Holding

The High Court’s discretion to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was exercised correctly and should not be interfered with, as the delay was not due to gross negligence or bad faith, and the condonation order is a dependent order that can be reviewed independently of the merits of the main appeals.

Summary

The appellants challenged a Mysore High Court order that condoned substantial delays in filing appeals against land acquisition awards, invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. They argued that the delay, caused by negligence of Government Pleaders, could not be deemed "sufficient cause" and that the condonation order should be set aside, especially since the main appeals had already been decided on merits. The State contended that the delay was attributable to the misconduct of its officers, that public interest was harmed, and that the condonation order was a dependent order whose validity could be examined independently. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had properly exercised its discretion, as the delay was not the result of gross negligence or bad faith, and that the order could be reviewed irrespective of the merits of the main appeals. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeals.

Issues considered

The propriety of condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the present case.
Whether the negligence of Government Pleaders constitutes "sufficient cause" for condonation.
Whether an order condoning delay is a dependent order that can be set aside even after the main appeals are decided.
Whether the Government can be held liable for the acts of its officers in limitation matters.
Whether the appeals against mere condonation become infructuous after the merits have been decided.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Acts. 18
Limitation Act, 1963s. 5

Subjects

limitationsufficient causegovernment liabilityland acquisitiondelay condonationdependent orderspublic interestcivil procedure

Judgment

y G. RAMEGOWDA v. S.L.A. OFFICER

Acquisition Officer granting Rs.58,000 per acre was unduly generous
199

A
for the acquisition was just about a year after the purchase, and that the
further enhancement by the Civil Court to Rs. r,45,200 per acre, clearly
suffered from the vice of extreme excessiveness.

The High Court noticed that the Government Pleader who was in
office till JS.!2.!970 had applied for certified copies on 20.7.1970, but B
the application was allowed to be dismissed for default and that in one

- i
case he appeared to have taken away the certified. copy even after he
had ceased to be a Government Pleader. After consideration of the
matter the Division Bench of the High Court condoned the delay in the
filing in the appeals.

L In the appeal' to this Court by the appellants-claimants it was
c
contended that the High Court fell into a manifest error in condoning
the inordinate and wholly unjustified delay and that the explanation
offered before and accepted by the High Court cannot. in law. be held
to constitute 'sufficient cause' for purposes and within the meaning of.
Section S of the Limitation Act.'·· 961. The State contested the appeals. D
by contending that the High Court had heard and disposed of the appe-
als before it on the merits, substantially reducing the compensation and
that the appellants had already preferred Special Leave Petitions
against the final order as such, and that the appeals against .the mere
condonation of delay do not survive at all and must be held to have
become infructuous. It was further contended that the Government E
Pleader whom the Government had necessarily to and did trust had let
down that trust, and there was therefore sufficient ground for the con-
donation of the delay so as to promote public interest and do substantial
justice.

Declining to interfere with the High Court's order and dismissing F
"the Appeals,

HELD: i. The fact that the main appeals are themselves, in
the meanwhile, disposed of finally on the merits by the High Court
would not by itself detract from aitd bar the consideration of.the .cor-
rectness of the order condoning the delays. This is an instance of what G
are called -''dependent orders". If the order excusing the delay is itself
set aside in these appeals, the further exercise, made in th~ meanwhile,
by the High Court finally disposing of the appeals, would be rendered
nugatory. [203H; 204A-B I

2. There is no general principle saving the party from all mis- H
takes of its counsel. l20SF]
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R.

3. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its
A
own special facts. [205G]

4. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of
bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why
the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. [205F-G I
B )._
5. The expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substan-
tial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be
condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deli- •
j.,
-
berate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking
condonation of the delay. [205G-H] I
c
6(i) The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for private citizen
-\
as for; Governmental~authorities. Government, like any other- litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a
somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where
D Government makes out a case where 'public interest was shown to have
suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers
"Or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with
it. [206D-E]

(ii) If appeals brought by Government are lost for such default,
E no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis,
suffers is public interest. [206C]

7(i)' In assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient
cause" for purpose of Section 5 it might, perhaps be somewhat un-
realistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial
F verdict, factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the function-
ing of the Government. fmplicit in the very nature of Governmental
functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making
process. [206E-H]

, (ii) Due recognition of these limitations on Government function-
G ing-'-within a reasonable limit-is necessary. It would be unfair and
unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same·footing
in all respects in such matters. [206G J

8. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law offi-
cers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and
H that it was one of those cases where the malafides of the ~fficers should
·.·,
G. RAMEGOWDA v. S.L.A. OFFICER [VENKATACHALIAH, J.J 201-

not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law offi- A
cers. It took quite some time for the Government to realise that the law
officers failed that trust. [206H; 207A, Cl

9. The criticism that the delay on the part of the Government
even after 20. l.197i for over one year cannot be said to be either B
bonafide or compelled by reasons beyond its control is not without
substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater
diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The
conduct of the Government was perilously close to such inaction as
might, perhaps have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation.
But in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the
awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without c
I an examination of their merits. [207D-F]
~
Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, I i969] i SCR i006; Con-
cord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi & Ors., [19791 3
SCR 694; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, I i970] 2 SCR 90; Collector_. D
Land Acquisition v. Katiii, I i987] 2 SCC i07; National Bank of Wales
Ltd., fI899] 2 L.R. 629 at 673 and Special Land Acquisition Officer v.
B.M. Kri<hnamurthy. [ i985] : SCC 469, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 856
and 857 Of 197 4 Etc. E
From the Judgment and Order dated 13/14.6.1973 of the Mysore
High Court in Misc. First Appeal Nos. 290 and 293 of 1973

R.B. Datar and Ravi P. Wadhwani for the Appellants.
F
M. Veerappa for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATACHALIAH, J. These three_ appeals, by the clai-
mant-respondents in certain Land Acquisition Appeals before the G
High Court, are preferred, by Special Leave, against the common-
order dated 14.6.1973 of the High Court of Mysore (Kamataka)
condoning, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, certain delays
on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer in preferring the three
corresponding appeals in M.F.A. No. 290 of 1973, M.F.A. 293 of 1973
and M.F.A. No. 289 of 1973 respectively, H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R.

A The appeals before the High Court were directed against the
common-award made by the Civil Judge;·Bangalore District, in
certain Land Acquisition References under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act steeply enhanci9g the compensation for the lands of
the appellants acquired for the purpose of. the 'University of
Agricultural Sciences' at Bangalore. The circumstances leading upto
B and necessitating the prayer for the condonation of the delays before
the High Court seem somewhat unfortunate, casting, as they do, as-
persions on the probity and rectitude of the conduct and good faith of
the Government Counsel entrusted with the conduct of land acquisi-
tion cases.

2. The common award, in the three land acquisition references /i\
C was passed by the learned Civil Judge on 17.7.1970. Application for
certified copies was made on 31.8.1971; copies obtained on 5.1.1972 -I
and M.F.A. No. 289 of 1973 was lodged before the High Court on \
19.1.1972 and the other two appeals viz., M.F.A. 290 of 1973 and 293
of 1973 on 10.4.1972. There were, thus, substantial delays in prefer-
D ring the appeals.

The Land Acquisition Officer, appellant before the High Court,
filed applications to have these delays excused. The Division-Bench of
the High Court was persuaded to make an order condoning the delay.

E The grievance of the State in the appeals was that the lands ,)...
which had been purchased in the year 1962 for a sum of Rs.7,000 per
acre, were acquired pursuant to the preliminary notification dated
2.3.1963 and the award of the Land Acquisition Officer granting
Rs.58,000 per acre was itself unduly generous having regard to the fact
that the acquisition was just about an year after the purchase by the
F claimants and that the further enhancement by the Civil Court to }-
Rs.1,45,200 per acre clearly suffered from the vice of extreme
excessiveness.

3. Sri. R.B. Datar, learned counsel appearing in support of
these appeals assailed the order of the High Court on the ground that
G the High Court fell into a manifest error in condoning these inordinate
and wholly unjustified delays and that explanation offered before, and
accepted by, the High Court sarnat , in law, be held to constitute J..
'sufficient cause' for purposes and within the meaning of, Section 5.
Learned Counsel strenuously urged that the rights vesting in the suc-
cessful parties to a litigation by the expiry of the period of limitation
H should not lightly be interferred with unless it was established that the
G. RAMEGOWDA v. S.L.A. OFFICER [VENKATACHALIAH, J.I 203

'Y appeal could not have been lodged in time despite the exercise of
reasonable diligence on the part of the appellant. Learned counsel
A

further contended that the fact that the Government Pleaders had not
discharged their duty to the Government, even if true, would be
wholly beside the point as that would be a matter of internal administ-
ration. If Government was not able to set its own house in order, says
learned counsel, the opposite party, who had the benefit of the adjudi- B
1
cation should not be exposed to a time barred appeal. There cannot,
~ says counsel, be one standard for an ordinary litigant and another for
Government.

- On the merits of the cause shown, learned counsel said, the
~
I
explanation served only to aggravate the negligence; that the explana-
tion might, at best, amount to sufficient-.:ause for the delay upto
c
l 20.1.1971 when the Civil Judge wrote to the Government and the
latter, admittedly, was put on notice of the award and decree passed in
~
the cases and that the subsequent delays of over an year thereafter in
preferring the appeals cannot, even on the most liberal construction of
'sufficient-cause', be said to be justified .. D

4. Shri Veerappa, learned counsel for the State, on the other
hand, while seeking to support the order under appeal submitted that
the circumstances of the case disclosed that the Government was put in
a predicament by its own law--0fficers and that where, as here, public-
.--4 interest had come to suffer owing to the bad-faith and divided loyalties E
on the part of the officers and advisers of Government, the technicali-
ties of procedure should yield to considerations which would promote
public interest and substantial justice. Shri Veerappa submitted that in
the present case the Government-Pleaders whom Government had
necessarily to and did trust had let down that trust and this was a case
of 'salt having lost its savour'. F
1 Shri Veerappa submitted that, during the pendency of the pre-
sent appeals, the High Court had heard and disposed of the appeals
before it on the merits substantially reducing the compensation; that
appellants have already preferred SLP Nos. 2319, 2320, 2493 of 1974
against that Judgment and that the present appeals, preferred as they G
are against the mere condonation of delay, do not survive at all and
,-1_ must be held to have become infructuous.

5. We might, perhaps, deal with the latter submission of Shri
Veerappa first. The fact that the main appeals are themselves, in the
meanwhile, disposed of finally on the merits by the High Court would H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R.

A not by itself detract from and bar the consideration of the correctness y
of the order condoning the delays. This is an instance of what are
called 'dependant-orders' and if the order excusing the delays is itself
set aside in these appeals, the further exercise, made in the mean-
while, by the High Court finally disposing of the appeals, would be
rendered nugatory. The submission of Shri Veerappa is, therefore,
B insubstantial.

6. In support of its prayer before the High Court for condona-
tion of the delays, Government narrated the chronological sequence of
events and the some-what protracted correspondence between
Government-Pleader and the Government and the difficulties faced
by the administration in even ascertaining the correct state of affairs
c owing to the negative and evasive attitude of the Government-Plead-
ers. These events and correspondence are referred to and evaluated in
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the High Court's order. After a consideration
of the matter, the High Court was pursuaded to the view that in the
circumstances of this case, it could not be said that the Government
D was negligent. High Court observed:

"Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, we
hold that there was not such negligence or inaction on the
part of the L.A.O., as to induce as not to exercise our
discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to con-
E done the delay in presenting the appeal."

Adverting to the conduct of the Government-Pleader the High
Court observed:

"But how could the L.A.0. anticipate that the Govern-
F ment Pleader or the Assistant Government Pleader would
fail to do such elementary duties like applying for such
certified copies, obtaining them and forwarding them to
the Government with his opinion? To say the least. the
conduct of the Government Pleader/ and/or. the Assistant
Government Pleader appears to us to be extraordinary."
G (emphasis supplied)

Indeed in the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the State
Government in these appeals, the Land Acquisition Officer avers:

"I beg to submit that due to the unusual conduct of the
H District Government Pleaders who were in office during a
G. RAMEGOWDA v. S.L.A. OFFICER [VENKATACHALIAH, J.J 205

particular period Government had to face the problem of A
delay in filing of appeals in hundreds of cases. The Govern-
ment was not able to know the real state of affairs till the
concerned Government Pleaders relinquished their office.
In fact, for some time, there was uttar confusion and it
became practically impossible to find out as to which are the
Land Acquisition cases which has been disposed of and in B
which appeals were not filed though appeals ought to have
been filed ........ It is humbly submitted that the case of
the Government for condonation of delay was that on
account of the fraud played by the concerned Government
Pleaders delay in filing the appeals has occurred and more
than a crore of rupees would be a loss to the Government on
account of the said fraud played by the Government Plead-
c
ers. In fact, in innumerable cases the Hon'b/e High Court
has condoned the delay in filing of the appeals, taking into
consideratiOn the most unusual conduct of Government
Pleaders which had landed the Government in difficulties. I
_beg to further submit that almost all the appeals which had D
been entertained by the Hon 'blc High Court after condon-
ing the delay, have been allowed on consideration of their
merits . ....... ".
(emphasis supplied)

7. The contours of the area of discretion of the Courts in the E
matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a
number of pronouncements of this Court. See: Ram/a/, Moti/a/ and
Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd., [1962] 2 SCR 762; Shakuntala Devi
Jain v.Kuntal Kumari, [1969] 1SCR1006; Concord of India Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Nirma/a Devi and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 694; Lala Mata Din
v. A. Narayanan, [1970] 2 SCR 90 and Collector, Land Acquisition v. F
Katiji, I19871 2 sec 107 etc. There is, it is true, no general principle
saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence,
deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona /ides on the part of the
party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be
exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered
on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression G
'sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so
as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring
appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona /ides is imput-
able to the party seeking condonation of the delay. In Katiji's case,
(supra), this Court said: H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1988) 3 S.C.R.

"When substantial justice and technical consideration.s are
A pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in in justice being done because of a non-
deliberate delay."

B "It must be grasped that judiciary is r~spected not on >-_
account of its power to legalise in justice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and
is expected to do so." -

8. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet ~
another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought
c by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest.
The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions
and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.

D The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen
as for Governmental-authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a
somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have
suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or :>-
E agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.

Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes
'sufficient cause' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be some-
what unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the \
judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic r
F of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree
of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain
amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said
that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little
play at the joints'. Due recognition of these liinitations on Govern'
G mental functioning-of course, within a reasonable limits-is neces-
sary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, ~
perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private
parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in
the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay inci-
dental to the decision making process. In the opinion of the High
H Court, the conduct of the law-officers of the Government placed the
J

G. RAMEGOWDA v. S.LA. OFFICER [VENKATACHALIAH, J.J 207

Government in a predicament and that it was one of these cases where
A
the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It
relied upon and trusted its law-officers. Lindley, M.R., in the Re:
National Bank of Wales Ltd., [1899] 2 LR. 629 at 673 observed,
though in a different context:

~ "Business cannot be carried on, upon principles of distrust. B
Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those

-
'I
~
'
above them, as well as by those below them, until_ there is
reason to distrust them."

In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite sometime for the
l Government to realise that the law-officers failed that trust.
I \.
c
While a private person can take instant decision a "bureaucratic
or democratic organ" it is said by a learned Judge "hesitates and
debates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizen-
tally and vertically till at .last it gravitates towards a conclusion, -
unmindful of time and impersonally." Now at the end, should we D
interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court? Shri Datar
criticised that the delay on the part of Government even after
20.1.1971 for over an year cannot be said to be either bonafide or
compelled by reasons beyond its control. This criticism is not without
substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater
diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency- of the situation. E
The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as
might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation.
But as is implicit in the reasoning_ of the High Court, the unarticulated
thought, perhaps was tqat in the interest of keeping the stream of justice

i pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to
assume finality without an examination of their merits. The HiglJ Court F
noticed that the Government pleader who was in office till 15.12.1970
had applied for certified copies on 20.7.1970, but the application was
allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case, however, he appears
to have takert away the certified copy even after he ceased to be a ·
Government Pleader. In a similar context where delay had been con-
doned by the High Court, this Court declined to interfere and G
observed:

"Having regard to the e!Jtirety of the circumstances, the
High Court thought that the State should not be penalised
for the lapses of some of its officers and that in the particu-
lar circumstances there were sufficient grounds justifying H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R.
y
A the condonation of delay in filing the appeals. It was a
matter for the discretion of the High Court. We are unable
to say that the discretion was improperly exercised ..... "

(See C.A. No. 992/l971, 1127/1974 and SLP (C) 3450/1974
dated 22.1.1985)
B
We think in the circumstances of this case, we should also decline to
interfere. Appeals are dismissed, but without an order as to costs.

N.V.K. Appeals dismissed. -