Holding

A brother of a deceased tenant is neither an "heir" nor a "family" member under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, and therefore cannot inherit the tenancy.

Summary

The suit premises were originally let to the plaintiff's father‑in‑law in 1940; after his death the tenancy passed to his son Baldev, and subsequently to Baldev's wife Lalita. Upon Lalita's death, her brother Durga Prasad claimed to inherit the tenancy and resisted eviction by the landlord. The landlord filed an eviction petition under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, and the lower courts held that Durga Prasad was neither an "heir" under Section 3(a) nor a "family" member under Section 3(g) of the Act. The Supreme Court examined the definition of "heir" under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and applied Section 15(2)(b) which directs that tenancy devolves to the heirs of the deceased tenant's husband, not to the tenant's brother. It concluded that the appellant could not inherit the tenancy and was occupying the premises without authority. Consequently, the Court ordered the appellant to vacate the premises and dismissed the appeals.

Issues considered

The appellant's status as an "heir" under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972
The appellant's status as a "family" member under Section 3(g) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972
Whether the devolution of tenancy on the death of a female Hindu tenant is governed by Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
The entitlement of the landlord to evict the appellant

Legislation cited

Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 15(2)(b), s. 3(1)(j)
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972s. 12, s. 16, s. 21(1)(a), s. 22, s. 3(a), s. 3(g)

Subjects

rent controlevictiontenancyheirfamilyHindu Succession ActU.P. Urban Buildings Actunauthorized occupation

Judgment

[20 I 7] I S.C.R. 745

DURGA PRASAD A
v.
NARAYAN RAMCHANDAANI (D) THR. LRS.
(Civil Appeal Nos.1305-06 of2017)
FEBRUARY 07, 2017 B

[DIPAK MISRA AND R BANUMATHI, JJ_]
Rent Control and Eviction:
UP Urban Buildings (Rer;ulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction)
Act, 1972 - ss. J(g), 3(a), 2lf!)(a) - Eviction Petition - Father-in- c
/aw took suit premises on rent and after his death, the son became
tenant of the suit property - Upo;1 fi;s death, the wife became the
tenant of the suit property - Upon fier death, brother of the c'eceased
lady tenant, if included in the definition of 'heir' u/s. 3(a) - Held:
Upon lady tenant's death, in terms of s. ) 5(2}(b), in the absence of
D
any son or daughter of deceased wife, tenancy would devolve upon
the heirs of h~r husband - Since appellant-brother of the deceased
lady tenant does not fa// under the category of 'heir' of the husband,
tenancy of the suit property would not devolve on him nor can he
be called as an 'heir 'u/s. 3(a) -Appellant being brother of deceased
lady tenant cannot be held to be the 'family' as the inclusive list E
given under the Act clearly omits ""brother and sister" - Thus,
appellant is neither an 'heir' as visualized u!s.3(a) nor 'family 'within
the meaning of s.3(g) - Merely because appellant was substituted
in the place of deceased lady tenant, appellant cannot become a
'heir' who normally resided with the tenant - Appellant is in
F
unauthorized occupation of the suit premises and is liable to be
evicted - Appellant directed to hand over the vacant possession of
the suit premises to the respondent-landlord within the st'pulated
period - Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - s. 3(1)(j) - Term 'heir'
,,. -
Meaning. G

Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The word 'heir' is not defined in the U.P. Urban
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972.
'Heir' is a person who inherits or may inherit by law. Section H
745
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 7] I S.C.R.

A 3(1)(1) of the Hindu Succession Act defines 'heir' as "lteir" means
any person, male or female, wlto is entitled lo succeed to tlte property
of a11 i11testate under tltis Act. The word 'heir' has to be given the
same meaning as would be applicable to the general law of
succession. [Para 10) [752-B-C]
B 1.2 In the instant case, the suit property was taken on rent
by the father-in-law of deceased tenant 'L' and after his death, his
son (husband of 'L') became tenant of the suit property. Upon his
death, 'L' became the tenant of the suit property. Upon death of
'L', in terms of Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, in
the absence of any son or daughter of deceased 'L', the ter.ancy
c would devolve upon the heirs of her husband. Since the appellant-
brother of deceased lady tenant, does not fall under the cattgory
of 'heir' of 'L' husband, the tenancy of the suit property would
not devolve on him nor can he be called as an 'heir' nuder Section
3(a) of the Act. The High Court pointed out that the deceased
D tenant-'L' being a Hindu female, the devolution of tenancy would
be determined under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act.
The appellant being ' brother of deceased tenant cannot be held
to be the 'family' as the inclusive list given under the Act clearly
omits "brother and sister'.' and the same cannot be read therein
as the list has to be read and interpreted strictly. [Para 12, 13]
E (753-F-H; 754-B-C]
1.3 Assuming, for the sake of arguments that the appellant
is an heir of 'L', for devolution of tenancy, on the death of 'L', the
app~llant has to be a 'tenant' within the meaning of Section 3(a).
As per Section 3(a)(l), in the case of residential building, in the
F event of death of a tenant, for heirs to be treated as tenant, the
_statute requires them to prove that they have been normally
residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his/her death.
The term used in the section is 'heir' which implies that not any
of the family member residing with the tenant would succeed to
G the tenancy, but only the heirs of tenant normally residing with
him/her. The words "normally residing with him" suggests that
only those heirs. would inherit the tenancy rights of deceased
tenant who resided with him ordinarily in normal course and not
temporarily. The legislative intent appears to be that only those .I

heirs would inherit tenancy who normally resided with the tenant
H and not occasionally. In the instant case, the appellant claim~ that
-

DURGA PRASAD v. NARAYAN RAMCHANDAANI (D) THR. 747
LRS.

he has been carrying on busfoess in the property along with his A
deceased sister 'L' and had been ordinarily living with her because
of the medical business they were running. The appellant being
the brother of deceased 'L' had no reason to normally reside
with his married sister. In her written statement filed in the release
application, 'L' has not averred that her brother-appellant was
B
living with her and that he was taking care of her. As rightly held
by the courts below, appellant is neither a 'heir' within the meaning
of Section 3(a) nor fall under the definition of 'family' as per Section
3(g) of the Act. [Para 14] [754-D-H]
1.4 During the pendency nr tit.: appeal before the First
Appellate Court, 'L' expired. Thereafter, the respondent-landlord c
moved a substitution application before the appellate court to
substitute the appellant who is the real brother of deceased-'L'.
On that application, the appellant was impleaded as a defendant-
respondent in the said appeal. As pointed out by the High Court,
the presen~ appellant may have been 'rightly' or 'wrongly' D
substituted after the demise of his sister. Merely because the
appellant has been substituted in th~ place of tenant 'L', the
appellant cannot become a 'heir' who normally resided with the
tenant 'L' [Para 15) [755-A-C]
Ganesh Trivedi v. Sundar Devi and Others (2002) 2 E
SCC 329 : 2002 (1) SCR 189 - held inapplicable.
1.5 Upon appreciation of the facts and evidence, the first
appellate court and the High Court rightly held that the appellant
is neither an 'heir' as visualized under Section 3(a) nor 'family'
within the meaning of Section 3(g) of the Act and that the appellant F
is in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises and is ;iable to
be evicted. The High Court directed the District Magistrate to
pass appropriate orders under Section 16 on the release
application of the landlord without further delay. Father-in-law of
'L' had taken the suit premises on rent in the year 1940. In view,
thereof, appellant is directed to hand over the vacant possession G
of the suit premises to the respondent-landlord within the
stipulated period. [Para 17, 18] [756-D-F, G-H]
V. Dandapani Chettiar v. Ba/asubramanian Chettiar
(Dead) by Lrs. And Others (2003) 6 SCC 633 : 2003
(2) Suppl. SCR 371 - referred to. H
\ 748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) I S~C.R.

A Case Law Reference
2002 (1) SCR 189 held inapplicable Para 3
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 371 referred to Para 11
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1305-
1306of2017.
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.03.2015 in Writ Pe:ition
(MS) No. 2729of2014 and 31.08.2015 in Review Application No. 289
of2015 in Writ Petitin (MS) No. 2729 of2014 of the High Court of
Uttarkhand at Nainital.
Parthiv Goswami, Manan Verma, Mrs. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Advs.
c for the Appellant.
Ms. Anusuya Salwan, Ms. S. Janani, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. BANUMATHJ, J. I. These appeals arise from the judgment
of the High Court ofUttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition(MS) No.
D
2729of2014 dated 09.03.2015 dismissing the writ petition and also the
review petition, thereby affirming the findings of Additional District and
Sessions Judge-VII, Dehradun that the appellant is an unauthorized
occupant in suit premises and that he does not come within the defin.itLon-.
of 'family' of the deceased tenant as per Section 3(g) nor an 'heir' '
E under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.
2. Brief facts which Jed to filing of these appeals are as under:
The respond.eut,landlord filed an eviction petition befo1e the
CompetentAuthority/Civil Judge, (Senior Division) under Section 21(1 )(a)
F of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act,
1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'U.P. Act XIII of 1972') for release
of property from the tenant-Late Lalita Devi from the suit property
bearing No.6/7, Amrit Kaur Road, (New Road), Dehradun on the ground
of his bona fide need. Father-in-law of deceased Lalita Devi-Hem
G Ram Shanna had taken the suit property on rent and after his dea:h his
son Baldev (husband of Lalita) became the tenant of the suit property
and after the death of Baldev, Lalita became the tenant of suit property.
The appellant is the brother of deceased Lalita, who was the tenant of
the respondent herein. The application was dismissed vide order dated
19.04.2010 by the Prescribed Authority. Aggrieved by the said order,
H respondent-landlord preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the U.P.
DURGA PRASAD v. NARAYAN RAMCHANDAANl (D) THR. 749
LRS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

Act XIII of 1972 before the appellate court which was transferred to A
Additional District Judge-VII, Dehradun. During the penelency of appeal,
tenant-Lalita Devi passed away on 06.07.20-rJ'. The respondent-landlord
moved a substitution application before fhe appellate court-with a prayer
that the appellant, who is the real brother of deceased, be substituted in
her place. The said' application was allowed and the appellant was
B
imp leaded as a defendant/respondent in the said appeal. The appellate
Court allowed the said appeal vide order dated 10.10.2014 holding that
during the pendency of the appeal the sole tenant-Lalita passed away
and Durga Prasad, who has been substituted is not a member of the
'family' and that he has not been able to prove iliiitiie was.pteviously
residing with his sister Lalita in the said premises. On those findings the c
appellate court set aside the order of the prescribed authority and al.lowed
the appeal. Thereafter the appellant-tenant preferred a writ petition before
the High Court .which was dismissed vide the impugned order dated
0<}.03.2915, holding that the appellant does not come within the definition
bf 'family' as per Section 3(g) ofU.P. Act XIII of 1972. The High Court
D
further held that vacancy was liable to be declared on the demised
premises, on the death of sole tenant-Lalita, the review applicatic:m filed
by the appellant also came to be dismissed vide order dated 31.08.2015.
-Both the orders are impugned in these appeals.
3. Mr. Parthiv Goswami, learned counsel for the appellant
contended that the High Court erred in holding that the appellarJ is not a E
_legal heir or representative of th_o deceased tenant and the said finding is
perverse and contrary to the materials on record. Learned counsd further
submitted that on the death of the tenant Lalita, respondent-landlord
himself filed an application for substitution of the present appellant as
the legal heir of the deceased tenant Lalita and the address ofthe appellant. F
at the time of filing of the application was shown as the same disputed
property i.e. House No.6/7, Amrit Kaur Road, Dehradun and which by
itself establishes that appellanthas been residing in the said property at
the time of death of tenant Lalita. The learned counsel for the appellant
has placed reliance upon Ganesh Trivedi vs. Sundar Devi and Others
(2002) 2 sec 329 to contend that the brother would inherit the tenancy G
and would fall within the definition of'family' .
. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord submitted that the
High Court rightly held that the appellant be,ing brotheroftenant Lalita is
. not a member of the 'family' as defined un~er Section 3(g) of the U.P.
' . H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] l S.C.R.

A Act XIII of 1972 and the appellant being an unauthorized occupant, the
High Court rightly ordered to be evicted. It was fu11her contended that
the tenant of the suit premises was Lalita and that tenant was a female
Hindu and on her death, the devolution of tenancy will be determined as
per Section I 5(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act and since the appellant
does not fall under the category of 'heir' of the husband of Lalita, the
B
High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition as well as the review petition
and the impugned orders do not warrant interference.
5. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and perused
the impugned order aild the materials on record.
c 6. The question for consideration is whether the appellant-brother
of the deceased tenant-Lalita is included in the definition of 'family'
under Section J(g) or an 'heir' under Section J(a) of the U.P. Act Xlll
of!972.
7. For proper appreciation of the question and the contentions
D raised, it is apposite to refer to relevant provisions of Section 3 of the
U.P. Act XIII of 1972 which defines the term 'tenant' and 'family' as
under:-
"3 (a) "tenant", in relation to a building, means a person by whom
its rent is payable, and on the tenant's death-
.E (I) in the case of a residential building, such only of his heirs as
normally resided with him in the building at the time of his
death;
(2) in the case ofa non-residential building, his heirs;
[Explanation - An occupant of a room in a hotel or a lodging
F
house shall not be deen1ed to be a tenant];

(g) "Family", in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building means,
his or her-
G (i) spouse;
(ii) male lineal descendants;
(iii) such parents, grandparents and any unmarried or widowed
or divorced or judicially separated daughier or daughter of a
male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing
H with him or her,
DURGA PRASAD v. NARAYAN RAMCHANDAANI (D) THR. 751
LRS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a A
legal right ofresidence in that building."
8. Section 12 of the U .P. Act XIII of I 972 relates to deemed
vacancies of a building which reads as under:-
"12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases - (I) A
landlord or tenant ofa building shall be deemed to have ceased to B
occupy the building or a part thereof if-
(a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom; or
(b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is ne>t
member of his family; or C
(c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as
members of his family have taken up residence, not being
temporary residence, elsewhere.
(2) In the case ofnon-residential building, where a tenant carrying
on business in the building admits a person who is not a member D
of his family as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be,
the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building.
(3) In the case ofa residential building, ifthe tenant or any member
of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets
vacated a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified E
area or town area in which the building under tenancy is situate,
he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under
his tenancy:

9. A careful analysis of the above provisions indicates that Section F:
3(a) uses the word 'heir'. Definition in Section 3(a) deals with the
contingency when a tenant dies. Tt is significant to note that the word
"family member" is absent in Section 3(a). "Family member" is defined
under Section 3(g) of the U.P. Act Xlll of 1972 and is also referred to in
Section 12 of the U.P. Act XIJJ of I 972. The word 'heir' in Section 3(a)
G
is used in relation to a 'tenant' who has to succeed as "tenant on the
tenant's death"; while 'family' is used in Section 12 which deals with a
situation ofan existing t.enant. The definition of 'family' as occurring in
Section 3(g) may not be relevant for the purposes of determining the
question as to who would bec01ne tenant on the death of original tenant,
since Section 3(a) uses'the word 'heir'. · H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] l S.C.R.

A 10. In the present case, we are dealing with the case as to who-
would become 'tenant' on the death ofLalita. Hence, the definition of
'family' is not relevant for the purposes of determining<as to who would
become tenant on the death of tenant Lalita. The only question falling
for consideration is whether the appellant-brother oftpe tenant Lalita is
an 'heir' under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. The word
B
'heir' is not defined in the Act. 'Heir' is a person who inherits or may
inherit by law. Section 3(1 )(f) of the Hindu Succession Act defin~~
'heir' as .. "heir" means any person, male or female, who is entitled
to succeed to the property of an intestate under this Act;". The word
'heir' has to be given the same meaning as would be applicable :o the
c general law of succession. In the. present case, as pointed out by the
High Court, the deceased tenant-Lalita being a hindu femalt, the
devolution of tenancy will bedetermined under Section 15 of the Hindu
Succession Act.
11. Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act lays down .the general
D order of succession to the property of a female intestate who dies after
the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act and states the scheme
of succession to her property which is different from that of order of
succession t() the property of a male intestate. Sub-section (2) of Section
15 carves out two exceptions to the general scheme and order of
succession. - We are concerned with clause (b) of sub-section (2) of
E Section 15 as noted above which has been grafted as an exception to
the provisions relating to the general orderof succession to the property
of a female intestate. Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Successio,1 Act
reads as under:-
"Section 15. General rules of succession in the case of
F female Hindus
( 1) ........... .
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1 ),·
(a) ......... .
G
(b ). Any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband
or from heri~-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any scin
or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any
pn~deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to
in sub-section ( 1) in the order s_p.;(;ified therein, but upon the heirs
H of the husband:"
DURGA PRASAD v. NARAYAN RAMCHANDAANI (D) THR. 753
LRS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

The exception carved out in Section I 5(2)(b) provides for a special A
order of succession in case of property inherited by her from her husband
or her father-in-law; but its operation is confined to the case of her dying··
without leaving a son or a daughter or children of pre-deceased children
to inherit her property. Language used in the section clearly specifies
that the .property inherited from the husband and father-in-Jaw would
B
devolve upon the heirs of husband/father-in-law from whom she inherited
the property. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in the
case of V. Dandapani Chettiar v. Balasubramanian Chettiar (Dead)
by Lrs. And Others, (2003) 6 SCC 633, and the relevant para reads
hereunder:-
" I 0. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 carves out an exception in case c
· ofa female dying intestate without leaving son, daughter or children
of a predeceased son or daughter. In such a case, the rule prescribed
is to find out the source from which she has inherited the property.
If it is inherited from her father or mother, it would devolve as
prescribed under Section l 5(2)(a). If it is inherited by her from D
her husband or father-in-Jaw, it would devolve upon the heirs of
her husband under Section l 5(2)(b ). The clause enacts that in a
case where the property is inherited.by a female from her father
or mother, it would devolve not upon the other heirs, but upon the
heirs of her father. This would mean that if there is no son or
daughter including the children of any predeceased son or daughter, E
then the property would devolve upon the heirs of her father.
Result would be - ifthe property is inherited by a female from
her father or her mother, neither her husband nor his heirs would
get such property, but it would revert back to the heirs of her
father." F
12. In the present case, the suit property was taken on rent by the
father-in-Jaw of deceased tenant-Lalita that is Hem Ram Sharma and
after his d~ath, his son Baldev (husband of Lalita) became tenant of the
suit property. Upon his death, Lalita became the tenant of the suit property.
Upon death ofLalita, in terms of Section l 5(2)(b) ofthe Hindu Succession
G
Act, in the absence of any son or daughter of deceased Lalita, the tenancy
would devolve upon the heirs of her husband. Since the appeliant does
not fall under the category of 'heir' ofLalita's husband, the tenancy of
the suit property will not devolve on him nor can he be called as an 'heir'
under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972.
H
••
•••
754 SUPREME COURT REP~RTS [2017] l S.C.R. DURGA PRASAD v. NARAYAN RAMCHANDAANI (D) THR. 755
LRS. [R. BANUMATH!, J.]

A 13. Section 3(g) defines 'family', in relation to landlord which Lalita Devi's husband-Baldev became the tenant of the suit property A
includes the spouse that is husband or wife of a person, ·male lineal and after Baldev's death, Lalita become the tenant of the suit property.
descendants which means his or her son, son~s son, son's son's son and During the pendency of the appeal before the First Appellate Court,
so on, parents, grandparents, unmarried, widowed, divorced d~ugliter or Lalita expired on 06.07.2013. Thereafter, the respondent-landlord moved
granddaughter, etc. The definitiori given in the clause is an inclusive one a substitution application before the appellate court to substitute the
and is supposed to be construed in its technical meaning which implies appellant who is the real brother of deceased-Lalita. On that application,
B B
what is not given has to be excluded as not forming part of the family of the appellant was imp leaded as a defendant-respondent in the said appeal.
landlord or tenant. Therefore, sisters and brothers oflandlord and tenant As pointed out by the High Court, the present appellant may have been
are excluded from his/her family. In the facts of present case, the 'rightly' or 'wrongly' substituted after the demise of his sister Merely
appellant being brother of deceased tenant cannot be held to be the because the appellant has been substituted in the place oftenant-Lalita,
'family' as the inclusive list given under the Act clearly omits "brother the appellant cannot become a 'heir' who normally resided with the
c and sister" and the same cannot be read therein as the list has to be read tenant Lalita. c
!Ind interpreted strictly.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Ganesh
14. Assuming, for the sake of arguments that the appellant is an Trivedi (supra), wherein this Court found, as a matter of fact, that brother
heirofLalita, for devolution of tenancy, on the death ofLalita, the appellant was residing in the tenanted premises and, therefore, tenancy/ights will
has to be a 'tenant' within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act devolve upon him on the death of original tenant within the meaning of
D Xlll of 1972. As per Section 3(a)(1 ), in the case ofresidential building, Section 3(a)(g) read with Section 12(1 )(b) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. D
in the event of death of a tenant, for heirs to be treated as tenant, the This is evident from the following observation made in paras (9) and
statute requires them to prove that they have been normally residing (10) of judgment which are reproduced as under:
with the deceased tenant at the time of his/her death. The term used in "9. The brother of a tenant is not included in the definition of
the section is 'heir' which implies that not any of the family member "family''. However, the present one is not a case where t:1e tenant
E
residing with the tenant would succeed to the tenancy, but only the heirs
of tenant normally residing with himn1er. The words "normally residing
... Suraj Prasad had during his lifetime taken up residence elsewhere
and/or allowed the suit premises to be occupied by hi~ brother.
E
with him" suggests that only those heirs would inherit the tenancy rights Deo Narain, being the real brother oflate Suraj Prasad, the tenant,
of deceased tenant who resided with him ordinarily in normal course had come to stay with his brother and was residing alo1ig with him
and not temporarily. The legislative intent appears to be that only those as such, even at the time of death of Suraj Prasad. It will not 1
heirs would inherit tenancy who normally resided with the tenant and therefore be correct to say that applicability of clause (b) of sub- •'
F not occ.1sionally. In the present case, the appellant claims that he has section (I) of Section 12 of the Act was attracted tc the suit F
been carrying on business in the property along with his deceased sister premises during the lifetime ofSuraj Prasad and a deemed vacancy
Lalita and had been ordinarily living with her because of the medical . had occurred. On the death of Suraj Prasad tenancy rights
business they \vere running. The appellant beingthe brother of deceased- devolved on Dea Narain, he being the only heir. He too became a
Lalita had no reason to normally reside with his married sister. Be it "tenant" within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 3. The
noted, in her written statement filed in the release application, Lalita has . de~ision of the High Court cannot, therefore, be faulted.
G G
not averred that her brother-appellant Durga Prasad was living with her
and that he was taking care of her. As rightly held by the Courts below, 10. There is yet another reason why no interference with the
Durga Prasad is neither a 'heir' within the meaning of Section 3(a) nor impugned order of the High Court is called for. Shri Upadhyay,
fall under the definition of 'family' as per Section 3(g) of the Act. the learned counsel for Respondents I to 3 invited our attention to
the pleadings and pointed out that admittedly the sale deed executed
15. As discussed earlier, originally Lalita's father-in-law-Hem Ram by Jagdamaba Prasad Awasthi in favour of Ganesh Trivedi, the
H Sharma took the premises on rent in the year 1940. After his death, H
••
•••
754 SUPREME COURT REP~RTS [2017] l S.C.R. DURGA PRASAD v. NARAYAN RAMCHANDAANI (D) THR. 755
LRS. [R. BANUMATH!, J.]

A 13. Section 3(g) defines 'family', in relation to landlord which Lalita Devi's husband-Baldev became the tenant of the suit property A
includes the spouse that is husband or wife of a person, ·male lineal and after Baldev's death, Lalita become the tenant of the suit property.
descendants which means his or her son, son~s son, son's son's son and During the pendency of the appeal before the First Appellate Court,
so on, parents, grandparents, unmarried, widowed, divorced d~ugliter or Lalita expired on 06.07.2013. Thereafter, the respondent-landlord moved
granddaughter, etc. The definitiori given in the clause is an inclusive one a substitution application before the appellate court to substitute the
and is supposed to be construed in its technical meaning which implies appellant who is the real brother of deceased-Lalita. On that application,
B B
what is not given has to be excluded as not forming part of the family of the appellant was imp leaded as a defendant-respondent in the said appeal.
landlord or tenant. Therefore, sisters and brothers oflandlord and tenant As pointed out by the High Court, the present appellant may have been
are excluded from his/her family. In the facts of present case, the 'rightly' or 'wrongly' substituted after the demise of his sister Merely
appellant being brother of deceased tenant cannot be held to be the because the appellant has been substituted in the place oftenant-Lalita,
'family' as the inclusive list given under the Act clearly omits "brother the appellant cannot become a 'heir' who normally resided with the
c and sister" and the same cannot be read therein as the list has to be read tenant Lalita. c
!Ind interpreted strictly.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Ganesh
14. Assuming, for the sake of arguments that the appellant is an Trivedi (supra), wherein this Court found, as a matter of fact, that brother
heirofLalita, for devolution of tenancy, on the death ofLalita, the appellant was residing in the tenanted premises and, therefore, tenancy/ights will
has to be a 'tenant' within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act devolve upon him on the death of original tenant within the meaning of
D Xlll of 1972. As per Section 3(a)(1 ), in the case ofresidential building, Section 3(a)(g) read with Section 12(1 )(b) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. D
in the event of death of a tenant, for heirs to be treated as tenant, the This is evident from the following observation made in paras (9) and
statute requires them to prove that they have been normally residing (10) of judgment which are reproduced as under:
with the deceased tenant at the time of his/her death. The term used in "9. The brother of a tenant is not included in the definition of
the section is 'heir' which implies that not any of the family member "family''. However, the present one is not a case where t:1e tenant
E
residing with the tenant would succeed to the tenancy, but only the heirs
of tenant normally residing with himn1er. The words "normally residing
... Suraj Prasad had during his lifetime taken up residence elsewhere
and/or allowed the suit premises to be occupied by hi~ brother.
E
with him" suggests that only those heirs would inherit the tenancy rights Deo Narain, being the real brother oflate Suraj Prasad, the tenant,
of deceased tenant who resided with him ordinarily in normal course had come to stay with his brother and was residing alo1ig with him
and not temporarily. The legislative intent appears to be that only those as such, even at the time of death of Suraj Prasad. It will not 1
heirs would inherit tenancy who normally resided with the tenant and therefore be correct to say that applicability of clause (b) of sub- •'
F not occ.1sionally. In the present case, the appellant claims that he has section (I) of Section 12 of the Act was attracted tc the suit F
been carrying on business in the property along with his deceased sister premises during the lifetime ofSuraj Prasad and a deemed vacancy
Lalita and had been ordinarily living with her because of the medical . had occurred. On the death of Suraj Prasad tenancy rights
business they \vere running. The appellant beingthe brother of deceased- devolved on Dea Narain, he being the only heir. He too became a
Lalita had no reason to normally reside with his married sister. Be it "tenant" within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 3. The
noted, in her written statement filed in the release application, Lalita has . de~ision of the High Court cannot, therefore, be faulted.
G G
not averred that her brother-appellant Durga Prasad was living with her
and that he was taking care of her. As rightly held by the Courts below, 10. There is yet another reason why no interference with the
Durga Prasad is neither a 'heir' within the meaning of Section 3(a) nor impugned order of the High Court is called for. Shri Upadhyay,
fall under the definition of 'family' as per Section 3(g) of the Act. the learned counsel for Respondents I to 3 invited our attention to
the pleadings and pointed out that admittedly the sale deed executed
15. As discussed earlier, originally Lalita's father-in-law-Hem Ram by Jagdamaba Prasad Awasthi in favour of Ganesh Trivedi, the
H Sharma took the premises on rent in the year 1940. After his death, H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 1 S.C.R.

A appellant, contains recitals to the effect that the former owner-
- larulloro was well aware of Deo Narain occupying the suit
premises' after the death of Suraj Prasad, that he was acknowledged
by the landlord as tenant in the premises, and that rent was also
'· paid by Deo Narain to the landlord under receipts issued by the
landlord though DeoNarain had fallen into some arrears of rent
B
atthe time of sale of the suit premises i_n favour of the appellant.
Such admissions made by Jagdamaba Prasad Awasthi are binding
on Ganesh Trivedi, the appellant, inasmuch as the same are
contained in the sale deed by which title has been derived by the
_ . appellant and thereunder the appellant has stepped into the shoes
c of the previous owner-landlordc Deo Narain's status as tenant in
. occupation of the suit premises, cannot, therefore, be doubted or
disputed by the appellant."
The aforesaid decision has been rendered in view of proven facts
in the said case and, therefore, has no application to the facts of the
D present case.
17. Upon appreciation of the facts and evidence, the first appellate
c~urt and the High Court rightly held that the appellant is neither an
'heir' as visualized under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 nor
'family' within the meaning of Section 3(g) of the Act and thatthe appellant
E is in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises and is liable to be
evicted. The High Court has directed the District Magistrate to pass
appropriate orders under Section 16 of the U .P. Act XIII of 1972 on the
release application of the landlord without further delay preferably within
three weeks from the date of judgment of the High_Court that is
09.03 :1015. Father-in-law of Lalita had taken the suit premises on rent
F in the y,ar 1940. In the facts and circumstances of the case, without
relegating the matter to the District Magistrate to pass orders on the
release application of the respondent-landlord, we deem it appropriate
to direct the appellant to hand over vacant possession to the respondent-
landlord.
-G I 8. In the result, the appeals are dismissed·: We direct the appellant
to hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondent-
landlord within four weeks ftom the date of this order failing which the
appellant shall be liable for contempt of this Court.

H Nidhi Jain Appeals disn1issed.