Holding

The conviction was upheld because the voluntary disclosure, recovery of stolen articles, and the surrounding circumstantial evidence satisfied the requirements of Sections 27 and 114 of the Evidence Act and the tests for conviction on circumstantial evidence.

Summary

Geejaganda Somaiah was convicted for the murder of his relative Chengappa, who had been seeking an equitable partition of family land. After Chengappa disappeared while meeting a revenue inspector, his body was found the next day. The appellant surrendered, made a voluntary statement to police, and gold ornaments and the alleged murder weapon were recovered from his house. The trial court convicted him under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and the High Court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the circumstantial evidence, the voluntary disclosure, and the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act satisfied the legal tests for conviction. It held that the chain of circumstances was complete, the disclosure statements were admissible under Section 27, and the presumption of guilt was justified, thereby upholding the conviction.

Issues considered

The admissibility of the appellant's voluntary disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the circumstantial evidence established a complete chain sufficient to convict under Section 302 IPC.
Whether the presumption of guilt under Section 114( a) of the Evidence Act applies to the recovered ornaments and weapon.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 25, s. 26, s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

circumstantial evidenceSection 27 Evidence ActSection 114 presumptionmurdervoluntary disclosureIndian Penal Codeland disputeequitable partition

Judgment

GEEJAGANDA SOMAIAH A
V.

STATEOFKARNATAKA

MARCH 12, 2007

[DR. ARIJITPASA YAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] B

Indian Penal Code,1860;

Section 302-Conviction under-Voluntary disclosure made by the
accused-Artie/es belonging to the deceased recovered from his possession- C
Held, inference can safely be drawn that the accused committed murder of
the deceased-Sections 27 and 114 of the Evidence Act, I 872.

The appellant and the deceased are from the same family but the claim
of equitable partition and share in family land by the deceased was opposed D
by the accused. Two days before of the incident, on the request of the deceased,
the Revenue Inspector has visited the the family lands for having equitable
partition ofland. On the fateful day, the deceased left to meet the Revenue
Inspector but didn't return and on the next day his dead body was found by
his wife lying by the side of the road with injuries on his person. The
informant, wife of the deceased, suspected the appellant to be the real culprit. E
The appellant surrendered and on the basis of voluntarily statement made by
him, gold chain, ring belonging to the deceased and the the weapon alleged to
have been used in the crime were recovered from the house of the accused.
The trial Court recorded conviction u/s 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. The
High Court also found the circumstances were conclusive to prove the guilt
of the accused and, therefore, confirmed the conviction and sentence. Hence, F
the appeal.

It was contended by the appellant that factual scenario as projected by
the prosecution does not establish the guilt of the accused and the
circumstances highlighted by the prosecution to establish its case does not
G
present a complete chain of circumstances to warrant any interference of
guilty.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

899 H
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A HELD 1.1. Conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence ...
but it should be tested by the touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial
evidence laid down by the this Court, viz. (i)the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The
circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established;(ii) the
facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
B of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;(iii) the circumstances should be
of a conclusive nature and tendency;(iv) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved; and(v) there must be a chain of evidence !-.

so compete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
c with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability
the act must have been done by the accused. [Para 13) [905-F; 906-D-E-FJ
...
Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1977) SC 1063; Eradu and
Ors. v. State of Hyderabad, AIR (1956) SC 316; Earabhadrappa v. State of
Karnataka, AIR (1983) SC 446; State of UP. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. AIR (1985)
D SC 1224; Ba/winder Singh v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1987) SC 350 and Ashok
Kumar Chatterjee v. State of MP., AIR (1989) SC 1890, referred to

Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR (1954) SC 621; C. Chenga Reddy
and Ors. v. State ofA.P., [1996) 10 SCC 193; Padala Veera Reddy v. State of
A.P. and Ors., AIR (1990) SC 79; State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava,
E AIR (1992) Crl. L.J.1104; Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1952) SC 343 and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.
State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC 1622, relied upon

Will's Circumstantial Evidence (Chapter VI) by Sir Alfred Wills, referred
to.
F
2.1. On the basis of the voluntary disclosure made by the accused, the
article belonging to. the deceased were recovered from his possession, an
inference, therefore, can safely be drawn that that not only the accused was
in possession of those articles belonging to the deceased but also committed
G murder of the deceased. (Para 14) (907-D)
J.P.Anandv. D.G.Bajfna, AIR (2002) SC 141 and Ezhil and Ors. v. State
of Tamil Nadu, AIR (2002) SC 2017, relied upon.
-·
Guiab Chandv. State of MP., AIR (1995) SC 1598, referred to. .; .
H
GEEJAGANDA SOMAIAH v. ST ATE OF KARNA TAKA [PASAYAT. .1.] 901

~- 3.1. A fact deposed to as discovered in consequence of information A
received from a person accused of an offence , in the custody of the police
officer, so much of the such information whether it amounts to a confession
or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered , may be proved,
however, the court has to be cautious that no effort is made by the prosecution
to make out a statement of accused with a simple case of discovery of fact in
order to attract the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. B
!Para ISi 1907-G; 908-CI

4 Pulukuri kottaya and Ors. v. Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 87; State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR (1960) SC 1125; Mohmed lnayatu//ah
v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR (1976) SC 483; Earabhadrappa v. State of C
Karnataka, 11983) 2 SCR 552; Stale of Maharashtra v. Damu, s/o Gopinath
Shinde & Ors. JT (2000) SSC 575; Mukund Alias Kundu Mishra & Anr. v.
State of M.P., AIR (1997) SC 2622; Ronny Alias Ronald James A/waris &
Ors. v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR (1998) SC 1251 and Sanjay@Kaka v. State
( NCT of Delhi) 120011 3 SCC 190, referred to.
D
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 311 of
2007.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.7.2005 of the High Court of
Kamataka at Bangalore in Crl. A. No. 4/2003.

V. Ramasubramanian (A.C.) for the Appellant. E
Sanjay R. Hedge, Anil K. Mishra and Vikrant Yadav for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. I. Leave granted.
F
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division
Bench of the Kamataka High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant
questioning correctness of the conviction recorded by the Fast Track Court.
The said Court found the appellant guilty of offence punishable under Section
302 of the India Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and sentenced him to G
undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.8,000/- with default
stipulation.'

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
~ One Chengapa (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'), his wife Smt. H
I
I
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A Baby Chengappa (PW- I), the accused and most of the witnesses are the
residents of Garvale village. There is no much dispute that the accused and
the deceased were related. According to the prosecution the Geejaganda
family to which the accused and the deceased belong owned nearly 348 acres
of land. Out of the same, donation of about 48 acres, was made and the
remaining area was with the family. There were six sharers in the said
B Geejaganda family. The said six sharers were in possession of the respective
portion of the remaining area. The deceased was claiming equitable partition
and share in family land which was opposed by the accused and this resulted '.
in ultimate murder of the deceased Chengappa on 23.9.1995 at 8.00 p.m. It
is relevant to note that there is no much dispute that on 21.9.1995 i.e. two
C days before the incident, the Revenue Inspector had visited and inspected
the family lands on the request made by the deceased for having equitable
partition. On 23.9.1995 in the morning the deceased left the house informing
his wife PW-I, that he is going to Madapura to meet the Revenue Inspector.
At that time, he was wearing one HMT Watch, gold ring with inscription
"GDC", a gold chain and a sum of Rs.2,500/-. He infonned PW-I that he may
D return in the evening and if he does not, he will come back on the next day
morning. Since the deceased did not come back even in the morning of
24.9.1995, PW-I went to the coffee land to attend the work and on the way
on Thakeri-Garvale Road, saw the dead body of her husband lying by the side
of the road with injuries on his person. On seeing it she went back to the
E house and infonned the incident to her children and all the family members
came back to the place. By then the police who had received incomplete
infonnation also arrived at the spot and after recording the statement of PW-
1 and treating the same as first information report, registered a case in Crime
No.215/1995 for the offence punishable under Section 302 !PC read with
Section 34 IPC against the two accused persons including the appellant-
F accused no. I and investigation was taken up.
4. After registration of the case the mandatory procedures like holding
of mahazar, drawing up of inquest proceedings were conducted. Statements
of witnesses were recorded and search for the accused was carried out. On
G the same day, i.e., on 24.9.1995, accused no. I voluntarily appeared before the
Investigating Officer and surrendered. He was taken into custody and
interrogated and from his voluntary statement, the permissible portion n1arked --.... ,.
as Ex.P-14 was recorded. On the basis of the voluntary statement, gold chain,
ring belonging to the deceased and the weapon alleged to have been used
in the crime in question were discovered from the house of the accused no. I.
H
GEE.IAGANDA SOMAIAI Iv. STATE OF KARNA TAKA [PASA YAT. J.) 903

Those were seized along with the bloodstained clothes which were subjected A
to forensic science examination. On receipt of all the reports including F.S.L.,
autopsy, serologist and on completion of the investigation, charge sheet was
filed against the accused persons for the offence punishable under Section
302 read with Section 34 of the !PC.

5. In order to establish its accusations the prosecution examined 16 B
witnesses. The accused persons pleaded innocence and stated that because
__, of enmity they have been falsely implicated.

6. The Trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record found the
appellant guilty. However, the co-accused was given the benefit of doubt and
order of acquittal was recorded. C
7. The entire case of the prosecution revolves around the evidence
which is circumstantial in nature, as there were no eye witnesses to the actual
assault. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are:

(i) Motive; D
(ii) Last seen together'
(iii) Discovery/recovery of the golden ornaments by the deceased and
the murder weapon seized from the house of the accused no. I
along with the bloodstained clothes of the accused no. I; and E
lastly
(iv) absence of any explanation by the accused no. I.

8. The High Court found that the circumstances were conclusive to
prove guilt of the accused and, therefore, confirmed the conviction and the
sentence by dismissing the appeal. F
9. In support of the appeal leaned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the factual scenario as projected by the prosecution does not establish
the guilt of the accused and the circumstances highlighted by the prosecution
to establish its case does not present a complete chain of circumstances to
warrant any interference of guilty. G

I0. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the
judgment of the High Court affirming that the judgment of the Trial Court.

11. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case
H
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 3 S.C.R.
~
A rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified
only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other
person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajas than. AIR ( 1977) SC 1063, Eradu
v. State of Hyderabad, AIR (1956) SC 316, Earabhadrappa v. State of
Karnataka, AIR (1983) SC 446, State a/UP. v. Sukhbasi, AIR (1985) SC 1224,
B Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350, and Ashok Kumar
Chatterjee v. State of MP. ,AIR (1989) SC 1890. The circumstances from which
an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond <-....

reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the
principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram
c v. State of Punjab AIR (1954 )SC 621 it was laid down that where the case
depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect
of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the
accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt.

We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga
D Reddy v. State ofA.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus:
"21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that
the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should
be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature.
Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should
E be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved
circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence."

In Pada/a Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR (1990) SC 79, it was laid
down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence
F must satisfy the following tests: ··--'.

(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be
drawn, must be cogently and firll'lly t!stablished;

(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly
G pointing towards guilt of the accused; "c>o
. ;.
'
•
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so
complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that with in all
human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none

H
GEEJAGANDA SOMAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [PASA YAT, J.] 905

.. --+ else; and A
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be
complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than
that of guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be
consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent
with his innocence." B
In State of UP. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava ( 1992) Cr!. LJ 1104, it was
~'
pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence
,_
and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one
in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the
circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and c
the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only
with the hypothesis of guilt.

12. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book 'Wills' Circumstantial Evidence'
(Chapter VJ) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the
case of circumstantial evidence: (I) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal D
inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected
~·
with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party
who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3)
in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence
must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify E
the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other
reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt; and (5) ifthere be any reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted.

13. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on F
circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law
relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in
1952.

In Hanumant Gov ind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. AIR (I 952) SC 343,
r
it was observed thus: G
'--
~~

"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a
circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established,
and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the
H
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be
.. All

such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be
proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as
B to show that within all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused."

A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC 1622, Therein, while dealing +
with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the
c prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna
in the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence or plea. The conditions
precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on
circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:

(I) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
D
drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must
or should and not may be established;

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the ·accused is
E
guilty;

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to
be proved; and
F
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused.

G 14. Some of the circumstances which need to be highlighted are recovery
'
of the gold ornaments of the deceased as well as the weapon used in the ·--t,
crime. The bloodstained clothes of the appellant were also seized. Prosecution
has relied on the evidence of PWs 6 and 12 to establish its stand about the
recovery. PW-6, the goldsmith who was called for testing and weighing gold
ornaments. He admitted that he accompanied police officer for recovery of the
H
GEEJAGANDA SOMA IAH v. ST ATE OF KARNA TAKA [PASA YAT. J.] 907

ornaments from the accused but resiled from certain parts of the statement
..+ A
made during investigation. PW-12 specifically stated that the appellant led the
police and the mahazar witness for discovery of the articles namely, gold
chain MO 10, bloodstained clothes i.e. MO 14 of the accused. These are
along with clothes were sent for forensic examination. The evidence of FSL
Officer and his report equally established that the b:oodstains were there.
Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'Evidence Act') has also B
application. As held by this Court in J.P. Anand v. D.G. Baffna, AIR (2002)
, ' SC 141, and Ezhi/ and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (2002) SC 2017, in
... the absence of explanation of the accused as to legitimate or origin of their
possession of articles belonging to the deceased, keeping in view of the time
within which the murder was supposed to have been committed and the body
found and the articles recovered from the possession of the accused an
c
inference can be can be safely drawn that not only the accused was in
possessions of those articles belonging to the deceased but also committed
murder of the deceased. The articles belonging to the deceased were in
possession of the accused who had voluntarily disclosed and as such
presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act was clearly applicable. D
.,,. 15. The most important circumstance for the prosecution in the case is
the disclosure statements of the accused persons and recoveries of the stolen
property, blood stained shirt and weapon of offence consequent upon such
statements. The admissibility of the statements made by the accused persons
to the police is challenged on twin grounds, i.e., (i) factually no such statement E
was made, and (ii) the statement made was inadmissible in evidence.

Section 25 of the Evidence Act mandates that no confession made to
a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence.
Similarly Section 26 of the Evidence Act provides that confession by the
- ,._.. F
accused person while in custody of police cannot be proved against him.
However, to the aforesaid rule of Sections 25 to 26 of the Evidence Act, there
is an exception carved out by Section 27 the Evidence Act providing that
when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police
officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or G
.J-;i not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby" discovered, may be proved .
Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26. Such statements are generally
termed as disclosure statements leading to the discovery of facts which are
presumably in the exclusive knowledge of the maker. Section 27 appears to
be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of
H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 3 S.C.R.

A inforniation given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information
was true and accordingly it can be safely allowed to be given in evidence.
I- ...
As the Section is alleged to be frequently misused by the police, the
courts are required to be vigilant about its application. The court must ensure
the credibility of evidence by police because this provision is vulnerable to
B abuse. It does not, however, mean that any statement made in terms of the
aforesaid section should be seen with suspicion and it cannot be discarded
only on the ground that it was made to a police officer during investigation.
The court has to be cautious that no effort is made by the prosecution to ·~
~
make out a statement of accused with a simple case of recovery as a case of
discovery of fact in order to attract the provisions of Section 27 the Evidence
c Act.

16. The position of law in relation to Section 27 of the Evidence Act was
elaborately made clear by Sir John Beaumont in Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors.
v. Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 87, wherein it was held:
D "Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to
the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain
statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The .,-
condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that
discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a
E person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police Officer must
be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section
seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in
consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby
that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed
F to be given in evidence; but clearly the extent of the information ......,.
admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to
which such information is required to relate. Normally the section is
brought into operation when a person in pol ice custody produces
from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body,
a weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which
G
the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown has argued that
in such a case the 'fact discovered' is the physical object produced, 'c:l

and that any infonnation which relates distinctly to that object can be
proved. Upon this view information given by a person that the body
produced is that of a person murdered by him, that the weapon
H
GEEJAGANDA SOMAIAH v. ST ATE OF KARNA TAKA [PASA YAT, J.] 909

.. -f produced is the one used by him in the commission of a murder, or A
that the ornaments produced were stolen in a dacoity would all be
admissible. If this be the effect of section 27, little substance would
remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections on
confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody. That
ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a
person under police influence might be induced to confess by_ the B
exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban
,. ' be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object
.. subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the
persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and
that in practice the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of
construction their Lordships think that the proviso to S.26, added by
c
S.27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. In
their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within
the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered
embraces the place from which the object is produced and the
knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must D
relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past
history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the
setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in
custody that "! will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my
house" does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were
E
discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that
a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge,
and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the
offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement
the words be added 'with which I stabbed A' these words are admissible
-~ since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of F
the informant."

17. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR (1960) SC
1125, this Court held that Sections 25 and 26 were manifestly intended to hit
an evil, viz., to guard against the danger of receiving in evidence testimony
from tainted sources about statements made by persons accused of offences. G
~- These sections form part of a statute which codifies the law relating to the
relevancy of evidence and proof of facts in judicial proceedings. The State
is as much concerned with punishing offenders who may be proved guilty of
committing of offences as it is concerned with protecting persons who may
be compelled to give confessional statements. Section 27 renders information H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A admissible on the ground that the discovery of a fact pursuant to a statement
made by a person in custody is a guarantee of truth of the statement made
by him and the legislature has chosen to make on that ground an exception
to the rule prohibiting proof of such statement. The principle of admitting
evidence of statements made by a person giving information leading to the
discovery of facts which may be used in evidence against him is manifestly
B reasonable. In that case the High Court had acquitted the accused on the
ground that his statement which lad to the recovery of gandasa, the weapon
of offence was inadmissible. The accused Deoman had made a statement to ( .
hand over the gandasa which he state~ to have thrown into a tank and got
it recovered. The trial court convicted the accused for the offence of murder.
C The Full Bench of the High Court held that Section 27 of the Evidence Act
which allegedly created an unjustifiable discrimination between persons in
custody and persons out of custody offending Article 14 of the Constitution
of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution') was unenforceable. After the opinion
of the Full Bench a Division Bench of the Court excluded from consideration
the statement made by the accused in the presence of the police officer and
D held that the story of the accused having borrowed a gandasa on the day
of occurrence was unreliable: The accused was acquitted but at the instance
of the State of U.P., the High Court granted a certificate to file the appeal in
this Court. This Court did not agree with the position of law settled by the
High Court and decided to proceed to review the evidence in the light of that
E statement in so far as it distinctly related to the fact thereby discovery being
admissible. Dealing with the conclusions arrived at by the High Court and on
the facts of the case, this Court observed:

"The High Court was of the view that the mere fetching of the
gandasa from its hiding place did not establish that Deoman himself
F had put it in the tank, and an inference could legitimately be raised
that somebody else had placed it in the tank, or that Deoman had seen
someone placing that gandasa in the tank or that someone had told
him about the gandasa lying in the tank. But for reasons already set
out the information given by Deoman is provable in so far as it
distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered; and his statement
G that he had thrown the gandasa in the tank is information which
di_stinctly relates to the discovery of the gandasa. Discovery from its
place of hiding, at the instance of Deoman of the gandasa stained with
human blood in the light of the admission by him that he had thrown
it in the tank in which it was found therefore acquires significance,
H and destroys the theories suggested by the High Court."
GEEJAGANDA SOMAIAH v. ST ATE OF KARNATAKA [PASA YAT. J.) 911

In Mohmed /nayatullah v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR ( 1976) SC 483 A
it was held that expression 'fact discovered' includes not only the physical
object produced but also place from which it is produced and the knowledge
of the accused as to that. Interpreting the words of Section "so much of the
infonnation" as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, the Court
held that the word "distinctly" means "directly", "indubitably", "strictly",
"unmistakably". The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the B
scope of proveable infonnation. The phrase "distinctly" relates "to the fact
thereby discovered". The phrase refers to that part of infonnation supplied
by the accused which is the direct cause of discovery of a fact. The rest of
the information has to be excluded.

Jn Earabhadrappa alias Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, [1983) 2 C
SCR 552, it was held that for the applicability of section 27 of the Evidence
Act two conditions are pre-requisite, viz., (i) information must be such as has
caused discovery of the fact, and (ii) the infonnation must 'relate distinctly'
to the fact discovered. Under Section 27 only so much of the information as
distinctly relates to the fact really thereby discovered, is admissible. While D
deciding the applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Court has
also to keep in mind the nature of presumption under Illustration (a) to (s)
of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The Court can, therefore, presume the
existence of a fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had
to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and
private business, in their relations to the facts of the particular case. In that E
case one of the circumstance relied upon by the prosecution against the
accused was that on being arrested after a year of the incident, the accused
made a statement before the police leading to the recovery of some of the
gold ornaments of the deceased and her six silk sarees, from different places
which were identified by the witness as belonging to the deceased. In that F
context the court observed:

"There is no controversy that the statement made by the appellant
Ex.P-35 is admissible under S.27 of the Evidence Act. Under S.27 only
so much of the infonnation as distinctly relates to the facts really
thereby discovered is admissible. The word 'fact means some concrete G
or material fact to which the infonnation directly relates ...

In State of Maharashtra v. Damu, S/o Gopinath Shinde & Ors., JT
(2000) 5 SC 575 has held that the Section 27 the Evidence Act was based on
the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events and giving the section
H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 3 S.C.R.

A actual and expanding meanings, held:
"The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the
doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded
on the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the
strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery
B is guarantee that the infonnation supplied by the prisoner is true. The
information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but it
results in discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable infonnation. Hence
the legislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by
restricting the admissible portion to the minimum. It is now well
settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged
c in section. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v.
Emperor, AIR ( 1947) PC 67, is the most quoted authority for supporting
the interpretation that the 'fact discovered' envisaged in the section
embraces the place from which the object was produced; the knowledge
of the accused as to it, but the infonnation given must relate distinctly
D to that effect."

18. Besides Section 27 the Evidence Act, the courts can draw
presumptions under Section 114, Illustrations (a) and Section I 06 of the
Evidence Act. In Guiab Chand v. State of MP. AIR (1995) SC I598, where
ornaments of the deceased were recovered from the possession of the accused
E immediately after the occurrence, this Court held:

"It is true that simply on the recovery of stolen articles, no inference
can be drawn that a person in possession of the stolen articles is
guilty of the offence of murder and robbery. But culpability· for the
aforesaid offences will depend on the facts and circumstances of the
F case and the nature of evidence adduced. It has been indicated by
this Court in Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan AIR (1956) SC 54,
that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference
should be drawn from certain circumstances. It has also been indicated
that where only evidence against the accused is recovery of stolen
properties, then although the circumstances may indicate that the
G theft and murder might have been committed at the same time, it is not
safe to draw an inference that the person in possession of the stolen ..,_
property had committed the murder. A note of caution has been given
by this Court by indicating that suspicion should not take the place
of proof. It appears that the High Court in passing the impugned
H
GEEJAGANDASOMAIAHv. STATEOFKARNATAKA[PASAYAT,J.] 913

-+ judgment has taken note of the said decision of this Court. But as A
rightly indicated by the High Court, the said decision is not applicable
in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High Court
has placed reliance on the other decision of this Court ren4Pred in
Tulsiram Kanu v. State, AIR (1954) SC I In the said decision, this
court has indicated that the presumption permitted to be drawn urider
Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act has to be drawn under B
the 'important time factor'. If the ornaments in possession of the
~ ' deceased are found in possession of a person soon after the murder,
.. a presumption of guilt may be permitted. But if several months had
expired in the interval, the presumption cannot be permitted to be
drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case. In the instant
case, it has been established that immediately on the next day of the
c
murder, the accused Guiab Chand had sold some of the ornaments
belonging to the deceased and within 3-4 days the recovery of the
said stolen articles was made from his house at the instance of the
accused. Such close proximity of the recovery, which has been
indicated by this Court as an 'important time factor', should not be lost D
sight of in deciding the present case. It may be indicated here that in
"',
a latter decision of this Court in Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka,
[1993] 2 SCC 330, this Court has held that the nature of the presumption
and Illustration (a) under Section 114 of the Evidence Act must depend
upon the nature of evidence adduced. No fixed time-limit can be laid
E
down to determine whether possession in the recent or otherwise and
each case must be judged on its own facts. The question as to what
amounts to recent possession sufficient to justify the presumption of
guilt varies according as the stolen article is or is not calculated to
pass readily from hand to hand. If the stolen articles were such as
- .)- were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one F
year that elapsed cannot be said to be too long particularly when the
appellant had been absconding during that period. In our view, it has
been rightly held by the High Court that the accused was not affluent
enough to possess the said ornaments and from the nature of the
evidence adduced in this case and from the recovery of the said
G
articles from his possession and his dealing with the ornaments of the
__le·
deceased immediately after the murder and robbery a reasonable
inference of the commission of the said offenc.e can be drawn against
the appellant. Excepting an assertion that the ornamenti belonged to
the family of the accused which claim has been rightly discarded, no
H
914 SUPREME COURT .REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R.

A plausible explanation for lawful possession of the said ornaments
immediately after the murder has been given by the accused. In the
facts of this case, it appears to us that murder and robbery have been
proved to have been integral parts of the same transaction and therefore
the presumption arising under Illustration (a) of Section 114 Evidence
Act is that not only the appellant committed the murder of the deceased
B but also committed robbery of her ornaments."

19. In the instant case also, the disclosure statements were made by the
'-<
accused persons on the next day of the commission of the offence and the
property of the deceased was recovered at their instance from the places
where they had kept such properties, on the same day. In the same affect are
C the judgments in Mukund Alias Kundu Mishra & Anr. v. State of MP. AIR
(1997) SC 2622 and Ronny Alias Ronald James Alwaris & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR (1998) SC 1251 . In the latter case the Court held:

"Apropos the recovery of articles belonging to the Oho! family from
the possession of the appellants soon after the robbery and the
D
murder of the deceased (Mr.Mohan Ohol. Mrs. Runi Ohol and Mr.
Rohan Oho!) which possession has remained unexplained by the
appellants the presumption under Illustration (a) of Section 114 of the
Evidence Act will be attracted. It needs no discussion to conclude
that the murder and the robbery of the articles were found to be part
E of the same transaction. The irresistible conclusion would therefore,
be that the appellants and no one else had committed the three
murders and the robbery."

20. These aspects were illuminatingly highlighted in Sanjay@ Kaka v.
State (N. C. T. of Delhi) [200 I] 3 SCC 190.
F
2.J.. Above being the position, the appeal is clearly without merit,
deserves dismissal which we direct.

BK Appeal dismissed.