Supreme Court of India
G.M. HARYANA ROADWAYSversusJAI BHAGWAN AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 312
- Decided
- 5 March 2008
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
Suppression of material fact by the State in an SLP is a serious breach; the SLP is dismissed and exemplary costs are imposed.
Summary
The State, G.M. Haryana Roadways, terminated a casual driver, Jai Bhagwan, whose reinstatement was ordered by the Labour Court. The State reinstated him on 10 May 2002 and later regularized his service on 21 June 2004, but failed to disclose these material facts in a writ petition before the High Court and again in a Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed before this Court. The SLP, filed 721 days after the reinstatement order and beyond the 153‑day limitation, sought a stay of the High Court’s dismissal of the writ. The respondent’s counter‑affidavit revealed the non‑disclosure. The Supreme Court held that suppression of material facts by the State is a serious breach, barred the SLP, dismissed it, and imposed exemplary costs of Rs.1,00,000.
Issues considered
- Whether the State’s non‑disclosure of its reinstatement and regularisation orders constitutes suppression of material fact warranting dismissal of the SLP.
- Whether the SLP filed beyond the 153‑day limitation can be condoned.
- Whether exemplary costs may be awarded for suppression of material facts and delay by the State.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. 136
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 25F, s. 25G, s. 2A
Subjects
Special Leave PetitionSuppression of material factLimitation periodExemplary costsIndustrial Disputes ActReinstatementState liabilityProcedural law
Judgment
(2008] 3 S.C.R. 1156
A G.M. HARYANA ROADWAYS
II.
JAi BHAGWAN AND ANR.
(Special Leave Petition (C) No. 23385 of 2004)
MARCH 5, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950 - art. 136:
SLP -- Petitioner-State taking one stand before Court but
C acting otherwise on the administrative side - Suppressing
material facts before Court by non-disclosure - Held:
Suppression of material fact and that too at the instance of the
State must be viewed seriously-Also on facts, State was guilty
of serious delay and /aches - Hence, SLP liable to be
D dismissed -- Exemplary cost of Rs. 1 lakh also imposed -
Del?Y I /aches.
Respondent No.1, a casual worker in the State
Roadways, was terminated from service. The Labour
E Court directed his reinstatement. Accordingly the State
Roadways re-instated Respondent No.1 but subsequently
filed writ petition before the High Court questioning the
award passed by the Labour CoLtrt. The factum of re-
instatement was not disclosed in the writ petition which
was summarily dismissed. Subsequently services of
F Respondent No.1 was regularized in terms of a scheme.
Thereafter the State Roadways filed the present
Special Leave Petition without disclosing the facts of
reinstatement and regularization. Respondent No.1 in his
G counter affidavit brought the aforementioned facts to the
notice of this Court.
Dismissing the SLP, the Court
HELD: 1. The explanation offered by the petitioner
H' .. 1156
G.M. HARYANA ROADWAYS v. JAi BHAGWAN AND 1157
ANR.
.. that non-disclosure of the said facts was not intentional A
+- cannot be accepted. The writ petition was filed before the
High Court after a period of about one year and five
months. Even prior thereto, the respondent was
reinstated in service. [Para 10J [1162-A, BJ
2. The Special Leave Petition was barred by 153 days, B
'F
but despite the same the orders dated 10.5.2002
... reinstating the first respondent and that of 21.6.2004
regularising his services were not brought to the notice
of the court. The delay occurred in filing the SLP was, in
fact, about 721 days. However, it appears that 478 days c
time was taken for obtaining the certified copy of the order
of the High Court which also appears to be a bit unusual.
[Para 11 J [1162-B, C, DJ
\
3.1. It is not understandable as to how even in a case
1 D
1
of this nature where the State pretended to be so serious
in obtaining a principle of law determined by this Court,
such a delay took place both in filing the writ petition as
also the Special Leave Petition. Suppression of material
fact is viewed seriously by the Superior Courts exercising
their discretionary jurisdiction. [Para 12J [1162-D, EJ E
3.2. The suppression must be of material fact so as
to enable it to refuse to exercise its discretionary
+· jurisdiction. What would be a material fact, suppression
whereof would disentitle the Appellant to obtain a F
discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. [Para 12) [1163-B]
S. J. S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of B1har and
Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 166; Arunima Baruah v. Union of India
(UOI) and Ors. (2007) 6 sec. 120 and Prestige Lights Ltd. v. G
State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC 449 - relied on.
t-- 4. If the aforementioned facts had been brought to
the notice of this Court, the Special Leave Petition might
·have been dismissed summarily. Even ~lay in filing. the
H ..
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
A same might not have been condoned. The Court was not _.
required to waste so much of time when the State itself ;-
had, for all intent and purport, accepted the award.
Furthermore, the State was guilty of serious delay and
latches. Therefore, for suppression of fact of such a nature
B and that too at the instance of the State must be viewed
seriously. It is expected that in future the State would take ~
necessary measures in pursuing its matter before the
Superior Court keeping in view the conduct expected of
...
a State. [Paras 12, 13] [1163-E, F, G]
C 5. Not only this special leave petition should be
dismissed but exemplary costs should also be awarded
in the matter. The cost is quantified at Rs.1,00,000/-.
[Para 14] [1164-A]
D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 23385 of 2004.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.9.2002 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No.
15317/2002.
E Manjit Singh Addi. A.G. T.V. George and Kavita Wadia for
the Petitioner.
S.K. Sabharwal for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. First respondent was appointed as a
Driver on daily wages by the appellant roadways. He was a·
casual employee. He was being paid wages at the rate fixed by
the Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak.
G 2. Indisputably, he was continuously working from 4.8.1995.
Allegedly, he abandoned the service. First Respondent's
contention, however, is that his services were illegally terminated.
3. First respondent filed an application under Section 2A
H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 praying for his reinstatement
G.M. HARYANA ROADWAYS v. JAi BHAGWAN AND 1159
ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
~
with full back wages along with continuity of service and other A
t-
statutory benefits.
The said application was allowed by the Labour Court.
Before the Labour Court, appellant did not adduce any evidence
to establish to its contention that workman himself had left his·
job. Apart from the fact that he was found to be working for more B
·t-
than 240 days during the period of 12 months preceding the
... date of his termination and furthermore as admittedly the .
mandatory requirements of Section 25F of the Act had not been
complied with, the learned labour court also found that some
drivers who were junior to him had been retained in service in c
violation of the provisions of Section 25G of the Act. It was,
therefore, directed that the respondent be reinstated on his
previous post with continuity of service and full back wages from
the date ofservice of the notice of demand.
-;, D
4. The said award appears to have been implemented in
"' part as the first respondent was reinstated in service by an order
dated 10.5.2002 passed by the General Manager, Haryana
Roadways, Rohtak, stating :
\
"As per Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rohtak judgment E
dated 28.2.2000, Shri Jai Bhagwan, Ex. Driver D.W. s/o
Shri Ram Kishan is hereby reinstated with immediate effect
along with continuity of service subject to decision of
outcome of the CWP/SLP on the post of Driver on daily
+
wages upto 31.5.2002. He will be paid as per@ fixed by F
Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak. He is posted at Rohtak &
Driver allotted No.102A.
The terms and conditions of the appointment will
remain the same as per previous order. His services are
liable to be terminated at any time without prior notice or G
assigning any reason. He can be transferred to any unit of
Transport Department, Haryana."
5. It is a matter of some significance that on the said date,
namely, 10.5.2002, no writ petition had been filed. A writ petition
H
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
A was fileid questioning the said award before the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh only on 27.7.2002. It does
not appear that even in the writ petition, the fact that first
respondent had been reinstated in service in term of the award
of the learned Labour Court was disclosed. The said writ petition
B was summarily dismissed by an order dated 23.9.2002.
6. Relying on or on the basis of a purported scheme for
regularization, the services of the first respondent were ...
regularized, stating :
c "In pursuance of the Transport Commissioner, Haryana,
letter No.1224-45/A2/E3 dated 23.3.1998 and letter
No.3471-90/A2/E3 dated 6.7.1999. Your services are
hereby regularized as driver w.e.f. 10.5.2002 after
completing 2 years of service in the scale of Rs.4000-
100-4800-EB-100-6000 subject to final outcome of
D
decision in CWP/SLP on the following terms and
conditions .... "
7. The special leave petition was filed before the Court on
13.9.2004 with an application for condonation of 153 days' delay.
E In the List of Dates filed with the SLP, the fact that the first
respondent had been reinstated in service or that his services
had been regularized had not been disclosed. To crown all, a
prayer for interim relief was made to the following effect :
"It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that Your Lordships
F may graciously be pleased to grant ad interim ex parte
stay of the operation of the final judgment and Order dated
23.9.2002 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh in CWP No.15317 of 2002."
G 8. A notice in this matter was issued by this Court on
1.11.2004. First Respondent in his counter affidavit brought the
aforementioned facts to the notice of this Court.
When the matter was heard on 7.12.2007, this Court
observed:
H
G.M. HARYANA ROADWAYS v. JAi BHAGWAN AND 1161
ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
... "When the matter was called out learned counsel for the A
i-
respondents has produced before us a letter dated
21.6.2004 whereby the services of respondent No.1 have
been regularized as driver with effect from 20.5.2002. The
said fact has not been mentioned in the list of dates. It
appears that questioning the award passed by the B
-+--
Industrial ribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, a writ petition·
.. was filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which
was dismissed by an order dated 23.9.2002. When the
matter came up before this Court, this Court not only issued
notice on the special leave petition but also issued notice c
on the prayer for interim relief .
.It is, therefore, evident that, on the one hand, the
petitioner has been questioning the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Court to direct reinstatement with full back-wages
~.
of the workman and, on the other, it itself has been passing D
~ such orders.
One of the grounds taken in the special leave petition
·is that the appointment of respondent No.1 in service was
not on a sanctioned post and he had abandoned the job
on his own during the period of question. E
Let notice be issued to the petitioner as to why an
appropriate order shall not be passed against the
administration of the Haryana Roadways, Rohtak, ir:i view
+ of the fact that they are taking one stand before the Court F
but acting otherwise on the administration side as also
withholding the material fact before the court.
Affidavit be filed before 7th January, 2008.
Put up the matter on 15th January, 2008."
G
9. Pursuant to the said directions, an affidavit has been
filed on 8.1.2008 stating that there was a communication gap
!--
between the Department and the counsel for the petitioner. No
explanation had been offered why material facts, as noticed
H
1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 3 S.C.R.
A hereinbefore, had not been disclosed in the list of dates.
10. Mr. Manjit Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General
appearing on behalf of the petitioner, would submit that non-
disclosure of the said facts was not intentional. We do not accept
the said explanation. We have noticed hereinbefore that the writ
8 petition was filed before the High Court after a period of about
one year and five months. Even prior thereto, the respondent
was reinstated in service.
11. We have also noticed that the Special Leave Petition
c was barred by 153 days, but despite the same the
aforementioned orders dated 10.5.2002 reinstating the first
respondent and that of 21.6.2004 regularising his services were
not brought to the notice of the court. The delay occurred in filing
the SLP was, in fact, about 721 days. However, it appears that
478 days time was taken for obtaining the certified copy of the
0
order of the High Court which also appears to be a bit unusual.
12. We fail to understand how even in a case of this nature
where the State pretended to be so serious in obtaining a
principle of law determined by this Court, such a delay took
E place both in filing the writ petition as also the Special Leave
Petition.
Suppression of material fact is viewed seriously by the
Superior Courts exercising their discretionary jurisdiction. In
S.J. S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors.
F [(2004)7SCC166], this court on suppression of fact held:
"As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a
litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief.
This rule has been evolved out of the need of the Courts
to deter a litigant from abusing the process of Court by
G
deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material
one in the sense that had it not bean suppressed it would
have had an effect on the merits of the case."
The said observation was quoted with approval by one of
H
G.M. HARYANA ROADWAYS v. JAi BHAGWAN AND 1163
ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
.. us in Arunima Baruah v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. [(2007) A
~
6 SCC 120], wherein the question which was raised was: How
far and to what extent suppression of fact by way of non-
disclosure would affect a person's right of access to justice?
The court notices that so as to enable it to refuse to exercise
its discretionary jurisdiction, the suppression must be of material B
+· fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would
~
disentitle the Appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Recently, in-Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India c
[(2007) 8 sec 449), this court held :
·"The High Court is exercising discretionary and ..
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a
-\
Court of Equity.. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that D
~ when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all
the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there
is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant
or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the
Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss E
it without entering into merits of the matter."
Had the aforementioned facts been brought to the notice
of this Court, the Special Leave Petition might have been
+ dismissed summarily. Even delay in filing the same might not
have been condoned. The Court w_as not required to waste so F
much of time when the State itself had, for all intent and purport,
accepted the award.
13. Furthermore, the State was guilty of serious delay and
latches. We, therefore, are of the opinion that for suppression
G
of fact of such a nature and that too at the instance of the State
must be viewed seriously. We hope and trust that in future the
t-- State shall take necessary measures in pursuing its matter
before the Superior Court keeping in view the conduct expected
of a State.
H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 3 S.C.R.
A 14. We, therefore, direct that not only this special leave
petition should be dismissed but exemplary costs should also
be awarded in the matter. The cost is quantified at Rs.1,00,000/
- (Rupees one lac only). As the respondent had not appeared
today, we are of the opinion that the cost should be paid to the
B National Legal Services Authority. The amount may be deposited
with the Member-Secretary, National Legal Services Authority
within a period of four weeks failing which it would be entitled to
realize the same in accordance with law with interest at the rate
...
of 12% per annum.
B.B.B. Special Leave Petition dismissed.
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