FAKHRUDDIN AHMADversusSTATE OF UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.

                        [2008] 13 S.C.R. 66


A                     FAKHRUDDIN AHMAD
                                 v.
             STATE OF UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.
              (Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2008)

                      SEPTEMBER 5, 2008
B
             [C.K. THAKKER AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]

       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- s.482 - Powers
  under - Exercise of - Scope - Discussed - Held: On facts,
c decision of the High Court to dismiss petition by Appellant u/
  s.482 seeking quashing of charge sheet and consequent
  proceedings initiated against him by Respondent No. 2 for
  alleged commission of offences uls. 420, 467, 468 and 471
  /PC was not in consonance with the broad parameters to be
D applied while dealing with a petition u/s.482 for discharge -
  Matter remitted back to High Court for decision afresh - Penal"
  Code, 1860 - ss. 420, 467, 468 and 471.
         Words and Phrases - "cognizance''- Meaning of - In
    context to s. 190, CrPC.
E       Respondent No.2 statedly issued a cheque in favour
  of Appellant against balance payment due. When the
  cheque was presented for payment, it was returned
  unpaid by the Bank with the remarks 'no fund'. Appellant
  served a legal notice on Respondent No.2 and its partner
F in terms of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
  1881, calling upon them to make payment against the               ·-
  said cheque. On getting the said notice, Respondent No.2
  took the s:and that he had issued a blank cheque bearing
  his signatures to one 'S' as security for money borrowed
G by him from 'S'; that 'S' misplaced the blank cheque, which
  was fraudulently used by the Appellant and presented to
  the banker for encashment. Respondent No.2 lodged a
  complaint against the Appellant before the Judicial
  Magistrate alleging commission of offences under
H                               66
             FAKHRUDDIN AHMAD v. STATE OF                  67
                 UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.

Sections. 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The Magistrate A
directed the police to register the case and investigate it.
Appellant moved the High Court for quashing of the
proceedings before the Magistrate. High Court declined
to interfere and dismissed the petition. Hence the present
appeal.                                                      B
     Remitting back the matter to High Court for decision
afresh, the Court
      HELD:1.1. On receipt of a complaint, the Magistrate
has more than one course open to him to determine tt._ c
procedure and the manner to be adopted for taking
cognizance of the offence;' One of the courses open to
the Magistrate is that instead of exercising his discretion
and taking cognizance of a cognizable offence and
following the procedure laid down under Section 200 or
                                                                0
Section 202 of the CrPC, he may order an investigation to
be made by the police under Section 156(3), which the
Magistrate did in the instant case. When such an order is
made, the police is obliged to investigate the case and
submit a report under Section 173 (2). On receiving the
police report, if the Magistrate is satisfied that on the facts E
discovered or unearthed by the police there is sufficient
material for him to take cognizance of the offence, he
may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190
(1) (b) and issue process straightway to the accused.
However, Section 190(1 )(b) does not lay down that a F
Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the
investigating officer gives an opinion that the investigation
makes out a case against' the ai;:cused. Undoubtedly, the
Magistrate can ignore the conclusion(s) arrived at by the
investigating officer. [Paras 8,9] [74-F,G,H 75 A-C]            G
      1.2. The Magistrate is thus not bound by the opinion
of the investigating officer and he is competent to exercise
his discretion in this behalf, irrespective of the view
expressed by the police in their report and decide whether      H
    68      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2008] 13 S.C.R.


A an offence has been made out Oi not. This is because the
  purpose of the police report under s.173 (2) of the CrPC,
  which will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by
  the police as well as the conclusion drawn by the police
  therefrom is primarily to enable the Magistrate to satisfy
B himself whether on the basis of the report and the material
  referred therein, a case for cognizance is made out or
  not. [Para 1O] [7 5 D-E]
          1.3. The expression 'cognizance' is not defined in
    the Code but is a word of indefinite import. Whether the
C   Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence
    will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case,
    including the mode in which the case is sought to be
    instituted and the nature of the preliminary action.
    Nevertheless, before a Magistrate can be said to have
D   taken cognizance of an offence, it is imperative that he
    must have taken notice of the accusations and applied
    his mind to the allegations made in the complaint or in the
    police report or the information received from a source
    other than a police report, as the case may be, and the
E   material filed therewith. It is only when the Magistrate
    applies his mind and is satisfied that the allegations, if
    proved, would constitute an offence and decides to
    initiate proceedings against the alleged offender, that it
    can be positively stated that he has taken cognizance of
F   the offence. Cognizance is in regard to the offence and
    not the offender. [Paras 14, 15] [76-H, 77-A]
       1.4. In the present case, on presentation of the
  complaint by Respondent No.2 before the Magistrate on
  its perusal, instead of taking cognizance of the offence
G alleged, with a view to issue a process, the Magistrate
  considered it appropriate to send the complaint to the
  police for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code.
  Therefore, it cannot be said that at the initial stage the
  Magistrate had taken cognizance. Thereafter, pursuant
H to the directions by the Magl:strate, the police registered .
                   FAKHRUDDIN AHMAD v. STATE OF                 69
-f                     UTTARANCHAL AND ANR.

      the FIR and submitted its report. It appears from the report A
      that the stand of the complainant that a report regarding
      mfsplacing of the cheque and its user by the appellant
      had been lodged with the police was found to be incorrect.
      Nonetheless, after further investigations the police finally
      filed the chargesheet against the appellant. The Magistrate B
      took cognizance of the offences on the basis of the
      chargesheet and the statements of various persons
      recorded by the police. [Paras 16, 17, 18] [77 D-F, 78 8-C]
           Ajit Kumar Pa/it v. State of West Bengal (1963) Supp. 1
      SCR 953 and S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v.            c
      .Videocon International Ltd. & .Ors (2008) 2 SCC 492 - relied
      on.
             R. R. Chari v. State of UP A.l.R. (38) 1951 SC 207;
      Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty (1910) ILR 37
                                                                 D
      Calcutta 412 and Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal
      Affair, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee AIR 37 (1950)
      Calcutta 437 - referred to.
            2.1. Though the powers possessed by the High
      Court under Section 482, CrPC are very wide but these E
      should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito
      justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
      administration of which alone the Courts exist. The
      inherent powers possessed by the High Court are to be
      exercised very carefully and with great caution so that a F
      legitimate prosecution is not stifled. Nevertheless, where
      t~.e High Court is convinced that the allegations made in
      the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they
      are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,
      do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
                                                                    G
      case against the accused or where the allegations made
      in the F.l.R. or the complaint are so absurd and inherently
 ""   improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can
      ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
      for proceeding against the accused, the powers ofthe
                                                                      H
    70      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2008) 13 S. C.R.
                                                                  \-
A High Court under the said provision should be exercised.
  [Para 19) [79-E-G]
        2.2. In the present case, the High Court has itself
  observed that no material had been placed before it, which,
  in fact, led the Judge to assume that the prosecution has
8 produced evidence in support of the complaint. It is, thus,
  manifest that in the absence of material stated to have
  been filed alongwith the chargesheet, the High ·Court did
  not get an opportunity to apply its mind as to whether on
  the basis of the material before the Magistrate, a prima
C facie case had been made out against the accused-
  appellant. In order to arrive at a conclusion, whether or
  not the appellant had made out a case for quashing of
  the chargesheet against him, the High Court ought to
  have taken into consideration the material which was
D placed before the Magistrate. For dismissal of the petition,
  the High Court had to record a finding that the
  uncontroverted allegations, as made, establish a prima
  facie case against the appellant. [Paras 18, 20) [78 H, 79
  A 8, 80 8-C]
E       2.3. The decision of the High Court dismissing the
  petition filed by the appellant on the ground that it is not
  permissible for it to look into the materials placed before
  the Magistrate is not in consonance with the broad
  parameters, enumerated in a series of decisions of this
F Court, to be applied while dealing with a petition under        >
  s.482 of the Code for discharge and, therefore, the
  impugned order is unsustainable. [Para 20) [80 8,C,D]
      State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992)
G Supp 1 sec 335 - relied on.
                        Case Law Reference
         (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 953       relied on     Para 12
         (1910) ILR 37 Calcutta 412   referred to   Para 1~
H        (2008) 2 SCC 492             relied on     Para 13
                         FAKHRUDDIN AHMAD v. STATE OF                       71
·j                     UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.'.]

                 AIR 37 (1950) Calcutta 437        referred to      Para 13       A
                 A.LR. (38) 1951 SC 207            referred to      Para 13
                 (1992) Supp 1 sec 335             relied on        Para 19
                 CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
            No. 1408 of 2008                                                      B

                 from the final Judgment and order dated 21/6/2006 of the
            High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Crl. Misc. Application
            No. 434 of 2006
                 Salman Khurshid, lmtiaz Ahmed and Naghma lmtiaz (for             c
            Mis. Equity Lex Associates) for the Appellant.
                 SatyajitA. Desai, Amoj N. Suryawanshi, Anagha S. Desai,
            A.P. Sahay and J.K. Bhatia for the Respondents.
                 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                       D
 ../
                 D.K. JAIN, J.: 1. Leave granted.
                  2. This appeal, by special leave, arises from the order
            dated 21st June, 2006 passed by the High Court of Uttaranchal
            in Criminal Misc. Application No.434 of 2006. By the impugned         E
            order, the High Court has dismissed the petition preferred by
            the appellant under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
            Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code'), seeking quashing of
            the chargesheet dated 15th December, 2005 and consequent
            proceedings initiated against him by respondent No.2 in this
                                                                                  F
            appeal, hereinafter referred to as the complainant, for allegedly
            committing offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468
            and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'the l.P.C.').
                 3. A few material facts giving rise to the present appeal are:
                  The appellant owns a poultry farm. According to the G
             appellant, he used to supply chickens to the complainant and
     ...     his partner on cash and credit basis. On 15th June, 2005, the
           · complainant is stated to have issued a cheque in the sum of
             Rs.8,65,000/- drawn on Union Bank of India in favour of the
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    72       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2008] 13 S.C.R
                                                                       \·
A appellant against the balance payment due. When the cheque
  was presented for payment, it was returned unpaid by the Bank
  with the remarks 'having no fund'. Thereupon, on 7th September,
  2005, the appellant served a legal notice on the complainant
  and his partner in terms of Section 138 of the Negotiable
B Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'the Act'}, calling upon them to
  make payment against the said cheque. On getting the said
  notice, the complainant is stated to have cooked up a story that
  he had issued blank cheques bearing his signatures to one
  Salim Ali as security for Rs.30,000/- borrowed by him along
c with a guarantee receipt dated 25th June, 2005 on a stamp
  paper. Salim Ali misplaced the aforementioned blank cheque,
  which was fraudulently used by the appellant by filling up the
  amount of Rs.8,65,000/- and was presented to the banker for
  encashment. The complainant claims to have informed the bank
  about the loss of the cheque.
D
        4. On 15th September, 2005, the complainant lodged a
                                                                       ,.
  complaint against the appellant before the Judicial Magistrate
  alleging commission of offences under Sections 420, 467, 468
  and 471 l.P.C. The learned Magistrate, vide his order dated
E 19th September, 2005, directed the police to register the case
  and investigate it. In the meanwhile, on 10th October, 2005, the
  appellant filed a complaint against the complainant and his
  partner under Section 138 of the Act and Section 420 l.P.C.
  The Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint and
F issued summons against the complainant.
        5. Aggrieved by the filing of the complaint by the
  complainant, the appellant moved the High Court for quashing
  of the proceedings before the Magistrate. As noted above, the
  High Court declined to interfere. Dismissing the petition, the
G High Court observed thus:
         "The prosecution has collected the evidence in this matter,
         though the evidence has not been filed before this Court
         by the applicant. Non-presentation of the statements
         recorded under Section ·151 Cr.P.C. leads me to take an
H
_,                   FAKHRUDDIN AHMAD v. STATE OF
                   UTTARANCHALAND ANR. (D.K. JAIN, J.:]
                                                                        73


             assumption that the prosecution has led the evidence to A
             support to the contention of the complainant. If there is an
             evidence and it discloses the prima facie case (sic)
             against the present applicant, there is no requirement of
             the said statement at this stage. If the applicant wants to
             make any such averment or submission that it cannot be B
             believed on account of certain contradictions in the
             documents, it can only be raised during the trial. This court
             cannot evaluate the disputed facts of the case. This court
             cannot decide as to whether the evidence is reliable or
             not."                                                           c
             Hence the presen~ appeal.
               6. Mr. Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel, appearing
        on behalf of the appellant submitted before us that the order
        passed by the High Court dismissing the petition is unsustainable
                                                                               D
        both in law as also on facts of the case. It was contended that
        the High Court failed to appreciate that the Magistrate had
        decided to proceed with the case improperly without application
        of mind, which is evident from the fact that: (i) the report submitted
        by the police pursuant to the direction issued by the Magistrate
        under Section 156(3) of the Code was in favour of the appellant; E
        (ii) the cheque in question was neither seen nor seized by the
        investigating officer and (iii} the chargesheet filed is perfunctory
        inasmuch as the assertions made therein, even iftaken on face
        value, do not satisfy the ingredients of any of the offences alleged
        to have been committed by the appellant. It was urged that the E
""      complaint against the appellant was frivolous and had been
        instituted with an ulterior motive to wreak vengeance and to
        pre-empt the filing of complaint against the complainant under
        Section 138 of the Act. It was, thus, argued that the parameters
        of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code laid down by G
        this Court in State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1
        are clearly attracted on facts in hand and, therefore, it was a fit
 >---   case where the High Court ought to have exercised its
        jurisdiction under the said provision.
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    74       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2008) 13 S.C.R.


A        7. Per contra, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, learned counsel
    appearing on behalf of the complainant, while supporting the
    order passed by the High Court, submitted that the assertions
    made in the chargesheet on the basis of the material collected
    by the police do constitute cognizable offences and as such,
s   the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition.
        8. Before examining the rival contentions, we may briefly
  refer to some of the relevant provisions in the Code. Chapter
  XIV of the Code, containing Sections 190 to 199 deals with the
  statutory conditions requisite for initiation of criminal
C proceedings and as to the powers of cognizance of a Magistrate.
  Sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code empowers a
  Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence in the manner laid
  therein. It provides that a Magistrate may take cognizance of an
  offence either (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which
D constitute such offence; or (b) upon a police report of such
  facts; or (c) upon information received from any person other
  than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such
  offence has been committed. Chapter XV containing Sections
  200 to 203 deals with "Complaints to Magistrates" and lays
E down the procedure which is required to be followed by the
  Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint.
  Similarly, Chapter XVI deals with "Commencement of
  Proceedings before Magistrates". Since admittedly, in the
  present case, the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the
F complaint in terms of Section 190 of the Code, we shall confine
  our discussion only to the said provision. We may, however,
  note that on receipt of a complaint, the Magistrate has more
  than one course open to him to determine the procedure and
  the manner to be adopted for taking cognizance of the offence.
G       9. One of the courses open to the Magistrate is that instead
  of exercising his discretion and taking cognizance of a
  cognizable offence and following the procedure laid down under
  Section 200 or Section 202 of the Code, he may order an
  investigation to be made by the police under Section 156 (3)
H of the Code, which the learned Magistrate did in the instant
                         FAKHRUDDIN AHMAD v. STATE OF                       75
                       UTTARANCHALANDANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.:]
-}
            case. When such an order is made, the police is obliged to A
            investigate the case and submit a report under Section 173 \2)
            of the Code. On receiving the police report, if the Magistrate is
            satisfied that on the facts discovered or unearthed by the police
            there is sufficient material for him to take cognizance of the
            offence, he may take cognizance of the offence under Section B
            190 (1) (b) of the Code and issue process straightway to the
            accused. However, Section 190 (1) (b) of the Code does not
            lay down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence
            only if the investigating officer gives an opinion that the
            investigation makes out a case against the accused.                   c
            Undoubtedly, the Magistrate can ignore the conclusion(s) arrived
            at by the investigating officer.

                  10. Thus, it is trite that the Magistrate is not bound by the
            opinion of the investigating officer and he is competent to
            exercise his discretion in this behalf, irrespective of the view      D
            expressed by the police in their report and decide whether an
            offence has been made out or not. This is because the purpose
            of the police report under Section 173 (2) of the Code, which
            will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the police as
            well as the conclusion drawin by the police therefrom is primarily    E
            to enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself whether on the basis
            of the report and the mat.erial referred therein, a case for
            cognizance is made out or not.

                  11. The next incidental question is as to what is meant by
            expression 'taking cognizance of an offence' by a Magistrate          F
 -",
            within the contemplation of Section 190 of the Code?
                  12. The expression 'cognizance' is not defi'ned in the Code
            but is a word of indefinite import. As observed by this Court in
            Ajit Kumar Pa/it Vs. State of West Benga/ 2 , the word
                                                                               G
            'cognizance' has no esoteric or mvstic significance in criminal
            law or procedure. It merely means-·become aware of and when
            used with reference to a Court o,r Judge, to take notice of
     .I.·
            judicially. Approving the observatiom'; of the Calcutta High Court
            in Emperor Vs. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty3, the Court
                                                                               H
    76        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008] 13 S.C.R


A   said that 'taking cognizance does not involve any formal action;
    or indeed action of any kind. but occurs as soon as a Magistrate.
    as such, applies his mind to the suspected commission of an
    offence.'

        13. Recently, this Court in S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement
8 Officer Vs. Videocon International Ltd. & Ors. 4 . speaking
  through C.K. Thakker, J . while considering the.ambit and scope
  of the phrase 'taking cognizance' under Section 190 of the
  Code, has highlighted some of .the observations of the Calcutta
  High Court in Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal
C Affairs, West Bengal Vs. Abani Kumar Banerjee 5 , which were
  approved by this Court in R. R. Chari Vs. State of U.P 6 . The
  obseNations are:

         "7 .... What is 'taking cognizance' has not been defined in
         the Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now
D
         to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that
         before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken
         cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1 )(a) CrPC,
         he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of
         the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of
E        proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the
         subsequent provisions of this Chapter, proceeding under
         Section 200, and thereafter sending it for enquiry and
         report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies
         his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the
F        subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action
         of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under
         Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose
         of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken
         cognizance of the offence."
G
          14. From the afore-noted judicial pronouncements, it is
    clear that being an expression of indefinite import, it is neither
    practicable nor desirable to precisely define as to what is meant
    by 'taking cognizance'. Whether the Magistrate has or has not
    taken cognizance of the offence will depend upon the
H
                        F.l\KHRUDDIN AHMAD v. STATE OF                   77
                      UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.:]

        circumstances of the particular case, including the mode in            A
        which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the
        preliminary action.
               15. Nevertheless, it is well settled that before a Magistrate
        can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence, it is
~
        imperative that he must have taken notice of the accusations           B
        and applied his mind to the allegations made in the complaint
        or in the police report or the information received from a source
        other than a police report, as the case may be, and the material
        filed therewith. It needs little emphasis that it is only when the
        Magistrate applies his mind and is satisfied that the allegations,     c
        if proved, would constitute an offence and decides to initiate
        proceedings against the alleged offender, that it can be positively
        stated that he has taken cognizance of the offence. Cognizance
        is in regard to the offence and not the offender.
                                                                               D
 -+           16. Adverting to the facts on hand, as noted above, on
         presentation of the complaint by the complainant before the
         Magistrate on 15th September, 2005, on its perusal, instead of
         taking cognizance of the offence alleged, with a view to issue
         a process, the learned Magistrate considered it appropriate to
         send the complaint to the police for investigation under Section
                                                                               E:
         156 (3) of the Code. Therefore, it cannot be said that at the
         initial stage on 15th September, 2005 the Magistrate had taken
         cognizance. Thereafter, pursuant to the directions by the
        ·Magistrate, the police registered the F.1.R. on 22nd September,
-'""'    2005 and submitted its report which reads as under:                   F

              "Sir,
              Applicant Virendra Singh Chauhan, the abovementioned,
              has issued two blank cheques bearing no. and Ale no. as
              mentioned back, has been issued to Salim Ali against the         G
              guarantee for Rs.30,000/- taken from him. The report of it
              being misplaced from the hands of Salim Ali has been
              given to Police Station and same the action has been
              taken in Bank by Accused Fakhrqddin in relation to the
              cheques. There exist no evidence regarding this with the         H
    78        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008) 13 S.C.R.


A        Applicant. The lodging of report regarding misuse of
         cheques by Fakhruddin or any application thereto has not
         been confirmed. Send for kind perusal.
                                                    S.I. Dinesh Rana
                                                       P.S. Haldwani"
B
        17. It appears from the afore-extracted report that the stand
  of the complainant that a report regarding misplacing of the
  cheque and its user by the appellant had been lodged with the
  police was found to be incorrect. Nonetheless, aft1ar further
C investigations the police finally filed the chargesheet against
  the appellant on 15th December, 2005. Relevant portion of the
  chargesheet reads thus:
         "Applicant Virendra Singh Chauhan on 22.09.05 vide
         Order of Ld. Court u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. filed a report that
D        accused block no.3 after getting the cheque somehow,
         issued by Applicant, which got misplaced by witness Salim
         Ali, by his own accord filled hefty amount of Rs.8,65,000/
         - (Rupees Eight Lacs Sixty Five Thousands only) and
         produced it before the Bank for the withdrawal of the same
E        but did not get the money as cash was not there. This
         case, after recording statement, case was investigated
         and till now after investigation, against the accused, u/s
         420, 467, 468, 471 !PC is proved. There is stay arrested
         against accused from High Court of Na1inital. Hence, it is
F        prayed that accused be summoned and after taking
         evidence he be punished."

        18. Although the order passed by the Magistrate taking
  cognizance is not before us but it is stated that the Magistrate
  took cognizance of the aforenoted offences on the basis of the
G afore-extracted chargesheet and the statements of various
  persons recorded by the police. Learned counsel appearing
  for the State placed on record copies of the statements. It is
  pertinent to note that in the impugned order, extracted above,
  the High Court has itself observed that no mdterial had been
H plased before it, which, in fact. led t!le learned .!t.:dge to assume
                        FAKHRUDDIN AHMAD v. STATE OF                     79
                      UTTARANCHAL AND ANR. [D.K. JAIN, J.:]
    ->·
             that the prosecution has produced evidence in support of the A
             complaint. It is, thus, manifest that in the absence ·of material
             stated to have been filed alongwith the chargesheet, the High
             Court did not get an opportunity to apply its mind as to whether
             on the basis of the material before the Magistrate, a prima facie
             case had been made out against the accused-appellant. Under B
     i.
          · these circumstances, we feel that it may not be proper to express
           · any opinion on the merits of the case against the appellant based
             on the documents _placed before us by lea med counsel for the
             State, save and except noting that the cheque in question, i.e. the
             'valuable security' does not form part of this set of documents. c
                 19. So far as the scope ahd ambit of the powers of the
~          High Court under Section 482 of the Code is concerned, the
           same has been enunciated and reiterated by this Court jn a
           catena of decisions and illustrative circumstances under which
           the High Court can exercise jurisdiction in quashing proceedings 0
           have been enumerated. However, for the sake of brevity, we do
           not propose to make reference to the decisions on the point. It
           would suffice to state that though the powers possessed by the
           High Court under the said provision are very wide but these
           should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae E
           to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which
           alone the Courts exist. The inherent powers possessed by the .
           High Court are to be exercised very carefully and with great
           caution so that a legitimate prosecution is not stifled.
     ,.    Nevertheless, where the High Court is convinced that the F
           allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint,
           even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
           entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
           a case against the accused or where the allegations made in
           the F.l.R. or the complaint are so absurd and inherently
                                                                              G
           improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
           reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
           proceeding against the accused, the powers of the High Court
           under the said provision should be exercised. [See: Bhajan
           Lat's case (supra)]
                                                                              H
    80       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008) 13 S.C.R


A       20. Beaiing in mind the above legal position, we are
  convinced that the High Court was not justified in dismissing
  the petition on the afore-stated ground. In our opinion, in order
  to arrive at a conclusion, whether or not the appellant had made
  out a case for quashing of the chargesheet against him, the
B High Court ought to have taken into consideration the material
  which was placed before the Magistrate. For dismissal of the
  petition, the High court had to record a finding that the
  uncontroverted allegations, as made, establish a prima facie
  case against the appellant. In our judgment, the decision of the
C High Court dismissing the petition filed by the appellant on the
  ground that it is not permissible for it to look into the materials
  placed before the Magistrate is not in consonance with the
  broad parameters, enumerated in a series of decisions of this
  Court and briefly noted above, to be applied while dealing with
  a petition under Section 482 of the Code for discharge and,
0
  therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable.
       21. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order is set
  aside and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for
  fresh consideration in accordance with law. Nothing said
E hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of any opinion
  on the merits of the case.
         22. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
    B.B.B.                                    Appeal disposed of.