GANGULA ASHOK AND ANR.versusSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

A                        GAl\/GULA ASHOK A"lD ANR.
                                           v.
                        STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

                                JANt.:AR Y 28, 20GO

8                     [K.T. THOMAS AND M.B.SHAH, JJ.]

         Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
   1989-Sections 2( l)(d1; 14--Special Court-Specification of-Held: it is for
  trial of the offences under the Act that a particular Court of Session in each
C district is sought to be ;pecified as a Special Court-Offences---Cognizance
  of-Held, a Special Court can take cognizance of the offence only when the
  case is committed to it by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions
  of the Code of Criminal Procedure-A particular Court of Session, even after
  being specified as a Special Court, continues to be essentially a Court of
  Session and the interdict imposed by Section 193 of the Code of Criminal
D Procedure on all Courts of Session against taking cognizance of any offence
  as a Court of origi11al jurisdictio11 would be applicable-He11ce, a complaint
  or a charge sheet could not straightway be laid before the Special Court--{Jn-
  less there is express provision to the co11trary in a11y other law, the provisions
  of the Code will apply and interdict contained i11 Section 193 of the Code
E cannot be circumienteli-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sectio11s 2(g);
  4(2 ); 5; 6 and 193

        Direction by the High Court to the Special Court to frame charges after
  committal of the case-Pennissibility of-Held, after committal of a case to
  a Special Court, it is for that Court to decide regarding the action to be take11
F next after hearing both sides and no direction can be given to it by the High
  Court at that stage-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 227.

           The second appellant was working as Matron of a Girls' Hostel run
    by the Social Welfare Department. One of the residents of the said Hostel
G   lodged a complaint with the police alleging that the first appellant, husband
    of the second appellant, outraged/tried to outrage her modesty and when
    she complained to the second appellant about the same, the second appel-
    lant tried to persuade her not to divulge it to any body else. The police after
    investigation, filed a charge sheet directly before the Sessions Court which
    was designated as the Special Court for trial of offences under Scheduled
H   Caste_s and Scheduled Tribes (Preventions of Atrocities) Act, 1989 com-
                                          468
                      GANGt;LAASHOK v. STArE                             469

mitted within the territorial limits of the district concerned. Pursuant        A
thereto, a charge was framed by the Special Judge against both the appel-
lants for the aforesaid offences respectively.

      Thereafter, the appellants moved the High Court for quashing the
charge as well as the charge sheet on various reasons. Single Judge of the
High Court set aside the proceedings of the Special Court thereby holding       B
that the procedure adopted by the investigating officer in filing the charge
sheet straightway to the Special Court was not in accordance with law. The
Charge sheet and the connected papers were directed to be returned to the
Police Officer concerned, who, in tum, was directed to present the same
before a Judicial Magistrate of first class "for the purpose of committal to    C
the Special Court." The Single Judge further directed that "on such com-
mittal the Special Court shall frame appropriate charges in the light of
the observations in the order". Against the aforesaid order, the appellants
have preferred the present appeal.

      Disposing of the appeal, this Court                                       D
      HELD : 1.1. A Special Court under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is essentially a Court of Session
and it can take CO!,'Ilizance of the offence when the case is committed to it
by the magistrate in accordance with the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. In other words, a complaint or a charge sheet cannot        E
straightway be laid before the Special Court under the Act and the inter-
dict contained in Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would
stand in the way. [476-F]

       1.2. Neither in the Code nor in the Act there is any provision F
whatsoever, not even by implication, that the specified Court of Session
(Special Court) can take cognizance of the offence under the Act as Court
of original jurisdiction without the case being committed to it by a
magistrate. If that be so, there is no reason to think that the charge sheet
or a compliant can straightway be filed before such Special Court for
offences under the Act. It can be discerned from the hierarchical settings G
of criminal courts that the Court of Session is given a superior and special
status. Hence the legislature has thoughtfully relieved the Court of Session
from the work of performing all the preliminary formalities which
magistrates have to do until the case is committed to the Court of
Session. [474-G-H; 475-A]                                                    H
    470                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2CCOj I S.C.R.
A         Meerabai v. Bhujbal Singh, (1995) Crl.LJ. 2376 MP; Pappu Singh v.
    State of U.P., (1!195) Crl.L.J. 2803 AJlahabad; fhagurmahto v. State of Bihar,
    (1993) 1 Crimes 643 Patna; Jyoti Arora v. State of Haryana, (1998) 2 Crl.L.R.
    73 P&H; Referri11g Officer rep. by State of A.P. v. Shekar Nair, (1999) 3 ALT
    533 = (1999) Crl.L.J. 4173, appro11ed.

B                                                                        =
          In re : Director General of Prosecution (1993) Crl.L.J. 760 (1992) 2
    Kerala Law Times 748; Hareendran v. Sarada, (1996) 1 ALT (Crl.) 162 =
    (1995) 1 KLT 231, Overruled.

           2.1. It is for trial of the offenc1:s under the Act that a particular Court
C   of Session in each district is sought to be specified as a Special Court.
    Hence the particular Court of Session, el'en after being specified as a
    Special Court, would continue to be essentially a Court of Session and
    designation of it as a Special Court would not denude it of its character
    or even powers as a Court of Session. The trial in such a Court can be
D   conducted only in the manner provided in Chapter XVIII of the Cod:e
    which contains a fasciculus of provisions for ''Trial before a Court of
    Session". Section 193 of the Code i1mposes an interdict on all Courts of
    Session against taking cognizance of any offence as a Court of original
    jurisdiction. It can take cognizance only if "the case has been committed
E   to it by a magistrate', as provided in the Code. [473-1<'-G; 474-C-D]

         2.2. Unless there is express provision to the contrary in any other
  law the interdict contained in Section 193 of the Code cannot be circum-
  vented. A reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure makes it clear that subject to the provisions in other enactments
F all offences under other laws shall also be investigated, inquired into, tried
  and otherwise dealt with under the provisions of the Code. This means
  that if other enactment contains any provision which is contrary to the
  provisions of th!il Code, such otlter functions would apply In place of the
  particular provMon of the Code. If !there is no such contrary provision in
G other laws, then provisions of the Code would apply to the matters covered
  thereby. Nor can Section 5 of the Code be brought in aid for supporting
  the view that the Court of Session s11ecified under the Act can obviate the
  interdict contained in Section 193 of the Code as long as there is no
   provision in the Act empowering the Special Court to take cognizance of
H the offence as a Court of original jurisdiction. [477-G; 475-D-F; 476-B-C]
                       GA-,GULAASHOK v. STATE                            471

      A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Anr., (1984] 2 SCC 51?0;        A
Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994] 3 SCC 440, referred
to.

      2.3. Special Courts created under certain other enactments have
been specially empowered to take cognizance of the offence without the
accused being committed tu it for trial, (e.g. Section 36-A (l)(d) of the       B
Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act). It is significant iliat
there is no similar provision in the Scheduled Caste Scheduled Tri~s
(Pre-vention of Atrocities) Act. [478-H; 479-A]

      3. The High Court has rightly set aside the proceedings initiated by
the Special Court. But the directions given by the Single Judge in his order
                                                                                c
that after committal of the case the Special Court shall frame chargll!
against the appellants, cannot be supported. It is for the Special Court to
decide regarding the action to be taken next, after hearing both sides as
provided in Section 227 of the Code. No direction can be give to the Special
Court at this premature stage as to what the court should adopt                 D
then. [479-C-D]

      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
94 of 2000.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 3.9.99 of the Andhra Pradesh             E
High Court in Crl.P. No. 3534 of 1998.

      Shakil Ahmed Syed and Shujat Hussain for the Appellants.

      Guntur Prabhakar for the Respondent.                                      F
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      THOMi\S, J. Leave granted.

       Cao a "special court" which is envisaged in Scheduled Castes and         G
Schedul.ed Tribes (Prevention of Atrocitie~) Act, 1989, (for short 'the Act')
take cognizance of any offence without the case being committed to that
court? If it cannot, then appellants cannot raise any grievance at this stage
regarding framing of a charge against them as they would get an oppor-
tunity for it later.                                                            H
    472                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2000] l S.C.R.
A        First appellant is a practicing advocate and second appellant is his
  wife who was working as Matron of a Girls' Hostel run by the Social
  Welfare Department. One Kumari G. Swetha was a resident of the said
  hostel. On 27.2.1996 the said Swetha lodged a complaint with the police
  alleging that on 6.1.1996 the firs~ appellant outraged/tried to outrage her
B modesty. Th;; police after investigation, fikd a charge-sheet directly before
  the Sessions Court, Karim Nagar (Andhra Pradesh) which was designatt:d
  as the special court for trial of offences under the Act committed within
  the territorial limits of the district concerned. In the charge· sheet, first
  appellant is alleged to have committed the offence under Section 3(l)(XI)
  of the Act and also Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. Besides first .
c appellant, the inwstigating officer arrayed his wife as the second appellant
  for the offence under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code in relation to
  the offences put against her husband, on the allegation that wht:n Kumari
  Swetha complained to the second appellant of the misdemeanor committed
  by the first accused, she tried to persuade the complainant not to divulge
D it to anybody else. Subsequently the police dropped Section 354 of the IPC
  from the charge-sheet and filed a revised charge-sheet pursuant to a query
  put by the Special Judge concerr.ed.

         A charge was framed by the Special Judge against both the appel-
E lants for the aforesaid offences rc:spectivdy. It was presumably at the said
  stage that tht: appellants moved the High Court for quashing the charge as
  well as the charge-sheet on various reasons. A Single Judge of the High
  Court of Andhra Pradesh found that the procedure adopted by the inves-
  tigating officer in filing the charge-sheet straight-away to the Special Court
p was not in accordance with law, and the Special Judge had no jurisdiction
  to take cognizance of any offenc,e under the Act without the case having
  been committed to that court. Accordixigly the learned Single Judge set
  aside the proceedings of the Special Court and directed the charge-sheet
  and the connected papers to be returned to the police officer concerned
  who, in turn, was directed to present the same before a Judicial Magistrate
G of 1st Class 'for the purpose of c.ommittal to the Special Court1'. Learned
  Single Judge further directt:d that "on such committal the special Court
  shall frame appropriate charges in the light of the observations in the
   order."

H         AppellantS have filed this appeal by special leave in challenge of the
               GANGlJLA ASHUK v. STATE [THOMAS, J.]                     473

aforesaid order of the learnt:d Singh: Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High       A
Court.

      W1,; haw to consider whether the Special Judge could take cog·
nizanct: of the offcnct: straightway without the case hdng commit:cd tu
him. If tht: Spt:cial Court is a Court of Session the interdict contained m
Section 193 of the Code of criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') would    B
stand in the way. It reads thus :

         193. Cognizance of offences by Courts of Session. - Except as
        otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for
        the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance    c
        of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case
        has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code."

      So the first aspect to be considered is whether the Special Court is
a Court of Session. Chapter II of the Code deals with "Constitution of
Criminal Courts and Offices". Section 6, which falls thereunder says that     D
"there shall be, in every State,the following classes of Criminal Courts,
namely:

      (i) Courts of session;;'

(The other classes of criminal courts enumerated thereunder are not            E
relevant in this case and hence omitted.)

       Section 14 of the Act says that "for the purpose of providing for
speedy trial, the State Uovernment shall, with tht: concurrt:nce of the Chit:f
Justice of tht: High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify F
for each district a Court of Session to be a Spt:cial Court to try the offenct:s
under this Act". So it is for trial of the offences under the Act that a
particular Court of Session in each district is sought to be specified as a
Special Court. Though the word "trial" is not defined either in the Codt: or
in the Act It is clt:arly distinguishable from inquiry. Tht: word 'inquiry' is
dt:fined in St:ction 2(g) of tht: Codt: as. ''t;very inquiry, other than trial, G
conducted under thls Code by a magistrate or court". So the trial is distinct
from inquiry and inquiry must always be a forerunm:r to tht: trial. Tht: Act
contemplatt:s only the trial to be conducted by the Special Court. The
add.:d n:ason for specifying a Court of Session as special Court is to t:nsure
spt:t:d for such trial. ''Special Court" is dt:fined in the Act as "a Court of H
    474                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2000) 1 S.C.R.
A Session specified as a Special Court in Section 14". [vide S.2(1)(d)I

        Thus the Court of Session is specified to conduct a trial and no other
  court can conduct the trial of offonces under the Act. Why the Parliament
  provided that only a Court of session can be specified as a Special Court'!
  faidently the legislature wanted the Special Court to be Court of Session.
B Hence the particular Court of Session, even after being specified as a
  Special Court, would continue to be essentially a Court of Session and
  designation of it as a Special Court would not denude it of its character or
  even powers as a Court of Session. The trial in such a court can be
  conducted only in the manner provided in Chapter XVIII of the Code
C which contains a fasciculus of pro\'Thions for "Trial before a Court of
  Session".

           Section 193 of the Code has to be understood in the aforesaid
    backdrop. The section imposes an interdict on all Courts of Session against
D   taking cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction. It can
    take cognizance only if "the case has been committed to it by a magistrate",
    as provided in the Code. Two segments have been indicated in Section 193
    as exceptions to the aforesaid interdict. One is, when the Code itself has
    provided differently in express language regarding taking of cognizance,
    and the second is when any other law has provided differently in express
E   language regarding taking cognizance of offences under such law. The
    word "expressly'' which is employed in Section 193 denoting to those
    exceptions is indicative of the kgislative mandate that a Court of Session      .-.-
    can depart from the interdict contained in the section only if it is provided
    differently '.n clear and unambiguous terms. In other words, unless it is
F   positively and specifically provided diffemetly no Court of Session can take
    cognizance of any offence direc:tly, without the case being committed to it
    by a magistrate.

          Neither in the Code nor in the Act there is any provision whatsoever,
G not even by implication, that the specified Court of Session (Special Court)
    can take cognizance of the offence under the Act as a court of original
    jurisdiction without the case being committed to it by a magistrate. If that
    be so, then: is no reason to think that the charge-sheet or a complaint can
    straightway be filed before such Special Court for offences under the Act.
    It can be discerned from the hierarchical settings of criminal courts that
H   the Court of Session is given a superior and special status. Hence we think
               GA,1\IGUlAASHOKv. STATE(THOMAS,J.]                        475

that the legislature would have thoughtfully relieved the Court of Session      A
from the work of performing all the preliminary formalities which
magistrates have to do until the case is committed to the Court of session.

       We have noticed from some of the decisions rendered by various
High Courts that contentions were advanced based on Sections 4 and 5 of
the Code as suggesting that a departure from Section 193 of the Code is         B
permissible under special enactments. Section 4 of the Code contains two
sub-sections of which the first sub-section is of no relevance since it deals
only with offences under the Indian Penal .Code. However, sub-section (2)
deals with offences under other laws and hence the same can be looked
into. Sub- section (2) of Section 4 is extracted below :                        c
        ''All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired
        into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same
        provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being m torce
        regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into,
        trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.'                        D

      A reading ·of the sub-section makes it clear that subject to the
provisions in other enactments all offences under other laws shall also be
investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with under the
provision of the Code. This means that if other enactment contains any
provision which is contrary to the provisions of the Code, such other           E
functions would apply in place of the particular provision of the Code. If
there is no such contrary provision in other laws, then provisions of the
code would apply to the matters covered thereby. This aspect has been
emphasised by a Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 16 of the
decision inA.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak andAnr., [1984] 2 SCC          F
500. It reads thus :

        ;'Section 4(2) provides for offences under other law which may be
        investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with accord-
        ing to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure but subject
        to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner G
        or place of investigation, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing
        with such offences. In the absence of a specific provision made in
        the statute indicating that offences will have to be investigated,
        inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to that
        statute, the same will have to be investigated, inquired into, tried H
    476                   St:PRJ:<ME COURT REPORTS                 [2UOO( 1 S.C.R.

A           and otherwise dealt with according to the Code of Criminal Pro-
            cedun:. In other words, Code of Criminal Procedure is the parent
            statme which provides for inwstigation, inquiring into and trial of
            case~ by criminal courts of various designations."


          Nor can Section 5 of the Code be brought in aid for supporting the
B   view that the Court l'f Sess10n ~pecified under the Act can obviate the
    interdict comained in Sect:on 193 of the Code as long as there is no
    provision in the Act empowaing the Special Court to take cognizance of
    the offonce as a court of original jurisdiction. Section 5 of the Code reads
    thus:
c            ''5. Saving. · Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence
             of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local
             law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power
             confom:d, or any >pecia1 form of procedure pn:scrihed, by any
             other law for the time being in force."
D
           This Court, on a reading of Section 5 in juxtaposition with Section
    4(2) of the l 'ode, has held rhat "it only relates to the extent of application
    of the Code in the mattt:r of territorial and other jurisdiction but does not
    nullify the effect of Section 4(2); In short, the provisions of this Code would
E   be applicabk to the extent, in the absence of any contrary provision in the
    special Act or any special provision including the jurisdiction or ap-
    plicability of the Code." (vide para 128 in Directorate of Enforcement v.
    Deepak Mahajan, \ 1994] 3 SCC 440.

          Hence we have no doubt that a Special Court under this Act is
F essentially a Court of Session and it can take cognizance of the offence
    when the case is committed to it by the magistrate in accordance with the
    provisions t'f the Code. ln other words, a complaint or a charge sheet
    cannot strai[lhtway be laid before the Special Court under the Act.

          When this question was considered by various High Courts, the High
G   Courts of Madhya Pradesh, Allahabad, Patna and Punjab & Haryana have
    adopted tht: view consistent with the view which we have statt:d above.
    (vide lvfeerabai v. Bhujbal Singh, (1995) Cr\. L.J. 2376 MP; Papu Singh v.
    State of U.P , ( 1995) Crl. L.J. 2803 Allahabad; Jhagurmahto v. State of Bihar,
    (1993) l Crimes 643 Patna; Jyoti Arora v. State of Haryana, (1998) 2 Crl.
H   L.R. 73 P.& H.
                     GANGULAASHOKv. STATE(THOMAS,J.]                             477

           But it seems that the only High Court which took a contrary view is A
'    the High Court of Kerala. At first a Division Bench of that High Court
     took the view that the Special Court can straightway take cognizance of the
     offence under the Act and proceed with the trial unaffected by Section 193
     of the Code. (vide In re: Director General of Prosecution, (1993) Crl. L.J.
     760 - (1992) 2 Kerala Law Times 748. One of the Judges of the Division
     Bench sought support to it from the observations of this Court in A.R.
                                                                                 B
     Antulay's decision (supra) and then observed that ''the same principle
     would apply because of the effect of the transmutation of the Session Court
     as a Special Court."

            When the correctness of the above decision was later doubted by the         c
     same High Court the question was refcued to a larger bench. In
     Hareendran v. Sarada, (1996) 1 ALT Crl. 162 = (1995) 1 KLT 23 a Full
     Bench of that High Court affirmed the view of the Division Bench
     afon:said. The Full Bench put forward mainly two reasons for adopting the
     said interpretation. First is that Section 20 of the Act stipulated that
                                                                                        D
     provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsis-
     tent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. As
     the section gives overriding effect for the provisions of the Act and it was
     enacted with a view to prevent commission of offence of atrocities against
=-   the member of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the Full Bench
     felt that ''it is rather difficult for us to hold that the committal proceedings   E
     is indispensable as a prelude to the case being tried by the Special Court.'
     Second is that, there is nothing in the Act to indicate that the Special Court
     would get jurisdiction only on a committal order made by the magistrate.

            The very approach of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court seems          F
     to be that there should be specific indication in the Act that the Special
     Court gets jurisdiction to try the offence only on a committal order, and in
     the absence of such specific indication the Special Court must have the
     right to take cognizance of the offence as though it is a court of original
     jurisdiction. We have pointed out above that unless there is express
     provision to the contrary in any other law the interdict contained in Section      G
     193 of the Code cannot be circumvented. Hence the reasoning of the Full
     Bench in Hareendrun v. Sarada (supra) is apparently fallacious.
=
           In fact all the other High Courts which dealt with this question (the
     decisions of which were cited supra) have dissented from the aforesaid H
    478                   SCPREMF. COURT REPORTS                   (2000] 1 S.CR.
A vfow of the Full Bench of the Kcrala High Court, after adverting to the
    reasons advanced by the Full Bcnch. A Division Bench of the Andhra
    Pradesh High Court afta referring to the Full bench decision in
    Hareendran v, Sarada (supra) made the following observations in Referring
    Officer rep. By State of A.P. v. Si1ekar Nair, (1999) 3 ALT 533 = (1999)
B   Crl. LJ 4173 :

            "We find it difficult tu agree with the reasoning of the Kerala High
            Court in the two decisions refom:d to above. As already observed
            by u~, in the absence of a particular procedure prt!scribed by the
            said Act as n:gards the mode of taking cognizance, enquiry or trial,
c           the procedure under the Code will have to be applied by reason
            of Stction 4(2) of the Code as clarified by the Supreme Court in
            the case of Directorate of Enforcement (AIR (1994) SC 1775).
            There is no provision in the Act which excludes the application of
            Section 191, Cr. P.C. The mere fact that no procedure is prescribed
            or specified under the Special Act dues not mean that the Special
D           Act dispenses with the procedure for committal in the Case triable
            by Court of Sessions and that the Special Court gets original
            jurisdiction in the matter of initiations, enquiry or trial. There is
            no good reason why the procedural provisions of Code relating to
            power and mode of takin;5 cognizance including Section 193 should
E           not be applied to the Special Court."

         We are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench of the
    Andhra Pradesh High Court has stated the legal position correctly in the
    above decisicm.

F          It must be noted that the observations of this Court in (A.R. Antulay
    (supra) were made in connection with th.: establishment of a Special Court
    under Criminal Amendment Act of 1952. What is to be pointed out is that
    a Special Judge appointed under the said Act was given the specific power
    to talce cognizance of the offonce without the case being committed to him.
G   Hence the observations in A.R . .A.ntult:y's case cannot be profitably utilized
    to support the interpretation of another Act wherein there is no such
    specific provision.

          It is contextually relavant to notice that Special Courts created under
    certain other enactments have been specially empowered to take cog-
H   nizance of the offonce without the accust:d being committed tu it for trial,
                GANGULAASHOKv. STATE[THOMAS,J.j                             479

(e.g. Section 36-A{l )( d) of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substan-        A
ces Act). It is significant that there is no similar provision in the Scheduled
Castes Scheduled Tribes (Prevntio11 of Atrocities) Act.

      We therefore, hold that the legal postilion stated in the decisions of
the Kerala High Court in Re Director General prosecutions and
Hareendra11 v. Sarada, is not in accordance with law. We approve the               B
interpretation adopted by the other High Courts in the decisions referred
to above as the correct legal position.

       So the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has rightly set aside, as per
the impugned order, the proceedings initiated by the special Court
Specified under the Act. But we do not support the directions given by the         c
learm:d Single Judge in his order that after committal of the case the
special Court shall frame charge against the appellants. It is for the Special
Court to decide regarding the action to be taken next, after h.:aring both
sides as provided in Section 227 of the Code. No direction can be given to
the Special Court at this premature stage as to what the court should adopt        D
then. It is open to the appellants to raisi: all their contentions at that stage
if they wish to make a plea for discharge. We make it clear that if any such
plea is made the Judge of the Special Court shall pass appropriate orders
untrammeled by the observations made in the impugned order.

       With the said directions and observations we disposed of this appeal.       E
M.P.                                                       Appeal disposed of