Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Industrial Tribunal correctly identified the workmen as employees of ONGC, and there was no perversity or patent illegality in its award, so the appeal was dismissed.

Summary

The Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) engaged a large number of workers through contractors for its drilling operations in Cachar. The ONGC Contractual Workers Union sought regularisation of these workers' services, leading the State Government to refer the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the workers were direct employees of ONGC and ordered their regularisation; ONGC challenged this, and a Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court reversed the award, deeming the workers as contractor employees and holding the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction. A Division Bench of the High Court set aside the Single Judge’s order and restored the Tribunal’s award, prompting ONGC to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the core issue was the employment status of the workers, found that the Tribunal had correctly determined they were ONGC employees, and observed no perversity or patent illegality in the award, thus dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

The true employment status of the workmen – whether they were employees of ONGC or of the contractors.
Whether the Industrial Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding beyond the reference made by the State Government.
Whether the High Court could interfere with the factual findings of the Industrial Tribunal under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Whether contract labourers are entitled to regularisation under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 227
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970s. 10
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Subjects

contract labourregularisationindustrial tribunalemployment statusjurisdictionArticle 226lifting the veilONGCunionindustrial dispute

Judgment

[2008] 8 S.C.R. 1223

.., G.M. ONGC, SHILCHAR A
v.
ONGC CONTRACTUAL WORKERS UNION
(Civil Appeal No. 4755 of 2001)
MAY 16,2008
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
~

Labour Laws - Industrial dispute - Employees claiming
regularization - reference to Industrial tribunal on the ques-
tion of regularization - Tribunal holding that the employees
being the direct employees of the principal employer and not c
that of the contractor; entitled to regularization - Single Judge
of High Court holding that workmen were employees of con-
tractor; hence not entitled to regularization - Division Bench
of High Court upholding the order of tribunal - On appeal,
• held: Workmen were entitled to regularization - Decision of D
the tribunal was not beyond the reference, as the real issue
was status of workmen and not regularization simpliciter- Tri-
bunal and Division Bench of High Court were justified in lift-
ing the veil in order to determine the nature of employment-
Contract Labour (Regularization and Abolition) Act, 1970. E

. 4'
The respondent-Union raised a dispute demanding
regularization of the services of its members. The demand
was opposed by the appellant-employer. Government
made a reference to Industrial Tribunal. Tribunal held that
the members of the Union were the employees of the ap- F
pellant and hence their services were liable to be regular-
ized. Appellant challenged the award. Single Judge of
High Court held that the appellant was not obliged to regu-
larize the services as the members of the Union were em-
~
ployees of the contractor and not of the appellant; and fur- G
, ther held that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by de-
ciding beyond the reference. In writ appeal, Division Bench
of High Court, setting aside the order of Single Judge up-
held that of the Tribunal. Hence the present appeal.
1223 H
1224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the light of the facts that have come
on record there is no perversity or patent illegality in the
Award of the Industrial Tribunal and on the contrary the
Tribunal has minutely examined the evidence in arriving
8 at its decision. In this view of the matter, it was inappro-
priate for the Single Judge of High Court to have re-ap-
praised the evidence and come to a different conclusion. •
[Para 9] [1232-C,D]
c 1.2 There are several observations which do sug-
gest that a workman who has put in 240 days or is a con-
tractual worker, is not entitled automatically to regulariza-
tion. However, the present case is not one of regulariza-
tion simpliciter such as in the case of an ad-hoc or casual
employee claiming this privilege. The basic issue in the
0
present case is the status of the workmen and whether
they were the employees of the ONGC or the contractor
and in the event that they were employees of the former,
claim to be treated at par with other such employees. This
was the basic issue on which the parties went to trial,
E notwithstanding the confusion created by the ill-worded
reference. The Division Bench has examined the evidence
on this aspect and has endorsed the finding of the Indus-
trial Tribunal. (Para 10] [1232-F-H, 1233-A,B]
F 1.3 The real issue was as to the status of the work-
men as employees of the ONGC or of the contractor, and
it having been found that the workmen were the employ-
ees of the ONGC they would ipso-facto be entitled to all
benefits available in that capacity, and the issue of regu-
G larization would, therefore, pale into insignificance. In this
situation, the Industrial Tribunal and the Division Bench
of the High Court were justified in lifting the veil in order
to determine as to the nature of employment. [Para 13]
[1236-G, 1237·A]
H
G.M. ONGC, SHILCHAR v. ONGC CONTRACTUAL 1225
WORKERS UNION

1.4 Even the ONGC had admitted that since 1988, A
there was no licensed contractor and that the wages were
being paid through one of the leaders of the Union and
one such contractor has been named. The Tribunal then
opined that it appeared from the record that the named
contractor himself was a workman and not a contractor, B
as he too was shown in the qcquittance roll to have re-
ceived wages. [Para 13] [1236-E,F]
1.5 It is true that the reference prima facie does give
the impression that it presupposes that the workmen were
contractual employees and the only dispute was with re- C
gard to the regularization of their services. It is equally true
that the reference appears to have been rather loosely
worded but as observed by the Industrial Tribunal and the
Division Bench, both parties were aware of the real issues
involved in the light of the protracted litigation and the ef- D
forts made during conciliat!on proceedings. The Division
Bench has, thus, rightly observed that it was open to the
Industrial Tribunal to have lifted the veil so as to determine
the nature of the employment and the dispute between the
parties and for that purpose to look into the pleadings and E
evidence produced before it. [Para 16] [1237-E,F,G]
Sadhu Ram vs. Delhi Transport Corporation AIR 1984
_., SC 1467 R.K.Panda and Ors. v>. Steel Authority of India and
~Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 304 Delhi C1Jth and General Mils Co. Uc!.
vs. The workmen and Ors. AIR ·1967 SC 469; UP State Efec- F
tricity Board vs. Pooran Chandra Pandey (2007) 12 SCALE
304 - relied on
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs. Virendra Kumar
Jayantibhai Patel (1997) 6 SCC 650; Trambak Rubber Indus- G
tries Ltd. vs. Nashik Workers Union and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC
416; Seema Ghosh vs. Tata Iron and Steel Co. (2006) 7 SCC
722; State of Karnataka and Ors. vs. KGSD Canteen Employ-
ees' Welfare Association and Ors. (2006) 1 SCC 567; MP
Housing Board and Anr. vs. Manoj Shrivastava (2006) 2 SCC A
1226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.
,.,,.
A 702; Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Workmen,
Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 2007(1) SCC 408,
Gangadhar Pillai vs. Siemens Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 533;
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. vs. Dan Bahadur Singh and Ors.
(2007) 6 SCC 207; Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. vs.
B Uma Devi(3) and Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1- distinguished.
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4755
of 2001
From the final Judgment and Order dated 24.12.1999 of
c the Gauhati High Court in W.A. No. 269/1998
WITH
T.P. (C) No. 890-892 of 2007
Dushyant A. Dave, S.B. Sanyal, Rekha Pandey, Madhavi <
D Divan, Aniruddha Rajput, Sonmath Mukherjee, Manoj Goel,
Shuvodeep Roy, Anil Kumar Tandale and Brij Bhusan for the
Appearing Parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E HARJIT SINGH BEDl,J. 1.This appeal after special
leave arises out of the following facts:
2. The appellant, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission
(hereinafter called the "ONGC") is engaged in the exploration t-
for oil and natural gas. In 1997, the ONGC started its drilling
F operations in the district of Cachar and for that purpose en-
gaged a large number of staff in various fields, initially through
contractors. These employees later formed the ONGC Contrac-
tual Workers Union (hereinafter called the "Union") which is the
contesting respondent in this matter. The Union raised a dis-
G pute demanding the regularization of the services of its mem-
bers. This demand was resisted by the ONGC and on the fail-
•
ure of conciliation proceedings, the State Government made a
reference to the Industrial Tribunal.
.3. The parties before the Industrial Tribunal filed their plead-
H
.-,
I
I
G.M. ONGC, SHILCHAR v. ONGC CONTRACTUAL 1227
WORKERS UNION [HARJIT SINGH BEDl,J.)

ings and also recorded their evidence. The Tribunal in its award A
dated 11th July 1994, held that the members of the Union were
indeed the employees of the ONGC and a direction was ac-
cordingly issued that their services be regularized in a phased
manner with pay and other allowances, as permissible to regu-
lar employees. This award was challenged by the ONGC in the B
High Court on the ground that the members of the Union were
employees of the contractors and not of the ONGC and as such
there was no obligation on the part of the ONGC to regularize
their services. The learned Single Judge accepted this submis-
sion and further observing that the Tribunal had exceeded its c
jurisdiction by deciding beyond the reference, allowed the writ
petition. A Writ appeal was thereafter taken by the Union before
the Division Bench of the High Court which, vide the impugned
judgment dated 24th December 1999, reversed the findings of
the learned Single Judge observing that the powers of the High D
>
Court while examining an award of a subordinate tribunal were
not as if it were a Court of Appeal and that the learned Single
Judge appeared to have fallen into a cardinal error in differing
with the conclusions on facts drawn by the Industrial Tribunal.
The Division Bench then noted that no workman or contractor
had been examined to show the existence of any contract labour E
and that no clarification having been sought by the ONGC un-
der section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regularisation & Aboli-
tion) Act 1970, the very basis for the employment of contract
labour did not exist. The Division Banch also observed that there
was no ambiguity with regard to the issues raised in the refer- F
ence made by the State Government as the parties were fully
aware as to its meaning and import. The writ appeal was ac-
cordingly allowed, the order of the learned Single Judge was
set aside and the award of the Industrial Tribunal restored. The
ONGC is before us in appeal. G

4. At the very outset, Mr. Dushayant A. Dave, the learned
senior counsel for the appellant has referred us to I.A. No.7/
2007 to bring on record the present ground situation vis-a-vis
the ONGC and the members of the respondent Union, and has H
,,

1228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A pointed out that till the year 1999, only one Oil Company, the -...
ONGC, owned by the Government of India had the exclusive
right to prospect for oil, but to accelerate exploration, it had been
decided as from that year, to throw the field open to National Oil
Companies or private companies, Indian or foreign, by way of
B an open bidding process, with the result that the ONGC was no
longer holding a monopoly in this regard. It has been submitted
that as a result of this liberalization, a large number of compa- ..
nies besides the ONGC were now engaged in the exploration
for oil and that it was imperative in this situation and changed
scenario for the ONGC to make an attempt to reduce its work
"'
$'

c
force and it had done so by introducing a voluntary retirement
scheme with effect from 1999, which had resulted in a reduc-
""
tion of more than 3500. It has been highlighted that at the time
of the filing of this appeal, about 400 and odd workmen had
been involved but many had subsequently accepted voluntary
D
retirement and the matter had been initially restricted to about
290 workmen, who in the light of the status quo order passed
by this Court in these proceedings, had been receiving pay-
ments/service charges to the tune of Rs.7,22,000/- per month
for the last 7 years which now totalled about seven crore al-
E though no work was being performed by them. It has been sub- •,
mitted that as a result of another Memorandum of Understand-
ing signed on 24th January 2007, another 176 workmen or their
legal heirs out of the 290 aforementioned, had opted out of the
appeal and accepted voluntary retirement with the result that as
F of today, only about 70 or 80 workmen were associated with
the Union in pursuing this appeal. It has accordingly been
pleaded that to meet the latest situation and in the light of the
above facts; the earlier scheme formulated by the ONGC for
absorption of its workmen set out in the additional affidavit filed
G on 141h February 2001, be treated as withdrawn, though the of-
fer with regard to the voluntary retirement scheme which has (
been accepted by the 176 workmen was still open to the present
members of the Union. On facts, it has been argued that the
findings of the Industrial Tribunal were erroneous and the learned
H Single Judge was,·therefore, fully justified in setting aside the

-I
G.M. ONGC, SHILCHAR v. ONGC CONTRACTUAL 1229
WORKERS UNION [HARJIT SINGH BEDl,J.]

award pursuant to its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the A
Constitution of India. Reliance for this argument has been
placed on Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Vs. Virendra
Kumar Jayantibhai Patel (1997) 6 SCC 650, Trambak Rub-
ber Industries Ltd. vs. Nashik Workers Union & Ors. (2003) 6
SCC 416 and Seema Ghosh vs. Tata Iron & Steel Co. (2006) B
7 sec 722. It has also been urged that a workman who had
worked for 240 days or more could not claim regularization of
services and that in any case, contractual workers were not
entitled to regularization. In support of this submission, reliance
has been placed on the State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. KGSD C
Canteen Employees' Welfare Association & Ors. (2006) 1
SCC 567, M.P Housing Board & Anr. vs. Manoj Shrivastava
(2006) 2 SCC 702, Indian Drug & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs.
Workmen, Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 2007(1) SCC
408, Gangadhar Pillai vs. Siemens Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 533 D
and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. vs. Dan Bahadur Singh & Ors.
(2007) 6 SCC 207. It has finally been contended that after t~1e
promulgation of the Contract Labour (Regularisation & Aboli-
tion) Act, 1970 regularization of contract labour was not per-
missible and in support of this plea, the learned counsel has
relied on Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. vs. National Union E
Waterfront Workers & Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 1 and Secretary,
State of Kamataka & Ors. vs. Uma Devi(3) & Ors. (2006) 4
sec 1.
5. Mr. Sanyal, the learned senior counsel has, at the very F
outset, pointed out that pursuant to the observations of this Court,
the ONGC had made an offer for absorption of the workmen by
way of an additional affidavit dated 141h February 2001 and the
Union had been seriously inclined to accept that offer, but had
sought some minor clarifications from the ONGC (which were G
not forthcoming) and on the contrary, the ONGC had moved I.A.
No.7/2007 withdrawing the said offer and suggesting another
voluntary retirement scheme which was not acceptable to the
members of the Union. It has accordingly been pleaded that it
was the ONGC which had been unfair in its dealings and that H
1230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A despite the passage of almost 28 years, the workmen had not
been able to get any substantial relief. It has also been submit-
ted that the Industrial Tribunal was fully justified in delving into
the facts of the case to see the nature of employment of the
workmen i.e. as to whether they were employees of the ONGC
B or of the contractor, and the Tribunal having done so, the learned
Single Judge was not justified in making a re-assessment on
facts. .For this argument, the learned counsel has relied on
R.K.Panda & Ors. vs. Steel Authority of India & Ors. (1994) 5
SCC 304 and Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra). It has also
C been contended that the reference made undoubtedly did give
an impression that the Union had accepted their status as con-
tractual workers and were merely seeking regularization of their
services but in the light of the pleadings of the parties, the evi-
dence led before the Industrial Tribunal and the arguments raised
D by the learned counsel in all the fora, it was clear that the exami-
nation was not limited to this investigation but the broader ques-
tion as to whether the members of Union were employees of
the ONGC or of the contractors was the core issue and as the
parties were fully aware of this basic fact, it was not open to the
ONGC to contend that the reference was bad. It has further
E been highlighted that reliance by the appellant on Uma Devi's
case was misplaced as this matter had been clarified and ex-
plained by this Court in UP State Electricity Board vs. Pooran
Chandra Pandey, (2007) 12 SCALE 304.
F 6. We first take up Mr. Dave's arguments with regard to
the propriety of the Division Bench entering into the facts of the
case and upsetting the findings recorded by the Single Judge
with regard to the nature of employment of the workmen. It has
been submitted that the interference by the Division Bench was
G not called for in the light of the various judgments of the Su-
preme Court.
7. On the contrary, Mr. Sanyal has been at pains to point
out that the Industrial Tribunal was in fact the sole fact finding
authority and interference by the Single Bench of the High Court
H in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could
G.M. ONGC, SHILCHAR v. ONGC CONTRACTUAL 1231
WORKERS UNION [HARJIT SINGH BEDl,J.]

be justified only if the findings could be said to be perverse. He A
has relied upon several judgments of this Court including Sadhu
Ram vs. Delhi Transport Corporation AIR 1984 SC 1467 for
this argument. It has also been submitted that there was no
perversity in the Award of the Industrial Tribunal, and the Single
Judge had, thus, impinged and transgressed into the jurisdic- B
tion of the Industrial Tribunal.

. 8. We have examined the arguments advanced by the
learned counsel. This Court has held time and again that the
High Court had the authority to enquire as to whether a finding
arrived at by the Tribunal was based on evidence and to correct c
an error apparent on the face of the record. The observations in
.:. Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd. 's case (supra) are to this ef-
feet and it has been highlighted that the High Court would be
fully justified in interfering with an Award of an Industrial Court
on account of a patent illegality. In Seema Ghosh's r:ase (Su- D.
pra), this Court observed that the High Court's interference un-
der Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with an Award of
the Labour Court was justified as the Award had been rendered
contrary to the law laid down by this Court and as a measure of
"misplaced sympathy", and was thus perverse. The other judg- E
ments cited by Mr. Dave lay down similar principles and need
not be dealt with individually. It will be seen therefore that the
interference would be limited to a few cases and as already
noted above, in the case of a patent illegality or perversity. On
the contrary, Mr. Sanyal's reliance on Sadhu Ram's case (su- F
pra) is more appropriate to the circumstances herein. It has been
observed as under:
"The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is truly wide but, for that very reason, it has to be
exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High G
Court to constitute itself into an appellate court over
• tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve
disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil
disputes and to re-adjudicate upon questions of fact
decided by those tribunals. That the questions decided H
1232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court
~
to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which II"

the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the
circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at
jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering.
B But where the tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference
is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the
Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it
was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment
.
for that of the labour Court and hold that the workman had
c raised no demand with the management".
9. We are therefore of the opinion that in the light of the _,
facts that have come on record we find no perversity or patent
illegality in the Award of the Industrial Tribunal and on the con-
trary must appreciate that it has minutely examined the evidence
D in arriving at its decision. In this view of the matter, it was inap-
propriate for the Learned Single Judge to have re-appraised
the evidence and come to a different conclusion.
10. Mr. Dave has also laid great emphasis on the fact that
in the light of several judgments of the Supreme Court there
E was no inflexible right in a workman who had put in 240 days or
more to have his/her services regularized and that contractual
workers were [n any case precluded from claiming this relief.
Mr. Sanyal has, however, submitted that most of the workmen
had joined in the year 1979 and 1984 and though they had two
F orders in their favour, one of the Industrial Tribunal and the other
of the Division Bench, they had not been able to enforce their
rights in some cases for almost 30 years. We have accordingly
chosen to deal with these issues together. There are several
observations which do suggest that a workman who has put in
!\
G 240 days or is a contractual worker, is not entitled automatically
to regularization. We, however, believe that the present case
is not one of regularization simpliciter such as in the case of an "' t
ad-hoc or casual employee claiming this privilege. The basic
issue in the present case is the status of the workmen and
H whether they were the employees of the ONGC or the contrac-
G.M. ONGC, SHILCHAR v. ONGC CONTRACTUAL 1233
WORKERS UNION [HARJIT SINGH BEDl,J.]

tor and in the event that they were employees of the former, a A
claim to be treated at par with other such employees. As would
be clear from the discussion a little later, this was the basic is-
sue on which the parties went to trial, notwithstanding the confu-
sion created by the ill-worded reference. The Division Bench
has examined the evidence on this aspect and has endorsed s
the finding of the Industrial Tribunal. We also find that the ob-
servations in R.K.Panda's case(supra) are significant:
"It is true that with the passage of time and purely with a
view to safeguard the interests of workers, many principal
employees while renewing the contracts have been insisting C
that the contractor or the new contractor retains the old
employees. In fact, such a condition is incorporated in the
contract itself. However, such a clause in the contract which
is benevolently inserted in the contract to protect the
continuance of the source of livelihood of the contract D
labour cannot by itself give rise to a right to regularization
in the employment of the principal employer. Whether the
contract labourers have become the employees of the
principal employer in course of time and whether the
) engagement and employment of labourers through a E
contractor is a mere camouflage and a smokescreen, as
has been urged in this case, is a question of fact and has
to be established by the contract labourers on the basis
of the requisite material. It is not possible for the High
Court or this Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction or F
jurisdiction under Article 136 to decide such questions,
only on the basis of the affidavits. It need not be pointed
out that in all such cases, the labourers are initially
employed and engaged by the contractors. As such at
what point of time a direct link is established between the G
contract labourers and the principal employer, eliminating
the contractor from the scene, is a matter which has to be
established on material produced before the court.
Normally, the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal, under
the Industrial Disputes Act are the competent fora to
H
1234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A adjudicate such disputes on the basis of the oral and
documentary evidence produced before them." ~

;; Likewise in Steel Authority of India's case (supra) this is
what the Court had to say:

B "An analysis of the cases, discussed above, shows that
they fall in three classes: (i) where contract labour is
engaged in or in connection with the work of an
establishment and employment of contract labour is
prohibited either because the industrial adjudication/court
c ordered abolition of contract labour or because the
appropriate Government issued notification under Section
10(1) of the CLRA Act, no automatic absorption of the
contract labour working in the establishment was ordered;
(ii) where the contract was found to be a sham and nominal,
rather a camouflage, in which case the contract labour
D
working in the establishment of the principal employer
were held, in fact and in reality, the employees of the
..
principal employer himself. Indeed, such cases do not
relate to abolition of contract labour but present instances
wherein the Court pierced the veil and declared the correct
E position as a fact at the stage after employment of contract <

labour stood prohibited; (iii) where in discharge of a
statutory obligation of maintaining a canteen in an
establishment the principal employer availed the services
of a contractor the courts have held that the contract labour
F would indeed be the employees of the principal employer."
...
10. It was contended by Mr. Dave that this Court in Uma
Devi's case (supra) has clearly opined that the contract or ca-
sual labour could not claim regularization and he has in particu-
lar emphasized that in the light of the admitted position that at
G
some stage, the workmen were indeed contract employees the
ratio of the aforesaid was clearly applicable to the facts of the
case. We, however, observe that the aforesaid decision was "
considered by another Bench of this Court in Pandey's case
(supra) wherein it has been held that the ratio of any decision
H
G.M. ONGC, SHILCHAR v. ONGC CONTRACTUAL 1235
WORKERS UNION [HARJIT SINGH BEDl,J.]

'f" must be understood in the background of the facts of that case A
and that the case is only an authority for what it logically de-
cides and what logically flows from it. In Pandey's case (supra)
the question was as to whether casual employees working in
the Electricity Board were entitled to regularization of their ser-
vices. This is what the Division Bench had to say in paragraphs B
16 and 17:

"We are constrained to refer to the above decisions and
principles contained therein because we find that often
Uma Devi's case (supra) is being applied by Courts
mechanically as if it were a Euclid's formula without seeing c
the facts of a particular case. As observed by this Court
in Bhavnagar University's case (supra) and Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 's case (supra}, a little
difference in the precedential value of a decision. Hence,
in our opinion, Uma Devi's case (supra) cannot be applied D
mech?.nically without seeing the facts of a particl!lar case,
as a little difference in facts can make Uma Devi's case
(supra) inapplicable to the facts of that case.
In the present case the writ petitioners (respondents herein)
only wish that they should not be discriminated against E
vis-a-vis the original employees of the Electricity Board
since they have been taken over by the Electricity Board
"in the same manner and position". Thus, the writ
... petitioners have to be deemed to have been appointed in
the service of the Electricity Board from the date of their F
original appointments in the Society. Since they were all
appointed in the society because 4.5.1990 they cannot
be denied the benefit of the decision of the Electricity
Board dated 28.11.1996 permitting regularization of the
employees of the Electricity Board who were working from G
before 4.5.1990. To take a contrary view would violate
Article 14 of the Constitution. We have to read Uma Devi's
case (supra) in conformity with Article 14 of the
Constitution, and we cannot read it in a manner which will
make it in conflict with Article 14. The Constitution is the H
1236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S.C.R.

A supreme law of the land, and any judgment, not even of ..,..
the Supreme Court, can violate the Constitution."
11. It will be seen therefore that each case has to be ex-
" amined to a very large extent on its specific facts, and a univer-
sal yardstick should not be attempted.
B
12. In the instant case, on a consideration of material pro-
duced before it, the Tribunal came to the following conclusions: ~

(1) That there existed a relationship of master and
servant.
c
(2) That there was no contractor appointed by ONGC.
(3) That the ONGC used to supervise and allot works to
individual workers.
(4) That the ONGC took disciplinary action and called
D
for explanations from the workers.
(5) The workers were paid wages though they did not
attend their duties due to Cachar Bandh and due to
flood.
E
' (6) The wages were paid direct to the workers by the
ONGC and the acquaintance roll was prepared by
the Management to make payment to the workmen".
13. It has also been observed that even the ONGC had .
F admitted that since 1988, there was no licensed contractor and
that the wages were being paid through one of the leaders of
the Union and one such contractor, Manik has been named.
The Tribunal then opined that it appeared from the record that
Manik himself was a workman and not a contractor as he too
G was shown in the acquittance roll to have received wages. We
find that the real issue was as to the status of the workmen as ...
employees of the ONGC or of the contractor, and it having been
found that the workmen were the employees of the ONGC they
<\
would ipso-facto be entitled to all benefits available in that ca-
pacity, and the issue of regularization would, therefore, pale into
H
G.M. ONGC, SHILCHAR v. ONGC CONTRACTUAL 1237
WORKERS UNION [HARJIT SINGH BEDl,J.]

-t insignificance. We find that in this situation, the Industrial Tribu- A
nal and the Division Bench of the High Court were justified in
lifting the veil in order to determine as to the nature of employ-
ment in the light of the judgments quoted above. We, there-
fore, find that the ratio of the judgment in Uma Devi's case (su-
pra) would not be applicable and that the facts of Pandey's case B
are on the contrary more akin to the facts of the present one .
•
14. We are therefore of the opinion that in the light of the
aforesaid observations, Mr. Dave's argument that the workmen
being on a contractual, were not entitled to any relief, cannot be
accepted and the large number of judgments cited by Mr. Dave, c
~
on this aspect, cannot be applied to the facts of the case.

15. We have also considered Mr. Dave's argument with
regard to the nature of the reference. We re-produce the refer-
ence as made:
... "Whether the demand of the ONGC 'Contractual Workers'
D

Union, Silchar on the management of ONGC, Cachar
Project, Silchar for regularization of the services of the
contractual workers is justified. If so, what relief are the
workmen concerned entitled to?" E
16. It is true that the underlined portion of the reference
prima facie does give the impression that it presupposes that
the workmen were contractual employees and the only dispute
... was with regard to the regularization of their services. It is equally
true that the reference appears to have been rather loosely F
worded but as observed by the Industrial Tribunal and the Divi-
sion Bench, both parties were aware of the real issues involved
in the light of the protracted litigation and the efforts made dur-
ing conciliation proceedings. The Division Bench has, thus,
rightly observed that it was open to the Industrial Tribunal to have G
lifted the veil so as to determine the nature of the employment
and the dispute between the parties and for that purpose to
look into the pleadings and evidence produced before it.
17. In Delhi Cloth & General Mils Co. Ltd. vs. The work-
H
1238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A men & Others AIR 1967 SC 469, this is what the Court had to
say:
+
-
•
"In our opinion, the Tribunal must, in any event, look to the
pleadings of the parties to find out the exact nature of the
dispute, because in most cases the order of reference is
B so cryptic that it is impossible to cull out therefrom the
various points about whfch the parties were at variance .
leading to the trouble. In this case, the order of reference
was based on the report of the Conciliation Officer and it
was certainly open to the Management to show that the
c dispute which had been referred was not an industrial
dispute at all so as to attract jurisdiction under the Industrial ...
'
Disputes Act. But the parties cannot be allowed to go a '
stage further and contend that the foundation of the dispute
mentioned in the order of reference was non-existent and
D that the true dispute was something else". •
18. The pleadings in the present matter would show that
the core issue before the Tribunal was with regard to the status
of the employees as employees of the ONGC or of the contrac-
tor and that it was this issue simpliciter on which the parties
E went to trial. Mr. Dave's argument with regard to the decision of
the Tribunal being beyond the reference, is to our mind, and in
the circumstances, hyper technical. In this background, we feel
that the judgments cited by Mr. Dave pertaining to regulariza-
ti on of contract labour are not applicable t,Q the facts of the case. '"
F
19. We, thus, find no merit in the appeal, which is accord-
ingly dismissed. In view of the judgment made in Civil Appeal
No.4755/2001, these Transfer Petitions are rendered
infructuous.
K.K.T. Appeal dismissed
•