvenile Justice Board
   or in the trial - He is seeking an authoritative pronouncement
   of the true purport and effect of different provisions of Juvenile
  Justice Act so as to take a juvenile out of the purview of the
E Act - Such adjudication has implications beyond the case of
   the juvenile accused - Therefore, the petition does not suffer
   from the vice of absence of locus of the petitioners and hence
   the petition is maintainable - Notice issued - Juvenile Justice
   (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
F       The case of the first respondent (a juvenile), who was
  an accused in a gang rape case, was before Juvenile
  Justice Board. The petitioner approached the Board,
  seeking his impleadment in the proceedings in order to
  seek interpretation of the provisions of the Juvenile
G Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. When
  the Board expressed its inability to decide the question
  of law raised by the petitioners, they filed a public interest
  litigation before High Court seeking interpretation of the
  provisions of the Act. High Court dismissed the petition.
H                               520
                          '
                         I.




  DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY v. RAJU, THROUGH                 521
       MEMBER, JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD
    In appeal, union of India contended that the petition       A
was not maintainable because third party/stranger does
not have any right to participate in criminal prosecution,
which is primarily function of the State.

   Issuing notice in the Special Leave Petition, the            B
Court

     HELD: 1.The administration of criminal justice in
India can be divided into two broad stages at which the
machinery operates. The first is the investigation of an
alleged offence leading to prosecution and the second           C
is the actual prosecution of the offender in a court of law.
The jurisprudence that has evolved over the decades has
assigned the primary role and responsibility at both
stages to the State, though in certain exceptional
situations there is a recognition of a limited right in a       D
victim or his family members to take part in the process,
particularly, at the stage of the trial. The law, however,
frowns upon and prohibits any abdication by the State
of its role in the matter at each of the stages and, in fact,
does not recognize the right of a third party/stranger to       E
participate or even to come to the aid of the State at any
of the stages. Private funding of the investigative process
has been disapproved. [Para 7] [527-D-G]

     2. The instant special leave petition does not suffer
                                                                F
from the vice of absence of locus on the part of the
petitioners so as to render the same not maintainable in
law. The petitioners do not seek impleadment in the
inquiry against the first respondent presently pending
before the Juvenile Justice Board or in the trial to which
he may be relegated in the event the questions of law are       G
answered in favour of the petitioners and that too within
the requisite time span. Such a prayer, i.e. for impleadment
was raised and decided against the petitioners by the
Board. The said prayer had not been pursued before the
High Court. Neither the same has been raised before this        H
   522     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A Court. All that the petitioners seek is an authoritative
  pronouncement of the true purport and effect of the
  different provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Case and
  Protection of Children) Act, 2000, so as to take a juvenile
  out of the purview of the said Act, in case he had
B committed an offence, which, according to the petitioners,
  on a true interpretation of Section 2(p) of the Act, is
  required to be identified and distinguished to justify a
  separate course of action, namely, trial in a regular court
  of law as a specific offence under the Penal Code and in
c accordance with the provisions of Cr.P.C. The
  adjudication that the petitioners seek clearly has
  implications beyond the case of the first respondent and
  the proceedings in which he is or may be involved. In fact,
  interpretation of the relevant provision& of the Act in any
  manner by this Court, if made, will not be confined to the
0
  first respondent alone but will have an effect on all
  juveniles who may come into conflict with law, both in the
  immediate and distant future. The issue of maintainability
  of the present proceeding from the aforesaid perspective
  reference to the case of the first respondent in the
E pleadings must be understood to be illustrative. If this
  Court is to interpret the provisions of the Act in the
  manner sought by the petitioners, the possible effect
  thereof in so far as the first Respondent is concerned will
  pale into insignificance in the backdrop of the far
F reaching consequences that such an interpretation may
  have on an indeterminate number of persons not
  presently before the Court. The special leave petition
  would be heard on merits and attempt would be made to
  provide an answer to the several questions raised by the
G petitioners. [Para 12] [529-H; 530-A-H; 531-A]

      3. The Juvenile Justice Board had deferred further
  consideration of the proceedings against the first
  respondent in anticipa tion of the order of this Court in
H the present matter. In the light of the view that the
 DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY v. RAJU, THROUGH                  523
      MEMBER, JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD
questions raised by the petitioners require an answer           A
which need not be specific qua the first respondent, it is
now open for the Board to proceed further in the matter
and render such orders, in accordance with law, as may
be considered just, adequate and proper. [Para 14] [531-
C-D]                                                            B

     Navinchanda N. Majithia vs. State of Meghalaya and Ors.
(2000) 8 SCC 323: 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 725; Thakur Ram
and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 911: 1966 SCR
740; Panchhi and Ors. vs. State of U.P. (1998) 7 sec 177:       c
1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 40; Janta Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and
Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 305: 1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 226; Simranjit
Singh Mann vs. Union of India and Anr. (1992) 4 SCC 653 -
referred to.
                     Case Law Reference:                        D
   2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 725        referred to      Para 7
   1966 SCR 740                   referred to      Para 8
   1998 (1) Suppl. SC~ 40         referred to      Para 9
                                                                E
   1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 226        referred to      Para 10
   (1992) 4 sec 653               referred to      Para 10

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: SLP (Criminal)
No. 1953 of 2013.
                                                                F
    From the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2013 of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. Crl. No. 124 of 2013

     Petitioner-In-Person, Sidharth Luthra, ASG, Mukul Gupta,
Geeta Luthra, Supriya Juneja, Anjali Chauhan, C.B. Prasad,      G
Gurmohan Singh Bedi, B.V. Bairam Das, B. Krishana Prasad,
A.J. Bhambhani, Nisha Bhambhani, Anant K. Asthana, Apurv
Chandola, Sudarsh Menon, Amod Kr. Kanth (Intervenor-In-
Person), A.K. Singh for the appearing parties.
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                  H
        524         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 8 S.C.R.


    A       RANJAN GOGOi, J. 1. Should the adjudication sought for
      by the petitioner be refused at the threshold on the basis of the
      fairly well established legal proposition that a third party/stranger
      does not have any right to participate in a criminal prosecution
      which is primarily the function of the State. The aforesaid
    B question arises in the following facts and circumstances.

         2. On 16.12.2012, a ghastly incident of gang rape took
    place in a moving bus in the streets of Delhi. In connection with
    the said incident six accused were arrested on 22.12.2012, one.
    of whom, namely, the first respondent in the present special
i,c leave petition was a juvenile on the date of the occurrence of
1




    the crime. The victim of the offence died on 29.1.2013. While
    the Juvenile Justice Board (hereinafter for short "the Board")
    was in seisin of the matter against the first respondent, the
    petitioners in the special leave petition approached the Board
  D seeking impleadment in the proceedings before the Board and
    an interpretation of the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care
    and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter for short 'the
    JJ Act') so as to enable the prosecution of the first respondent
    in a regular criminal court. According to the petitioners while
  E the Board did not pass any written orders in the matter it had
    expressed its inability to decide the question of law brought
    before it and directed the petitioners to approach a higher
    Court. Accordingly, on 18.1.2013 the petitioners filed a public
    interest litigation in the High Court of Delhi with the following
  F prayers.

              (i)     Laying down an authoritative interpretation of
                      Sections 2(1) and 2(k) of the Act that the criterion
                      of 18 years set out therein does not comprehend
                      cases grave offences in general and of heinous
    G
                      crimes against women in particular that shakes the
                      roots of humanity in general.

              (ii)    That the definition of offences under Section 2(p)
                      of the Act be categorized as per the grievousness
                      of the crime committed and the threat to public
 DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY v. RAJU, THROUGH MEMBER,                 525
      JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

              safety and order.                                        A

      (iii)   That Section 28 of the Act be interpreted in terms
              of its definition, i.e., Alternative Punishment and
              serious offences having minimum punishment of 7
              years imprisonment and above be brought outside          B
              its purview and the same should be tried by an
              Ordinary Criminal Court.

      (iv)    Incorporating in the Act, the international concept of
              age of Criminal Responsibility and diluting the
              blanket immunity provided to the juvenile offender       C
              on the basis of age.

      (v)     That the instant Act be read down in consonance
              with the rights of victim as protected by various
              Fundamental Rights including Article 14 and 21 ef        o
              the Constitution.of India.

      (vi)    Pass such other and further order or orders as this
              Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
              and circumstances of the case."
                                                                       E
      3. By order dated 23.1.2013 the High Court declined to
answer the questions raised on the ground that the petitioners
had an alternative remedy under the JJ Act against the order
as may have been passed by the Board. On the very next day,
i.e., on 24.1.2013 the Board dismissed the application filed by        F
the petitioners seeking impleadment and the other reliefs. On
19.2.2013 the petitioners had approached this Court seeking
special leave to appeal against the order dated 23.1.2013
passed by the High Court of Delhi dismissing the public interest
litigation.                                                            G

     4. The prayers made by the petitioners in the public
interest litigation before the High Court not having been touched
upon in 'ny manner whatsoever, on the ground already noticed,
naturally the scope of the present special leave petition, if it is
                                                                       H
    526     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A   to be entertained, must be understood to be co-extensive with
    the questions arising before the High Court.

       5. At the very outset, Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned
  Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union as well as
8 Mr. A.J. Bhambhani, learned counsel for the first respondent
  has raised a vehement plea that this special leave petition
  should not be entertained as the same ex facie disclose serious
  doubts with regard to its maintainability. The gravamen of the
  contentions raised by the learned counsels for the respondents
C is that the administration of criminal justice in India does not
  envisage any role for a third party/stranger and it is the State
  which represents the victim of a crime to vindicate the rights
  that may have been violated .and the larger social interest in
  enforcing and maintaining the criminal law system. In this regard
  learned counsels have placed reliance on several decisions of
D this Court, which will be noticed hereinafter, wherein the
  aforesaid legal principle has been stated and reiterated.

        6. To counter the arguments advanced on the plea of
  maintainability raised by the respondents, the first petitioner -
E Dr. Subramanian Swamy, who had appeared in person and
  were authorized to do so on their behalf by the other petitioners,
  has submitted that the prayers made before the High Court
  which would now require consideration of this Court make it
  clear that the petitioners neither seek impleadment in the
F proceeding pending before the Board against the first
  respondent nor the payers made have any specific bearing to
  the criminal acts committed by the first respondent. According
  to the first petitioner, reference to the 16th December, 2012
  incident and to the role of the first respondent in the said
G incident is merely incidental and illustrative. The approach to
  the High Court and to this Court has been made in view of the
  larger public interest inherent in the question raised by the
  petitioners. All that the petitioners seek is an authoritative
  pronouncement on the provisions of the JJ Act and its
  applicability to juveniles within the meaning of the said Act who
H
 DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY v. RAJU, THROUGH MEMBER,                 527
      JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

commit certain categories of extremely heinous and depraved             A
criminal acts. On merits, the first petitioner has contended that
the provisions of the JJ Act ought to be read down by this Court
to provide for categorization of the offences committed by a
juvenile depending on depravity thereof and for the trial of a
juvenile for the most serious and heinous of such offences by           B
treating such acts as offences under Indian Penal Code. We
have noticed, in brief, the contentions of the petitioners on
merits though we had confined the hearing that took place on
14.8.2013 to the question of maintainability of the special leave
petition leaving the merits of the questions and issues raised          c
open for consideration in the event it becomes so necessary.

      7. The administration of criminal justice in India can be
divided into two broad stages at which the machinery
operates. The first is the investigation of an alleged offence
leading to prosecution and the second is the actual prosecution         D
of the offender in a Court of Law_. The jurisprudence that has
evolved over the decades has assigned the primary role and
responsibility at both stages to the State though we must
hasten to add that in certain exceptional situations there is a
recognition of a limited right in a victim or his family members        E
to take part in the process, particularly, at the stage of the trial.
The law, however, frowns upon and prohibits any abdication by
the State of its role in the matter at each of the stages and, in
fact, does not recognize the right of a third party/stranger to
participate or even to come to the aid of the State at any of           F
the stages. Private funding of the investigative process has
been disapproved by this Court in Navinchanda N. Majithia
v. State of Meghalaya and Others 1 and the following
observations amply sum up the position:
                                                                        G
      "18. Financial crunch of any State treasury is no
      justification for allowing a private party to supply funds to
      the police for conducting such investigation. Augmentation
      of the fiscal resources of the State for meeting the
1.   c2000) a sec 323.                                                  H
    528       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A         expenses needed for such investigations is the lookout of
          the executive. Failure to do it is no premise for directing a
          complainant to supply funds to the investigating officer.
          Such funding by interested private parties would vitiate the
          investigation contemplated in the Code. A vitiated
B         investigation is the precursor for miscarriage of criminal
          justice. Hence any attempt, to create a precedent
          permitting private parties to supply financial assistance to
          the police for conducting investigation, should be nipped
          in the bud itself. No such precedent can secure judicial
C         imprimatur."

       8. Coming to th.e second stage of the system of
  administration of criminal justice in India, this Court in Thakur
  Ram and Others v. The State of Bihar2, while examining the
  right of a third party to invoke the revisional jurisdiction under
D the Code. of 1898, had observed as under :

          "The criminal law is not to be used as an instrument of
          wrecking private vengeance by an aggrieved party against
          the person who, according to that party, had caused injury
E         to it. Barring a few exceptions, in criminal matters the party
          who is treated as the aggrieved party is the State which
          is the custodian of the social interests of the community
          at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps
          necessary for bringing the person who has acted against
          the social interests of the community to book."
F
       9. In Panchhi and Others v. State of U.P. 3 this Court have.
  refused leave to the National Commission for Women to
  intervene in an appeal before this Court wherein a young
  mother was facing execution of the capital sentence imposed
G on her on the ground that the National Commission for Women
  or for that matter any other organization cannot have locus
  standi in a criminal case.

    2.   AIR 1966 SC 911.
H 3.     (1998) 1 sec 177.
 DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY v. RAJU, THROUGH MEMBER,               529
      JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

     10. This Court has also been slow in approving third party       A
intervention in criminal proceedings on grounds of larger public
interest. In Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Others4 the public
interest litigation petitioner was held to have no locus to bring
a public interest litigation seeking certain directions in a matter
of issuance of a letter of rogatory/request to the Swiss              B
Government in an investigation that was then pending in what
came to be popularly known as the Bofors case. Similarly, in
Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India and Anr6. this Court
had declined leave to the President of a recognized political
party, namely, Akali Dal (M) to challenge, under Article 32 of        c
the Constitution, the conviction and sentence of the accused
found guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC. The view
taken by this Court in Simranjit Singh Mann (supra) seems to
be based on the fact that petitioner before this Court was a total
stranger to the offence committed by the accused whereas in           0
Janta Dal (supra) the public interest litigation petitioner was
found to have a personal and private interest in the matter. [para
119 of the Report in Janta Dal (supra)]

      11. Adverting to the facts of the present case, undoubtedly,
in the pleadings of the petitioners there is a reference to the       E
first respondent, i.e., the juvenile who is alleged to have
committed the offence. There can also be no manner of doubt
that if the provisions of the JJ Act are to be construed in the
manner that the petitioners seek the first respondent will be
affected. The petitioners are in no way connected with the            F
incident in question. But would the above, by itself, render the
action initiated by the petitioners non-maintainable on the
ground that they have no locus to raise the questions that have
arisen being total strangers to the alleged crime, as contended
by the Respondents on the strength of the principles noticed          G
above?

      12. The petitioners do not seek impleadment in the inquiry
4.   (1992) 4 sec 305.
5.   (1992) 4 sec 653.                                                H
    530      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A   against the first respondent presently pending before the Board
    or in the trial to which he may be relegated in the event the
    questions of law are answered in favour of the petitioners and
    that too within the requisite time span. Such a prayer, i.e., for
    impleadment was raised and decided against the petitioners
B   by the Board. The said prayer had not been pursued before
    the High Court. Neither the same has been raised before us.
    All that the petitioners seek is an authoritative pronouncement
    of the true purport ar.d effect of the different provisions of the
    JJ Act so as to take a juvenile out of the purview of the said
c   Act in case he had committed an offence, which, according to
    the petitioners, on a true interpretation of Section 2(p) of the
    Act, is required to be identified and distinguished to justify a
    separate course of action, namely, trial in a regular Court of Law
    as a specific offence under the Penal Code and in accordance
    with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
0
    adjudication that the petitioners seek clearly has implications
    beyond the case of the first respondent and the proceedings
    in which he is or may be involved. In fact, interpretation of the
    relevant provisions of the JJ Act in any manner by this Court, if
E   made, will not be confined to the first respondent alone but will
    have an effect on all juveniles who may come into conflict with
    law both in the immediate and distant future. If we are to view
    the issue of mainta!nability of the present proceeding from the
    aforesaiq perspective reference to the case of the first
     respondent in the pleadings must be understood to be
F   illustrative. If this Court is to interpret the provisions of the Act
    in the manner sought by the petitioners, the possible effect
    thereof in so far as the first Respondent is concerned will pale
    into insignificance in the backdrop of the far reaching
    consequences that such an interpretation may have on an
G   indeterminate number of persons not presently before the Court.
    We are, therefore, of the view that it would be appropriate for
    us hold that the special leave petition does not suffer from the
    vice of absence of locus on the part of the petitioners so as to
    render the same not maintainable in law. We, therefore, will
H    proceed to hear the special leave petition on merits and
 DR. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY v. RAJU, THROUGH MEMBER,                 531
      JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARD [RANJAN GOGOi, J.)

attempt to provide an answer to the several questions raised            A
by the petitioners before us.

     13. We, therefore, issue notice in this special leave petition
and permit the respondents to bring their respective additional
pleadings on record, if any.
                                                                        B
       14. By our order dated 31.7.2013 we had permitted the
first petitioner to bring to the notice of the Board that the present
special leave petition was to be heard by us on 14.8.2013. We
are told at the Bar that in anticipation of our orders in the matter,
the Board has deferred further consideration of the proceedings         C
against the first respondent. In the light of the view taken by us
that the questions raised by the petitioners require an answer
which need not be specific qua the first respondent we make
it clear that it is now open for the Board to proceed further in
the matter and render such orders, in accordance with law, as           D
may be considered just, adequate and proper.

K.K.T.                                      Notice issued in SLP.