GAJANAND AGARWALversusSTATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.

                         GAJANAND AGARWAL                                       A
                                     V.

                     STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.

                          SEPTEMBER 18, 2006

      [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.]                           B

      Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Section 438-Penal Code, 1860-
Sections 498A, 304B, 302 and 406-Dowiy Prohibition Act, 1961-Section 4
 -Bail applications of accused rejected by trial Court .and High Court on       C
earlier occasions-Bail granted by the High Court subsequently without stating
any reasons--Correctness of-Held, a Court dealing with a bail application
is required to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and should state
the reasons for granting bail in its order-Any order dehors of such reasons
suffers from non-application of mind-Hence, the High Court is directed to
reconsider bail applications in accordance with law keeping in view the         D
principles set in.

      Two accused with other family members were charged by
proseeution for offences under sections 498A, 3048, 302 and 406 read with
section 34 IPC and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Several        E
bail applications were filed initially by the accused before trial court and
High Court which were rejected. The High Court, in fresh bail applications
moved by the accused, granted bail holding that it is granted in peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case.

      Appellant, who is the father of the deceased, filed appeals before this   p
Court challenging the grant of bail to the two aceused by High Court. The
appellant contended that the High Court has not given any reasons for
grant of bail; and that it did not refer to various orders passed by the
trial court and the High Court rejecting the bail applications on earlier
occasions.
                                                                                G
     Allowing the appeals, the Court

      HELD: I.I. On a cursory perusal of the High Court order granting
bail, it shows complete non-application of mind. Though detailed

                                    349
                                                                                H
    350                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits
    of the case is to be avoided by the Court while passing orders on bail
    applications, yet a court dealing with the bail application should be
    satisfied as to wh.:ther there is a prima facie case. Exhaustive exploration
    of the merits' of the case is not necessary. The Court dealing with the
B   application for bail is required to exercise its discretion in a judicious
    manner and not as a matter of course. (356-C, DI

         Omar Usman Chamadia v. Abdul & Anr.. JT (2004) 2 SC 176; State of
    Punjab & Ors. v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, AIR 184 SC 444 and V.D.
    Chaudhary v. State of VIiar Pradesh & Anr., (2005) 7 SCALE 68, referred
C   to.
         1.2 There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for prima facie
    concluding why bail was being granted particularly where an accused was
    charged of having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the
    Courts dealing with application for bail to consider among other
D   circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail, they are :

          1. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case
    of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence;

         2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or
    apprehension of threat to the complainant;
E
          3. Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the change.

         Any order dehors of such reasons suffers from non-application of
    mind. (356-D, E, F, G(

          Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh & Ors., (2002( 3 SCC 598;
F   Puran etc. v. Rambilas & Anr. etc., (2001 ( 6 sec 338; Kalyan Chandra
    Sekhar v. Rajesh Ranjan ((!) Pappu Yadav & Anr., JT (2004) 3 SC 442;
    Chaman lalv. State of UP. & Anr., JT (200416 SCC 540 and Kamaljit Singh
    v. State of Punjab & Anr.. (20051 7 SCC 326, referred to.

G        1.3. There is no mention about the State's stand in the impugned
    orders of the High Court. The callousness of the State is deprecated.
                                                                     (357-D(

          Salim Khan v. Sanjai Singh & Anr.. (2002( 9 SCC 670, referred to.

H         1.4 . The orders of bail are not necessary orders of any precedent
          GAJANAND AGARWAL v. STATE OF ORISSA [PASAYAT. J.)                    351
value. (357-Ef                                                                         A
      State of Punjab & Anr. v. Rajesh Syal, (200218 SCC 158, referred to.

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Cinnirtal Appeal No. 972
of 2006.
                                                                                       B
      From the final Judgment and Order dated 22.6.2006 of the High Court
of Orissa at Cuttack in BLAPL Case No. 4575/2006.

      With Crl. A.No. 973/2006.

     U.U. Lalit, Sanjay Sen, Rana S. Biwas, Visha Anand, Manish P.S.                   C
Chouhan and Sarla Chandra for the Appellant.

     Janaranjan Das, Swetaketu Mishra, Jana Kalyan Das, Avijeet Bhajabal
and Rutwik Panda for the Respondents.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                       D
      ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.

        Challenge in these appeals is to the order of the learned Single Judge
 of the Orissa High Court granting bail to the respondent no.2 in each case.
.In criminal Appeal relating to SLP (Criminal) 3745 of 2006 respondent no.2            E
 is Bimal Kumar Khetan whereas in the criminal appeal relating to SLP
 (Criminal) 3746 of 2006, the respondent no.2 is Sunil Kumar Khetan. The
 primary stand of the appellant is that the bail was granted without application
 of mind, as no reason was indicated as to why respondent no.2 (hereinafter
 referred to as the 'accused') was entitled to bail. It is poii.ted out that earlier
 several petitions were rejected by learned Additional Sessions Judge and the          F
 High Court.

      It is unnecessary to elaborately state the factual position as stated by
the appellant.

      Bimal was married to the daughter of the appellant i.e. Manisha G
(hereinafter referred to as 'deceased'). The marriage between the deceased
and the said accused took place on 9.5.2005. Within five months of marriage,
the deceased was found dead on 1.10.2005. The appellant lodged FIR at the
Jharsuguda police station and on the basis case was registered and investigation
was undertaken. The offences indicated were under Sections 498A, 3048 H
    352                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and
  Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, (in short 'the Act') Respondent no.2-
  8imal was arrested on 3.10.2005. Rest of the accused persons were found to
  be absconding and police having failed to arrest them in spite of issuance of
  non-bailable warrants of arrest made an application in terms of Sections 82
  and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (in short 'Cr.P.C.') was
B filed. On 16.12.2005 father-in-law of the deceased Kailash Khetan and mother-
  in-law Kanta Khetan filed application in terms of Section 438 Cr.P.C. before
  the High Court which was rejected. Process under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C.
  was issued by the learned ADJM on 19.12.2005. On 16.1.2006 respondent
  no.2 Bimal filed application for bail which was rejected on the ground that
C investigation was still in progress. Liberty was granted to the accused to
  move the Sessions Judge for bail after completion of investigation and
  submission of final form. On 24.1.2006 application in terms of Section 438
  was filed by Sunil Kumar (respondent no.2 in the connected appeals) and
  Sujata Khetan. The same were rejected by order dated 24.1.2006. An
  application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. was filed by Kailash and Kanta. The
D same was again rejected by the High Court. On 27.1.2006 the Trial Court
  issued orders in terms of Section 83 Cr.P.C. to attach the moveable properties
  of the accused. On 30.1.2006 the investigating officer submitted the charge-
  sheetltinal report before the learned SDJM indicating that a prima facie case
  has been made against the respondent No.2-8imal Kumar Kailashnath (father-
£ in-law), Kanta Devi (mother-in-law), Sunil (brother-in-law) the respondent
  no.2 in the connected appeal under Sections 498A, 3048, 302, 406 read with
  Section 34 IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act. The prosecution made a further
  prayer to permit investigation in terms of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. since some
  of the accused persons were still absconding and were not arrested. After
  surrendering, Kanta Khetan and Sujata Devi filed application for bail. The
F same was rejected by learned SDJM. Learned Sessions Judge also rejected
  the bail application. The applications filed by Kailashnath and Sunil were
  also subsequently rejected. On 13.2.2006, respondent no.2 8imal filed fresh
  bail application before the Sessions Court, which was rejected. The learned
  Additional Sessions Judge took note of factual position which according to
G him were relevant for the purpose of rejecting the bail application. It was
  noted that strong case under Section 302/3048 IPC was made out. Sujata
  Devi filed bail petition before the High Court after rejection of bail application
  by the Sessions Judge. The High Court by order dated 6.3.2006 granted bail
  to her.

H         Interestingly. it was noted that the order was not to be treated as a
         GA.IANANDAGARWAL 1·. STATEOFORJSSA [PASAYAT, .I.]                353
 precedent so far as other ac:used persons are concerned. The correctness of A
 such a direction shall be dealt with later. It is to be noted that on 22.3.2006
 Kanta Devi moved the High Court for bail. The High Court granted the bail
imposing condition similar to those which were stipulated in case of Sujata
Devi. Accused Sunil Kumar moved the High Court for regular bail. By order
dated 7.4.2006 the prayer was rejected but liberty was granted to renew his B
prayer for bail after the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. On
21.4.2006 the High Com1 granted bail to Kailashnath on the ground that he
was aged and was sick. Here again, the High Court passed an order to the
effect that same was not to be treated as ·a precedent so far as other accused
persons are concerned. On 3.5.2006 accused Sunil Kumar moved the Sessions
Court for bail on the ground that hrs father requires further treatment at C
Apollo Hospital and there was no male member to accompany him. The
learned Sessions Judge rejected the prayer of bail by order dated 3.5.2006
suspecting genuineness of the documents filed. It was noted that report was
dated 30.6.2006 i.e. date put on the advisory report, while the application
was made earlier. Because of this suspicious document, the application for
bail was rejected.                                                               D
      On I 0.5.2006 another application for bail was moved by respondent
no.2 Bimal Kumar after case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Learned
Additional Sessions Judge rejected the prayer in view of the fact that no
changed circumstances have been shown. On 18.5.2006 accused Sunil moved          E
the High Court for bail. The order granting bail to him is the subject-matter
of challenge in one of the appeals.

      The date for framing of charge was fixed to 6.6.2006. Accused Bimal
filed bail application before the High Court. By order dated 22.6.2006 bail
has been granted. The orders passed in the cases of Bimal and Suni/ read as      F
follows:

     Bima/'s case

           ''Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for
       the State.                                                                G
           Mr. Dhal, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the cause
       of death was not known and the other accused persons have been
       released on bail, so the present petitioner also be released ory, bail.

           Mr. Naik, learned counsel for the infonnant, at the other hand,       H
    354                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A           strongly repudiates the submissions made by Mr. Dhal and submit
            that though cause of the death was not known and causing suspicion,
            but some blood stained clothes were found.

                Considering the submissions made and p.!rusing the materials
            available and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, I
B           direct that the petitioner, who is in custody for ten months, be released
            on bail on executing a bond of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand)
            with two local sureties each for the like amount to the satisfaction of
            the learned Addi. Sessions Judge, Jharsuguda in S.T. case No.24/
            2006. With further conditions that he shall not threaten or coerce the
            witnesses, shall not indulge io any criminal activity, shall appear in
c           court on each date to which the case stands posted for trial and shall
            cooperate with the investigation. Deviation of any of the conditions
            shall entail cancellation of bail.

                The PLAPL is disposed of.''
D                                                       (Underlined for emphasis)

          Su nil's case

                "Perused the case diary and other materials available on record.
            The petitioner is the brother-in-law. He is in custody for quite some
E           time. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case I direct that
            the petitioner who is in custody be released on bail on his executing
            bond for Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand) with two local
            sureties, each for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Court
            below, with further conditions that he shall not indulge in any criminal
            activity, shall appear before the Court on each date to which the case
F
            will be posted for trial. Violation of any of the above conditions will
            entail cancellation of bail.

               This order shall howe1·er not be treated as precedent so far as
            husband is concerned. "
G                                                       (Underlined for emphasis)

          Learned counsel for the appellant subm ittcd that no reason has been
    indicated by the High Court for granting bail except stating that " in the
    peculiar facts and circumstances of the case" the bail was being grated because
H   the accused is in custody for ten months". Simiiar is the case ofSunil Kumar.
         GAJANAND AGARWAL v. STA TE OF ORI SSA [PASA VAT, J.]             355
       It is urged that as to what the peculiar facts and circumstances of the   A
case are, the High Court did not indicate even it did not refer to the various
orders passed earlier by the learned Additional Sessions Jude and by the High
Court on the earlier occasions. Even factually the High Court is not correct
in stating that the accused was in custody for ten months. In fact, he was
arrested on 3. I0.2005 and the date of order is 22.6.2006.
                                                                                 B
      Learned counsel for respondent no.2 submitted that though the High
Court order's prima facie does not disclose reasons, the various materials
were placed in support of the prayer for bail which were not considered.
According to him High Court was justified in granting bail. The Hon'ble
Judge had earlier dealt with the matter and was, therefore, conversant with      C
the materials on record. That probably is the reason for holding that peculiar
circumstances existed.

      This Court had occasion to deal with similar casual disposal of the bail
application.
                                                                                 D
      At this juncture. it would be. appropriate to take note of a decision of
this C0urt in Omar Usman Chamadia v. Abdul and Anr., JT (2004) 2 SC 176.
In para I0, it was observed as follows:

       "However, before concluding, we must advert to another aspect of
       this case which hj!s caused some concern to us. In the recent past, we E
        had several occasions to notice that the High Courts by recording the
       concessions shown by the counsel in the criminal proceedings refrain
       from assigning any reason even in orders by which it reverses the
       orders of the lower courts. In our opinion, this is not proper if such
       orders are appealable, be it on the ground of concession shown by
       learned counsel appearing for the parties or on the ground that F
       assigning of elaborate reasons might prejudice the future trial before
       the lower courts. The High Court shou Id not, unless for very good .
       reasons desist froni indicating the grounds on which their orders are
       based because when the matters are brought up in appeal. the court
       of appeal has every reason to know the basis on which the impugned G
       order has been made. It may be that while concurring with the lower
       court's order, it may not be necessary for the said appellate court to
       assign reasons but that is not so while reversing such orders of the
       lower cou1ts. It may be convenient for the said court to pass orders
       without indicating the grounds or basis but it certainly is not convenient
       for the court of appeal while considering the correctness of such H
    356                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A           impugned orders. The reasons need not be very detailed or elaborate.
            lest it may cause prejudice to the case of the parties. but must be
            sufficiently indicative of the process ofreasoning leading to the passing
            of the impugned order. The need for delivering a reasoned order is
            a requirement of law which has to be complied with in all appealable
            orders. This Court in a somewhat similar situation has deprecated the
B           practice of non-speaking orders in the case of State of Punjab and
            Ors. v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi. AIR ( 1984) SC 444".

          These aspects were recently highlighted in l'.D. Choudhary v. State of
    Uttar Pradesh and Anr., (2005 (7) SCALE 68).

c         Even on a cursory perusal the High Court's order shows complete non-
    application of mind. Though detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate
    documentation of the merits of the case is to be avoided by the Court while
    passing orders on bail applications, yet a court dealing with the bail application
    should be satisfied as to whether there is a prima facie case, but exhaustive
D   exploration of the merits of the case is not necessary. The court dealing with
    the application for bail is required to exercise its discretion in a judicious
    manner and not as a matter of course.

          There is a need to indicate in the order. reasons for prima facie
    concluding why bail was being granted particularly where an accused was
E   charged of having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the courts
    dealing with application for bail to consider among other circumstances, the
    following factors also before granting bail, they are:

          I. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of
    conviction and the nature of supporting evidence;
F
          2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension
    of threat to the complainant:

          3. Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge.

G        Any order dehors of such reasons suffers from non-application of mind
    as was noted by this Court, in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh
    and Ors., [2002] 3 SCC 598, Puran etc. v. Rambilas and Anr. etc., [2001]
    6 SCC 338 and in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu
    Yadav & Anr., JT (2004) 3 SC 442.

H         The above position was highlighted by this Court in Chaman Lal v.
          GAJANANDAGARWALv. STATEOFORISSA[PASAYAT.J.]                       357

State of U.P. and Anr., JT (2004) 6 SC 540, and in Kamaljit Singh v. State         A
of Punjab and Anr.. [2005] 7 SCC 326.

      In the case of Sunil the order is still more queer. Bail was granted to
him as he was the brother-in-law and has been in custody for quite some
time.
                                                                                   B
      The least that the High Court could have done is to refer to the earlier
orders and, in fact, as to how the scenario had changed to warrant a departure
from the earlier view expressed. That apparently has not been done. In case
of Sunil, learned Additional Sessions Judge, had observed as to how the non-
genuine documents were pressed into service while applying for bail. That C
aspect has not been even noted by the High Court.

      Nothing more is needed at this stage to set aside the impugned order
of the High Court.

      What is more baffling is that in the impugned orders there is no mention
about the States' stand. Was it a silent spectator before the High Court? D
Similar callousness was deprecated by this Court in Salim Khan v. Sanjai
Singh and Anr., [2002] 9 SCC 670.

      While allowing these appeals we direct reconsideration of the
applications for bail by the High Court in accordance with law keeping in          E
view the principles set out above.

       Before parting the appeals we would take note of the direction by the
High Court that its order is not to be treated as a precedent. In fairly well
settled that orders of bail are not necessarily orders of any precedent value.
Apart from that the correcting of orde..S stating that they shall not be treated   F
as a precedent has been dealt by this Court.

      In S1ate of Punjab and Anr. v. Rajesh Syal, (2002] 8] SCC 158 it was
observed as follows:

            "Before concluding, we would like to observe, with respect, that       G
       by directing that the order which was passed in VK. Sharma case
       (2000] 9 sec 449 should not be treated as a precedent implies that
       the said order is otherwise not in accordance with law and therefore
       should not be regarded as a precedent. This Court has ample
       jurisdiction to pass orders under Article 142( 1) of the Constitution
                                                                                   H
    358                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A          which may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or
           matter. But even in exercising this power, it is more than doubtful
           that an order can be passed contrary to law. In V.K. Sharma case this
           Court did not purport to exercise any jurisdiction under Article 142.
           The decision to direct the applicant to file applications to be moved
           for consolidation of the cases pending in different courts for different
B          offences to be tried in a single court was not in accordance with law,
           and the said decision in V. K. Sharma and that of P. K. Sharma (WP
           (Crl.) Nos. 72-75 of 2000, dated 5.5.2000 (SC) are overruled."

          The appeals are accordingly allowed.
c B.S.                                                          Appeals allowed.