Supreme Court of India
GENOA SINGH AND ORS.versusSTATE OF U.P.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 790
- Decided
- 9 July 2008
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The Court held that the appellants exceeded the right of private defence and therefore could not claim its protection, resulting in conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC with a ten‑year imprisonment.
Summary
The appellants, Genoa Singh and others, were convicted for the murder of the complainant's father and uncle after a dispute over a field boundary. They claimed the violence was in exercise of the right of private defence. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Sections 96‑106 of the IPC, the burden of proof under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, and the requirement that force be proportionate and necessary. It held that the accused exceeded the lawful limits of private defence, as the threat had ceased and the force used was excessive. Consequently, the protection of private defence could not be invoked and the appropriate conviction was under Section 304 Part I IPC, with a reduced sentence of ten years imprisonment for each appellant. The appeal was partly allowed, altering the conviction and sentence.
Issues considered
- The applicability of the right of private defence under Sections 96‑106 IPC to the facts of the case
- Whether the burden of proving private defence lies on the accused under Section 105 of the Evidence Act
- Whether the force used by the accused exceeded the lawful limits of private defence, warranting conviction under Section 304 Part I instead of murder under Section 302 r/w Section 34
- The appropriate quantum of sentence after the conviction
Legislation cited
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 105
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 100, s. 101, s. 102, s. 103, s. 104, s. 105, s. 106, s. 302, s. 304, s. 308, s. 323, s. 324, s. 34, s. 96, s. 97, s. 98, s. 99
Subjects
private defenceself-defenceIndian Penal CodeSection 304 Part ISection 302Section 34burden of proofexcess of forcecriminal law
Judgment
[2008) 10 S.C.R. 553
"")
GENOA SINGH AND ORS. A
v..
STATE OF U.P.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1036 of 2008)
JULY 9, 2008
~ 8
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: ss. 96 - 106, s302 rlw s. 34, s. 304 Part
I and s. 323 rlw s 34:
.
'
Right of private defence - Use of force by accused in c
exercise of right of private defence -Accused armed with weap-
ans allegedly attacked father and uncle of complainant caus-
ing injuries - Victims succumbed to injuries - Trial Court found
accused persons guilty of committing offences under s. 302 rl
•~ w s.34 /PC and 323 rlw s.34 /PC and sentenced them to un- D
dergo life imprisonment - Affirmed by High Court - Held: In
the facts and circumstances of the case, accused exceeded
the right of private defence, hence, the protection for exercis-
ing the said right cannot be extended to them -However, ap-
propriate conviction would be under s.304 Part I /PC - Ac- E
cordingly, custodial sentence altered to 10 years instead of
life imprisonment - Sentence/Sentencing.
Right of private defence - Scope and ambit of - Dis-
cussed.
"')- F
According to the prosecution, on the fateful day
when the complainant along with his father and uncle
was repairing the boundary of the field, which was alleg-
edly damaged by the accused persons, accused appel-
lants armed with weapons came to the spot. They started
G
giving blows to the uncle and father of the Complainant.
On hearing the hue and cry, some persons from nearby
area came to their rescue and taken the father and uncle
of the complainant in injured condition to police station.
553 H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
A An F.l.R. was registered against accused persons for com-
mitting offences under ss.323, 324 and 308 l.P.C. Later
both the victims succumbed to injuries. The Police inves-
tigated the matter and s·ubmitted the charge sheet. Trial
Court found the appellants guilty of committing the of-
B fences u/s.302 r/w s.34 and s.323 r/w s.34 IPC and sen-
tenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.
Appeal filed thereagainst by the appellants was dismissed
by the High Court. Hence, the present appeal.
Appellants contended that the High Court should
C have given the benefit available for exercising right of pri-
vate defence as the evidence clearly established that they
used the force against the deceased in exercise of their
right of private defence.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court,
D
HELD 1.1. Section 96, IPC provides that nothing is
an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of
private defence. The Section does not define the expres-
sion 'right of private defence'. It merely indicates that
E nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such
right. Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a per-
s~n legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of pri•
vate defence is a question of fact to be determined on the
facts and circumstances of each case. [Para 6] [560 F-G]
F 1.2. No test in the abstract for determining such a
questio.n can be laid down. In determining the question
of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding cir-
cumstances. 'ltis not necessary for the accused to plead
Jn so many words that he acted in self-defence. If the cir-
G cumstances show that the right of private defence was
legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider
such a plea. In a given case the Court can c.onsider it even
if the accuse·d has not taken it, if the same is available to
be considered from the material on record. [Para. 6] [560
H G- 561 Bl
GENOA SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. 555
2.1. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, A
1872, the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up
the plea of self-defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is
not possible for the Court to presume the truth of the plea
of self-defence. The Court shall presume the absence of
such circumstances. [Para 6] [561 8-D]
~. ~
2.2. An accused taking the plea of the right of private
defence is not necessarily required to call evidence; he can
establish his plea by reference to circumstances transpir-
ing from the prosecution evidence itself. The question in
such a case would be a question of assessing the true ef- c
feet of the prosecution evidence, and not a question of the
accused discharging any burden. [Para 6] [561-D-E]
2.3. Where the right of private defence. is pleaded, the
. defence must be a reasonable and probable version satis-
D
~ fying the Court that the harm caused by the accused was
necessary for either warding off the attack or for forestalling
the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the
accused. The burden of establishing the plea of self-defence
is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by
showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea E
on the basis of the material on record. [561 E-F]
Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration AIR 1968
SC 702, State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima AIR 1975 SC 1478,
... State of UP v. Mohd. Musheer Khan AIR 1977 SC 2226, F
~
Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab AIR 1979 SC 577 and
Salim Zia v. State of UP AIR 1979 SC 391 relied on.
2.4. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based
on surmises and speculation. While considering whether
the right of private defence is available to an accused, it G
is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict
severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In order to find
whether the right of private defence is available to an ac-
cused, the entire incident must be examined with care and
viewed in its proper setting. [Para 7] [562 D-E] H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
;t-
A 2.5. Sections 96 to. 98, IPC and 100 to 106 IPC are
controlled by Section 99, IPC. To claim a right of private
defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the ac-
cused must show that there were circumstances giving
rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either
B death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The bur- ;l·
den is on the accused to show that he had a right of pri-
vate defence which ext~nded to causing of death. Sec-
tions 100 and 101, IPC defiQe the limit and extent of right
of private defence. [Para 7] [562 G- 563 A]
c 2.6. The right of private defence commences, as soon
as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises
from an attempt, or threat, to commit the offence, although
the offence may not have been committed but not until there
is that reasonable apprehension. [Para 8] [563 B-C] ..
D ~
Jai Dev. v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 612 relied on.
2.7. In order to find whether right of private defence
is available' or not, the injuries received by the accused,
the imminence of threat to his safety, the injuries .caused
E by the accused and the circumstances whether the ac-
cused had time to have recourse to public authorities are
all relevant factors to be considered. [Para 9] [563 D-E]
Biran Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1975 SC 87 Wassan
Singh v. State of Punjab (1996) 1 SCC 458 and Sekar alias
F Raja Sekharan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, -1,
TN. 2002 (8) sec 354 relied on.
2.8. Due weightage has to be given to, and hyper tech-
nical approach has to be avoided in considering what
happens on the spur of the moment on the spot and keep-
G
ing in view normal human reaction and conduct, where
selrf..preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if y
the fact situation shows that in the guise of self-preserva-
tion, what really has been done is to assault the original
aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable apprehen-
H
GENOA SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. 557
...,.
sion has disappeared, the plea of right of private-defence A
can legitimately be negatived. [Para 10] [564 8-C]
Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1991 SC 1316
relied on.
)
2.9. The right of self-defence is a very valuable right, B
serving a social purpose and should not be construed
narrowly. [Para 11] [564-0]
2.10. The person facing a reasonable apprehension
of threat to himself cannot be expected to modulate his
defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude of c
only that much which is required in the thinking of a man
in ordinary times or under normal circumstances.[Para
11] [564 F-G]
.: Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P. AIR 1971SC1857 relied on .
-4 D
Russe/ on Crime, 11th Edition Volume I P.49 referred to.
2.11. The right of private defence is essentially a de-
tensive right circumscribed by the governing statute,
available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It
should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pre- E
text for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose of
offence. It is a right of defence, not of retribution, expected
to repel unlawful aggression and not as retaliatory mea-
~. sure. While providing for exercise of the right, care has
+ been taken in IPC not to provide and has not devised a F
mechanism whereby an attack may be a pretence for kill-
ing. A right to defend does not include a right to launch
an offensive, particularly when the need to defend no
longer survived. [Para 13] [565 8-E]
G ~
V Subramani and Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2005 (10)
y sec 358 relied on.
2.12. In the facts and circumstances of the instant
case, though the appellants claimed to be exercising the
right of private defence, it was exceeded. That being so, H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
~
A the protection for exercising the right of private defence
cannot be extended to the appellants. But the appropri-
ate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC and
custodial sentence of 10 years in case of each appellant
and fine imposed by the trial Court would meet the ends
B of justice. [Para 15] [565 E-G] *-
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1036 of 2008
From the Judgment and final Order dated 28.10.2006 of
c the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal
No. 2917 of 1980
Sushil Kumar, Manoj Prasad for the Appellants.
R.K. Gupta, Rajiv Kumar Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra and
D
lrshad Ahmad for the Respondent. ,
~
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division
E Bench of the Allahabad High Court upholding the conviction of
the appellants for offences punishable under Section 302 read
with Section 34 and Section 323 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The learn~dAddi-
tiohal Sessions Judge, Bijnor had found the accused appel-
,,.
F lants guilty and had sentenced each to undergo RI for life for the
first offence and six months' RI for the second offence. The sen- -+
tences were directed to run concurrently. One Leela Singh who
faced trial alongwith the appellants was given the benefit of doubt
and was acquitted of the charges.
G 3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
The incident is alleged to have taken place on 171h June, y'
1980 at about 6.00 p.m. at Village Bilai, which is also 4 Kms.
at a distance from the Police Station Haldaur, District Bijnor.
The report of the incident was lodged at Police Station Haldaur
H
GENOA SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. 559
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
on that very day at 8.30 p.m. The allegations of the prosecution A
as would appear from the written report (Exhibit Ka-8) are that
a day before the incident sometime in the evening boundary of
the fields of the complainant was damaged by accused Genda
Singh and Mahavir Singh and for it some altercations had also
-f. taken place. On the fateful day (171h June 1980) in the morning B
hours, the complainant Kendra Pal Singh alongwith his father
Virendra Singh and uncle Hari Raj Singh went to plough their
fields. They were just repairing the boundary at that place where
it was damaged by accused Genda Singh and others. It was
about 7.00 a.m. Genda Singh armed with Tabal, Mahavir Singh c
armed with axe, Thamman Singh armed with Lathi and Leela
Singh armed with iron pipe came at that place and exhorted
that the boundary wall would not be disturbed from the place
where it was set up. Some quarrel had taken place on it and
~ they gave blows with their weapons to Hari Raj Singh and
0
~ Virendra Singh. On hearing the hue and cry made by the com-
plainant, Surendra Singh, Prakash Singh, Balbeer Singh,
Naubahar Singh and other persons turned up at the site and
rescued the complainant and other persons. Father of the com-
plainant Virendra Singh in unconscious state and Hari Raj Singh
in a precarious condition were brought to the Police Station E
where report was lodged. The report was registered at Crime
No.130 of 1980 at the Police Station Haldaur for the offences
under Sections 323, 324 and 308 IPC and its entry was also
made in the G.D. (Exhibit Ka-12). Sub lnspectorVipin Pal Singh
i. and other Police Constables namely Anwar Khan, Mahendra F
Singh and, Shaukat Khan were sent from the Police Station to
the hospital with necessary papers for drawing inquest report
vide exhibit ka-12 P.W. B.S.Rana S.I., (P.W.8) took up the in-
vestigation of the case and prepared the inquest report. Dr.
Gurcharan Singh (P.W.2) conducted the autopsy at the dead G
body of Hari Raj Singh on that very day at 4.30 P.M. and pre-
'r pared the report (Exhibit Ka-6). Virendra Singh was brought to
the Primary Health Centre at 8.00 a.m. on 171h June, 1980 by
Constable Tej Pal Singh He died on the same very day. It was
opined by the doctor who conducted the autopsy of Hari Raj H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 10 S.C.R.
)--
A Singh and Virendra Singh that their deaths had taken place on
account of shock and hemorrhage. It was also opined that the
ante mortem injuries sustained by the victims might have been
caused on that very day i.e. 17th June, 1980.
Injuries of PW-5 Kendra Pal Singh were also medically -}.-
B examined at Primary Health Centre, Haldaur on 18th June, 1980
at 9.15 a.m. (Exh. Ka-2) by PW-1 (Dr. Chaod Kumar Singh).
Charge sheet was filed after investigation. Since accused
persons abjured their guilt, trial was held.
c Placing reliance on the evidence of the witnesses, more
particularly, the injured witness the trial Court found the accused
persons guilty and convicted and sentenced as aforenoted. The
judgment of the trial Court was questioned before the High Court
in Criminal Appeal No. 2917 of 1980. As noted above, the High
I
D Court dismissed t~e appeal. ~
4. Primary stand of learned counsel for the appellants was
that the High Court should have given the benefit available for
exercising right of private defence. It was submitted that the
evidence clearly established that the accused persons were ·
E exercising their right of private defence.
5. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand sup-
ported the judgment of trial Court and the High Court .
. 6. Only question which needs to be considered is the al- ~
F leged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC pro- ~
vides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of
the right of private defence. The Section does not define the
expression 'right of private defence'. It merely indicates that noth-
ing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right.
G Whether in a partic\Jlar set of circumstances, a person legiti-
mately acted in ·the exercise of the right of private defence is a
y
question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances
of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a
question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact,
H the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances. It is
GENOA SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. 561
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
-~
not necessary for the accused to plead in so many words that A
he acted in self-defence. If the circumstances show that the right
of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the
Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court can
consider it even if the accused has not taken it, if the same is
._,\ available to be considered from the material on record. Under 8
Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evi-
dence Act'), the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up
the plea of self-defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not
possible for the Court to presume the truth of the plea of self-
defence. The Court shall presume the absence of such circum- c
stances. It is for the accused to place necessary material on
record either by himself adducing positive evidence or by elic-
iting necessary facts from the witnesses examined for the pros-
ecution. An accused taking the plea of the right of private de-
fence is not necessarily required to call evidence; he can es-
.... D,
tablish his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from
the prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case
would be a question of assessing the true effect of the prosecu-
tion evidence, and not a question of the accused discharging
any burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the
defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying E 1
the Court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary
for either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further rea-
sonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The bur-
den of establishing the plea of self-defence is on the accused
'l
F,
y and the burden stands discharged by showing preponderance
of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material
on record. (See Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration
(AIR 1968 SC 702), State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima (AIR 1975
SC 1478), State of UP v. Mohd. Musheer Khan (AIR 1977
SC 2226), and Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab (AIR 1979 G.
SC 577). Sections 100 to 101 define the extent of the right of
private defence of body. If a person has a right of private de-
fence of body under Section 97, that right extends under Sec-
tion 100 to causing d~ath if there is reasonable apprehension
that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the H
p
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
t-·
A assault. The oft quoted observation of this Court in Salim Zia v. r"
State of UP (AIR 1979 SC 391), runs as follows:
"It is true that the burden on an accused person to establish
the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the one
which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution
B :*-
is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, .
the accused need not establish the plea to the hilt and •
may discharge his onus by establishing a mere ,...
preponderance of probabilities either by laying basis for I-
that plea in the cross-examination of the prosecution
c witnesses or by adducing defence evidence."
The accused need not prove the existence of the right of
private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him
to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of probabili- I
ties is in favour of his plea.
D
~
7. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on
surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right
of private defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant
whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury
E on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private .
defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be
examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. Section
97 deals with the subject matter of right of private defence. The
plea of right comprises the body or property (i) of the person
F exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; and the right may >-
Y- ~-
be exercised in the case of any offence against the body, and in
the case of offences of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal tres-
•
I
pass, and attempts at such offences in relation to property. Sec- l
tion 99 lays down the limits of the right of private defence. Sec-
tions 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against certain
l
G
offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and
100 to 106 is controlled by Section 99. To claim a right of pri-
-<
vate defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the ac-
cused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to
reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or griev-
H
GENOA SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. 563
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
ous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused A
to show that he had a right of private defence which extended to
causing of death. Sections 100 and 101, IPC define the limit
and extent of right of private defence.
8. Sections 102 and 105, IPC deal with commencement
* and continuance of the right of private defence of body and prop-
erty respectively. The right commences, as soon as a reason-
8
able apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt,
or threat, to commit the offence, although the offence may not
have been committed but not until there is that reasonable ap-
prehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable appre- cI
hension of the danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev. v. State
of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 612), it was observed that as soon as
the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the
threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route, there
I
can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence. D
~
9. In order to find whether right of private defence is avail-
able or not, the injuries received by the accused, the imminence
of threat to his safety, the injuries caused by the accused and
the circumstances whether the accused had time to have re-
course to public authorities are all relevant factors to be consid- E
ered. Similar view was expressed by this Court in Biran Singh
v. State of Bihar (AIR 1975 SC 87). (See: Wassan Singh v.
State of Punjab 11996) 1 SCC 458, Sekar alias Raja Sekharan
.
.,.-
v. State represented by Inspector of Police, TN. (2002 (8) SCC
354) . F=
10. As noted in Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR
1991 SC 1316), a person who is apprehending death or bodily
injury cannot weigh in golden scales in the spur of moment and
in the heat of circumstances, the number of injuries required to
G
disarm the assailants who were armed with weapons. In mo-
ments of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium it is often
difficult to expect the parties to preserve composure and use
exactly only so much force in retaliation commensurate with the
danger apprehended to him where assault is imminent by use
H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.
f-
A of force, it would be lawful to repel the force in self-defence and
the right of private-defence commences, as soon as the threat
becomes so imminent. Such situations have to be pragmati-
cally viewed and not with high-powered spectacles or micro-
scopes to detect slight or even marginal overstepping. Due
B weightage has to be given to, and hyper technical approach
has to be avoided in considering what happens on the spur of *
the moment on the spot and keeping in view normal human re-.
action and conduct, where self-preservation is the paramount
consideration. But, if the fact situation shows that in the guise
c of self-preservation, what really has been done is to assault the
original aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable appre-
hension has disappeared, the plea of right of private-defence
can legitimately be negatived. The Court dealing with the plea
has to weigh the material to conclude whether the plea is ac- t--
I
I
ceptable. It is essentially, as noted above, a finding of fact.
D
~
11. The right of self-defence is a very valuable right, serv-
ing a social purpose and should not be construed narrowly. (See
Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P (AIR 1971 SC 1857). Situations
have to be judged from the subjective point of view of the ac-
E cused concerned in the surrounding excitement and confusion .
of the moment, confronted with a situation of peril and not by
any microscopic and pedantic scrutiny. In adjudging the ques-
tion as to whether more force than was necessary was used in
the prevailing circumstances on the spot it would be inappro-
F priate, as held by this Court, to adopt tests by detached objec-
.
-r'
tivity which would be so natural in a Court room, or that which
would seem absolutely necessary to a perfectly cool bystander.
The person facing a reasonable apprehension of threat to him-
self cannot be expected to modulate his defence step by step
with any arithmetical exactitude of only that much which is re-
G
quired in the thinking of a man in ordinary times or under normal
circumstances. -<
12. In the illuminating words of Russel (Russel on Crime,
1
11 h Edition Volume I at page 49):
H
GENOA SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. 565
[DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
" .... a man is justified in resisting by force anyone who A
manifestly intends and endeavours by violence or surprise
to commit a known felony against either his person,
habitation or property. In these cases, he is not obliged to
retreat, and may not merely resist the attack where he
stands but may indeed pursue his adversary until the B
danger is ended and if in a conflict between them he
happens to kill his attacker, such killing is justifiable."
13. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive
right circumscribed by the governing statute i.e. the IPC, avail-
able only when the circumstances clearly justify it: It should not
c
be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a vindic-
tive, aggressive or retributive purpose of offence. It is a right of
defence, not of retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggres-
sion and not as retaliatory measure. While providing for exer-
D
~ cise of the right, care has been taken in IPC not to provide and
has not devised a mecl}anism whereby an attack may be a pre-
tence for killing. A right to defend does not include a right to
launch an offensive, particularly when the need to defend no
longer survived.
E
14. The above position was highlighted in V Subramani
and Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 (10) SCC 358).
15. Factual scenario as noted above clearly goes to show
that though the appellants claimed to be exercising the right of
•y private defence, it was exceeded. That being so, the protection
F
for exercising the right of private defence cannot be extended
to the appellants. But the appropriate conviction would be un-
der Section 304 Part I IPC and custodial sentence of 10 years
in case of each appellant and fine imposed by the trial Court
G
would meet the ends of justice.
16. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed.
H
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