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Supreme Court of India

ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE AND ANR.versusM. SAMBA SIVA RAO AND ORS.

Citation
2000 INSC 305
Decided
9 May 2000
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

Non‑compliance with a Section 40 summons constitutes a contravention of the FERA and is punishable under Section 56, regardless of any monetary value involved.

Summary

The Enforcement Directorate issued summons under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 to M. Samba Siva Rao and others, who refused to comply with the directions. The Delhi High Court held that such refusal did not attract Section 56 of the Act and dismissed the complaints. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the purpose of the Act, the binding nature of a Section 40 summons, and the meaning of "in any other case" in Section 56(1)(ii). It held that non‑compliance with a Section 40 summons is a contravention of the Act and falls within the ambit of Section 56, irrespective of any monetary value involved. Consequently, the High Court judgments were set aside and the complaints were allowed to proceed. The Court emphasized a purposive construction of the statute and rejected a restrictive interpretation limiting Section 56 to money‑value offences.

Issues considered

  • Whether refusal to obey a summons issued under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 attracts the provisions of Section 56 of the Act.
  • Whether the expression "in any other case" in Section 56(1)(ii) limits the offence to violations involving a monetary value.
  • Whether the power to summon under Section 40 becomes meaningless if non‑compliance is not punishable under Section 56.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Foreign Exchange Regulation ActSection 40Section 56summonsnon‑compliancepenal statutesstatutory interpretationenforcement directoratejudicial proceeding

Judgment

              ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE AND ANR.                                    A
                                        v.
                   M. SAMBA SIVA RAO AND ORS.

                                MAY 9, 2000

 [G.B. PATTANAIK, DORAISWAMY RAJU AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.]                          B


      Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973:

      Sections 40 and 56 Summons-Issue of-Refusal to comply with
directions under-Held: Amounts to contravention of the provisions of the          C
Act. Hence, S.56 is attracted and punishable thereunder S.56 cannot be
restricted only to violations in respect of the money value involved.
Provisions-Are a complete Code in themselves.

      Words and phrases:
                                                                                  D
      "Jn any other case" Meaning of-Jn the context of S. 56(J)(ii) of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.

       The appellant Directorate summoned the respondents under Section 40
of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 but they refused to comply           E
with the direction under the summons. High Court dismissed the complaint
filed by the appellant holding that Section 56 of the Act was not attracted for
violation of Section 40 of the Act Hence this appeal.

      The following question arose before this Court :-
                                                                                  F
       Whether refusal on the part ofa person, who is summoned under Section
40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 to comply with the directions
under the summons, would attract the provisions of Section 56 of the Act?

      Allowing the appeal, this Court
                                                                                  G
      HELD: 1.1. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 was enacted
by the Parliament bash:ally for the conservation of the foreign exchange
resources of the country and the proper utilisation thereof in the interest of
economic development of the country. The Act having been enacted in the
interest of national economy, the provisions thereof should be construed so       H
                                      51
    52                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A as to make it workable and the provisions should receive a fair construction
    without doing any violence to the language employed by the Legislature. The
    provisions of Section 40 itself which confers power on the officer of
    Enforcement Directorate, to summon a"ny person whose attendance, he:
    considers necessary during the cours1~ of any investigation, makes it binding
B   as provided under Section 40(3). These principles should be borne in mind,
    while interpreting the provisions of Section 40 and its effect, if a person
    violates or disobeys the directions issued under Section 40. [57-8-C)

           1.2. Sections 56(1) (i) and (ii) are material for deciding the quantum of
    punishment and there is no reason why the expression in any other case' in
C   Section 56(1 )(ii) should be given any restrictive meaning to the effect that it
    must be in relation to the money value involved. The summons issued under
    Section 40, if not obeyed, must be held to be a contravention of the provisions
    of the Act and at :any rate, a contravention of a direction issued under the Act,
    and, therefore, such contravention would squarely come within the ambit of
    Section 56 of the Act. (57-G-H; 58-A)
D
           2.1. The view of the High Court that Section 56 would bring within its
    sweep only such violation or contravention which under different provisions of
    the Act have been deemed to be a contravention under the Act like Section 43(4),
    Section 8(1) read with Section 45(1). Section 49 and so on is not acceptable
    since such an interpretation would malke the power to summons under Section
E   40 meaningless and the provisions ofSection 40(3) making it a bounden duty
    for the persons summoned to attend purposeless. [58-H; 59-A)

          2.2. Therefore, the ultimate c:onclusion of the High Court in the
    impugned judgment that the Union of India can prosecute the accused for
F   offences under the provisions of Section 174 or any other relevant provision
    under Chapter 10 of the Penal Code, 1860 relating to contempt of the lawful
    authority of public servants, is not su:1tainable in law. [59-G)

          2.3. Bearing in mind the purpose for which an officer of the Enforcement
    Directorate has been empowered to summon persons, either to give evidence
G   or to produce a document and the provisions of the Act, making the persons
    summoned, bound to state the truth and further the investigation in question
    having been made to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections
    193 and 228 of the IPC, on a plain literal meaning being given to the language
    used in Section 56 of the Act, it has to be held that the directions given under
    the summons under Section 40 would come within the purview of Section 56
H   and, therefore, would be punishabl.e thereunder. [59-H; 60-A-B)
                ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE v. M. SAMBA SIVA RAO [PA TTANAIK, J.]         53
                Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of Rajasthan, (1996] 9 SCC A
          735, relied on.

                P. V. Prabhakara Rao v. Enforcement Directorate, Hyderabad, (1998)
          Crl. LJ. 2507 AP, approved.

               /tty v. Asst. Director, (1992) 58 ELT 172 Ker and C. Sampath Kumar v.        B
          A.N. Dyaneswaran, Criminal DPs Nos. 5468 and 5629of1996, decided on
          1-8-1997 Mad, overruled.

.
;
              CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.1294-
          1300of1999.
                                                                                            c
                From the Judgment and Order dated 9.7.99 of the Delhi !ligh Court in
          Crl. M. (M) Nos. 500, 1299/97, 477/98, 3094/97, 1509/98, 502/97 and 541 of1998.

                Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Mukul Rohtagi, Additional Solictor
          General, Ashok Panda, A.K. Ganguly, Tufail A. Khan, Naveen Kumar Matta,
                                                                                            D
          Ms. Lata Krishnamurthy, P. Parmeshwaran, R.K. Handoo, K.V. Mohan, Rohit
          P. Ranjan, P. Ojha, K.V. Mohan, S.C. Ghosh, Satish Vig, D. Mahesh Babu,
          Rohit Minocha, Ajay Kumar Yadav and Ashim Roy for the appearing parties.

               The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                            E
                 PATTANAIK, J. All these appeals are directed against a common
          judgment of a learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court and a common
          question of law arises and as such they are heard together and are being
          disposed of by this common judgment. The question for consideration in all
          these appeals is whether refusal on the part of a person, who is summoned
          under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter F
          referred to as 'the Act') to comply with the directions under the summons,
          would attract the provisions of Section 56 of the Act? The High Court by the
          impugned judgment came to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 56
          of the Act will not get attracted for violations of the directions under Section
          40 of the Act and, accordingly, the complaints filed for such violation and G
          cognizance taken in the complaint cases have been quashed.

               Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, the learned Additional Solicitor General, contended
          that the power having been conferred on the officers of the Enforcement
          Directorate to summon any person, whose attendance is necessary, either to
    ...   give evidence or to produce a document, in course of any investigation or H
    54                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A proceeding under the Act and the Act itself having made it binding on the
    person summoned to attend, as provided in sub- section (3) of Section 40,
    the refusal on the part of the person summoned to carry out the obligation
    under the statute, should be seriously viewed and must be held to be a
    contravention of the provisions of the Act, making such contravention
B   punishable under Section 56 of the Act, and the High Court was in error in
    quashing the complaints filed.

           Mr. R.K. Handoo, the learned counsel appearing for the accused
    respondents in some of the appeals as well as Mr. A.K.Ganguly, the learned
    senior counsel, appearing for the accused in some of the appeals, however
C   contended that the orders/directions, violation of which is punishable under
    Section 56 of the Act are those statutory orders or directions and the summon~
    issued under Section 40 has no statutory character and, therefore, the said
    violation by the person summoned, cannot be made punishable under Section
    56 of the Act. It was also further contended that the 'offence' not bein~
    defined under the Act, one will have to examine the definition of 'offence' in
D   General Clauses Act and on such an examination, it would appear that the
    impugned violation cannot be held to be an 'offence' and, therefore, cannot
    be made punishable under Section 56 of the Act, and the High Court, therefore
    was fully justified in quashing the complaints filed. For better appreciation of
    the contentions raised, it would be necessary to extract the provisions of
E   Section 40 and Section 56 of the Act in extenso:

           "Section 40: Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce
           documents- (I )Any Gazetted officer of Enforcement shall have power
           to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary
           either to give evidence or to produce a document during the course
F          of any investigation or procce.ding under this Act.

           (2)A summons to produce documents may be for the production of
           certain specified documents of a certain description in the possession
           or under the control of the person summoned.

G          (3 )All persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in person
           or by authorised agents, as such officer may direct; and all persons
           so summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject
           respecting which they are examined or make statements and produce
           such documents as may be required;

H          Provided that the exemption under Section 132 of the Code of Civil          ....
    ENFORCEMENTDIRECTORATEv. M. SAMBA SIVA RAO [PATTANAIK, J.]           55
     Procedure, 1908, shall be applicable to any requisition for attendance    A
     under this Section.

     (4) Every such investigation or proceeding as aforesaid shall be deemed
     to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228
     of the Indian Penal Code.
                                                                               B
     Section 56: Offences and prosecutions: (!)Without prejudice to any
     award of penalty by the adjudicating officer under this Act, if any
     person contravenes any of the provisions of this Act [other than
     Section 13, Clause (a) ofsub-section(I) of(Section 18, Section 18A),
     clause (a) of sub-section (I) of Section 19, sub-section(2) of Section
     44 and Sections 57 and 58] or of any rule, direction or order made        c
     thereunder, he shall, upon conviction by a Court, be p1mishable-

     (i) in the case of an offence the amount or value involved in which
     exceeds one lakh of rupees with imprisonment for a term which shall
     not be less than six months, but which may extend to seven years and
     with fine;                                                                D

    Provided that the Court may, for any adequate and special reasons to
    be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for
    a term of less than six months;

    (ii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a term which may extend      E
    to three years or with fine or with both.

    (2)1f any person convicted of an offence under this Act [not being an
      .
    offence under Section 13 or clause (a) of sub-section (!)(Section 18
    or Section 18A) or clause (a) of sub-section(!) of Section 19 or sub-
    section (2) of Section 44 or section 57 or Section 58] is again convicted F
    of an offence under this Act [not being an offence under Section 13
    or clause (a) of sub-section (I) of [Section 18 or Section 18A] or
    clause (a) of sub-section (I) of Section 19 or sub-section (2) of
    Section 44 or Section 57 or Section 58], he shall be punishable for the
    second and for every subsequent offence with imprisonment for a G
    term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend
    to seven years and with fine:

    Provided that the Court may, for any adequate and special reasons to
    be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for
~
    a term of less than six months.                                      H
    56                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A         (3) Where a person having been convicted of an offence under this
          Act [not being an offence under Section 13 or clause (I) of sub-sec.( I)
          of [section 18 or section ISA] or clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
          Section 19 or sub-section (2) of section 44 or section 57 or section 58]
          is again convicted of an offence under this Act [not being an offence
          under Section 13 or clause (a) of sub-section (!) of [section 18 or
B        section ISA], or clause (a) o:f sub-section (!)of Section 19 or sub-
         section (2) of Section 44 or Section 57 or section 58], the court by
         which such person is convic:ted may, in addition to any sentence
         which may be imposed on him under this section, by order, direct that,
         that person shall not carry on such business as the court may specify,
c        being a business which is likely to facilitate the commission of such
         offence, for such period not exceeding three years, as may be specified
         by the court in the order.

         (4) For the purpose of sub-section(!) and (2), the following shall not
         be considered as adequate and special reasons for awarding a sentence
D        of imprisonment for a term of less than six months, namely-

         (i) the fact that the accused has been convicted for the first time of
         an offence under this Act.

         (ii) the fact that in any proceeding under this Act, other than a
E        prosecution, the accused has been ordered to pay a penalty or goods
         in relation to such proceedings have been ordered to be confiscated
         or any other penal action has been taken against him for the same
         offence;

         (iii) the fact that the accused was not the principal offender and was
F        acting m~:rely as a carrier of goods or otherwise was a secondary party
         in the commission of the offonce;
         (iv) the age of the accused.

         (5) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), the fact that an
G        offence under this Act has caused no substantial harm to the general
         public or to any individual shall be an adequate and special reason
         for awarding a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six
         months.
         (6) Nothing in [the proviso to Section 188 of the Code of Criminal
H        Procedure, 1973] shall apply to any offence punishable under this.
           ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE v. M. SAMBA SIVA RAO [PA TTANAIK, J.)          57
            Section."                                                                   A
    The answer to the questions raised would depend upon an analysis and
    interpretation of the aforesaid two provisions of the Act The Foreign Exchange
    Regulation Act, 1973 was enacted by the Parliament, basically for .the
    conservation of the foreign exchange resources of the country and the proper
    utilisation thereof in the interest of economic development of the country. The     B
    Act having been enacted in the interest of national economy, the provisions
    thereof should be construed so as to make it workable and the interpretation
    given should be purposive and the provisions should receive a fair construction
    without doing any violence to the language employed by the Legislature. The
    provisions of Section 40 itself, which confers power on the officer of              C
    Enforcement Directorate, to summon any person whose attendance, he
    considers necessary during the course of any investigation, makes it binding
    as provided under sub- section (3) of Section 40, and the investigation or the
    proceeding in course of which such summons are issued have been deemed
    to be a judicial proceeding by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 40. These
    principles should be borne in mind, while interpreting the provisions of            D
    Section 40 and its effect, if a person violates or disobeys the directions issued
    under Section 40. Before embarking upon an in-depth inquiry into the provisions
    of the Act for the purpose of interpretation of Sections 40 and Section 56,
    it would be appropriate to notice some of the decisions given by different
    H~~moo~~~                                                                           E

           A learned Sine.Je Judge of the Kerala High Court considered this
    question in the case of !tty v. Assistant Director, (1992) 58 E.L.T.172 (Ker.).
    On a conjoint reading of Sections 40 and 56 of the Act, the learned Judge
    came to the conclusion that the failure to obey the summons issued under
    Section 40(1) cannot be held to be a contravention of the provisions of the F
    Act, Rule, direction or order inasmuch as it is only when directions pertaining
    to some money value involved is dis-obeyed, such disobedience is punishable
    under Section 56 of the Act. The learned Judge applied the ordinary rules of
    construction that penal statutes should receive a strict construction and the
    person to be penalised must come squarely within the plain words of the G
    enactment. We are unable to accept the constructions put in the aforesaid
    judgment as in our view clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 56(1) are material for
    deciding the quantum of punishment and further, there is no reason why the
    expression "in any other case" in Section 56( I)(ii) should be given any
    restrictive meaning to the effect that it must be in relation to the money value
    involved, as has been done by the Kerala High Court. The summons issued H

•
     58                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

 A under Section 40, if not obeyed, must be held to be a contravention of th¢
     provisions of the Act and at any rate, a contravention of a direction issued
     under the Act, and therefore, such t'9ntravention would squarely come within
    the ambit of ~ection 56 of the Act. The question came up for consideration
     before a leanied Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of C.
B Sampath Kumar v. A.N. Dyaneswaran in Criminal O.P. No. 5468 and 5629 of
     1996 and was disposed of by the learned Judge of the Madras High Court
    by judgment dated 1.8.97. The Mad!lis High Court also came to the conclusion
    that the entire Section 56 of the Act is identified and substantiated only in
    terms of the extent and value of the money involved in the offence, and
    therefore, violation or contravention of ~ummons, issued under Section 40 of
C ti:ie Act un-related to the money involved in the investigation cannot be held
    to be punishable under Section 56. Against the aforesaid judgment of the
    Madras High Court, the department had preferred appeals to this Court, which
   were registered as Criminal Appeal Nos. 143-144/98, but the question raised
    was not necessary to be answered as the persons concerned appeared before
   the Enforcement Authorities and were arrested by the said Enforcement
D Authority and, therefore, this Court kept the questions of law open by its
   order dated 20th July, 1998. In yet another case, the question arose for
   consideration before the Madras High Court in Criminal 0.P. No. 5718/96 and
   a learned Single Judge did not agree with the earlier decision of the said High
   Court in Criminal O:P. Nos. 5468 and 5629 of 1996 and referred the matter to
E a Division Bench by his Order dated 13th of August, 1997 and it was submitted
   at the Bar that the Division Bench has not yet disposed of the matter. The
   question came up for. consideration before the Andhra cf>radesh High Court
   in the  case of P. V. Prabhakara Rao v. Enforcement Directorate, Hyderabqd
   & Anr., reported in 1998 Crl.LJ.2507 and the said High Court has taken the
   view that failure to attend and give statement in pursuance of summons
F issued under Section 40 of the Act, clearly amounts to disobeyance of the
   directions given by the concerned authority and therefore, provisions of sub-
   section ( l) of Section 56 applies. 11ne learned Judge of Andhra Pradesh High
   Court interpreted the expression "in any other case" in clause (ii) of Section
   56( l) to mean that the said provision would get attracted even though no
G amount or value is involved in the contravention in question. The aforesaid
   view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court appears to us, is the correct
 . interpretation of the provisions contained in Sections 40 and 56 of the Act.

         The learned Judge of the Delhi High Court in the impugned Judgment
  is of the view that Section 56 would bring within its sweep only such violation
H or contravention which under different provisions of the Act have been
           ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE v. M. SAMBA SIVA RAO [PA TTANAIK, J.)          59
    deemed to be a contravention under the Act like Section 43(4), Section 8(1)         A
    read with Sec.45(1 ), Section 49 and so on. We are unable to accept this
    interpretation put by the learned Judge as in our view such interpretation
    given, would make the power to summons under Section 40 meaningless and
    the provisions of sub-section(3) of Section 40 making it bounden duty for the
    persons summoned to attend purposeless. The learned Judge of the Delhi
    High Court also committed the same error as the learned Single Judge of the         B
    Kerala High Court in interpreting-clause (ii) of Section 56(1) by holding that
    the same is identified and substantiated only in terms of the money involved
    in the offence. On behalf of the department, an argument had been advanced
    before the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court that the provisions
    of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is a complete code in itself but the         C
    same contention did not find favour with the learned Single Judge: Obviously,
    the judgment of this Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v.
    State of Rajasthan and Ors., [1996] 9 SCC 735 had not been brought to the
    notice of the High Court. In the aforesaid case, one of the questions for
    consideration before this Court was whether the provisions of Sections 4 and
    5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would come in aid of the investigation          D
    of the offence under FERA by a member of police force like an officer of DSPE
    in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure? This Court held:

            " ............ But FERA is a self-contained code containing comprehensive
            provisions of investigation, inquiry and trial for the offences under       E
            that Act. The provisions under FERA gives power to the officers of
            the Directorate of Enforcement or other officers duly authorised by
            the Central Government under FERA to search, confiscate, recover,
            arrest, record statements of witnesses etc. FERA contains provisions
            for trial of the offences under FERA and imposition of punishment for
            such offences. FERA, being a special law, containing provisions for         F
            investigation, enquiry, search, seizure, trial and imposition of
            punishment for offences under FERA, Section 5 of the Code of Criminal
            Procedure is not applicable in respect of offences under FERA."

    In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of this Court, the             G
    ultimate conclusion of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the
    impugned Judgment that the Union of India can prosecute the accused for
    offences under the provisions of Section 174 or any other relevant provision
    under chapter IO of the IPC relating to contempts of the lawful authority of

-   public servants, is not sustainable in law. As has been stated earlier, bearing
    in mind the purpose for which an officer of Enforcement Directorate have            H
     60                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. J_ S.C.R.

· A been empowered to summon persons, either to give evidence or to produce
   a document and the provisions of the Act, making the persons summoned,
   bound to state the truth and ¥her the investigation in question having been
   made to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228
   of the Indian Penal Code, on a plain literal meaning being given to the
   language used in Section 56 of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that
 B violation or contravention of the directions given under the summons under
   Section 40 would come within the purview of Section 56 and, therefore would
   be punishable thereunder, and !the impugned judgment of the Delhi High
   Court as well the judgment of Kerala High Court must be held to have been
   wrongly decided.
 c        We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgments of the learned Single
     Judge of Delhi High Court and allow these appeals and direct that the
     complaint proceedings may be proceeded with, in accordance with law.

     vss                                                      Appeals allowed.


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