Holding

The Court held that strict statutory compliance is essential, but defects in verification or affidavit are not fatal if remedied, photocopies duly attested satisfy Section 81(3), annexures integral to the petition must meet the same requirements, and amendments under Section 86(5) are limited to clarifying already‑alleged corrupt practices.

Summary

In the 1989 Mizoram Assembly elections, fifteen unsuccessful MNF candidates filed election petitions alleging corrupt practices by the elected Congress(I) candidates. The High Court rejected preliminary objections, allowed certain amendments, and struck out vague paragraphs, prompting the returned candidates to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether non‑compliance with Sections 81 and 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the attendant Rules, and the requirement of Form 25 affidavits rendered the petitions void. It held that photocopies attested as true copies satisfy Section 81(3), that defects in verification or affidavit are not fatal if cured, and that annexures integral to the petition must meet the same statutory standards. The Court also clarified the limited scope of amendment under Section 86(5). Consequently, the appeals were partly allowed, the High Court’s orders were modified to reflect the correct legal position, and directions were issued to cure procedural defects.

Issues considered

The election petitions were not in conformity with the requirements of Sections 81 and 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Rules framed thereunder.
Whether Rule 1 and related rules enabling filing before the Stamp Reporter were ultra vires Article 329 of the Constitution and Section 169 read with Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the Act.
Whether photocopies of the petitions, without a specific attestation form, satisfy the statutory requirement of a ‘true copy’ under Section 81(3).
Whether the lack of a proper verification clause and non‑compliance with Form 25 affidavit requirements under Section 83 render the petitions dismissible under Section 86(1).
Whether annexures and schedules constitute an integral part of the petition and must comply with Section 81(3) and Section 83(2).
The permissible scope of amendment of particulars of corrupt practice under Section 86(5).

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VI Rule 15
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961s. Form 25, s. Rule 94A, s. Rule 95-A
Constitution of Indias. Article 329, s. Section 169
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 117, s. 80, s. 81, s. 82, s. 83, s. 86

Subjects

election petitioncorrupt practiceverificationaffidavitRepresentation of the People ActSection 81Section 83Section 86photocopyamendmenthigh court

Judgment

A F.A. SAPA ETC. ETC.
v.
SINGORA AND ORS. ETC.

MAY 10, 1991

B [A.M. AHMADI, V. RAMASWAMI AND M. FATHIMA
BEEVI JJ.]

The Representation of the People Act, 1951-Sections 80, BOA,
81, 82, 83, 86 read with Rules 94, 95-A and Form 25 of the Representa-
tion of the People's Rules, 1951-Presentation of"Eledion Petition-
c Contents of-Trial Court's duty to '·ee whether complied with the statu-
tory requirements-Proper attestation and verification-Necessity of.
.-t·
The Representation of the People Act, 1951-Section 83-Safe-
guards against allegation of corrupt practices-Legislative intention
explained.
D
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908--0rder VI, Rule, 15 read with
Section 83, the Representation of the People's Act, 1951-Verification
of election petition-Application of C'Jde.

The Representation of the People Act, 1951-Chapter 11-
E Title-"Presentation of Election Petitions to Election Commission"-
Held requires amendment.

The respondents, who lost the State Assembly elections as candi-
dates of the Mezo National Front(MNF) from different constituencies of
Mizoram, challenged the election of the Congress (I) candidates on the
F ground of corrupt practices in the High Court.

The appellants-the returned candidates raised certain preliminary
objections regarding the maintainability of each petition. On the basis
thereof two preliminary issues were raised for consideration. The appel-
lants moved for striking off the pleadings. Thereupon, the original peti-
G tioners-the respondents applied for amendment of their election peti-
tions which was strongly opposed hy the appellants. The preliminary
objections, the applications for striking off the pleadings and the ,.. _
amendment applications were heard together.

The two preliminary issues raised were (i) whether the election
H petitions were in confirmity wi!h the requirements of Sections 81 and 83

752
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA 753

of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 and the Rules framed
A
thereunder by the High Court and (ii) whether rule 1 and the other
related rules and notes thereto enabling the filing of the Election Petition
before the Stamp Reporter assigned to the election court by the Chief
Justice were ultra vires Article 329 of the Constitution and Section 169
read with Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the R.P. Act.
B
The appellants contended that the election petitions being photo
copies, could not be treated as election petitions as contemplated by
law; that the copies of petitions served on them were not attested to be
true copies of the original petitions as required by Section 81(3); that
the election petitions were not signed and verified in the manner laid
down by the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as the source of infor-
mation bad not been disclosed In the verification or in the affidavit in c
Form 25 as required by rule 94A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961
(the Rules); that no schedule of material particulars of corrupt practice
had been annexed to the affidavit purporting to be under Form 25, and
that the presentation of the election petitions before the Stamp Reporter
was inconsistent with Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the R.P. Act and D
Article 329 of the Constitution.

The averments in each election petition were identical.

The High Court rejected the preliminary objections and partly
allowed the applications for striking off the averments in the election E
petitions and partly permitted certain amendments to the election peti-
tions, against which order the present appeals are filed in this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The returned candidate-the appellant contended that paragraph 3
of the election petition was the most crucial paragraph inasmuch as__i_t F
disclosed the names of towns and villages as well as the period during
which the alleged corrupt practices were committed had been deli-
berately omitted from the verification clause and the affidavit; that
failure to mention paragraph 3 of the election petition in both the verifi-
cation clause of the petition ·and the affidavit was fatal and cannot be
cured after the expiry of the limitation period of 45 days; that the G
affidavit was not in Form No. 25 prescribed under Rule 94A of the
Rules and since Section 83 of the R.P. Act is mandatory and failure to
adhere to Form No. 25 was fatal, as the doctrine of substantial comp-
liance bad no place in election law but even if that doctrine could be
invoked, the respondent failed to make substantial compliance; that the
election petitions being photocopies could not be entertained as valid H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 2 S.C.R.

election petitions; that copies of the election jietitions served on the
A
returned candidates were not attested as true copies of the priginal as
required by Section 81(3); that the election petitions and the schedule
and annexures were not signed and verified as required by the Code;
_,,, ..
that an election dispute founded on the allegation of corrupt practice
being quasi-criminal in nature calls for strict adherence to the require- ·
B ments of election law as was evident from Section 86(1) of R.P. Act
which provided for dismissal of an election petition which failed to
comply with the requirements of Sections 81, 82 or 117 of the statute;
and that if the Code did not apply to Mizoram, it applied to an election
petition because section 83(1)(c) obligates that an election petition 'shall
be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the
>-
Code for the verification of pleadings'.
c
This Court partly allowing the appeals,

HELD: 1. Our election law being statutory in character must be
strictly complied with since an election petition is not guided by ever
D changing common law principles of justice and notions of equity. Being
statutory in character it is essential that it must conform to the require- ~
ments of our election law. But at the same time the purity of election
process must be maintained at all costs and those who violate the statu-
tory norms must suffer for such violation. If the returned candidate is
shown to have secured his success at the election by corrupt means he
E must suffer for his misdeeds. [772 B-D]

2. A charge of corrupt practice has a two dimensional effect; its
impact on the returned candidate has to be viewed from the point of
view of the candidate's future political and public life and from the
..
point of view of the electorate to ensure the purity of the election pro-
F cess. There can, therefore, be no doubt that such an allegation involving
corrupt practice must be viewed very seriously and the High Court
shoul:' ensure compliance with the requirements of Section 83 before
the~wesgototrial. [7830-EJ

3. What is essential is that the petitioner must take the responsi- ,.._,
G bility of the copy being a true copy of the original petition and sign in
token thereof. No particular form of attestation is prescribed; all that
the sub-section enjoins is that the petitioner must attest the copy under
his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. By certifying the
same as true copy and by putting his signature at the foot thereof, the
petitioner of each election petition had clearly complied with the letter
H and spirit of section 81(3) of the R.P. Act. [786A-B]
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA 755:

4. Section 86(1) mandates that the High Court 'shall' dismiss an
election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 A
_)"{ __ or Section 82 or Section 117 of the R.P. Act. The language of this
.,.._ sub-section is quite imperative and commands the High Court, in no
uncertain terms, to dismiss an election petition which does not comply
with the requirements of section 8Ior section 82. [773B-D]
B
S. Election of a returned candidate can be rendered void on proof
of the alleged corrupt practice. In addition thereto be wonld incur a
subsequent disqualification also. This harshness is·essential if we want
onr democratic process to be clean, free and fair. Eradication of cor-
rupt practice from onr democratic process is essential if we want it to
thrive and remain healthy. Our democratic process will collapse if
r
unhealthy corrupt practices like appeals to voters on basis of caste,
creed, commnnity religion, race, language, etc., are allowed to go
nncbecked and unpunished. Use of corrnpt practices in elections to
secnre short term gains at the cost of purity of onr democratic process
must be frowned at by every right thinking citizen~ [773D-F]
D
6. It is for that reason that the law bas provided for double
jeopardy to deter candidates, their agents and others from indnlging in
sncb nefarions practices. Bnt while there is snfficient jnstification for
the law to be harsh with those who indulge in such practkes, there is also the
need to ensure that such allegations are made with a sence of responsi-
bility and concern and not merely to vex the returned candidate. It is with E
this in view that the law envisages that the particnlars of sncb allega-
tions shall be set out fully disclosing the name of the party responsible
• for the same and the date and place of its commission. A simple verifica-
tion was considered insufficient and, therefore, the need for an affidavit
in the prescribed form. These procednral precantions are intended to
ensure that the person making the allegation of corrupt practice realises F
the serionsness thereof as such a charge would be akin to a criminal
charge since it visits the party indulging in such practice with a two-fold
penalty. [773E-H]

7. If full particulars of an alleged corrupt practice are not sup-
plied, the proper course would be to give an opportunity to the G
petitioner to cnre the defect and if be fails to avail of that opportnnity
that part oftbe charge may be struck down. [77SF-G]

8. Once the amendment sought falls within the purview of :iection
86(5), the High Court sbonld be liberal in allowing the same unless, in
the facts and circnmstances of the case, the Conrt finds it unjust and H
756 SUPREME COLRT REPORTS I 1991] 2 S.C.R.

prejudicial to the opposite party to allow the same. Such prejudice
A
must, however, he distinguished from mere incouvenience. [77SG-H]

9. The power conferred by section 86(5) cannot he exercised to -"'
allow any amendment which will have the effect of introducing a cor-
rupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. If it is found that the
B proposed amendments are not in the nature of supplying particulars
but raise new grounds, the same must he rejected but if the amend-
ments are sought for removing vagueness by confining the allegations to
the returned candidate only such an amendment would fall within the
parameters of section 86(5) of the R.P. Act. [7898-D] J_

10. Clause(c) of sub-section (I) of section 83 provides that an
c election petition shall he signed by the petitioner and verified in the
manner laid down by the Code for the verification of the pleadings.
Under section 83(2) any schedule or annexure to the pleading must he
similarly verified. Order 6 Rule 15 is the relevant provision in the Code.
Sub-rule (2) of Rule IS says that the person verifying shall specify with
D reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies
on his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received
and believed to he true. The verification must he signed by the person
making it and must state the date on and the place at which it was
signed. The defect in the verification can be (i) of a formal nature
and not very substantial (ii) one which substantially complies with
E the requirements and (iii) that which is material but capable of being
cured. [776A-C]

11. The object of requiring verification of an election petition is
clearly to fiJ the responsibility for the averments and allegations in the
petition on the person signing the verification and at the same time dis-
F couraging wild and irresporu.ible allegations unsupported by facts. [776C-D]

12. In cases where corrupt practice is alleged in the petition, the
petition shall also he supported by an affidavit in the prescribed form,
i.e., Form No. 25 prescribed by Rule 94Aofthe Rules. [7760-E]

.G 13. While defective verification or a defective affidavit may not
be fatal, the High Court should ensure its compliance before the parties
go to trial so that the party required to meet the charge is not taken by
surprise at the actual trial. [783E-F]

14. The charge of corrupt practice has to he proved beyond
H reasonable doubt and not merely by preponderance of probabilities.
P.A. SAPA v. SJNGORA 757

Miegation of corrupt practice being quasi-criminal in nature, the
failure to supply full particulars at the earliest point of time and to
A
disclose the source of information promptly may have an adverse bear-
)".
..... ing on the probative value to be attached to the evidence tendered in
proof thereof at the trial. Therefore, even though ordinarily a defective
verification can be cured and the failure to disclose the grounds or
sources of information may not be fatal, failure to place them on record' B
with promptitude may lead the court in a given case to doubt the vera-
city of the evidence ultimately tendered. H, however, the affidavit of the
schedule or annexure forms an integral •part of the election petition
~ itself, strict compliance would be insisted upon. [783G-784B)

15. The requirements of section 81(3) are mandatory and failure
to comply with them would render the petition liable to summary dis- c
missal under section 86(1)ofthe R.P. Act. [784G)

16. H a document does not form an integral part of the election
petition but is merely referred to in the petition or filed in the proceed-
ings as evidence of any fact, failure to supply a copy thereof will not D
prove fatal. Therefore the maintainability of an election petition will
depend on whether the schedule or annexure to the petition constitutes
an integral part of the election petition or not. Hit constitutes an integ-
ral part it must satisfy the requirements of section 81(3) and failure in
that behalf would be fatal. But if it does not constitute an integral part
of the election petition, a copy thereof need not be served along with the E
petition to the opposite party. (787A-CJ

17. The High Court is directed to issue directions to the election
Jc petitioner of each petition to remove the defects within sncb time as it
may allow and if they or any of them fail to do so, pass appropriate
consequential orders in accordance with law. [789A-B) F

Gurumayam S. Sarma v. K. Ongbi Anisija Devi, Civil Appeal No.
659of1957 dated 9.2.1961; State of Nagaland v. Rattan Singh, [1966] 3
SCR 830; V.L. Roh/us v. Deputy Commissioner, Aizawal, [1970) 2
SCC 908; Raj Narain v. Indira Gandhi, AIR 1972 SC 1302 at 1307:
~ (1972) 3 SCR 841; Manphu/ Singh v. Surinder Singh, [1973) 2 SCC 599 G
at 608; K.M. Mani v. P.J. Antony, [1979) 1 SCR 701; Samant N.
Bal-Krishna v. George Fernandez, [1969) 3 SCR 603; D.P. Mishra v.
Kamal Narayan Sharma, [1971) 1 SCR 8; Ba/wan Singh v. Lakshmi
Narain, (1969) 22 ELR 273; Murarka Radhey Shyam v. Roop Singh
Rathore, [1964) 3 SCR 573; State of BJmbay v. Puru.ihottam Jog Naik,
[1952) SCR 674; The Barjum Chemicals Ltd. v. The Company Law H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A Board, [1966] Supp. SCR 311; K.K. Nambiarv. Union of India, [1970]
3 SCR 121 at 125; Jadav Gi/ua v. Suraj Narain Iha, AIR 1974 Patna
207; M/s Sunder Industries Ltd. v. G.E. Works, AIR 1982 Delhi 220;
K.K. Somanathan v. K.K. Ramachandran, Am 1988; Kera/a 259;
Kama/am v. Dr. Syed Mohammad, [1978] 3 SCR 446; M/s. Sukhwin-
der Pai v. State of Punjab, [1982] 1 SCC 31; Z.B. Bukhari v. Brij
B Mohan, [1975] Suppl. SCR 281; Prabhu Narayan v. A.K. Srivastava,
[1975] 3 SCR 552; Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram, [1974] 4 SCC 237; M.
Karunanidhi v. Dr. H. V. Hande, [1983] 2 SCC 473; Mith/esh Kumar
Pandey v. Bajdyanath Y7idav, [1984] 2 SCR 278; Rajender Singh v.
Usha Rani, [1984] 3 SCC 339; U.S. Sasidharan v. K. Karunakaran,
[1989] 4 SCC 482 and Ch. Subba Rao v. Member, E.T. Hyderabad,
[ 1969] 6 SCR 213 Referred to.
c
18. When by the same statute the words 'Election Commissioner'
were substituted by the expression 'High Court' with effect from
December 14,1966. Even though by the said Amendment Act jurisdic·
tion was conferred on the High Court in place of the Election Commis-
D sion, surprisingly the title of Chapter II continues to read 'Presentation
of election petitions to Election Commission'. Parliament will do well
to correct this slip by substituting the words 'High Court' for the ex-
pression 'Election Commission' to bring it in conformity with the
changes introduced by Act 47 of 1966. [768E-F]

E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
179-189 of 1991 etc. etc ..

From the Judgment and Order dated 3.9.1990 of the Gauhati ~
High Court in Election Petition No. 7 of 1989.

f A.M. Mazumdar, Dr. L.M. Singhvi, S.K. Nandy. S. Parekh and
Ms. Lira Goswami for the Appellants.

Dr. B.L. Wadehra and M.K.D. Namboodiri for the Res1xmdents.

G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by -~ .
_

AHMADI, J. Special leave granted in all SLPs.

Mizoram acquired Statehood on February 20, 1987. At the
general election held on January 21, 1989, the respondents of this
batch of appeals contested the State Assembly elections as candidates
H of the Mizo National Front (MNF) from different constituencies. The
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA [AHMADI, J.] 759

results of the election were declared on January 23, 1989. They lost to
A
candidates fielded by the Indian National Congress (I). The unsuccess-
ful MNF candidates challenged the election of the Congress (I) candi-
dates mainly on the ground that they had indulged in and were guilty
of corrupt practices. As many as fifteen such election petitions came to
be filed in the Gauhati High Court on one single day, March 9, 1989.
Although fifteen petitions were filed, one Congress (I) candidate had B
succeeded from two constituencies and one candidate belonged to the
Mizo National Front (Democratic) Party. On service of notice of the
filing of the election petitions, the returned candidates entered appea-
rance and raised certain preliminary objections regarding the main-
tainability of each petition. On the basis thereof two preliminary issues
were raised for consideration. The returned candidates moved for
striking off the pleadings. Thereupon the original petitioners applied c
for amendment of their election petitions which was strongly opposed
by the returened candidates. The preliminary objections, the applica-
tions for striking off the pleadings and the amendment applications
were heard together.
D
·~. The two preliminary issues raised by the learned Judge hearing
the election petitions were (i) whether the election petitions were in
conformity with the requirements of Sections 81 and 83 of the Rep-
resentation of the People Act, 1951 (R.P. Act), and the Rules framed
thereunder by the Gauhati High Court and (ii) whether rule 1 and the
other related rules and notes thereto enabling the filing of the Election E
Petition before the Stamp Reporter assigned to the election court by
the learned Chief Justice were ultravires Article 329 of the Constitu-
tion and Section 169 read with Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the R.P.
Act. So far as the first objection was concerned, the returned candi-
dates contended that the election petitions were photo-copies and
could not, therefore, be treated as election petitions as contemplated F
by law, the copies of petitions served on the returned candidates were
not attested to be true copies of the original petitions as required by
Section 81(3), the copies served on them with the annexures were not
true copies of the original; the election petitions were not signed and
verified in the manner laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure
inasmuch as the source of information had not been disclosed in the G
verification or the affidavit in Form 25 as required by rule 94A of the
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (the Rule) and no schedule of mate-
rial particulars of corrupt practice had been annexed to the affidavit
purporting to be under Form 25. In regard to the second objection the
contention was that the presentation of the election petitions before
the Stamp Reporter was inconsistent with Sections 80, 80A and 81 of H
760 SUPREME COt;RT REPORTS [ 1991) 2 S.C.R.

the R.P. Act and Article 329 of the Constitution inasmuch as the law
A
requires that an election petition shall be presented to the High Court.
The learned Judge in the High Court overruled both the preliminary
objections holding, in the case of the first, that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of the relevant provisions and on
the second point he ruled that the presentation of the election petition
B to the Stamp Reporter appointed or authorised under the Rules was
presentation in accordance with the Rules and the same did not conf-
lict with Article 329(b) of the Constitution. Thus both the preliminary
objections stood rejected.

The returned candidates had applied under Order VII Rule 16 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. (the Code), for striking out certain aver-
c ments from the memo of the election petitions on the ground of failure
to disclose a cause of action. A prayer was also made for dismissal of
the petitions on that ground. The learned Judge in the High Court
rejected this contention observing that under the election law the High
Court is empowered to permit amendment of the election petition with
D a view to amplifying the averments bearing on the question of corrupt
practice which it considers necessary for ensuring a fair and effective
trial of the election dispute. In this view of the matter the learned
Judge examined the averments of each paragraph in detail and
directed the deletion or modification of certain paragraphs, the aver-
ments wherein were vague of bereft of necessary particulars. He
E directed that paragraphs 6, 9, 12, 13, 21, 22, 38 and 40 shall stand
deleted whereas paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 8, 14 to 20, 25 to 27, 30 to 37, 39
and 45 of the petition giving rise to CA No. 179 of 1991 shall stand
modified. All allegations against the election agent or other agents of
the returned candidates were ordered to be struck off. In other words
he directed that the allegations of corrupt practice shall be confined to
F the returned candidates only. Similar orders were passed in the other
election petitions subject to the variation in number of paragraphs,
etc. For convenience we will take the pleadings of C.A. No. 179/91 as
representative since we are told that the averments in each election
petition are identical except for some variations here and there. Thus
the learned Judge rejected the preliminary objections and partly
G allowed the application for striking off the averments in the election
petitions and partly permitted certain amendments to the election peti-
tions. It is against the said order that the returned candidates have
approached this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

At the time of admission of these appeals two questions were
H formulated for examination and we will confine ourselves to them in
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA [AHMADI, l.l 761

the course of this Judgment. These two questions are as under:
A
(I)"The Election Petitions are liable to be dismissed in
limine under Section 83 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 as the affidavit filed by the Election
Petitioner in each case is not strictly in conformity with
Form 25, inasmuch as the verification as regards the aver- B
ments based on knowledge and the averments based on
information has not been made separately as required by
the said Form prescribed under Rule 95-A of the Represen-
J- tation of the People Rules, 1951; and

(II) The copies of the Election petitions served on
the petitioners herein (the respondents in the Election Peti- c
tions) not being true copies of the Election Petitions, the
Election Petitions were not maintainable and were liable to
be dismissed in limine in view of Section 81 read with
Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951."
D
The appellants herein are the returned candidates. Election Peti-
tions were filed against them challenging their election on more or less
identical grounds. Since the Election Petitions are stated to be based
on a single master copy, we would refer to the averments of E.P. No. 7
of 1989 filed against the appellant F. Sapa of Civil Appeal No. 179 of
1991. E

On a perusal of the cause title of the petition it becomes evident
that the name of the constituency and the particulars of the petitioner
and the respondents are left blank and filled in hand. The petition is
stated to be under Sections 80 and 81 of the R.P. Act. Paragraph 1
furnishes the dates concerning the election programme and the F
particulars regarding the petitioner. In paragraph 2 the particulars
regarding the total votes, votes polled by each candidate, etc., have
been set out. While the various heads are typed, the figures are hand
written. The various typed heads would show that particulars upto five
respondents could be furnished even though in the said petition only
three respondents figure. That is why the columns regarding three G
respondents have been filled in while serial Nos. 6 and 7 meant for
respondents 4 and 5 have been left blank. This supports the appellant's
say that one master copy of the election petition was prepared and
thereafter particulars in respect of each petitioner were filled in
hand. In paragraph 3 it is averred that the M.P.C.C.(I) had with the
consent and knowledge of the returned candidate conceived and H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A executed the entire election compaign of the returned candidate bet-
ween December 31, 1988 and January 19, 1989. So also the returned
candidate had on his own and with the help of M.P.C.C.(I),.its func-
tionaries and workers organised and addressed public meetings and
undertook door to door convassing to promote his chances for success.
Thereafter the list of towns and villages where he held such meetings,
B etc"' are written in hand in the blank space left for that purpose. This is
also indicative of that factl that a master copy was prepared to challenge
all the fifteen elections. In paragtaphs 4 and 5 the details regarding the
compaign literature or material, such as stickers, hand-bills, pamph-
lets, press publications, etc., have been furnished. These have been
produced with their English translations at Annexures I to VI( a). It is
C averred that this compaign literature was widely distributed through-
out the length and breadth of the entire constituency .between the
aforestated dates and was also air dropped by helicopter on January
20, 1989 throughout the constituency. These were also read out and
explained to the voters in the constituency during the aforesaid
period. After making this averment in paragraph 6, the petitioner
D proceeds to add in paragraph 7 as under:

"That by publishing printing, circulating, distributing and
by reading out and explaining to the audiences including
the electors and their family members throughout the
length and breadth of the constituency as indicated above,
E Respondent No. 1 (returned candidate) has been guilty of
corrupt practices under Section 123 .......... "

The details in regard to the M.P.C.C.(I)'s Election Manifesto ->.
produced at Annexure I (English translation-Annexure lA) have been
set out in paragraphs 8 to 22 along with comments, inferences, etc. In
F paragraph 23 there is a mention of Annexure II which is merely a
repeat of Annexure I dealt with in the aforesaid paragraphs 8 to 22. In
paragraph 24 reference is to Annexure III which is merely the
summary of the Election Manifesto dealt with in the preceding
paragraphs. Paragraphs 25 to 29 refer to the leaflet-Operation Josna-
Annexure IV-and submission thereon. The next two paragraphs 30
G and 31 contain reference is to a sticker-Aiinexure V-which appeals to
the religious sentiments of those following the Christian faith and
states: "Let us vote Mizoram Congress (i) for Mizos and Christians"-
which, it is contended, constitutes corrupt practice. Then come
paragraphs 32 to 40 which relate to a leaflet-Annexure VI-entitled
"what our vote will bring about" and then proceeds to add "Christian
H Government" and "promise of visit of the holy land (Isreal)". then,
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA [AHMADI, J.] 763

after referring to the activities aforestated, it is alleged in paragraph 41
A
that this has materially affected the election prospects of the other
.• ... contesting candidates also. Paragraphs 42, 43 and 44 refer to Press
publications in 'India Today', 'Statesman -and the Assam Tribune and
Sentinals'. Paragraph 45 enumerates the grounds on which the election
of the returned candidate is liable to be set aside. Paragraphs 45A to
47 deal with sundry items. This in brief is the nature of the Election B
Petition. The petition is verified as under:

"I. SANGURA the petitioner herein verify that the facts
-.i.- mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 18, 19, 28, 35, 30, 33,
36, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 45A, 46 & 47 are true to my
knowledge and facts mentioned in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32,34, 35, c
37, 40 & 41 are based on information received and believed
to be true. Grounds A, B & C and the legal suumissions are
based on legal advice. Verified at Guwahati on 7th March,
1989."
D
The verification is typed but the petitioner's name and the paragraph
numbers at both the places are hand written. It will be seen from the
above verification clause that paragraphs 3, 16, 17, 25, 31 & 39 have
not been verified at all either as true to knowledge or on information
and/or belief whereas paragraph 41 is mentioned at both the places. It
may also be noted at this stage that in regard to the second part of the E
verification based on 'information received' and 'believed to be true' it

. is not clarified which of the paragraphs are based on 'information
received' (nor is the source of information disclosed) and which are
founded on 'believed to be true'.

Appended to the petition is the petitioner's typed affidavit, F
which runs into six paragraphs. The name of the petitioner, his age and
address appear to be filled in on a typewriter. In paragraph 2 of the
affidavit it is stated that the petitioner (unsuccessful candidate) has
alleged several corrupt practices on the part of the Respondent No. 1
(the returned candidate), his election agent and other agents and virtu-
~ ally the same phrase is repeated in paragraph 3. Then ;n paragraph 4 it G
is stated: 'for brevity the details of the corrupt practices alleged by me
which have been given in the Election Petition and are not being
repeated in this ·affidavit and the same may be treated and read as part
of this affidavit' and then the deponent proceeds to add 'The said
particulars and details of corrupt practices are contained in paragraphs
4 to 40 of the said election petition'. The word and figures '4 to 40' are H

''
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 2 S.C.R.

written in hand after scoring out the words and figures '7 to 47'. Then
A
comes paragraph 5 which may be reproduced:

"That I solemnly state and affirm that all that has been
stated in the election petition by way of corrupt practices as
a correct to the best of my knowledge and to the informa-
B tion received by me and believed by me to be true".

It will be seen from the above that according to the election petitioner
the particulars and details of the corrupt practices are contained in
paragraphs 4 to 40 which also omits pargraph 3 which is, according to
the returned candidate/appellant crucial. Then in paragraph 5 extrac-
ted above the election petitioner states that all that he has stated in
c regard to corrupt practices in his election petition (which according to
paragraph 4 are contained in paragraphs 4 to 40) is 'correct to the best
of my knowledge and to the information.received by me and believed
by me be true'. It is not stated which of the particulars contained in
paragraphs 4 to 40 are true to his knowledge, which are based on
D information received (apart from disclosure of source of information)
and which he believes to be true. The affidavit is totally silent in regard
to paragraphs 1to3, and 41to47 of the election petition.

The returned candidate/the appellant herein, therefore, con-
tends that paragraph 3 which is the most crucial paragraph in the entire
E election petition inasmuch as it discloses the names of towns and vil-
lages as well as the period during which the alleged corrupt practices
were committed has been carefully, deliberately and scrupulously omit-
ted both from the verification clause and the affidavit referred to
hereinabove for reasons best known to the election petitioner and,
contends the appellant, once this paragraph 3 is kept out of considera-
F tion, the Election Petition is, rendered 'a theoretical and unimagina-
tive essay' on corrupt practice of appeal to religion. It is, therefore,
contended that failure to mention paragraph 3 of the election petition
in both the verification clause of the petition and the affidavit filed in
support thereof is fatal and cannot be cured particularly after the
expiry of the limitation period of 45 days.
G
The appellant further contends that the affidavit is not in Form
No. 25 prescribed under Rule 94A of the Rules and hence the affidavit
is no affidavit at all. Since Section 83 of the R.P. Act is mandatory and
strict compliance thereof is expected of an election petitioner failure to
adhere to Form No. 25 is fatal as the doctrine of substantial comp-
H liance has no place in election law but even if that doctrine could be
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA [AHMADI. J.] 765

invoked to rescue the election petitioner out of the situation in which
A
he was placed himself, it was absolutely essential for him to clearly
state in his affidavit which paragraphs of the Election Petition are
based on his knowledge, which are based on information received and
which are based on his belief. Since even this is missing it is difficult to
say that there is substantial compliance assuming the doctrine has
application. Counsel for the appellant fairly stated that if the aver- B
ments in the election petition had been sworn to in the above manner it
could perhaps be argued that failure to strictly follow Form 25 could be
excused on the doctrine of substantial compliance and the procedural
defect could be cured by an appropriate amendment. But, argued
counsel, the doctrine could never be pressed into service where the
petitioner has failed to disclose which part of the allegations regarding C
corrupt practice are based on knowledge, which on information
received and which on belief. Where there is failure to comply with
even the basic requirements of an affidavit, there can be no question of
substantial compliance; this being a case of non compliance, what-
soever. Where several paragraphs of the election petition remain unaf-
firmed under the verification clause as well as the affidavit, the D
unsworn allegation can have no legal existence and the election cotlrt
cannot take cognizance thereof. The further allegation was that the
election petitions being photocopies could not be entertained as valid
election petitions; that copies of the election petitions served on the
returned candidates were not attested as true copies of the original as
required by Section 81(3) and that the election petitions and the E
schedule and annexures were not signed and verified as required by
the Code. An election dispute founded on the allegation of corrupt
practice being quasi-criminal in nature calls for strict adherence to the
requirements of election law as is evident from Section 86(1) of R.P.
Act which provides for dismissal of an election petition which fails to
comply with the requirements of Sections 81, 82 or 117 of the said F
statute.

Before we set out the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, refe-
rence may be made to Order VI Rule 15 of the Code which deals with
verification of pleadings. This rule is divided into three parts: the first
part begins with 'save as otherwise provided by any law for the time G
being in force' and then proceeds to add that every pleading shall be
verified by the party or by one of the parties or by some other person
acquainted with the facts of the case; the second part posits that every
person verifying shall specify what he verifies of his own knowledge
and what he verifies upon information received or believed to be true
by reference to paragraph numbers and the third part states that the H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) 2 S.C.R.

A verification shall be signed by the party making it. It was, however,
pointed out that by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 1, the Code
extends to the whole of India except (a) the State of Jammu and
Kashmir and (b) the State of Nagaland and the tribal areas. The expla-
nation defines the expression 'tribal areas' as territories which,
immediately before January 21, 1972 were included in the tribal are~s
B of Assam as referred to in paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the
Constitution. Paragraph 20 says that the areas specified in Parts I, II
and III of the table shown below shall respectively be the tribal areas
within the State of Assam, the State of Meghalaya and the Union
Territory of Mizoram. Part III which is relevant for our purpose com-
prises (1) the Chakma District (2) the Lakher District and (3) the Pawi
District. During the British period the area was divided into North
c Lushai Hills and South Lushai Hills but was later amalgamated into a
single District of Lushai Hill District and was made part of Assam and
was placed under the administrative charge of a Superintendent. On
our attaining independence, the Superintendent was replaced by a
Deputy Commissioner but the District of Lushai Hills continued to be
D part of Assam. The Lushai Hill District was renamed Mizo District in
1954 by an Act of Parliament and was placed under a District council.
After a spell of .disturbances on the implementation of the North-
Eastern Reorganisation Act, 1971, the Mizo District was upgraded
into a Union Territory and was renamed Mizoram. It was divided into
three districts, namely, (i) Aizawal ( i) Lunglei and (iii) Chhimtuipui.
E The Mizo Hill District was replaced by Chakma, Lakher and Pawi
Districts which find a mention in Part III of the Table to paragraph
20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. It was, therefore, argued
that the provisions of the Code did not and do not apply to the State of
Mizoram. In support of this contention reliance is placed on three
decisions of this Court namely ( 1) Gurumayam S. Sarma V.K. Ongbi
F Anisija Devi, Civil Appeal No. 659 of 1957 dated February 9, 1961 (2)
State of Nagaland V. Rattan Singh, [1966) 3 SCR 830 and (iii) V.L.
Roh/us V. Deputy Commissioner, Aizawal, [1970] 2 SCC 908. It is
unnecessary to notice these decisions in detail because Dr. Singhvi
does not seriously question this proposition. But, contends Dr.
Singhvi, if the Code did not apply to Mizoram in view of the above, it
G applied to an election petition because Section 83(1)(c) obligates that
an election petition 'shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in
the manner laid down in the Code for the verification of pleadings'.
Therefore, even though the provisions do not extend to Mizoram by
virtue of Section 1(3) of the Code, counsel submitted they are applic-
able by incorporation to election petitions by the thrust of Section
H 83( l)(c) of the R.P. Act to the extent indicated therein.
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA [AHMADI, J.] 767

And now to the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act and the
Rules framed thereunder. The expression 'corrupt practice' defined in A
Section l(c) means any of the practices specified in Section 123. The
>-· various corrupt practices enumerated in Section 123 are (1) bribery, (2)
undue influence, (3) an appeal by a candidate or his agent or by another
other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent to
vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his reli- B
gion, race, caste. community or language or the use of, or appeal to
religious symbols, etc., (3A) the promotion of, or attempt to pro-
mote, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the
citizens of India on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or
language, (4) the publication of any statement of fact which is false and
which he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in
ralation to another candidate, (5) the hiring or procuring of any vehi- c
cle or vessel or the use of such vehicle or vessel for the free conveyance
of any elector to or from any polling station, (6) the incurring or
authorising of expenditure in contravention of Section 77, (7) the
obtaining or procuring of any assistance from any Government servant
of the class specified and (8) booth capturing. Sections 8 and SA lay D
down that any person convicted for practising any corrupt practice by
an order made by the High Court under Section 99 shall be disqualified
for a period of six years in the case of the former in addition to being
punished on conviction and for a period not exceeding six years in the
case of the latter. Counsel for the appellant, therefore, contended that
proof of allegations of corrupt practiCe would visit the returned candi- E
date with certain serious consequences and must, therefore, be viewed
seriously. Being quasi-criminal in nature courts have and must always
insist on strict compliance with the provisions of law in that behalf and
failure to do so must prove fatal. Laying this background, counsel for
the appellants invited our attention to Sections 80 to 86 of the R.P.
Act. F

The R.P. Act is divided into XI parts. We are essentially con-
cerned with Part VI entitled 'Disputes Regarding Elections' which is
divided into V chapters. Chapter I is a single section chapter compris-
ing section 79 which defines certain expressions used in Part VI and
Part VII dealing with corrupt practices and electoral offences. Chapter G
II entitled 'Presentation of election petitions to Election Commission'
comprises Sections BO to 85, Section 85 having since been repealed.
Section 80 says no election shall be called in question except by an
election petition presented in accordance with the provisions con- ·
tained in that part. Section SOA, inserted by Act 47 of 1966, confers
jurisdiction on the High Court to try an election petition. Section 81 H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A deals with the presentation of such petitions. It reads as under:

"81. Presentation of petitions.-(!) An election petition
calling in question any election may be presented on one or
more of the grounds specified in sub-section(!) of section
100 and section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at
B such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but
not earlier than, the date of election of the returned candi-
date, or if there are more than one returned candidate at
the election and the dates of their election are different, the
later of those two dates.

Explanation.--In this sub-section, 'elector' means a
c person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the
election petition relates, whether he has voted at such elec-
tion or not.

(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by
D as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned
in the petition, and every such copy shall be attested by the
petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the
petition."

Sub-section (2) of this section was omitted by Act 47 of 1966 when by
E the same statute the words 'Election Commission' were substituted by
the expression 'High Court' with effect from December 14, 1966. Even
though by the said Amendment Act jurisdiction was conferred on the
High Court in place of the Election Commission, surprisingly the title -~
of Chapter II continues to read 'Presentation of election petitions to
Election Commission'. Parlia111ent will do well to correct this slip by
F substituting the words 'High Court' for the expression 'Election Com-
mission' to bring it in .conformity with the changes introduced by Act
47 of 1966. Section 82 indicates the parties to be joined as respondents.
Then comes Section 83.which reads thus:

"83. Contents of petition.--(!) ~n election petition--
G
(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts
on which the petitioner relies;

(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice
that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as
H possible of the names of the parties alleged to have com-
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA (AHMADI, J.] 769

milted such corrupt practice and the date and place of the
A
commission of each such practice; and

(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the
manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5
of 1908) for the verification of pleadings:
B
Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt
practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an
affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation
of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof.

(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be
· signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as c
the petition."

On a plain reading of this provision it is manifest that it is incumbent
on the petitioner to set forth 'full particulars of any corrupt practice' he
alleges against the returned candidate. This should be accompanied by D
-+ 'as full a statement as is possible' of the names of those who have
indulged in such corrupt practice and the date and place of the com-
mission thereof. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) enjoins that the election
petition shall not only be signed but also verified in the manner laid
down in the Code. The proviso then prescribes an additional safeguard
in cases where corrupt practice is aileged, as in the present case, E
namely, that the election petition shall be accompanied by an affidavit
in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt
~-·
practice and the particulars thereof. This provision reflects the anxiety
of the legislature to ensure that allegations of corrupt practice are not
lightly made; not only that but it ensures that the responsibility thereof
-is fixed on the petitioner himself by asking him to swear an affidavit in F
support thereof. 'Prescribed' says Section 2(g) means prescribed by
rules made under the said Act. Form 25 is the form of the affidavit
prescribed by Rule 94A of the Rules. Next sub-section (2) of this
section provides that any schedule or annexure to the petition shall
also be signed and verified in the same manner as the petition itself.
Section 84 sets out what relief the petitioner can claim in such an G
election petition. That brings us to chapter III entitled 'Trial of elec-
tion petitions'. Only two sections from this chapter require to be
noticed. The first is section 86, the relevant part whereof reads:

"86. Trial of election petitions.-(1) The High Court shall
dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 2 S.C.R.

provisions of section 81 or section 82 or section 117.
A
Explanation.-An order of the High Court dismissing an
election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to -./.
be an order made under clause (a) of section 98.

B (2) As soon as may be after an election petition has been
presented to the High Court. It shall be referred to the
Judge or one of the Judges who has or have been assigned
by the Chief Justice for the trial of election petitions under
sub-section (2) of section 80A."

The rest of the sub-sections are not germane to the controversy before
c us. Section 87 outlines the procedure to be followed by the High Court
in the trial of an election petition. It says that it shall be tried 'as nearly
as may be', in accordance with the procedure applicable under the
Code to the trial of suits. Since sub-section (1) of Section 86 refers to
Section 117 we may notice it at this stage. It provides for a deposit of
D Rs.2,000 as security for the costs of the petition with which we are now
concerned. Dr. Singhvi, therefore, emphasised that the law for the .~·
trial and resolution of election disputes found in the aforesaid provi-
sions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder offers a self-contained
Code and it is not necessary to look elsewhere except where provisions
of any other law are incorporated in this statute by reference. He
E further submitted that since some of the election disputes could be
quasi-criminal in nature, e.g., where corrupt practice is alleged, strict
compliance with the provisions of the statute and Rules is expected by
the legislature in such cases and even if the provisions are treated as
directory as held by the learned Judge in the High Court, the degree of
non-compliance which the Court will tolerate to ensure substantial
F compliance will not be the same as in an ordinary civil proceeding. He
submitted that tested on this touchstone, this Court should hold that
there is no substantial compliance for otherwise the election law would
loss its sanctity and seriousness and vague charges of corrupt practice
would be lightly made to vex the returned candidates and when faced
with an objection attempts to cure the defects through applications for
G amendment of the pleadings would become the order of the day
thereby defeating the very object of expeditious disposals of election
petitions envisaged in Section 86(7) of the R.P. Act.

Dr. Singhvi took strong exception to the approach of the learned
Judge in the High Court when he ruled that strict compliance with the
H provisions of Sections 81 and 83 of the R.P. Act was not necessary and
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA [AHMADI. J.l 771

that the procedural requirements thereunder were to be treated in the
A
same manner as a suit or any other proceedings of a civil nature. He
submitted that this approach of the learned Judge betrays an errone-
ous understanding that election petitions are also to be treated on par
with ordinary civil proceedings, notwithstanding the quasi-criminal
character of such proceedings, and it is this approach of the learned
Judge which has led him to reach a conclusion unknown to election B
law. In particular he invited our attention to the following obser-
vations of the learned Judge which according to counsel betrays his
fallacious approach:

"I am not prepared to hold that simply because a petition
before the court happens to be an election petition, the
procedural requirements should be construed in a mechani- C
cal or pedantic manner without any regard to the object
sought to be achieved thereby. The law does not require
the court, while dealing with an election petition, to con-
strue the pleadings in such a hyper technical manner and to
make a microscopic examination thereof with a view to D
finding out a slip here or a deviation there which may be
used as a ground for the rejection of the petition in /imine
in the name of maintaining the democratic process or the
purity of election. In my opinion, the procedural require-
ments in an election case also should be construed in the
same manner as in cases under the C.P .C. The approach of E
the court should not be to reject the election petition, in

,. limine on every possible pretext of non-compliance with
one or more of the procedural requirements unless the law
itself, in clear terms, mandates it to do so."

It is manifest from the above observations that the learned Judge took F
the view that the procedural requirements are intended to serve the
object of providing a mechanism to reach the ultimate objective of
dispensing justice in election disputes. According to him these provi-
sions were merely adjectival and must, therefore, be r,onstrued liber-
ally so as to advance the cause of justice and not to stiffle it at the
threshold. In support of this line of thought the learned Judge placed G
reliance on the observations of this Court in Raj Narain v. Indira
Gandhi, AIR 1973 SC 1302 at 1307 wherein this Court has observed as
under:
;
"Rules of pleadings are intended as aids for fair trial and
for reaching a just decision. An action at law should not be H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) 2 S.C.R.

equated to a game of chess. Provisions of law are not mere
A
formulae to be observed as rituals. Beneath the words of a
provision of law, generally speaking, there lies a juristic
principle. It is the duty of the Court to ascertain that princi-
ple and implement it."

B Let us examine if the criticism of the learned counsel to the approach
of the learned Judge is well founded.

It is fairly well settled that our election law being statutory in
character must be strictly complied with since an election petition is
not guided by ever changing common law principles of justice and
notions of equity. Being statutory in character it is essential that it
c must conform to the requirements of our election law. But at the same
time the purity of election process must be maintained at all costs and
those who violate the statutory norms must suffer for such violation. If
the returned candidate is shown to have secured his success at the
election by corrupt means he must suffer for his misdeeds.
D
The mode for calling in question the election of a returned
candidate is by presenting an election petition 'in accordance with the
provisions of this Part' (Section 80). Such a petition has to be pre-
sented within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candi-
date. Sub-section (3) of section 81 provides that such an election peti-
E lion must be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are
respondents and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner
under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. This provi-
sion which explains how a copy of an election petition shall be
attested, emphasises that such attestation will be under the petitioner's
own signature. What the contents of an election petition shall be is
F enumerated in Section 83. It must contain a concise statement of mate-
rial facts on which the petitioner relies but where a petition is founded
on the allegation of corrupt practice, it shall set forth full particulars of
the corrupt practice alleged by the petitioner, including as full a state-
ment as possible of the names of the parties who have indulged in such
corrupt practice together with the date and place of the commission
G thereof. Such an election petition as well as every schedule or an-
nexure thereto must be signed by the petitioner and verified in the
manner provided by the Code for the verification of pleadings. But, in
cases where the petitioner has alleged corrupt practice that is not
enough, the proviso demands that the petition shall be accompanied
by an affidavit in the prescribed form supporting the allegation of such
H corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. Therefore, an election
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA [AHMADI. J.] 773

petition in which corrupt practice is alleged stands on a different foot-
A
ing from an election petition which does not carry such an allegation.
The legislature has taken special care to ensure that ordinary verifica-
tion will not suffice, it must be supported by an affidavit in the pre-
'· scribed form. Form 25 has been prescribed for such an affidavit under
rule 94A of the Rules. That rule says that the affidavit referred to in
the proviso to Section 83(1) shall be in Form 25. The form of the B
affidavit requires the deponent to state which of the paragraphs of the
election petition in which allegations of corrupt practice are made are
based on his own knowledge and which are based on this information.
Section 86{1) then mandates that the High Court 'shall' dismiss an
election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section
81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the R.P. Act. The language of this
sub-section is quite imperative and commands the High Court, in no c
uncertain terms, to dismiss an election petition which does not comply
with the requirements section 81 or section 82. This mandate is, how-
ever, qualified by sub-section (5) referred to earlier.

Election of a returned candidate can be rendered void on proof D
of the alleged corrupt practice. In addition thereto he would incur a
subsequent disqualification also. This harshness is essential if we want
our democratic process to be clean, free and fair. Eradication of cor-
rupt practice from our democratic process is essential if we want it to
thrive and remain healthy. Our democratic process will collapes if
unhealthy corrupt practices like appeals to voters on basis of caste, E
creed, community, religion, race, language, etc., are allowed to go
unchecked and unpunished. Use of corrupt practices in elections to
·,c secure short term gains at the cost of purity of our democratic process
must be frowned at by every right thinking citizen. It is for that reason
that the law has provided for double jeopardy to deter candidates,
their agents and others from indulging in such nefarious practices. But F
while there is sufficient justification for the law to be harsh with those
who indulge in such practices, there is also the need to ensure that such
allegations are made with a sense of responsibility and concern and not
merely to vex the returned candidate. It is with this in view that the law.
envisages that the particulars of such allegations shall be set out fully
disclosing the name of the party responsible for the same and the date G
and place of its commission. A simple verification was considered
insufficient' and, therefore, the need for an affidavit in the prescribed
form. These procedural precautions are intended to ensure that the
person making the allegation of corrupt practice realises the serious-
ness thereof as such a charge would be akin to a criminal charge since it
visits the party indulging in such practice with a two-fold penalty. That H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 2 S.C.R.

is why this Court described it as quasi-criminal in nature in Manphul
A Singh v. Surinder Singh, [1973] 2 SCC 599 at 608 and reiterated the
same in K.M. Mani v. P. J. Antony, [1979] 1 SCR 701. Hence the
insistence that each ingredient of the charge must be satisfactu ,
proved before a verdict of guilt is recorded by the Court. In Mani's
case this Court held that the allegations must be established beyond
B reasonable doubt and not merely by a preponderence of probability. It
is, therefore, equally essential that the particulars of the charge or
allegation are clearly and precisely stated in the election petition to
afford a fair opportunity to the person against whom it is levelled to
effectively counter the same.

The law in regard to the adjudication of an election dispute has
c been set out, as stated earlier, in Part VI of the R.P. Act, the provi-
sions whereof constitute a self-contained Code. Therefore, an election
petition calling in question the election of a returned candidate must
be made in accordance with the provisions of this part of the statute.
Under the provisions of this part an election petition calling in ques-
D tion the election of a returned candidate must be founded on one or
more of the grounds specified in Sections 100 and 101 for any of the
reliefs specified in Section 84 thereof. Section 100 specifies several
grounds, one of them being commission of a corrupt practice by the
returned candidate. Section 83( !)(a) stipulates that every election peti-
tion shall contain a concise statement of the "material facts' on which
E the petitioner relies. That means the entire bundle of facts which
would constitute a complete cause of action must be concisely stated in
an election petition. Section 83(l}(b} next requires an election
petitioner to set forth full 'particulars' of any corrupt practice alleged
against a returned candidate. These 'particulars' are obviously diffe-
rent from the 'material facts' on which the petition is founded and are
F intended to afford to the returned candidate an adequate opportunity
to effectively meet with such an allegation. The underlying idea in
requiring the election petitioner to set out in a concise manner all the
'material facts' as well as the 'full particulars', where commission of
corrupt practice is complained of, is to delineate the scope, ambit and
limits of the inquiry at the trial of the election petition.
G
Before the amendment of the R.P. Act by Act 27 of 1956, section
83(3) provided for an amendment of an election petition insofar as
'particulars' of corrupt practice were concemed. By the 1956 amend-
ment this provision was replaced by Section 90(5) which in turn came
to be deleted and transferred as sub-section (5) of section 86 by the
H Amendment Act 47 of 1966. Section 86(5) as it presently stands
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA (AHMADI, J.I . 775

empowers the High Court to allow the 'particulars' of any corrupt
practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified provided
the amendment does not have the effect of widening the scope of the
election petition by introducing particulars in regard to a corrupt
practice not previously alleged or pleaded within the period of limita-
tion in the election petition. In other words the amendment or amplifi- B
cation must relate to particulars of a corrupt practice already pleaded
and must not be an effort to.expand the scope of the inquiry by intro-
ducing particulars regarding a different corrupt practice not earlier
pleaded. Only the particulars of ·that corrupt practice of which the
germ exists in the election petition can be amended or amplified and
there can be no question of introducing a new corrupt practice. It.is
significant to note that section 86(5) permits 'particulars' of any cor- C
rupt practice 'alleged in the petition' to be amended or amplified and
not the 'material facts'. It is, therefore; clear from the trinity of clauses
(a) and (b) of section 83 and sub-section (5) of section 86 that there is a
distinction between 'material facts' referred to in clause (a) and
'particulars' referred to in caluse (b) and what Section 86(5) permits is D
the amendment/amplification of the latter and not the former. Thus
the power of amendment granted by section 86(5) is relatable to
clause (b) of section 83(1) and is coupled with a prohibition, namely,
the amendment will not relate to a corrupt practice not already
pleaded in the election petition. The power is not relatable to clause
(a) of section 83(1) as the plain language of section 86(5) confines itself E
to the amendments of 'particulars' of any corrupt practice alleged in
the petition and does not extent to 'material facts'. This becomes
crystal clear on the plain words of the closely connected trinity of
Sections 83(1)(a), 83(1)(b) and 86(5) and is also supported by autho-
rity. See Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez, Cl969] 3 SCR
603 and D.P. Mishra v. Kamal Narayan Sharma, [1971] 1 SCR 8. In
Ba/wan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, [1969] 22 ELR 273 this Court held F
that if full particulars of an alleged corrupt practice are not supplied,
the proper course would be to give an opportunity to the petitioner to
cure the defect and if he fails to avail of that opportunity that part of
the charge may be struck down. We may, however, hasten to add that

'
''-y
.
once the amendment sought falls within the purview of section 86(5),
the High Court should be liberal in allowing the same unless, in the
facts and Circumstances of the case, the· Court nods it unjust and
prejudicial to the opposite party to allow the same. Such prejudice
G

must, however, be distinguished from mere inconven\ence, vide Raj
Narain v. Indira Gandhi, [1972] 3 SCR 841. This much for the provi-
sions of section 83(1)(a) and (b) and section 86(5) of the R.P. Act.
H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

That brings us to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 83, which
A
provides that an election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and

-
verified in the manner laid down by the Code for the verification of the --,( ...
pleadings. Under section 83(2) any schedule or annexure to the plead-
ing must be similarly verified. Order 6 Rule 15 is the relevant provision
in the Code. S~b-rule (2) of Rule 15 says that the person verifying shall
B specify with reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading,
what he verifies on his own knowledge and what he verifies upon
information recived and believed to be true. The verification must be
signed by the person making it and must state the date on and the place
at which it was signed. The defect in the verification can be (i) of a
formal nature and not very substantial (ii) one which substantially .
c complies with the requirements and (iii) that which is material but
capable of being cured. It must be remembered that the object of
requiring verification of an election petition is clearly to fix the
responsibility for the averments and allegations in the petition on the
person signing the verification and at the same time discouraging wild
and irresponsible allegations unsupported by facts. Then comes the
D proviso which provides that in cases where corrupt practice is alleged
in the petition, the petition shall also be supported by an affidavit in
the prescribed form i.e. Form No. 25 prescribed by Rule 94A of the
Rules. Lastly sub-section (2) of section 83 lays down that any schedule
or annexure to the petition shall also be similarly signed and verified.
Two question arise: (i) what is the consequence of a defective or
E incomplete verification and (ii) what is the cosequence of a defective
affidavit? It was also said that the verification clause in regard to
averrnents or allegations based on information ought to disclose the
source of information which had not been dondn this case.

It must at the outset be realised that section 86(1) which lays
p down that the High court 'shall' dismiss an election petition which does
not comply with the provisions of section 81 or section 82 or section
117 does not in terms refer to section 83. It would, therefore, seem
that the legislature did not view the non-compliance of the require-
ment of section 83 with the sam.e gravity as in the case of sections 81,
82 or 117. But it was said that a petition which does not strictly comply
G with the requirements of section 83 cannot be said to be an election
. petition within the contemplation of section 81 and hence section 86(1)
\was clearly attracted. In Murarka Redhey Shyam v. Roop Singh
Rathore, [1964] 3 SCR 573 one of the defects pointed out was that
t4ough the verification stated that the averments made in some of the
paragraphs of the petition were true to the personal knowledge of the
H petitioner and the averments in some other paragraphs were verified
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA !AHMADI, J.] 777

to be true on advice and information received from legal and other
sources, the petitioner did not in so many words state that the advice A

.. and information received was believed by him to be true. The Election
Tribunal held that this defect was a matter which came within section
...,: ¥ 83(1)(c) and the defect could be cured in accordance with the princi-
pies of the Code. This Court upheld this view in the following words:
B
"It seems clear to us that reading the relevant sections in
Part VI of the Act, it is impossible to accept the contention
that a defect in verification which is to be made in the
manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for
~ the verification of pleadings as required by cl. (c) of sub-s.
( 1) of s. 83 is fatal to the maintainability of the petition."
c
It is thus clear from this decision which is binding on us that mere
defect in the verification of the election petition is not fatal to the
maintainability of the petition and the petition cannot be thrown out
solely on that ground. As observed earlier since section 83 is not one of
three provisions mentioned in section 86(1), ordinarily it cannot be D
construed as mandatory unless it is shown to be an integral part of the
--1 petition under section 81.

The proviso to section 83(1) was inserted by section 18 of
Amendment Act 40 of 1961. It is attracted where the petitioner alleges
any corrupt practice. In that case the election petition must be E
accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form i.e. Form No. 25.
The affidavit is intended to support the allegation of corrupt practice
and the particulars thereof pleaded in the election petition. Order 19
y
Rule 3 of the Code provides that affidavits should be confined to such
facts as the deponent is able on his own knowledge to prove. Here
again the submission was that the affidavit to be sworn in Form No. 25 F
prescribed by Rule 94A must be sworn consistently with Order 19 Rule
3 of the Code. The submission, therefore, was that the affidavit must
disclose the source of information for otherwise itwill be no affidavit
at all. In this connection reliance is placed on the decision of this Court
-- ~
.
in State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, [1952) SCR 674 wherein
at page 681 this Court while dealing with the verification of the G
affidavit of the Home Secretary observed that when the matter deposed
to is not based on personal knowledge the source of information
should be clearly disclosed. Again in The Barium Chemicals Ltd. v.
The Company Law Board, (1966] Supp. SCR 311 Shela!, J. at page 352
reiterated that where allegations of ma/a fides are not grounded on
personal knowledge but only on 'reason to believe', the source of H
778 SUPREME COCR1 REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

information must invariably be disclosed. Same was the view expres-
A
sed in the case of K.K. Nambiarv. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 121 at
125. Based on the law laid down in the aforesaid three cases the
learned counsel for the appellants submitted that an affidavit which on
its to disclose the source of information has no efficacy in law and is
not worth the paper on which it is written, more so in an election
B petition alleging corrupt practice, for otherwise it will fail to achieve
the purpose, namely, to give an opportunity to the returned candidate
to counter the allegation. According to the learned counsel, the
affidavit contemplated by the proviso to section 83(1) is intended to be
an integral part of the petition under section 81 and failure to comply
with the requirement of disclosing the source of information renders
the petition liable to summary dismissal under section 86(1) of the
c R.P. Act. Reliance was placed on Jadav Gilua v. Suraj Narain Jha,
AIR 1974 Patna 207; Mis Sunder Industries Ltd. v. G.E. Works, AIR
1982 Delhi 220; K.K. Somanathan v. K.K. Ramachandran, AIR 1988
Kerala 259; Kama/am v. Dr. Syed Mohamad, [1978] 3 SCR 446 and
Mis Sukhwinder Pal v. State of Punjab, [1982] 1SCC31, which support
D this view.
~-
In the case of Murarka Radhey Shyam, (supra) two election peti- '
tions were filed challenging his election to the House of the People. In
those two petitions certain preliminary objections were raised touch-
ing on the maintainability of the petitions on the ground that there
E was failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the R.P.
Act. One of the preliminary objections with which we are presently
concerned was non-compliance with section 83 inasmuch as the
affidavit in respect of corrupt practices which accompanied the peti-
tion was neither properly made nor in the prescribed form. The further
submission was that an election petition under section 81 must comply
F with the requirements of section 83 for otherwise it cannot be rightly
described as an election petition under section 81 of the R.P. Act. This
Court referred to the observation of the Election Tribunal, which
reads as under:

"The verification of the affidavit of the petitioner is appa-
G rently not in the prescribed form but reading as a whole the
verification carries the same sense as intended by the words
mentioned in the prescribed form. The mistake of the
Oaths Commissioner in verifying the affidavit cannot be a
sufficient ground for dismissal of the petitioner's petition
summarily, as the provisions of s. 83 are not necessarily to
H be complied with in order to make a petition valid and such
F.A. SAPA v. SJNGORA [AHMADI, J.] 779

affidavit can be allowed to be filed at a later stage also." A

and expressed its agreement therewith. It also held that the defect in
the time and place of verification cannot be a fatal defect and can be
remedied.
B
In Virendra Kumar Sak/echa v. Jagjiwan and Others, [1972] 3
SCR 955 Rule 7 of the M.P. High Court Rules provided that every
affidavit should clearly express how much is a statement and declara-
tion from knowledge and how much is based on information or belief
and must also state the source of information or belief. This Court held
that the requirements of Form 25 were not consistent with Rule 7
which purported to give effect to Order 19 of the Code. In that case the C
affidavit accompanying the petition did not disclose the source of
information in respect of certain speeches alleged to have been made
by the appellant which constituted corrupt practice nor were the notes
thereof allegedly made by certain persons produced therewith. This
Court while stating that it was not necessary to express any opinion on
0
the question whether the non-disclosure of the source or ground of
information in the affidavit can prove fatal, nevertheless observed that
the grounds or sources of information are required to be stated since
section 83 states that an election petition shall be verified in the
manner laid down by the Code and the affidavit was, therefore,
required to be modelled as required by Order 19 of the Code. This
decision is not an authority for the proposition that failure to disclose E
the source or ground of information would result in dismissal of the
petition under section 86(1) of the R.P. Act. ·

In Krishan Chand v. Ram Lal, [ 1973] 2 SCC 759 the appellant, a
voter questioned Ram Lal's election on the allegation that he, his
election agent and some others with his consent, had committed vari- F
ous acts of -corrupt practices detailed in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the
petition. The petition was verified by the appellant and was accom-
panied by an affidavit wherein he stated that paragraphs 11 and 12
were based on information· received and believed to be true. The
respondent raised a preliminary objection that the petition was liable to
be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions of the R.P. Act G
read with the Code as the sources of information were not disclosed. In
support of this contention reliance was placed on the decisions
rendered under Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 2 of the Code.
Dealing with this submission, this Court observed in paragraph 6 of
the judgment as under:
H
780 SUPREME COLIRT REFORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A
"At the outset it may be stated that the provision for set- l
ting out the sources of information where the allegations ~
have been verified as having been made on information and
knowledge of the petitioner is not a requisite prescribed "-
under Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules. 1961,
which are applicable to the filing of an election petition.
B Under sub-section (1) of Section 83 an election petition has
to contain a concise statement of the material facts on
which the petitioner relies; it has to set forth full particulars
of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including
as fullda stahtement as possdible ohf the names oUhe pa rttihes Jc-
a 11 ege to ave commlltc sue corrupt practice anc1 e
date and place of the commission of each such practice and
c shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner
laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the
verification of the pleadings, provided that where the
petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall
also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form
D in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the
particulars thereof." ~--

Setting out Form 25 prescribed under Rule 94A, this Court proceeded
to further observe:

£ "There is nothing in this form which requires the petitioner
to state under clause (b) of Form 25 the source or sources
of his information. The appellant has referred us to Order
XI, Rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules as also to Rule
12(A) of the Punjab High Court Rules, in which when the
deponent in the affidavit filed in support of the petition
F states that he has made the allegations in the paragraph or
paragraphs specified on information, he is required also to
disclose the sources of information. But when there are
specific rules made under the Act which govern the elec-
tion petitions, no other rules are applicable. Nor is the
disclosure of the source of information a requisite under
G Order VI, Rule 15(2) C.P.C. On this ground alone the
submission of the appellant can be rejected."

Thus this Court came to the conclusion that the election petition under
section 83(1)(b) must itself contain all the necessary material facts and
in the affidavit in support the petitioner is required to say which of the
H allegations are based on personal knowledge and which are based on ·
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA (AHMADI. J.] 781

information received and believed to be true. If the source of informa-
A
tion has not been set out and the opposite party finds it difficult to
answer the allegations regarding corrupt practice, he can always apply
for better particulars. In other words the failure to disclose or divulge
the source of information was not considered fatal to the petition. This
Court, therefore, concluded that the election petition did not suffer
from any defect on that score. B

Similar was the view taken by this Court in Z. B. Bukhari v. Brij
Mohan, ( 1975] Suppl. SCR 281 while dealing with the contention that
the affidavit in support of the election petition founded on allegations
of corrupt practice falling under sub-sections {3) and {3A) of section
123 was not in proper form. Repelling this contention the Court held C
that a petition can only be dismissed for a substantial defect. In taking
this view reliance was placed on Prabhu Narayan v. A.K. Srivastava,
[ 1975] 3 SCR 552 wherein this Court had negatived the contention that
failure to disclose the sources of information would render the
affidavit defective.
D
However, strong reliance was placed on this Court's decision in
Kama/am v. Dr. Syed Mohamad, (1978] 3 SCR 446. In that case the
respondent's election to the Lok Sabha was challenged alleging cor-
rupt practice. The election petition was duly signed and verified by the
appellant and was accompanied by the requisite affidavit in support of
the allegations of corrupt prnctice and their particulars. The election E
petition and the affidavit were tied together as one document. The
appellant's signature appeared at the foot of the affidavit but there was
y no such signature at the foot of the election petition itself. In this
backdrop of facts this Court held that both the election petition and
the affidavit constituted one single document. This Court after refer-
ring to sections 81(3), 83 and 86{1) observed as under: F

"The context in which the proviso occurs clearly suggests
that the affidavit is intended to be regarded as part of the
election petition. Otherwise, it need not have been intro-
duced in a section dealing with contents of an election peti-
tion nor figured as a proviso to a sub-section which lays G
down what shall be the contents of an election petition.
Sub-section (2) also by analogy supports this inference. It
provides that any schedule or annexure to an election peti-
tion shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the
same manner as an election petition. It is now established
by the decision of this Court in Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram H

I
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991) 2 S.C.R.

A Singh Aharwar, (1968) 3 SCR 13 that sub-section (2)
applied only to a schedule or annexure which is an integral
part of the election petition and not to a schedule or anne-
xure which is merely evidence in the case but which is
annexed to the election petition merely for the sake of
adding strength to it."
B
After quoting from the decision in Sahodrabai's case at pages 19-20,
this Court proceeded to state:

"It would, therefore, be seen that if a schedule or annexure
is an integral part of the election petition, it must be signed
c by the petitioner and verified, since it forms part of the
election petition. The subject-matter of sub-section (2) is
"' thus a schedule or annexure forming part of the election
petition and hence it is placed in section 83 which deals
with contents of an election petition. Similarly, and for the
same reasons, the affidavit referred to in the proviso to
D
Section 83, sub-section (1) also forms part of the election
petition. The election petition is in truth and reality one
document consisting of two parts, one being the election
petition proper and the other being the affidavit referred to
in the proviso to section 83, sub-sectio11 ( 1). The copy of
the election petition required to be filed under the first part
E of sub-section (3) of section 81, would, therefore, on a fair
reading of that provision along with section 83, include a
copy of the affidavit."

The above observations have, however, to be read in the context of the
F controversy before the Court. The dispute between the parties was
limited to the fulfilment of the last part of section 81(3), viz.", the
requirement that every such copy of the election petition 'shall be
attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of
the petition'. As pointed out earlier it was found as a fact that the
signature was at the foot of the affidavit tied to the petition and not at
G the foot of the petition itself. The Court. therefore, came to the con-
clusion that since the affidavit constituted an integral part of the elec-
tion petition. the requirement of the latter part of section 81(3) was
Satisfied. The decision clearly turned on the special facts of that case.

From the text of the relevant provisions of the· R.P. Act. Rule
H 94A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 3 of the
F.A .. SAPA v. SINGORA [AHMADI, J.l 783

Code and the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges
A
(i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential
that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affid•vit
' accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of
information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based
on information believed to be true (iii) if the respondent desire better
particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for B
the same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the
same and (iv) the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can
be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition, in
which case the defect concerning material facts will have to be dealt
with, subject to limitation, under section 81(3) as indicated earlier.
Similarly the Court would have to decide in each individual case
whether the schedule or annexure referred to in section 83(2) consti- c
tutes an integral part of the election petition or not; different con-
siderations will follow in the case of the former as compared to those in
the case of the latter.

A charge of corrupt practice has a two-dimensional effect; its D
impact on the returned candidate has to be viewed from the point of
view of the candidate's future political and public life and from the
point of view of the electorate to ensure the purity of the election
process. There can, therefore, be no doubt that such an allegation
involving corrupt practice must be viewed very seriously and the High
Court should ensure compliance with the requirements of section 83 E
before the parties go to trial. This is quite clear from the observations
of this Court in the case of K.M. Mani v. P.J. Anthony, [1979) 1 SCR
701. While defective verification or a defective affidavit may not be
fatal, the High Court should ensure its compliance before the parties
go to trial so that the party required to meet the charge is not taken by
_<(urprise at the actual trial. It must also be realised that delay in com- F
plying with the requirements of section 83 read with the provisions of
the Code or the omission to disclose the grounds or sources of informa-
tion, though not fatal, would weaken the probative value of the
evidence ultimately lead at the actual trial. Therefore, an election
petitioner can afford to overlook the requirements of section 83 on
pain of weakening the evidence that he may ultimately tender at the actual G
trial of the election petition. That is because as held in Mani's case the
charge of corrupt practice has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
and not merely by preponderance of probabilities. Allegation of corrupt
· practice being quasi-criminal in nature, the failure to supply full parti-
culars at the earliest point of time and to disclose the source of informa-
tion promptly may have an adverse bearing on the probative value to be H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A
attached to the evidence tendered in proof thereof at the trial. There-
fore, even though ordinarily a defective verification can be cured and
the failure to disclose the grounds or sources of information may not
be fatal, failure to place them on record with promptitude may lead the
court in a given case to doubt the veracity of the evidence ultimately
tendered. If, however, the affidavit or the schedtlle or annexure forms
B an integral part of the election petition itself, strict compliance would
be insisted upon.

The next objection is based on the language of section 81 of the
R.P. Act. This section deals with the presentation of an election peti-
tion. Sub-section (1) thereof says that an election petition may be
presented by any candidate at such election or any elector within 45
c days from, but not earlier than, the date of the election of the returned
candidate or if there are more than one returned candidate at the
election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those
dates. This sub-section specifies on what ground or grounds the elec-
tion of the returned candidate can be challenged, who can challenge
D the election and imposes a penod of limitation for filing such a petition.
Sub-section (2) of this section was omitted by Act 47 of 1966. Then
comes sub-section (3) which stipulates that every election petition shall
be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents
mentioned in the petition, and every such copy shall be attested by the
petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.
E This sub-section enjoins (i) supply of such number of copies of the
petition as are respondents and (ii) every such copy must be attested
by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the
petition. There is no controversy regarding the first aspect, the con-
troversy centres round the second part. It must be remembered that
non-compliance with the requirement of sub-section (1) or (3) of
F section 81 can prove fatal in view of section 86(1) of the R.P. Act. See
Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram, [1974] 4 SCC 237; M. Karunanidhi v. Dr.
H. V. Hande, [1983] 2 SCC 473; Mithilesh Kumar Pandey v. Baidya-
nath Yadav, [1984] 2 SCR 278; Rajender Singh v. Usha Rani, [1984] 3
SCC 339 and U.S. Sasidharan v. K. Karunakaran, [1989] 4 SCC 482. It
is quite obvious from these decisions that the requirements of section
G 81(3) are mandatory and failure to comply with them would render the
petition liable to summary dismissal under section 86(1) of the R.P.
Act.

The objection raised in the context of section 81 is that the elec-
tion petition in every case is a mere photocopy prepared from a typed
H one and the copy of the election petition served on the returned candi-
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA [AHMADI, J.] 785

date in each case was not duly attested to be a true copy of the original
A
as required by section 81(3) and hence the petition was liable to be
dismissed in limine under secioll 86(1) of the R.P. Act. Section 81(1).
does not debar photo copying but Rule 1 of the Rules says that it shall
be "type-written or printed". There is no dispute that a model election
petition was prepared and got typed and prints thereof were taken out
by the process of photocopying. These prints were used both as origi- B
nal election petitions as well as copies. The particulars in regard to
each petition, e.g., the names of the parties, the voting pattern, the
towns and villages where utterances amounting to corrupt practice
were made, etc., were filled in and the court fee was affixed on one of
them which constituted the original and photocopies thereof were filed
before the Stamp Reporter in accordance with the Rules. The photo-
copy bearing the court fee stamps was indisputably signed by the elec- c
tion petitioner and was presented with sufficient copies to the Stamp
Reporter. The original election petition is, therefore, a photocopy of
the typed model and the copies are also photocopies prepared from the
original petition. Evidently the underlying idea in providing that the
election petition shall be type-written or printed is to ensure that the D
document is legible. There is no complaint that the document which is
admitted as an election petition and the copies thereof are not legible.
If that be so it is difficult to appreciate the objection that the photo-
copy should not be treated as an original petition even if it otherwise
complies with the requirement of law. The High Court was, therefore,
justified in treating the same as the original election petition. E

The next objection raised by the appellants is that the copy of the
petition served on each one of them is not attested to be a true copy of
\he original petition as required by section 81(3) of the R-P. Act and
Rule 1 of the Rules. Each copy is 'attested as 'certified true copy' and
the petitioner has put his signature thereunder. This, contend the F
appellants, is not in conformity with section 81(3) and, therefore, it is
obvious that the mandatory requirement of section 81(3) re.ad with
section 86(1) is not satisfied. On a plain reading of section 81(3) it
becomes clear that the requirement of that provision is (i) the election
petition should be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are
respondents mentioned in the petition and (ii) e"ery such copy shall be G
attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of
the petition. There is no dispute in regard to the compliance of the first
part. So far as 'the second part is concerned, all that the section
requires is that the copy should be attested by the petitioner to be a
true copy of the petition under his own signature. The requirement of
this part of the provision is met by each copy having been signed at the H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1991] 2 S.C.R.
foot thereof by the concerned petitioner. What is essential is that the
A
petitioner must take the responsibility of the copy being a true copy of
the original petition and sign in token thereof. No particular form of
attestation is prescribed; all that the sub-section enjoins is that the
petitioner must attest the copy under his own signature to be a true
copy of the petition. By certifying the same as true copy and by putting
B his signature at the foot thereof, the petitioner of each election peti-
tion had clearly complied with the letter and spirit of section 81(3) of
the R.P. Act. In fact in Ch. Subba Rao v. Member. E.T. Hyderabad,
[1969] 6 SCR 213 which was followed in Kamalam's case (supra) this
Court had accepted the mere signature without the words like true
copy, sufficient attestation under section 81(3) of the R.P. Act. We
are, therefore, in agreement with the finding recorded in this behalf by
c the High Court.

The next grievance of the appellants is that they were not served
with a true copy of the election petition inasmuch as the annexures
served therewith were not true copies of the original. Section 83(2)
D lays down that any schedule or annexure to the petition shall be signed
by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as a petition. The
grievance under this head is not that there is no compliance with
section 83(2) but that the annexure which was an integral part of the
election petition was not a true copy of the original, inasmuch as
certain pages found in the annexure produced with the petition were
·E missing from the copies supplied to the returned candidates/appel-
lants. It was strongly submitted that an annexure which is an integral
part of the election petition is an important and vital document and
failure to supply a true copy thereof clearly violates the mandatory
requirement oCsection 81(3) and renders the petition liable to be
dismissed by virtue of section 86(1) of the R.P. Act. As held in
F Sahodrabai' case (supra) where details of averments too compendious
for inclusion in the petition are included in the schedule or annexure,
the schedule or annexure in that case must be treated as integrated
with the election petition and must comply with the requirement of
Section 83(2) and section 81(3) failing which the provision of section
86( 1) would stand attracted. But this does not apply to a schedule or
G annexure which produces a document as evidence in support of the
..- allegation in the election petition. Such a schedule or annexure cannot
... be described as integrated with the election petition and defect in
verification thereof would not prove fatal. In Sasidharan's case (supra)
the same principle has been reiterated. In the case the election
petitioner referred to a video cassette showing progress of the consti-
H tuency which also contained speeches of government servants. A copy
F.A. SAPA \I. SINGORA (AHMAiJT, J.I 787

of this document was n.,ot served on the opposite party alongwith the
election petition. It was held that the said document formed part of the A
election petition and failure to supply a copy thereof along with the
election petition was fatal. If a document does not form an integral
part of the election petition but is merely referred to in the petition or
filed in the proceedings as evidence of any fact, failure to supply a copy-
thereof will not prove fatal. Therefore, the maintainability of an elec- B
tion petition, in the context of the point on hand will depend on
whether the schedule or annxure to the petition constitutes an integral
part of the election petition-or not. If it constitutes an integral part it
-l . must satisfy the requirements of section 81(3) and failure in that be~alf
would be fatal. But if it does not constitute an integral part of the
election petition , a copy thereof. need not be served along with the
petition to the opposite party. Much would, therefore, depend on C
whether the schedule or annexure was an integral part of the election
petition or not ; if the former, failure to serve it along with the petition
to the returned candidate would be fatal but not so in the latter case .
The appellants contend that it was an integral part of the election
petition but the High Court did not go into this question; it solely D
relied on the Stamp Reporter's report. It then emp~asised that no
J d<!ct was noticed by the Stamp Reporter in the following words:

"The stamp reporter, in the instant case. found the copies
in order _a nd made his endorsement accordingly . l do not
find any reason not to rely upon the endorsement of the ·E
stamp reporter." "

Therefore, the criticism that the High Court which was duty bound to
'f
apply its mind and decide the question judicially had abdicated . in
favour of the Stamp Reporter's decision extracted earlier~ We are
afraid this criticism is not wholly cprrect, because the High Court has F
also observed that ' no spe~ific omission or deviation in the copy from
the original was pointed out' nor was it shown that the respondents
were misled _on that account. We have also closely scrutinised the
application made by the returned candidate in the High Court and
except for a general allegatioi:i that the annexure served along with the
petition was not a true copy, no specific allegation is found. However, G
in the spe~ial leave petition filed in this Court question No. (vi) states
that certain pages were missing from the copy of the annexure served
on the returned candidate. Then in paragraph 11 it is averred that
pages 15 and 16 of Annexure II were missing. Since no such specific
allegation was made in the application filed by the returned candidate,
the High Court had no occasion to go into this allegation and to ascer- H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991) 2 S.C.R.

A .tain if the missing pages contained material forming an integral part of
the election petition . We would not like to embark upon an inquiry in
this behalf and would leave it to the appellants to agitate the question
before the High Court. We would request the High Court to examine
the contention on merits, if raised, and answer the same in accordance
with law.
B
Although we have come to the conclusion that the defect in
verification is not fatal and can be cured, no attempt has been made by
the election petitioners to cure the same nor has the High Court
directed the petitioners to do so. By way of a sample our attention
was drawn to the election petition No. 7 of 1989 which has given rise to
Civil Appeal No. 179 of 1991. The said petition has 47 paragraphs
c besides the prayer clause. The verification clause shows that para-
graphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 18, 19, 28, 35 , 30, 33, 36, 38, 41to47 of the election
petition are on knowledge whereas paragraphs 7 to 15, 20, to 24, 26,
27, 29, 32 , 34, 35, 37. 40 and 41 are on information received and
believed to be true. It will be seen from the above that paragraphs 3, 6,
D 16, 17, 25, 3 1 and 39 are not verified at all. It was submitted by counsel
for the appellants that paragraph 3 contained vital allegations regard-
ing corrupt practice and since that ·paragraph has not been verified at
all, the appellant is likely to be handicapped at the trial. It was con-
tended that such was the position in as many as six petitions if not
more. Further some of the paragraphs, e.g., 41 are verified under both
E heads of the verification clause, thereby causing confusion. In the
affidavit sworn in comliance of the proviso to section 83( 1) it is stated .
that particulars and details of corrupt practice are contained in
· paragraphs 4 to 40 of the election petition. Then the. petitioner states
that what he has alleged by way of corrupt practice in the election
petition is correct 'to the best of my knowledge and to the information
F received by me and believed by me to be true'. It is thus not clear
which allegation of corrupt practice is based on his knowledge and
which information he believes to be true. Besides when this affirma-
tion is compared with the verification clause of the election petition,
the confusion is worst confounded. Similar is the case with the verifica-
tion of the annexures. There is, therefore , considerable force in the
G submission of ·the learned counsel for the appellants that even if the
High Court concluded that the defect in verification/affirmation was
not fatal , the High Court ought to have directed the petitioners to cure
the defects within the time stipulated by it so that the appellants would
know the exact position before the trial and would not be taken by
surprise. We think the High Court committed an error in failing to give
H a ppropriate directions in the matter. More or less similar defects are
F.A. SAPA v. SINGORA !AHMADI, J.] 789

also found in the verification/affirmation clause in the other election A
petitions/affidavits. We would, therefore, request the High Court to
issue directions to the election petitioner of each petition to remove
the defects within such time as it may allow and if they or any of them
fail to do so, pass appropriate consequential orders in accordance with 1

l~. . B

The High Court has applied the correct test while permitting the
amendments. The High Court has rightly pointed out that the power
conferred by section 86(5) cannot be exercised to allow any amend-
ment which will have the effect of introducing a corrupt practice not
previously alleged in the petition. If it is found that the proposed
amendments are not in the nature of supplying particulars but raise c
new grounds, the same must be rejected but if the amendments arr:
sought for removing vagueness by confining the allegations to the
returned candidate only such an amendment would fall within the
parameters of section 86(5) of the R.P. Act. It was on this correct
understanding of the legal position that the High Court scrutinised the
amendment application. It was not shown at the hearing of these appe- D
als that any particular averment introduced by way of an amendment
had the effect of introducing· a totally new allegation of corrupt
practice not previously pleaded in the election petitions. Yet, if the
appellants can point out any inconsistency, the High Court will remove
the same.
E
These were all the submissions made before us. We have dealt
with them in extenso and have clarified the legal position. We have
suggested certain modifications in the impugned orders and have indi-
cated the course of action to be adopted by the High Court. We need
not recapitulate the modifications and the future course of action. The
impugned order of the High Court in each petition will stand modified F
to the extent it is inconsistent with the legal position explained
hereinabove. The High Court will pass appropriate orders to remove
the inconsistencies. The appeals will stand allowed only to the extent
of the modifications/directions made by this order with no order as to
cost in each election petition.

V.P.R. Appeals partly allowed.