GANGADHAR MADHA VRAO BIDWAI (DEAD) BY LRS.versusHANMANTRAO VYANKATRAO MUNGALE

       GANGADHAR MADHA VRAO BIDWAI (DEAD) BY LRS.                            A
                                    v.
             HANMANTRAO VYANKA TRAO MUNGALE

                          DECEMBER 7, 1994

             [R.M. SAHAI AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.]                           B

    Partnership Act/Partition Act: Partition of partnership-Recitals in
deed of dissolution to the effect that certain property was partnership
property-Dissolution deed not registered-Whether could be admissible in
evidence-Held: Yes.
                                                                             c
     Both the plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondent were
partners in a partnership formed in 1952 which lasted till 1959. In 1955
the plot in dispute was purchased by the defendant. At the time of
dissolution two Partnership Deeds were executed. In the schedule
appended to the Partition Deed it was mentioned that the said property
together with the structure standing thereon, the well and the motor         D
fixed on the said well would be treated as joint or r.ommon property.

     The appellant issued notice for execution of the sale deed. But when
the defendant neglected to do so the appellant filed a suit for partition
by metes and bounds. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. The
two Deeds of Dissolution of partnership were held inadmissible for           E
want of registration. The order was upheld by the High Court. Hence
this appeal.

    Allowing the appeals, this Court ·

     HELD: 1.1. It was found by the High Court and could not be              F
disputed by the respondent that if the plot in dispute was held to be a
partnership property then it did not require registration. It is true that
this plot was purchased in 1955 by the respondent alone, but he was not
precluded in law from bringing it in the partnership. The
circumstances and the three documents indicate that even though the          G
land was purchased by the respondent, it appears both the parties have
been treating this property as being joint ownership of both. This may
have been due to relations which existed between them prior to 1959
but there appears no reason to discard the recital in these documents
which unequivocally establish that the property at the time of
dissolution was owned by the partnership. (368 C, DJ                         H
                                    365
    366                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1994) SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A        1.2. The recital in the Deed of Dissolution of partnership of
    September 1961 that it was a partnership property, could not be
    ignored. Apart from it, the appellant had filed earlier suit in which the
    claim of the appellant that these documents were obtained under
    duress was not accepted. Even though the suit was dismissed on ground
    of limitation, the genuineness of the documents was not doubted. If that
B   be so, then the recital in the Dissolution Deed could not be ignored. The
    High Court was not justified in recording the finding that recital in the
    Deed did not carry out the intention of executants. The suit for
    partition is liable to be decreed. (368 E, F]

        S. V. Chandra Pandian and Ors., v. S. V. Si'valinga Nadar and Ors.,
c   (1993) 1 sec 589, relied on.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 900 of 1980.

       From the Judgment and Order dated 19.3.79 of the Bombay High
    Court in F.A. No. 12of1971.
D
          A.K. Sen and S.K. Bhattacharya for the Appellant.

       V.M. Tharkunde, M.D. Adkar, R.K. Misra, Ejaz Maqbool and K.K.
    Gogna for the Respondent.

E         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        R.M. SABAi, J. The only question that arises for consideration is
    whether the recital in a Deed of Dissolution of partnership. Ext. 48, that
    Survey Plot No. 699 was a partnership property was admissible in evidence.

F        Both the plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondent were partners in
    Messers Maharashtra Metal Manufacturing Company. The partnership was
    formed in 1952 and it lasted till 1959. In 1955 the plot in dispute was
    purchased by the defendant. At the time of dissoltion a partition Deed, Ext.
    46, was executed. A Deed of Dissolution, Ext. 47, was executed on !St
    August, 1961 and another Deed., Ext. 48, was executed on l st Septelnber,
G
    1961. In all these Deeds, this plot was mentioned. In the last Deed the
    recital read as under!:-

                   "We both have been carrying on the business of making and
                   selling Iotas (a) of copper in partnership for a long time in the
                   name of "Messers Maharashtra Metal Manufacturing
H
          G. M. BIDWAI (DEAD) v. H. V. MUNGALE [R.M. SAHAI, J.]          367

              Company" Pune. We have duly recorded the deed of A
              dissolution of partnership on the date 1-9-1961. There were
              factories running at two places and belonging to ·the our
              partnership. Similarly there is a plot bearing Survey No. 699
              of the ownership of our partnership, situated near Saibaba
              Temple, Satara Poona Road, Swargate and we both reside
              there. The places of both the factories are taken on rent and B
              the same were also (included) in our partnership."

     In the schedule appended to the Partition Deed it was mentioned that
the said property together with the sturcture standing thereon, the well and
the motor fixed on the said well would be treated as joint or common
property. Since in the Deed of Dissolution of lst August, 1961 it was C
mentioned,

              "Survey No. 699 has been purchased in the name of No. 1
              Mungale. No. 1 Mungale should execute a sale deed of half
              share in this land in favour of No. 2 Bidwai at Bidwai's
              expense."                                                 D

the appellant issued notice for execution of the sale deed. But when the
defendant neglected to do so the appellant filed the suit for partition by
metes and bounds. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. The two Deeds
of Dissolution of partnership were held inadmissible for want of
registration. The order was upheld in appeal. It was held that the recital in E
Exts. 46 and 47 with regard to terms of dissolution of partnership did not
require registration. But so for as it sought to effect the interest of defendant
in the non-partnership immoveable property the document being
unregistered was inadmissible. In respect of Ext. 48 the High Court held
that the recital in the document that it was partnership property did not F
appear to be correct.

     Sri Ashok Sen, the learned senior counsel urged that the law is settled
that no registration was required of the partnership property as it did not
result in transfer of any interest. R-eliance was placed on S. V. Chandra
Pandian and Ors. v. S. V. Sivalinga Nadar and Ors., [1993) I SCC 589. The G
learned counsel urged that in any case Section 14 of the Partition Act
indicated that any property acquired subsequently becomes partnership
property. Sri Tarkunde, the learned senior counsel supported the findings
recorded by the High Court. He submitted that the documents, Exts. 46, 47
and 48, did not establish that plot No. 699 was partnership property. He
urged that in Ext. 46 the mala (garden land) and the present suit property H
     368                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS·             (1994] SUPP. 6 S.C.R

A    had been separately mentioned. Therefore, it was clear that it was not
     partnership property. Learned counsel urged that the High Court having
     found documentary evidence to be insufficient or inadmissible examined
     the oral evidence and held that the land was not partnership property as
     such it was not an appropriate case in which this Court should exercise its
     jurisdiciton under Article 136 of the Constitution. The learned counsel
B    argued that the respondent having proved that the land was purchased by
     him, it was for the appellant to prove that the property belonged to both.

         The real question that arises for consideration is if the recital in the
    Deed of Dissolution dated 1.9.1961 showing that plot no. 699 was
    partnership property was inadmissible for want of registration. It was found
c   by the High Court and could no~ be disputed by the respondent that if plot ·
    no. 699 was lield to be a partnership property then it did not require
    registration. It is true that this plot was purchased in 1955 by the respondent   \

    alone, but he was not precluded in law from bringing it in the partnership.
    The circumstances and the three documents indicate that even though the
    land was purchased by the respondent, it appears both the parties have been
D treating this property as being in joint ownership of both. This may have
    been d~e to good relations which existed between them prior to 1959 but
  · there appears no reason to discard the recital in these documents which
    unequivocally establish that the property at the time of dissolution was
    owned by the partnership. The recital in the Deed of Dissolution · of
    partnership of September, 1961 that it was a partnership property, could not
E be ignored. Apart from it, the appellant had filed earlier suit in which the
    claim of the appellant that these documents were obtained under duress was
    not accepted. Even though the suit was dismissed on ground of limitation,
    but the genuineness of the documents was not doubted. If that be so, then
    the recital in the Dissolution Deed could not be ignored. The High Court
    was in absence of any challenge to Ext. 48 not justified in recording the
F finding that recital in the Deed did not carry out intention of executants. Sri
    Sen was correct in submitting that once it was held that plot No. 699 was
    partnership property then there was no need for registration and the
    appellant's suit was liable to be decreed.

          In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of the
G    two courts below dismissing the plaintiffs suit are set aside and the suit for
     partition is decreed. There shall be no order as to costs.

     G.N.                                                        Appeals allowed.




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