ENGINEERING EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCILversusUSHA ANAND AND ANOTHER

                    [2013] 6 S.C.R. 285


     ENGINEERING EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL                         A
                              v.
              USHA ANAND AND ANOTHER
            (Criminal Appeal No. 387 of 2007)
                       MAY 29, 2013
                                                                  B
     [DR. B. S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
                                                     \
      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Jurisdiction
- Scope of -Criminal proceedings ulss.420, 4681471 /PC
against respondent no. 1's husband, and three other accused       C
- All accused, without prejudice to their claim, -Oeposited
money with appellant, a channelising industry under the
Ministry of Commerce - Case against husband of respondent
no. 1 stood abated on his death - Other three accused
acquitted - After acquittal, they were granted relief of refund   D
of the money deposited, by the High Court - Similar claim
by respondent no. 1 on behalf of her late husband - Allowed
by High Court in exercise of jurisdiction uls.482 CrPC -
Propriety - Plea of appellant that husband of respondent no. 1
deposited the amount not in pursuance of any order of court       E
but on his own volition to avoid arrest, and hence same cannot
be directed to be refunded u/s.482 CrPC - Held: Evidence
on record make it clear that the money was deposited by the
husband of respondent no. 1 on his own volition with the
appellant - Deposition of any sum as a condition of bail and      F
a deposit with the Agency on one's own even if to avoid arrest
would stand on a different footing - The later action has
nothing to do with the proceedings in the court - s.482 CrPC
could not have been exercised as the action taken by
appellant, was absolutely an administrative action and,           G
therefore, the same could only be challenged by way of a writ
petition and not by seeking relief invoking the inherent power
u/s.482 CrPC - Liberty granted to appellant to approach the
High Court by way of writ petition - Penal Code, 1860 -
ss.420, 4681471.
                             285                                  H
    286     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A      'Y', the husband of 1st respondent, was a merchant
  exporter of automotive components. The Central Bureau
  of Investigation (CBI) registered cases against him for
  offences punishable under Sections 420, 468/471 of IPC.
  Identical cases were registered against his three brothers,
B namely, 'A', 'S' and 'Su'.

       'Y', without prejudice to his claim, deposited a sum
  of Rs.22 lakhs with the appellant-Engineering Export
  Promotion Council (EEPC), a channelising industry
  under the Ministry of Commerce and requested it to
C inform the Special Investigation Branch (CBI) not to take
  any measure against him. The other three brothers also
  similarly deposited sum with the said agency. The trial
  continued in different cases against all the four brothers
  and, eventually, 'A', 'S' and 'Su' were acquitted in all the
D cases by the trial court which extended them the benefit
  of doubt. 'Y' expired before conclusion of the trial and,
  thereforE), the trial stood abated against him. Against the
  judgment of acquittal of the three brothers, CBI preferred
  appeals, which were dismissed and no appeal was
E preferrE)d assailing the judgment of affirmation of
  acquittal. Thereafter, they claimed refund of the amount
  by filing applications before the trial Judge who allowed
  the same.

F      As the amount was not refunded despite the order
  passed by the trial court, one of the brothers filed
  applica(ion before the High Court which passed order
  directing the appellant to refund the amount. Thereafter,
  the 1st respondent filed an identical application before
G the High Court with a prayer to command the appellant
  to refund the amount of Rs.22 lakhs deposited by her late
  husband, 'Y', which was allowed.

      In the instant appeal, the appellant challenged the
  order of the High Court contending 1) that the husband
H of 1st respondent had deposited money with the
 ENGINEERING EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v.                287
               USHA ANAND
appellant on his own and it was not in pursuance of the A
order or command of any court and it had nothing to do
with the grant of bail; 2) that the High Court fell into grave
error by applying the doctrine of parity which was
remotely not applicable; and further 3) that when as a
condition of bail a sum is deposited, the same is liable to 8
be released after acquittal but when an amount is
deposited on one's volition it cannot be directed to be
refunded under Section 482 CrPC.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                              c
      HELD: 1. From the order passed by the High Court,
it is clear that the High Court was exercising its inherent
powers under Section 482 CrPC. The fulcrum of the order
passed by the High Court is that late husband of the 1st
respondent had deposited the money to avoid arrest and        o
similarly placed accused persons had been acquitted and
they had been granted relief of refund by the trial court
and similar treatment should be meted out to her. [Para
11] [294-H; 295-A-B]

     2. There is nothing like unlimited arbitrary jurisdiction E
conferred on the High Court under Section 482 of the
Code. The power has to be exercised sparingly, carefully
and with caution only where such exercise is justified by
the tests laid down in the Section itself. Section 482 does
not confer a~y new power on the High Court but only F
saves the inherent power which the court possessed
before the enactment of the Code. There are three
circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may
be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under
the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, G
and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. There is
a distinction between the exercise of power under Article
226 of the Constitution of India and the power under the
Code. [Para 15 and 16] [297-A-F]
                                                              H
    288      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A       R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866: 1960
    SCR 388; State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal and others AIR 2005
    SC 4135; State of U.P. and others v. Surender Kumar (2005)
    9 SCC 1:61; Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kera/a AIR 2008
    SC 1614: 2008 (4) SCR 701 - relied on.
B
          3. In the case at hand, the High Court has given
    emphasis on judgment of acquittal and the deposit of
    money with the appellant to avoid arrest. As far as the
    judgment of acquittal because of abatement is concerned,
    it is not necessary to dwell upon what would be the effect
C   of an acquittal in a case of this nature. The second issue
    being Important requires to be delved into. late 'Y' had
    written two letters to the appellant on 25.8.1994 and on
    30.8.1'994      respectively.    From     the    aforesaid
    communications, it is clear that the money was deposited
D   by the husband of the 1st respondent on his own volition
    with the appellant. The High Court observed that the other
    three brothers had deposited the amount under same
    circumstances and, therefore, after their acquittal the
    amount was directed to be refunded. The High Court has
E   referred to its earlier order wherein it had been
    categ,orically stated that the money was deposited as a
    condition of bail. Deposition of any sum as a condition of
    bail and a deposit with the Agency on one's own even if
    to avoid arrest would stand on a different footing. The later
F   actioh has nothing to do with the proceedings in the court.
    Thus, understood, Section 482 of the Code could not have
    been exercised as the action taken by the appellant, a
    channelising industry under the Ministry of Commerce is
    absolutely an administrative action and, therefore, the
G   same can only be challenged by way of a writ petition and
    not by seeking relief invoking the inherent power under
    Section 482 of the Code. [Paras 18 and 20] [297-G-H; 298-
    A-B]; 299-F-H; 300-A]

          4. Consequently, the order passed by the High Court
H
  ENGINEERING EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v.                 289
                USHA ANAND
is set aside and liberty is granted to appellant to              A
approach the High Court by way of writ petition. If a writ
petition is filed, the same shall be dealt with on merits.
[Para 21] [300-B-C]
                     Case Law Reference:
                                                                 B
    1960 SCR 388              relied on             Para 12
    AIR 2005 SC 4135          relied on             Para 13
    (2005) 9 sec 151          relied on             Para 15
                                                                 c
    2008 (4) SCR 701          relied on             Para 16

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 387 of 2007.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 01.06.2006 of the High       D
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. M.C. No. 540 of 2004 in
Criminal Miscellaneous (M) No. 3009 of 2003 read with order
dated 04.07.2006 in Crl.M.No. 6349 of 2006 in Crl. M.M. No.
3009 of 2003.
                                                                 E
   Amit Singh Chadha, Sangeeta Manda!, Kunal Sinha, Fox
Manda! & Co. for the Appellant.

    R. Nedumaran, Chandar Kumar, B.K. Prasad, Sonal Jain,
Tan may Agarwal (for Vinay Garg), P. Parmeswaran for the
Respondents.                                                     F

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. In this appeal challenge is to the
orders dated 1.6.2006 and 4. 7.2006 passed by the High Court
of Delhi in Criminal M.C. No. 540 of 2004 in Crl. M. (M) No.     G
3009 of 2003 and Crl. M. No. 6349 of 2006 in Crl. M. (M) No.
3009 of 2003 respectively.

     2. The facts which are essential to be exposited are that
the husband of the 1st respondent, late Yash Pal Anand, was a    H
    290      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 6 S.C.R.


A merchant exporter of automotive components and was carrying
  on business in the name and style of Mis. Anand Craft Centre.
  The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered six cases
  against him for offences punishable under Sections 420, 468/
  471 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC") in the year 1994.
B Identical cases of equal numbers were registered against his
  brothers, namely, Ashok, Salish and Subhash. The allegations
  against the four accused persons are not required to be stated
  because the controversy pertains to a different realm
  altogether. As the factual matrix would demonstrate, late Yash
c Pal Anand had deposited a sum of Rs.22 lakhs with
  Engineering Export Promotion Council (EEPC), a channelising
  industry 4nder the Ministry of Commerce. Other three brothers
  had also deposited the sum with the said agency. The trial
  continued in different cases against all the four brothers and,
  eventually, Ashok, Salish and Subhash were acquitted in all the
0
  cases by the trial court which extended them the benefit of
  doubt. As far as the husband of the 1st respondent is concerned,
  he expired before the conclusion of the trial and, therefore, the
  trial stood abated against him. Against the judgment of acquittal
E of the three brothers CBI preferred appeals which were
  dismissed on 27.5.2002 and no appeal was preferred
  assailing the judgment of affirmation of acquittal. Thereafter,
  they claimed refund of the amount by filing requisite applications
  before the learned trial Judge who, by order dated 13.8.2001,
  directed refund of the amount. The reason ascribed by the trial
F court for refund was that the said sum was deposited by the
  accused persons in compliance of the conditions of the bail
  order and it was clearly stated that the accused persons had
  deposited the money without prejudice to their rights and as
  they had been acquitted, they were entitled to refund of the
G money deposited with the EEPC.

        3. As the amount was not refunded despite the order
    passed by the trial court, one of the brothers preferred Cri.M.
    (M) No. 3541 of 2001 before the High Court which passed an
H   order directing the present appellant to refund the amount. The
 ENGINEERING EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v.                     291
        USHA ANAND [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
relevant part of the order dated 5.10.2001 passed in Crl. M.         A
(M) No. 3541 of 2001 is as follows: -

    ''The question that is being raised before me, is whether
    the amount deposited by the accused persons pursuant to
    orders dated 12.10.1994 requiring the petitioner to deposit      B
    a sum of Rs.15,24,079/- with the second respondent by
    way of terms and condition of the bail and the petitioner
    during trial having been acquitted of all charges on
    22.6.2001 is entitled to receive back the money that is
    deposited pursuant to the orders of this Court with the
    second respondent as a condition of bail. Learned counsel        C
    for the CBI submits that the CBI does not have the money
    and that the same was deposited with the second
    respondent and, therefore it is only the second respondent
    that can be directed to return the money deposited.
                                                                     D
     I have heard learned counsel present for the parties the
     second respondent choosing not to be present, I direct that
     the amount deposited by the petitioner with the second
     respondent pursuant to orders of this Court and which was
     directed to be returned vide order dated 13.8.2001 shall        E
     be returned within a period of two weeks from date of
     service of the order."

      4. Thereafter, the 1st respondent filed Crl. M. (M) No. 3009
of 2003 with a prayer to command the respondent No. 2, the
appellant herein, to refund the amount of Rs.22 lakhs on the         F
ground that she was the sole legal heir; that the allegations in
all the cases were identical without any exception; that the trial
court had allowed the applications for refund vide order dated
13.8.2001 in respect of other brothers; that as the order passed
by the trial court was not complied with, one of the brothers had    G:
filed Crl. M. (M) No. 3541 of 2001 before the High Court which
was disposed of by order dated 5.10.2001 directing the
respondent to refund the deposited amount within two weeks;
that as the trial against the husband had abated, she had not
been able to move the application earlier; that ~fter the            H
    292        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A   termination of the trial she had approached the officers of the
    responder:it but despite the earlier direction by this Court and
    they being under legal obligation to refund the amount,
    tremendous apathy was shown and money was not refunded;
    and that no response was given to the legal notice and,
B   therefore, she was entitled to refund of the deposited sum.

         5. The High Court entertained the application preferred by
    the 1st respondent and passed the following order on
    3.12.2003: -

c         "In identical petition namely Crl. M. (M) No. 3541/2001 an
          order dated 15.10.2001 was passed directing refund of
          the money deposited by the petitioner of that petition within
          a period of two weeks from the date of service of the
          respondent.
D
          Sil:\ce in this case also respondent No. 2 has been served
          the same order needs to be passed. The amount
          deposited by the petitioner shall now be returned to the
          petitioner within a period of two weeks from today."
E         6. Being grieved by the aforesaid order special leave
    petition (Crl.) No. 41 of 2004 was filed before this Court, which
    was eventually converted to Criminal Appeal No.1085 of 2004.
    This Gourt, on 27.9.2004, passed the following order in the said
    criminal appeal: -
F
          "Let the present appellant, if they are advised, file their
          objections, if any, to the petition in Criminal Miscellaneous
          (Main) No. 3009 of 2003 in the High Court within three
          weeks from today. If any objection is filed, the same shall
G         be considered on its own merits by the High Court about
          which we express no opinion. The Criminal Miscellaneous
          (Main) No. 3009 of 2003 shall be restored to its original
          position as stood before disposal on 3.12.2003. If no
          objection is filed, the order passed on 3.12.2003 shall
H
 ENGINEERING EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v.                      293
        USHA ANAND [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    remain operative. The liberty given to the appellant to file     A
    a counter shall be also applicable to the CBI.

    This order has been passed notwithstanding the stand of
    the respondents that full liberty was granted to the appellant
    to file any objection which they failed to avail. Since a        B
    specific stand has been taken that the appellant intended
    to file objections for which it was not granted any
    opportunity, we have passed the present order."

     7. After the aforesaid order an objection was filed and the
High Court, while dealing with the controversy referred to the       C
order passed by the trial court on 13.8.2001 directing refund
of amount in respect of other accused persons, and further
referred to the order passed on 5.10.2001, which we have
reproduced hereinabove, and thereafter, as is manifest from
the order impugned, ii reproduced a part of the letter dated         D
30.8.1994 by late Yash Pal Anand written to the respondent No.
2 therein and observed thus: -

    "Admittedly, the other three brothers also deposited the
    amount under the same circumstances. After their acquittal       E
    when they applied to the trial court for refund of the amount
    deposited by them the trial court directed the refund of the
    amount. While passing the order of refund the learned trial
    court has categorically observed that money was
    deposited in compliance of the condition of bail order and
    without prejudice to the rights of the accused to be entitled    F
    to refund of the money. I fail to understand as to why same
    treatment be not meted out to the petitioner."

    8. Being of this view, the High Court further opined that
once the proceeding stood abated against him, it cannot be           G
argued that the case would have resulted in conviction when
cases against other brothers on identical allegations had
resulted in acquittal and the appeals had been dismissed.
Resultantly, the petition was allowed and the respondent No. 2
                                                                     H
    294       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A   therein was directed to refund the amount within a period of four
    weeks.

        9. Mr. Amit Singh Chadha, learned senior counsel
  appearing for the appellant, has seriously criticized the order
8 on the ground that the respondent's husband had deposited the
  money with the appellant on his own and it is not in pursuance
  of the order or command of any court and it has nothing to do
  with the grant of bail. It is strenuously urged that the High Court
  has fallen into grave error by applying the doctrine of parity
C which is remotely not applicable. It is canvassed by him that
  when as ~ condition of bail a sum is deposited, the same is
  liable to be released after acquittal but when an amount is
  deposited on one's volition it cannot be directed to be refunded
  under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short
  "the Code").
D
        10. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, per
  contra, would contend that the order passed by the High Court
  is absolutely defensible inasmuch as when the trial stood
  abated against late Yash Pal Anand, husband of the 1st
E respondent, it had the effect of acquittal and, therefore, the fall
  out is refund of the amount which had been deposited with the
  appellant. It is his further submission that when the charges were
  identical against all and the three accused persons were
  acquitted, there was no justification to treat the legal heir of
F other accused in a different manner. It is put forth that the
  amount was deposited by late Yash Pal Anand to avoid arrest
  and wi,thout prejudice which is perceptible from letter dated
  30.8.1994 written by him to the appellant which has been
  appositely referred to by the High Court and hence, interference
G with the order impugned would amount to non-refund of the
  amount to the respondent which would result in miscarriage of
  justice.

          11. To appreciate the rivalised submissions raised at the
  Bar, we have with great anxiety scrutinized the order passed
H by the High Court. Indubitably, the High Court was exercising
     ENGINEERING EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v.                  295
            USHA ANAND [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. The fulcrum        A
of the order passed by the High Court is that late husband of
the Isl respondent had deposited the money to avoid arrest and
similarly placed accused persons had been acquitted and they
had been granted relief of refund by the trial court and again
reiterated by the High. Court under Section 482 of the Code,          B
similar treatment should be meted out to her.

     12. To appreciate the ratiocination of the order passed by
the High Court it is necessary to understand the jurisdiction of
the High Court while exercising the power under Section 482           C
of the Code. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1 a three-Judge
Bench was dealing with the scope of inherent power the High
Court under Section 561A of the old Code. In that context, it
has been observed that the High Court has said inherent power
as may be necessary is meant to give effect to any order under
the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or           D
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

     13. In State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal and others, 2 the Court,
dealing with the scope of exercise of power under Section 482
of the Code. has observed that the Section does not confer any        E
new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power
which the Court possesses before the enactment of the Code.

     14. After so stating it has been laid down that it envisages
three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may
be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the
                                                                      F
Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, and (iii)
to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible
nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern
the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment
dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may             G
possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper

1.    AIR 1960 SC 866.
2.    AIR 2005 SC 4135.                                               H
    296        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 6 S.C.R.


A   discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law.
    That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which
    merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High
    Courts.

8       15. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to State of U.P.
  and others v. Surender Kumar wherein the appellant-State had
  assailed the order passed by the a learned Judge of the
  Allahabad High Court who, in exercise of power under Section
  482 of the Code, had modified its earlier order directing the
C responder:it-State and its functionaries not to carry out search
  and seizure of the goods lying at the railway station or in the
  custody of the City Booking Agency belonging to the applicant
  therein ptior to their delivery to the consignee and also not to
  interfere in the functioning of the City Booking Agency. The two
  learned Judges opined that the High Court could not have
D modified the order as it amounted to review. Repelling the
  contention that the High Court had only acted in accordance
  with the judgment of the Division Bench of the said High Court,
  the two.Judge Bench proceeded to state as follows: -

E         "In the garb of an application for modification of that order,
          the respondent could not file an application which was in
          effect a review application praying for other reliefs. Yet the
          High Court passed an order directing the appellants not
          to search and seize the goods lying at the railway station
F         or in the custody of the City Booking Agency of the
          applicant prior to the delivery to the consignees. It has
          f1:1rther directed that the appellants shall not interfere in the
          functioning of the City Booking Agency. These are matters
          which were entirely beyond the scope of the application
          under Section 482 CrPC and if, we may say so, beyond
G
          the jurisdiction of the High Court exercising jurisdiction
          under Section 482 CrPC. It does not arise out of any order
          passed by a court, nor was there any allegation of abuse
          of the process of the court, nor was it a case of manifest
H   3.   (2005) g sec 1s1.
     ENGINEERING EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v.                       297
           USHA ANAND [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

       injustice caused to a party. A direction like the one which         A
       the High Court has given in its impugned order could be
       given by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction
       in an appropriate case and not under Section 482 CrPC."

     16. In Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala 4 the central
                                                                           B
controversy that arose before this Court pertained to the scope,
content and ambit of the inherent power conferred on the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code. A submission was
canvassed that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section
482 of the Code was not available to order investigation into
any case by the police. After referring to number of decisions
                                                                           c
it has been opined thus: -

      "22. In our view, there is nothing like unlimited arbitrary
      jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 482
      of the Code. The power has to be exercised sparingly,                D
      carefully and with caution only where such exercise is
      justified by the tests laid down in the Section itself. It is well
      settled that Section 482 does not confer any new power
      on the High Court but only saves the inherent power which
      the court possessed before the enactment of the Code.                E
      There are three circumstances under which the inherent
      jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to
      an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the
      process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of
      justice."                                                            F
      17. In the said case, the two-Judge Bench made a
distinction between the exercise of power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India and the power under the Code.

     18. In the case at hand, the High Court has given, as has             G
been stated hereinbefore, emphasis on judgment of acquittal
and the deposit of money with the appellant to avoid arrest. As
far as the judgment of acquittal because of abatement is
concerned, it is not necessary to dwell upon what would be the
4.    AIR 2008 SC 1614.                                                    H
    298         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 6 S.C.R


A effect of an acquittal in a case of this nature. The second issue
  being important requires to be delved into. Late Yash Pal
  Anand, had written two letters to the appellant on 25.8.1994 and
  on 30.8.1994 respectively. We may reproduce the relevant part
  of the letter dated 30.8.1994 : -
B
       "Witho\lt prejudice to our claim and contention that benefit
       of 1.P.R.S. has been legally claimed by us, we are happy
       tendering approximately a sum of Rs.7,40,000.00 which
       constitute about 27% of the total sum of Rs.27,50,000.00
       as payable by us to E.E.P.C. as alleged to be payable.
c      The detail of the tendering amount is as under.

           1.    Banker's Cheque No. 198929 di. 27.8.94 of Rs.
                 2,80,000.00 issued by Canara Bank, New Delhi.

D          2.    Banker's Cheque No. 198928 di. 27.8.94 of Rs.
                 4,60,000.00 issued by Canara Bank, New Delhi.

          Kindly accept this sum of Rs. 7,40,000.00 under protest
          and acknowledge.

E         We are already made 13% amount vide Banker's Cheque
          No. 198878 di. 25.8.94 of Rs. 3,60,000.00 issued by
          Canara Bank, New Delhi and now total amount paid 40%
          (Rs, 11,00,000.00)

F         We are at present in serious financial constraint, therefore,
          the: balance left over amount may not be deposited by us
          immediately. But however the remaining sum should be
          deposited in the course of the time as intimated to you from
          time to time.
G         In view of the above you are requested to also kindly inform
          immediately to the special investigation branch (CBI) not
          to take measure against us.

          We assure you that we will fully co-operate with you from
H         time to time and further assure you that the entire sum as
 ENGINEERING EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL v.                     299
        USHA ANAND [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     become-i:sayable by us shall be paid with."                    A

                                              [Emphasis added]

     19. Again on 5.10.1994 late Yash Pal Anand wrote
another letter the relevant part of which is as follows: -
                                                                    B
     "We are already made 13% amount vide Banker's Cheque
     No. 198878 dt. 25.8.94 of Rs. 3,60,000.00 issued by
     Canara Bank, New Delhi and 27% of Rs. 7,40,000.00
     (Banker's Cheque No. 198929 dt. 27.8.94) and now total
     amount paid 80% (Rs. 22,00,000.00)                             c
     We are at present in serious financial constraint, therefore
     the balance left over amount may not be deposited by us
     immediately. But however the remaining sum should be
     deposited as early as possible.
                                                                    D
     In view of the above you are requested to also kindly inform
     immediately to the special investigation branch (CBI) not
     to take measure against us."

                                            [Emphasis supplied]     E

      20. From the aforesaid communications, it is clear that the
 money was deposited by the husband of the 1st respondent on
 his own volition with the appellant. The High Court has observed
that the other three brothers had deposited the amount under
 same circumstances and, therefore, after their acquittal the       F
amount was directed to be refunded. The High Court has
referred to its earlier order wherein it had been categorically
stated that the money was deposited as a condition of bail.
Deposition of any sum as a condition of bail and a deposit with
the Agency on one's own even if to avoid arrest would stand         G
on a different footing. The later action has nothing to do with
the proceedings in the court. Thus understood, Section 482 of
the Code could not have been exercised as the action taken
by the appellant, a channelising industry under the Ministry of
Commerce is absolutely an administrative action and,                H
    300      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013] 6 S.C.R.


A   therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the same can
    only be challenged by way of a writ petition and not by seeking
    relief invoking the inherent power under Section 482 of the
    Code.

B       21. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the order passed
  by the High Court is set aside and liberty is granted to appellant
  to approach the High Court by way of writ petition. If a writ
  petition is filed, the same shall be dealt with on merits. Needless
  to emphasise, all contentions relating to liability, entitlement for
C refund and all other aspects are kept open as we have not
  expressed any opinion on any count except the jurisdictional
  facet. There shall be no order as to costs.

    B.B.B.                                          Appeal allowed.