EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. AND ANR.versusUNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

A          EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. AND ANR.
                                 v.
                     UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

                                 MARCH 11, 2004

B           [Y.K. SABHARWAL AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.]


          Labour Laws:


c
          Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952:

          Paragraph 80(2)-Excluded employees-Newspaper industry-
    Emp/oyees of newspaper industry did not come in the category of "excluded
                                                                                    --
    employees" and were entitled to all benefits of the Scheme irrespective of
    pay-Test of income had been excluded by keeping the newspaper industry
D   and employees as a class apart-Petitioners challenged the constitutionality
    of Para 80(2) alleging that there was no valid basis to single out newspaper
    industry for additional burden-Held: Para 80(2) which applied exclusively
    to employees of newspaper industry did not suffer from the vice of
    arbitrariness-Hence, it was not violative of Art. I 4 of the Constitution
    although it singled out newspaper industry by excluding income test only with
E   regard to the said industry-Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
    Provisions Act, 1952, Paras. 2(1), 2(/) and (5)-Working Journalists and
    Other Newspaper Employees (Condition of Service) and Miscellaneous
    Provisions Act, 1955.

          Constitution of India, 1950:
F
        Article 32-Writ petition-Delay and /aches-Effect of-Held: The
  constitutional remedy under Art. 32 is discretionary-In one case Court may
  decline discretionary relief if there is an inordinate delay-But, in another
  case, the Court may ignore the delay and pronounce upon the invalidity of a
G provision-It will depend from case to case-On facts, writ petition challenging
  benefit given to employees of newspaper industry in the year 1956 and
  continuing till date was dismissed on the ground of long delay.

           The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 32 of
    the Constitution challenging the constitutionality of Paragraph 80(2) of
H                                        1098
                  EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1.               I 099
--·   the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. The effect of the impugned          A
      paragraph was that the employees of the petitioner-newspaper industry,
      for the purposes of the provident fund scheme, did not fall in the category
      of excluded employees despite their pay being above the prescribed amount
      as notified by the respondent from time to time.

            The employees of the petitioner had not been included in the category     B
      of "excluded employee" as defined in Paragraph 2(t)(ii) of the Scheme for
      the last more than 47 years. The effect of Paragraph S0(2) of the Scheme,
      which came into force in the year 1956, was that the income ceiling had
      not been applied to the employees of the newspaper establishments. The
      result was that the newspaper establishments and newspaper employees            C
      did not -come in the category of 'excluded employee'. In other words,
      irrespective of pay, all such employees were entitled to the benefit of the
      Scheme.

            On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that only in case of
      employees of the newspaper industry, the test of income had been excluded       D
      by keeping the newspaper establishments and employees as a class apart
      which was wholly discriminatory; that there was no rationale or valid basis
      for artificially treating newspaper establishments and employees as a
      distinct class so as to make them ineligible. on the basis of income ceiling;
      and that there was no valid basis to single out newspaper establishments        E
      for additional burden.

           The following question arose before the Court:-

            Whether the benefit given to the employees of the newspaper
      industry in the year 1956 under Paragraph 80(2) of the Employees'
      Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 and continuing till date could be challenged        F
      at this stage after a lapse of so many years by only one of the newspaper
      establishments in the country?

           Dismissing the petition, the Court

            HELD: 1. Undoubtedly, the employees of the newspaper G
      establishments are in a better position than the employees of other
      establishments and industries since the newspaper employees, without any
      income ceiling limit, are entitled to the benefits of the Employees'
      Provident Funds altd Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and Employees'
      Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. That has been the position for the last H
      1100                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A nearly half a· century. On the other hand, right since the inception of the
      PF Act, the benefit of the Scheme has been denied to those employees who
                                                                                     -
      have more than a specified income. The benefit has been extended to
      weaker sections of employees of other establishments and industries and
      not to all sections. The income ceiling has been amended by notifications
B     issued from time to time. (1108-D-E)

           2. In the present case, it is not the contention of the petitioner that
      only temporary relief was granted to the employees of the newspaper
      industry. Apart from this, the employees of the newspaper industry have
      always been treated as a class apart. Moreover, the mere fact that similar
•C    benefit, even after a lapse of about half a century, has not been given to
      the employees of other industries will not make the benefit given to the
      newspaper industry discriminatory. (1112-G-H[

             In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979[ 1 SCC 381, followed.

D           Motor General Traders v. State ofA.P., (1984) l SCC 222, Rattan Arya
      v. State of T.N., (198,6) 3 SCC 385, Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of
      Maharashtra, (1998) /z SCC 1 and Chintapaa/li Achalah v. P. Gopalakrishna
      Reddy, AIR (1966) AP 51, held inapplicable.

            3.1. No hard-and-fast principle can be laid down that under no
IE    circumstances delay would be a relevant consideration in judging the
      constitutional validity of a provision. The constitutional remedy under
      Article 32 is discretionary. In one case, this Court may decline
      discretionary relief if a person aggrieved has slept over for long number
      of years. In another case, depending upon the nature of violation, the court
      may .ignore delay and pronounce upon the invalidity of a provision. It will
IF    depend from case to case. (1113-C-D)

           Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, [1970[ 2 SCR 697; Mis.
      Tilokchand and Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110 and
      Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, [1974[ l SCC 317,
...., relied on.
J

            3.2. In the present case, there is no satisfactory explanation for the
      delay of over forty-five years. The petition can be rejected by declining
      to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioners only on this count.
      Further, a provision though constitutional when enacted, may with passage
:-I   of time become unconstitutional, but the said principle has no applicability
                       EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1.             1101

-         to the present case. 11114-C)

                4. In spreading information, the employees of newspaper industry
                                                                                          A


          play a dominant role and considering the employees of newspaper industry
          as a 'class', the benefit under the Scheme was extended almost at the same
          time when the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees
          (Condition of Service) and Miscellaneous Provision A;:t, 1955 was enacted.      B
..,.___   Thus, there can be no question of any adverse effect on the freedom of
          press. The financial burden on the petitioners cannot be said to be a 'harsh
          treatment'. The contention that now the petitioners are unable to bear the
          financial burden, which they have been, bearing· for the last over forty-
          five years is wholly irrelevant. It is for the petitioners to manage their
          affairs if they intend to continue with their activity as a newspaper
                                                                                          c
          establishment. [1115-E-F) ·

               Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union ofIndia, [1985]
          1 SCC 685, Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1962] 3 SCR 842 and
          Bennett Coleman and Co. v. Union of India, [1972] 2 SCC 788, referred to.       D
                5. The definition of 'newspaper employee' in Section 2 of the
          Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Condition of
          Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 takes into its fold all the
',.
          employees who are employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any
          newspaper establishment. To provide social welfare legislation and grant        E

---       benefit, a beginning had to be made somewhere without embarking on
          similar legislation in relation to other industries. The fact that even after
          about. half a century similar benefit has not been extended to the employees
          of any other industry will not result in invalidation of the benefit given to
          the employees of the press industry. It is, therefore, not possible to accept
          the contention of the petitioner that the impugned provision is violative
                                                                                          F
          of Article 14 on the ground that it singles out newspaper industry by
          excluding income test only in regard to the said industry.
                                                                  [1120-H; 1121-A-B]

               Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India, [1959] SCR 12,
                                                                                          G
          relied on.

                Budhan Chaudhry v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045, referred to.

-             Chiranjit Lal Chowduri v. Union of India, [1950] SCR 869, State of
          Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, (1951] SCR 682, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali H
    1102                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [1952)
    SCR 435, Lachmandas Kewa/aram Ahuja v. State of Bombay, (1952) SCR
    710, Quasbn Razvi v. State of Hyderabad, (1953) SCR 581 and Habeeb
    Mohamad v. State of Hyderabad, [1953) SCR 661, cited.

          6. Apart from the fact that it may not be always possible to grant
B

                                                                                      --
    to everyone all the benefits in one go at the same time, it seems that the
    impugned provision and the enacting of the Working Journalists and
    Other Newspaper :t):mployees (Condition of Service) and Miscellaneous
    Provisions Act, 1955 was part of a package deal and that probably is the
    reason for other newspaper establishments not challenging it and the
C   petitioners also challenging it only after a lapse of so many years. Further,
    Sections 2(i), 4 and Schedule I of the Employees' Provident Funds and
    Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, show how gradually the scope of the
                                                                                      -
    Act has been expanded b:y the Central Government and the Act and the
    Scheme made applicable to various branches of industries. From whatever
    angle that one may examine, the attack on the constitutional validity based
D   on Article 14 cannot be accepted. (1121-C-D]

           CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (C) No. 59 of2001.

           (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

E       Anil B. Dewan, B. Raghavan, Ms. Nina Gupta, Mrs. Vanita Bhargav
    and Ms. Bina Gupta for the Petitioners.

           N. N. Goswami, S.W.A. Qadri and B.V. Bairam Das for the Respondents.

          Arun Kathpalia, Amit Dhupar, Anant Kumar and Pradeep K. Baskhi
F   for Intervenor.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          Y.K. SABHARWAL, J. In this petition filed under Article 32 of the
    Constitution of India challenge is to the constitutionality of paragraph 80(2)
G   of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. The effect of the impugned
    paragraph is that the employees of newspaper industry, for the purposes of
    provident fund scheme, do not fall in the category of excluded employees
    despite their pay being above prescribed amount as notified by Government
    of India from time to time.

H          In order to appreciate the question involved, it is necessary to examine
      EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL., J.]l} 03

     certain provisiorts of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous           A
     Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, 'the PF Act').

             The PF Act was passed by the Parliament in the year 1952 to, inter
      alia, provide for the institution of provident fund for employees in factories
      and other establishments. Sub-section (3) of Section 1, inter alia, provides
      that the Act applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any    B
      industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty or more persons are
     employed and to any other establishment employing twenty or more persons
     or class of such establishments which the Central Government may, by
     notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. The expression
     "basic wages" is defined in Section 2(b) and the expression "scheme" in           C
     Section 2(1). 'Scheme' means the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme framed
     under Section 5 of the PF Act. The Central Government has been empowered
     to add to Schedule-I any other industry in respect of the employees whereof
     it is of opinion that a provident fund scheme should be framed under the Act
     and thereupon the industry so added shall be deemed to be an industry specified
     in Schedule I for the purposes of the Act. Section 5, inter a/ia, provides that   D
     the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, frame
     a Scheme to be called the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme for the
     establishment of provident funds under the Act for employees or for any
     class of employees and specify the establishments or class of establishments
                                                                                       E

--
     to which the said Scheme shall apply and there shall be established as soon
     as may be after the framing of the Scheme, a Fund in accordance with the
     provisions of the Act and the Scheme.

            In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the PF Act, the
     Central Government framed the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952
     (for short, 'the Scheme'). The employees to whom the provisions of the            F
     Scheme and the Act would not apply are defined as "excluded employee" in
     paragraph 2(f) of the Scheme. The said paragraph to the extent relevant for
     present purposes reads as under :

          "2(f) 'excluded employee' means -

            (i) ...
                                                                                       G

             (ii) an employee whose pay at the time he is otherwise entitled to
                  become a member of the Fund, exceeds six thousand and five
                  hundred rupees per month;

                  Explanation. - 'Pay' includes basic wages with dearness              H
    1104                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A                  allowance, retaining allowance (if any) and cash value of food
                   concessions admissible thereon;

           The income ceiling mentioned in paragraph 2(f)(ii) has been substituted
    and suitably increased from time to time by issue of notification by the
    Central Government having regard to the fall in money value and increase in
B   wages. The ceiling of Rs. 6,500 per month· was fixed by notification dated
    4th May, 2001 w.e.f. 1st June, 2001. Earlier to 1st June, 2001, it was Rs.5,000
    per month. Originally, an employee whose pay exceeded Rs.300 per month
    was placed into the category of an 'excluded employee'. In 1957, the pay
    ceiling was increased to Rs. 500 per month; in 1962, it was increased from
C   Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,000; in 1976, it was increased from 1,000/- to Rs. l,600; in
    1985, it was increased from 1,600 to Rs. 2,500; in 1990, it was increased
    from Rs. 2,500 to Rs. J,500, in 1994, it was increased from Rs. 3,500 to Rs.
    5,000; and lastly to Rs. 6,500 in the year 200 I.

           In so far as the employees of the newspaper industries are concerned,
D they have not been included in the category of 'excluded employee' for the
    last more than 47 years. By notification dated 4th December, 1956 issued by
    the Central Government, Chapter X was inserted in the scheme incorporating
    therein special provisions in the case of newspaper establishments and
    newspaper employees. Paragraph 80 thereof, substituted the definition of
    expression 'excluded employee' in relation to its application to newspaper
E   establishments and newspaper employees. The relevant part of Paragraph 80
    reads as follows :

            "80. Special provisions in the case of newspaper establishment
            and employees. The Scheme shall, in its application to newspaper
            establishments and newspaper employees, as defined in Section 2 of
F           the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous
            Provisions Act, 1955, come into force on the 31st day of December,
            1956 and be subject to the modifications mentioned below:

             (I) In Chapters I to IX, references to 'industry', 'factories' and
                 'employees' shall be construed as references to 'newspaper
G                industry', 'newspaper establishments' and 'newspaper
                 employees', respectively:
             (2) 'excluded employee' means, -
             (i)   an employee who, having been a member of the Fund, has
                   withdrawn the full amount of his accumulations in the Fund
H
     EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL, J.]l J05

                 under clause (a) or (c) of sub-paragraph (I) of paragraph 69;          A

.           (ii) an apprentice .
                 Explanation. - 'Apprentice' means a person who, according to
                 the standing orders applicable to the newspaper establishment
                 concerned, is an apprentice or who is declared to be an apprentice
                 by the authority specified in this behalf by the appropriate           B
                 Government."

          The aforesaid paragraph came into force on 31st December, 1956.
    Therefore, since the said date, instead of paragraph 2(f), the employees of the
                                                                                        C
-   newspaper establishments have a separate and distinct definition. The effect
    of definition as contained in the impugned paragraph 80(2) is that since
    I 956, the income ceiling has not been applied to the employees of newspaper
    establishments. The result is that newspaper establishments and newspaper
    employees do not come in the category of 'excluded employee'. In other
    words, irrespective of pay, all such employees are entitled to the benefit of
    the scheme.                                                                         D
          The main attack of the petitioners to the constitutional validity of
    Paragraph 80(2) is that only in case of employees of newspaper industry, the
    test of income has been excluded by keeping the newspaper establishments
    and employees as a class apart which is wholly discriminatory. There is no
    rationale or valid basis for artificially treating newspaper establishments and     E
    employees as a distinct class so as to make them ineligible on the basis of
    income ceiling. The impugned definition of 'excluded employee' in paragraph
    80(2) suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and offends Article 14 of the
    Constitution of India apart from imposing a serious financial burden only on
    newspaper establishments. According to the petitioners, there is no valid
                                                                                        F
    basis to single out newspaper establishments for additional burden.

          The petitioners have tried to explain that though the impugned provision
    came into effect in 1956, they tried to bear the burden with equanimity and
    with a certain sense of rectitude but, with passage of years, there has been
    severe setback to the newspaper industry in general and the petitioners'            G
    organization in particular and, therefore, this challenge at this stage. In this
    regard, it has been pointed out that the recent trends have witnessed a recession
    of several financial crises in newspaper industry as a result of decline in their
    revenue from advertisements because of diversion of advertisements to
    electronic media. The inroads made by Television is said to have taken the
    sheen off the print media. In any case, delay in such matters, when                 H
    1106 .                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2004] 2 S.C.R.

A constitutional validity is in issue, cannot be of any consequences, is the
    submission of Anil Dewan, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners. It
    has been further submitted that the mere fact that other newspaper
    organizations have not challenged the impugned provision is also of no
    consequence.

B         In order to appreciate the challenge in question, it is also necessary to
    examine certain provisions of the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper
    Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955
    (for short, 'the Working Journalists Act').

           The Working Journalists Act was enacted to regulate certain conditions
C   of service of working Journalists and other persons employed in the newspaper
    establishments. "Newspaper Employee" means any working journalist, and
    includes any other person employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any
    newspaper establishment [Sec.2(c)]. The expression 'newspaper establishment'
    is defined in Section 2(d). The expression 'non-journalist newspaper employee'
D   is defined in Section 2(dd). The working journalists and those who are not
    journalists but are employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any newspaper
    establishment, are newspaper employees. Chapter II of the Working Journalists
    Act, inter alia, deals with conditions of service of working journalists,
    incorporating therein special provisions in respect of certain cases of
    retrenchment, payment of.gratuity, hours of work, leave, fixation or revision
E   of rates of wages, constitution of a Wage Board, Tribunal etc. Chapter IIA,
    inter alia, provides for fixation or revision of rates of wages of non-journalist
    newspaper employees, constitution of Wage Board for fixing or revising their
    rates of wages, constitution of Tribunal etc. Section 15 of the Working
    Journalists Act, inter alia, stipulates that the PF Act, ;:is in force for the time
p   being, shall apply to every newspaper establishment in which twenty or more
    persons are employed on any day, as if such newspaper establishment were
    a factory to which the aforesaid Act had been applied by a notification of the
    Central Government under sub-section (3) of Section l thereof, and as if a
    newspaper employee were an employee within the meaning of that Act. The
    applicability_ of the PF Act to the employees of the newspaper establishments
G   is not in issue. The issue here is about not subjecting the employees of the
    newspaper establishments to income ceiling whereas employees of all other
    establishments and industries to which the PF Act is applicable, are subjected
    to income ceiling.

          The Constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Working
H
     EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL . .l.]1107

     Journalists Act was examined in the celebrated decision of the Constitution   A
     Bench in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. and Anr. v. The Union of India
     and Ors., [1959] SCR 12, and one of the questions was about violation of
     equality clause. We will revert to the said decision a little later.

             The contention is that the impugned provision which applies exclusively
     to the employees of newspaper industry suffers from the vice of arbitrariness B

-    because there is no rational or distinctive basis for culling out a separate class
     called "newspaper establishment and newspaper employees" and to provide
     for a harsher and more financially crippling measure by providing a special
     definition thereby totally eliminating the income test. There is no valid

-    classification to split the employers into newspaper organizations and non- C
     newspaper organizations for different and discriminatory treatment in the
     matter of Provident Fund Contribution. It has also been contended that as a
     matter of fact the extent of financial power available to newspaper industry
     is much less than many other industries like Steel, Heavy Engineering and
     other cash rich industries and if, at all, there is a case for providing a lesser
     burden it is newspaper industry which deserves it as a class. Instead of that, D
     a heavy burden has been imposed upon a weaker section of the industries,
     viz., newspaper industry. The petitioners have also faintly suggested violation
     of right of freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under Article
      19(l)(a) contending that in view of additional burden, it becomes very difficult
     to maintain price line by keeping the price of the newspaper at certain level E
     without increasing it and even a marginal increase would affect the number
     of readers, particularly, in a country like India with a large number of
     economically weaker sections. This reduction in the access of newspapers to
     the members of the public is a matter that is fraught with serious consequences
     because it not merely affects the fundamental rights of the petitioners to
     disseminate the news freely but it also affects the right of the members of the F

--   public to know, which is the essence of democracy. The contention is that
     any action which has effect of increasing the price of newspaper has very
     serious ramifications. It is claimed that the effect of the impugned provision
      is to place additional financial burden which is hardly conducive to the
      furtherance of the freedom of press and there is no warrant for providing
     harsh· special impositions which are not applicable to other business G
      organizations. The continuation of such a definition year after year would
      result in petitioners' totally going out of business since the amount involved
      have become astronomical.

           The stand of the respondent in brief is that having regard to various    H
    1108                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2004] 2 S.CR.

A considerations concerning newspaper establishments, the Government has
    distinguished the said establishments from non-newspaper establishments.
    The impugned provision is a welfare legislation made for the welfare of the
    employees of the newspaper establishments so as to cover a wider range of
    employees and grant to them the benefit of the beneficial legislation. Such a
    legislation is in furtherance of the freedoi;n of press enshrined in Article
B   19(l)(a) of the Constitution oflndia. The Journalist and the rersons working
    in the newspaper establishments fonn as much integral part of freedom of
    press as the establishment itself and it is to promote and protect the journalist
    and other employees of newspaper establishments who also fonn the bed
                                                                                               -
    rock of freedom of spe~ch and expression that the benefit of Provident Fund
C   to even those who draw higher pay has been extended.

          Undoubtedly, the employees of the newspaper establishments are in a
    better position than the employees of other establishments and industries
    since the newspaper employees, without any income ceiling limit, are entitled
    to the benefits the PF Act and the Scheme. That has been the position for the
D   last nearly half a century. On the other hand, right since inception of the PF
    Act, the benefit of the Scheme has been denied to those employees who have
    more than specified income. The benefit has been extended to weaker sections
    of employees of other establishments and industries and not to all sections.
    The income ceiling has been .amended by notifications issued from time to
E   time as already noticed.

          The question for detennination also is whether this benefit given to the
    employees of newspaper industry in the year 1956 and continuing till date
    can be challenged at this stage after lapse of so many years by only one of
    the newspaper establishments in the country.
F          The principles under Article 14 of the Constitution are well settled. It
    is not necessary to burden this judgment with various decisions on the subject
    of arbitrariness and the classification, except to notice the principles laid In
    Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979] I SCC 381 as under:

            "(5) By the process of classification, the State has the power of
G
            determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of
            legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.
            This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some
            inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well-
            defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection ···-
H           on the ground that it has no application to other persons. ClassificatiQn
        EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL. J.D 109


---           thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation,
              usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates
              a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons
                                                                                            A


              and classes arbitrarily.

              (6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs
              and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can          B
              recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be
~-
              arbitrary, or evasive.

              (7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that
              is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics
              which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in          c
              others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have
              a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass
              the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the
              classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
              distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that
                                                                                            D
              differentia must have a rationa,l relation to the object sought to be
              achieved by the Act.

              (8) The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the
              object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there
              must be a nexus between them. In short, while Article 14 forbids
              class discrimination by conferring privileges a imposing liabilities
                                                                                            E
              upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons
              similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred
              or the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid
              classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification


--
'
              is not arbitrary in the sense above mentioned."

           We will now examine other cases on which reliance has been placed by
      Mr. Anil Dewan in support of challenge to the impugned provision.
                                                                                            F



             Motor General Traders and Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
      [1984) l sec 222:· has been relied in support of the contention that the mere         G
      fact that the discrimination is allowed to be continued for a long time is not
      a ground to dispel the attack and also that what may have been once a non-
      discriminatory piece of legislation, in course of time, can become
      discriminatory. Motor General Traders' case is a case under Rent Laws where
      challenge was to the constitutional validity of clause (b) of Section 32 of           H
    1110                   :UPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2004] 2 S.C.R.

A Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960
    which exempts all buildings constructed on and after 26th August, 1957 from
                                                                                    -
    the operation of the Act. The provision was enacted to provide an incentive
    to the house building activity to meet the shortage of accommodation and
    encourage new constructions. The effect of the impugned provision was that
    the Act was not to apply to any building constructed on and after 26th
B   August, 1957. Earlier, when the constitutionality of the said provision was
    questioned before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the ground that it
    violated Article 14 of the Constitution, the petition was dismissed by the
    High Court [Chintapalli Achaiah v. P. Gopalakrishna Reddy, AIR (1966) AP
    51] observing that the hardship caused to the tenants by the exemption given
C   in the case of buildings constructed after 26th August, 1957 was short-lived
    and the concession should be tolerated for a short while. This Court noticed
    that the exemption had continued for more than a quarter of a century and
    ~e landlords who earned their exemption under Section 32(b) had continued
    to enjoy for a long number of years the freedom to indulge in malpractices
    which the Act intended to check while others are governed by the Act.
D
          In view of Section 32(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Act, there were two
  sets of buildings in every area in which the Act applied (I) those to which
  the Act applied; and (2) those which are exempted under Section 32(b). It
  was noticed that the buildings to which the Act was applicable are aged more
E than 26 years and those to which it was not applicable are aged about 26
  years or less. During these 26 years from August 26, 1957, thousands of
  buildings may have been constructed and all of them are continuing to enjoy
  the immunity from the provisions of the Act. It was contended in that case
  that the result was that there were two class of landlords one class governed
  by the Act and the other not. There were also two class of tenants as well-
F one having the protection of the remedial provision of the Rent Act and the
  other not having such protection. The contention that was urged in support
  of challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 32 (b) was that whatever
  may have been the position in the first few years, after the Act was passed,
  there is no justification for continuing the exemption for all time to come. It
  was observed that the object of granting exemption was only to provide an
G incentive to the building activity and also that even the State Government
  was not quite satisfied with the existing law. The question of discrimination
  was determined having regard to these factors. The classification of buildings
  for purposes of Section 32(b) was held not to have satisfied the true tests of
  classification. It was observed that while it may be that there is some
                 for
H justification exempting new buildings say which are five, seven or ten
                                                                                    -
-    EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL. J.Jl J 11

    years old from the Act, in order to provide an incentive to builders of new
    buildings, there is hardly any justification to allow buildings which were
    constructed more than ten years ago to remain outside the scope of the Act.
                                                                                         A


    The landlords of such buildings, it was noticed, must have realized a large
    part of investment made on such buildings by way of rents during all these
    years. The Court took into account that owing to continuous influx of                B

-   population into urban areas in recent years the rates of rents have gone up
    everywhere and that the landlords of such buildings have been able to take
    advantage of the situation created by the shortage of urban housing
    accommodation which is now a universal phenomenon. Under these
    circumstances, it was held that there was no longer any need to continue the
    exemption. It was said that there cannot be any valid justification to apply the     C
    Act to a building which was 27 years old and not to apply it in the case of
    a building which is 26 years old. It was held that the classification of buildings
    into two classes for purposes of Section 32(b) of the Act, therefore, does not
    any longer bear any relationship to the object, since the buildings which are
    exempted have already come into existence and their owners have realised a
    major part of their investment.                                                      D
            In Motor General Traders' case, two answers were given to the
    contention that since the impugned provision has been in existence for over
    23 years and its validity has once been upheld by the High Court, this Court
    should not pronounce upon its validity at this late stage. First, the very fact      E
    that nearly 23 years are over from the date of enactment and the discrimination.
    is allowed to be continued unjustifiably for such a long time is a ground of
    attack pointing out that what should have been just an incentive has become
    a permanent bonanza in favour of those who constructed building subsequent
    to August 26, 1957; there being no justification for the continuance of the
    benefit to a class of persons without any rational basis whatsoever, the evil        F
    effects flowing from the impugned exemption have caused more harm to the
    society than one could anticipate. What was justifiable during a short period
    has turned out to be a case of hostile discrimination by lapse of nearly a
    quarter of century. The second answer given was that mere a lapse of time
    does not lend constitutionality to a provision which is otherwise bad.
                                                                                         G
          Rattan Arya and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., [1986] 3 SCC
    385 again is a decision in which a provision of the Rent Act exempting from


-   protection of the Act residential buildings paying monthly rent exceeding Rs.
    400 whereas no such restriction was imposed in respect of tenants of non-
    residential buildings was struck down being violative of Article 14, following       H
    I I I2
                                                                                       -
                            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A the Motor General Traders' case (supra).
          In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and
    Anr., [ 1998] 2 SCC I challenge was to the validity of certain provisions of
    the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 insofar
    the same provided that the landlords cannot charge rent in excess of the
B   standard rent. It was held that there is considerable judicial authority for the
    proposition that with the passage of time, a legislation which was justified
    when enacted may become arbitrary and unreasonable with the change of
    circumstances. A three Judge Bench said that :


c
             "It is true that whenever a special provision, like the Rent Control
             Act, is made for a section of the society it may be at the cost 'of
             another section, but the making of such a provision or enactment rriay
                                                                                       -
             be necessary in the larger interest of the society as a whole but the
             benefit which is given initially if continued results in increasing
             injustice to one section of the society and an unwarranted largess or
             windfall to another, without appropriate corresponding relief, then
D
             the continuation of such a law which necessarily, or most likely,
             leads to increase in lawlessness and undermines the authority of the
             law can no longer be regarded as being reasonable. Its continuance
             becomes arbitrary."
E          None of the aforesaid decisions, in our view, have any applicability to
    the case in hand for various reasons. The aforesaid decisions were concerned
    with validity of provisions which intended to grant only a temporary benefit
    having regard to the prevailing conditions but were continued for long number
    of years without review of change of conditions and as purpose had been
    achieved, the provisions were held to be violative of equality clause. Further,
F   after coming to the conclusion as above that the impugned provisions have
    become discriminatory, this Court rejected the contention that since the
    provisions had been unsuccessfully challenged earlier and held the field for
    a long time, the same do not deserve to be invalidated. In the present case
    it is not the contention that only temporary relief was granted to the employees
    of the newspaper industry. Apart from this, the employees of newspaper
G   industry have always been treated as a class apart, an aspect which we have
    dealt in later part of the judgment. Moreover, the mere fact that the similar
    benefit even after lapse of about half a century has not been given to the
    employees of other industries will not make the benefit given to the newspaper
    industry discriminatory. The principle that a provision which may be
H   constitutional when enacted may become unconstitutional later due to changed
      EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL. J.p 113

     scenario, has no applicability whatsoever to the present case.                      A
            Undoubtedly, the classification cannot be arbitrary. It has to be rational
     and must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. The
     classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia. There is no
     difficulty in accepting these principles relied upon by Mr. Dewan. The
     difficulties generally do not arise in formation of principles under Article 14.    B
--   But at times, difficulties do arise in the application of such principles to
     concrete cases.

            We may also notice the aspect of long delay in laying challenge to the
     validity of the impugned provisions. No hard and fast principle can be laid C
     down that under no circumstances delay would be a relevant consideration in
     judging constitutional validity of a provision. It has to be remembered that
     tQ.e constitutional remedy under Article 32 is discretionary. In one case, this
     Court ~ay decline discretionary relief if person aggrieved has slept over for
     long number of years. In another case, depending upon the nature of violation,
     court may ignore delay and pronounce upon the invalidity of a provision. It D
     will depend from case to case. In Rabindra Nath Bose and Ors. v. Union of
     India and Ors., [1970] 2 SCR 697, the extreme proposition that this court has
     no discretion and cannot dismiss a petition under Article 32 on the ground
     that it has been brought after inordinate delay, was not accepted by the
     Constitution Bench. The plea to reconsider law laid down in Mis. Ti/okchand
     and Motichand and Ors. v. HB. Munshi and Anr., [1969] 1 SCC 110 did not E
     succeed. It was held that:

            "But after carefully considering the matter, we are of the view that no
            relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable
            explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution        F
            after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given
            Original Jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the
            Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court
            would go into stale demands after a lapse of years.

            It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it    G
            does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution
            makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in
            petitions filed after inordinate delay."

          In Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar and Ors. v. The State ofMaharashtra
     and Ors., [1974] 1SCC317 on aspect of belated and stale claims, the Bench           H
    I I 14                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A said that it is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and
    proper exercise of discretion. In Tilokchand (supra) Chief Justice Hidayatullah
                                                                                      -
    pointed out that the question "is one of discretion for this Court to follow
    from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit... .. It
    will depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and remedy claimed
B   are and how the delay arose."

          In the present case, there is no satisfactory explanation for delay of
    over forty five years. The petition can be rejected by declining to exercise
    discretion in favour of petitioners only on this count. Further, as already
                                                                                      ---
    noticed, a provision though constitutional when enacted, may with passage of
C   time become unconstitutional, but the said principle has no applicability to
    the present case. The contention here is that the impugned provision was
    unconstitutional from its inception in the year 1956 since there was never any
    legal basis for classification of newspaper establishments as a separate class.
    We have, also examined hereafter this contention as well.

D         Mr. Dewan contends that newspaper industry cannot be singled out for
    harsh treatment. Reliance is placed upon observation made in Indian Express
    Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
   [ 1985] 1 sec 641 at 685 para 66 to the effect that levy of tax on newspaper
   industry should not be overburden on newspapers which constitute the Fourth
   Estate of the country which should not be singled out for harsh treatment.
E One of the questions that came to be considered was whether newspapers
   have immunity from taxation. Considering the earlier decisions, namely, Sakal
   Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. The Union of India, [1962] 3 SCR 842 and
   Bennett Coleman and Co. and Ors. V. Union ofIndia and Ors., [ 1972] 2 sec
   788, the first being concerned with the newspaper price page policy and in
F the second the challenge being to the newsprint policy imposed by the
   Government, it was held that none of these two decisions were concerned
   with the power of the Parliament to levy tax on any goods used by the
   newspaper industry. Holding that taxes have to be levied for the support of
   the Government and newspapers which derive benefit from the public
   expenditure cannot disclaim their liability to contribute a fair and reasonable
G amount to the public exchequer, the above observations were made about not
   singling out newspaper industries for harsh treatment. It was further observed
   that a wise administrator should realize that the imposition of a tax like the
   customs duty on newsprint is an imposition of knowledge and would virtually
   amount to a burden imposed on a man for being literate and for being conscious
H. of his duty as a citizen to inform himself about the world around him. It was
       EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL, J.]1115

      further said that the fundamental principle involved was the people's right to A
      know. Freedom of speech and expression should, therefore, receive a generous
      support from all those who believe in the participation of people in the
      administration. It is on account of this special interest which society has irt
      the freedom of speech and expression that the approach of the Government
      should be more cautious while levying taxes on matters concerning newspaper B


-     industry than while levying taxes on others. This Court held that while the
      contention that no tax can be levied on newspaper industry cannot be accepted,
      it had to be held that any such levy is subject to review by courts in the light
      of the provisions of the Constitution. The observations in the judgment were


---   pressed into service in support of the contention that freedom of speech and
      expression would be adversely affected by continuing the definition of C
      'excluded employee' in respect of the newspaper industry which has been
      singled out for harsh treatment. As· can be seen from above, observations
      have been made in a different context. In any case, the decision, far from
      supporting the contention of the petitioners, in fact, to an extent lends support
      to the benefit that was given to the employees of the newspaper industry in
      the year 1956 as a result of the impugned provision. It has to be remembered D
      that in spreading information, the employees of newspapers industry play
      dominant· role and considering the employees of newspaper industry as a
       'class', this benefit was extended almost at the same time when the Working
       Journalist Act was enacted. Thus, there can be no question of any adverse
       effect on the freedom of press. The financial burden on employer, on facts E
       as herein, cannot be said to be a 'harsh treatment'. The contention that now
       the petitioners are unable to bear the financial burden which they have been
       bearing for the last over forty five years is wholly irrelevant. It is for petitioners
       to manage their affairs if they intend to continue with their activity as
       newspaper establishment.


-            In Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. and Anr. v. The Union of India
      and Ors., [ 1959] SCR 12, the question as to the vires of the Working Journalists
      (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 came up for
                                                                                           F


      consideration. Tracing the history of the events which led to the enactment
      of the said Act, it was noticed that newspaper industry in India did not
      originally start as an industry but started as individual newspapers founded        G
      by leaders in national, political, social and economic fields. During the last
      half a century, however, it developed characteristics of a profit making industry
      in which big industrialists invested money and combined controlling several
      newspapers all over the country also became the special feature of this
      development. The working journalists except for the comparatively large             H
A
    1116                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2004] 2 S.C.R.

    number that were found concentrated in the big metropolitan cities, were
    scattered all over the country and for the last ten years and more agitated that
                                                                                        --
    some means should be found by which those working in the newspaper
    industry were able to have their wages and salaries, their dearness allowance
    and other allowances, their retirement benefits, their rules of leave and
B   conditions of service, enquired into by some impartial agency or authority,
    who would be empowered to fix just and reasonable terms and conditions of
    service for working journalists as a whole. The Government of India appointed
    a Press Commission to, inter alia, enquire into the state of press in India, its
    present and future lines of development and in particular to examine the

C
    method of recruitment, training, scales of remuneration, benefits and other
    conditions of employment of working journalists, settlement of disputes
    affecting them and factors which influence the establishment and maintenance
                                                                                        -
    of high professional standards. The commission also considered that there
    should be certain minimum wage paid to a journalist. The possible impact of
    such a minimum wage was also considered by it and it was considered not
    unlikely that the fixation of such a minimum wage may make it impossible
D   for small papers to continue to exist as such but it thought that if a newspaper
    could not afford to pay the minimum wage to the employee which would
    enable him to live decently and with dignity, that newspaper had no business
    to exist." It also considered the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act to
    the Working Journalists and came to the conclusion that the working journalists
E   did not come within the definition of workman as it stood at that time in the
    Industrial Disputes Act nor could a question with regard to them be raised by
    others who were admittedly governed by the Act. It, therefore, considered the
    question as to t~e tenure of appointment and the minimum period of notice
    for termination of the employment of the working journalists, .hours of work,
    provision for leave, retirement benefits and gratuity, made certain
F   recommendations and suggested legislation for the regulation of the newspaper
    industry which should embody its recommendations with regard to notice
    period, bonus, minimum wages, Sunday rest, leave and provident fund and
    gratuity. Almost immediately after the report of the Press Commission,
                                                                                        -
    Parliament passed the Working Journalists (Industrial Disputes) Act, 1955 (I
G   of 1955). It was an Act to apply the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the
    working journalists. The application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to
    the working journalist was not, however, deemed sufficient to meet the
    requirements of the situation. There was considerable hesitation in Parliament
    for the implementation of the recommendations of the Press Commission.
    Ultimately, the Government introduced a Bill on 30th November, 1955 in
H   Rajya Sabha being Bill No.13 of 1955. It was a Bill to regulate conditions
      EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL. 1.Jl 117

     of service of working journalists and other persons employed in newspaper A
     establishments. The recommendations of the Press Commission in regard to
     the minimum wages and other aspects, above noticed, was left to the Minimum
     Wages Board to be constituted for the purpose by the Centrai Government.
     Finally, the Working Journalist (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous
     Provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955) was passed and rer.eived the assent of the B

-,   President on 20th December, 1955. The Act was challenged on the ground
     that it violates the fundamental right under Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution
     guaranteeing to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression.
     Pointing out that the regulations of the conditions of service is the main

-    object which is sought to be achieved by the impugned Act, it was considered
     that if a general law in regard to industrial or labour relation had been applied C
     to press industry as a whole, no exception could have been taken to it.
     Further, ifthe matter had rested with the application of the Industrial Disputes
     Act, 1947 to the working journalist or with the application of the Industrial
     Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 or the Employees' Provident Fund
     Act, 1952 to them, no exception could have been taken to this mt:asure. The
     contention urged was that apart from application of these general laws to the D
     working journalists, there are provisions enacted in the impugned Act in
     relation to payments of gratuity, hours of work, leave and fixation of the
     rates of wages which are absolutely special to the press industry qua the
     working journalists and they have the effect of singling out the press industry
     by creating a class "of privileged workers with benefits and rights which have E
     not been conferred upon other employees and the provisions contained therein
     have the effect of laying a direct and preferential burden on the press, have
     a tendency to curtail the circulation and thereby narrow the scope of
     dissemination of information, fetter the petitioners' freedom to choose the
     means of exercising their right and are likely to undermine the independence
     of the press by having to seek Government aid.                                    F
            This Court noticed that the journalist are but the vocal organs and the
     necessary agencies for the exercise of the right of free speech and expression
     and any legislation directed towards·the amelioration of their conditions of
     service must necessarily affect the newspaper establishments and have its        G
     repercussions on the freedom of press. The impugned Act can, therefore, be
     legitimately characterized as a measure which affects the press and if the
     intention or the proximate effect and operation of the Act was such as to
     bring it within the mischief of Article 19(1)(a), it would certainly be liable
     to be struck down. The real difficulty, however, in the way of the petitioners
     is that whatever be the measures enacted for the benefit Of the working          H
    1118                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A journalists neither the intention nor the effect and operation of the impugned
    Act is to take away or abridge the right of freedom of speech and expression
    enjoyed by the petitioners. The question of violation of right of freed~m of
    speech and expression as guaranteed under Article 19(1 )(a) in the present
    case on account of additional burden as a result of impugned provision does
    not arise.
B
          An attack was also made in the said case to the constitutional validity
    of the Act on the ground that it selected the working journalists for favoured
    treatment by giving them additional benefits which other.persons in similar

C
    or comparable employment had not got and in providing for the fixation of
    their salaries without following the normal procedure envisaged in the
    Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The following propositions were advanced :

           "1. In selecting the Press industry employers from a)l industrial
                                                                                     -
           employers governed by the ordinary law regulating industrial relations
           under the Industrial Disputes Act, 19~, and Act I of 1955, the
D          impugned Actsubjects the Press industry employers to discriminatory
           treatment.

           2. Such discrimination lies in

           (a) singling out newspaper employees for differential treatment;

E          (b) saddling them with a new burden in regard to a section of their
           workers in matters of gratuities, compensation, hours of work and
           wages;

           (c) devising a machinery in the form of a Pay Commission for fixing
           the wages of working journalists;
F
           (d) not prescribing the major criterion of capacity to pay to be taken
           into consideration;

           (e) allowing the Board in fixing the wages to adopt any arbitrary
           procedure even violating the principle of audi alteram partem;
G          (f) permitting the Board the discretion to operate the procedure of the
           Industrial Disputes Act for some newspapers and any arbitrary
           procedure for others;

           (g) making the decision binding only on the employers and not on the
H          employees, and
               EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. 1·. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL. J.]1119

-                     (h) providing for the recovery of money due from the employers in
                      the same manner as an arrear of land reven"'.le.
                                                                                                 A

                      3. The classification made by the impugned Act is arbitrary and
                      unreasonable, in so far as it removes the newspaper employers vis-a-
                      vis working journalists from the general operation of the Industrial .
                      Disputes Act, 1947, and Act I of 1955."                                B
..,..__.   /
                     The aforesaid propositions were considered in the light of the principles
               laid down in various decision on the aspect of Article 14. The well established
               principle to be always borne in mind is that while Article 14 forbids class

-              legislation, it does not forbids reasonable classification. In Budhan Chaudhry
               and Ors. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045 Das, J. (as His Lordship then
               was) speaking for the court said:
                                                                                                 C

                      "The provisions of article 14 of the Constitution have come up for
                      discussion before this Court in a number of cases, namely, Chiranjit
                      Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India, [1950] SCR 869, The State of D
                      Bombay v. F.N Ba/sara, [1951] SCR 682, The State of West Bengal
                      v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284, Kathi Raning Rawat v. The
                      State ofSaurashtra, [1952] SCR 435, Lachmandas Kewalaram Ahuja
                      v. The State of Bombay, [1952] SCR 710, Quasim Razvi v. The State
                      of Hyderabad, [1953] SCR 581, and Habeeb Mohamad v. The State
                      of Hyderabad, [1953] SCR 661. It is, therefore, not necessary to enter E
                      upon any lengthy discussion as to the meaning, scope and effect of
                      the article in question. It is now well-established that while article 14
                      forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification
                      for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of
                      permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,
                      (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia F
                      which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from
                      others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a
                      rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in
                      question. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely,
                      geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What G
                      is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of
                      classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also
                      well-established by the decisions of this Court that article 14 condemns
                      discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of
                      procedure."
                                                                                                 H
    1120                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2004) 2 S.C.R.

A         In the light of the aforesaid principles, in Express Ne'wspapers (supra)
    the Court considered whether the Act impugned therein violated the
                                                                                        -
    fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14. It was observed that in framing
    the scheme, various circumstances peculiar to the press had to be taken into
    consideration. These considerations weighed with the Press Commission in
    recommending special treatment for working journalists in the matter of
B   amelioration of their conditions of service. The position as prevailing in other
    countries was also noticed. In nutshell, the working journalists were held as
    a group by themselves and could be classified as such. If the Legislature
    embarked upon a legisla~ion for the purpose of ameliorating their conditions
                                                                                        -
    of service, there was nothing discriminatory about it. They could be singled
C   out for preferential treatment. It was opined that classification of this type
    could not come within the ban of Article 14. Considering the position in
    regard to the alleged discrimination between press industry employers on one
    hand and the other industrial employers on the other, it was said that even
    considering the Act as a measure of social welfare legislation, the State could
    only make a beginning somewhere without embarking on similar legislations
D   in relation to all other industries and if that was done in this case no charge
    could be levelled against the State that it was discriminating against one
    industry as compared with the others. The classification could well be founded
    on geographical basis or be according to objects or occupations or the like:
    The only question for consideration would be whether there was a nexus
E   between the basis of classification and the object of the Act sought to be
    achieved. Both the conditions of permissible classification were fulfilled. The
    classification was held to be based on an intelligible differentia which had a
    rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, viz., the amelioration of
    the conditions of service of working journalists. The attack on constitutionality
    of the Act based on Article 14 was negatived.
F
            Though challenge in the aforesaid case was to special treatment to
    working journalists but what is to be seen is, that the press industry was held
    to be a class by itself. The definition of 'newspaper employee' takes into its
    fold all the employees who are employed to do any work in, or relation to,
                                                                    I
G   any newspaper establishment. The decision in Express Newspaper's case
    amply answers the main contention about the Press Industry having been
    singled out, against the petitioners. This decision also holds that to provide
    social welfare legislation and grant benefit, a beginning had to be made
    somewhere without embarking on similar legislation in relation to other .
    industries. The fact that even after about half a century similar benefit has not
H   been extended to the employees of any other industry, will not result in
 EXPRESS PUBLICATIONS (MADURAI) LTD. v. U.0.1. [SABHARWAL. J.]1121

invalidation of benefit given to employees of press industry. It is not for us      A
to decide when, if at all, to extend the benefit to others. In view of aforesaid,
we are unable to accept the contention that the impugned provision is violative
of Article 14 on the ground that it singles out newspaper industry by excluding
income test only in regard to the said industry.

      Apart from the fact that it may not be always possible to grant to            B
everyone all benefits in one go at the same time, it seems that the impugned
provision and the enacting of the Working Journalists Act was part of a
package deal and that probably is the reason for other newspaper
establishments not challenging it and petitioners also challenging it only after
lapse of so many years. Further Section 2(i), 4 and Schedule I of Provident         C
Fund Act shows how gradually the scope of the Act has been expanded by
the Central Government and the Act and Scheme made applicable to various
branches of industries. From whatever angle we may examine, the attack on
the constitutional validity based on Article 14 cannot be accepted.

      In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in the contentions      D
urged on behalf of the petitioners. The petition is accordingly dismissed.

v.s.s.                                                       Petition dismissed.