GEOJIT FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD.versusSANDEEP GURAV

         [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1427 : 2025 INSC 1021

              Geojit Financial Services Ltd.
                            v.
                     Sandeep Gurav
               (Civil Appeal No. 10970 of 2025)
                         19 August 2025
     [J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]


                    Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appeal filed
by the appellant on the ground that the appellant had not filed the
arbitration petition u/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 within the period of limitation prescribed therein.

                           Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.33, 34(3) –
Computation of period of limitation – High Court dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the appellant had not filed
the arbitration petition u/s.34 within the period of limitation
prescribed therein – Appellant contended that the impugned
order is in direct conflict with Ved Prakash’s decision as the
period of limitation for challenging an award would, in terms
of s.34(3) of the 1996 Act, commence only from the date on
which an application filed u/s.33 of the Act 1996 is disposed of:
Held: 1. The impugned order of the High Court does not reflect
the correct position of law. [Para 20]
2. Where an application u/s.33 of the 1996 Act has not been
filed, the legislature was conscious enough to state that it would
be the date of the receipt of the award which would earmark the
commencement of limitation for an application for setting aside
of an award in terms of s.34 of the 1996 Act – Whereas, in the
case where an application u/s.33 of the 1996 Act has been filed,
the legislature was conscious enough to lay down that it would
be the date of disposal of such request or application, that would
be the starting point for calculation of limitation – Where such
an application u/s.33 of the 1996 Act is filed, irrespective of
whether the arbitral tribunal upon considering such application,
either makes or does not make any correction or modification or
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    choose to render or to not render an additional award in terms of
    s.33 of the Act, 1996, the starting point for the period of limitation
    for challenging the same u/s.34(3) would be the date of disposal
    of such application u/s.33 by the arbitral tribunal as long as
    the application u/s.33 of the 1996 Act had been filed within the
    prescribed period of limitation – Any other interpretation to the
    contrary, would do violence to plain and unambiguous language
    used in s.34(3) of the Act, 1996 – What is of significance, u/s.34(3)
    of the Act, 1996 is the date on which the application or request
    u/s.33 came to be disposed by the arbitral tribunal – Where a
    request is made u/s.33 of the 1996 Act, it is immaterial for the
    purpose of computation of limitation u/s.34(3) whether such
    request fell within the purview of the said provision or not – What
    is material is only that such request was made in the manner
    delineated u/s.33 i.e., it fulfilled the twin conditions of being made;
    (I) “within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award” and
    (II) “with notice to the other party” stipulated therein – Thus,
    the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside.
    [Paras 35(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), 37]

                              Case Law Cited
    State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. [2007] 3
    SCR 416 : (2007) 10 SCC 742 – distinguished.
    M/s. Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons v. Union of India, 2018 SCC
    OnLine SC 3181; USS Alliance v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine
    SC 778 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
    Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

                             List of Keywords
    Period of limitation; Computation of limitation u/s.34(3); Arbitration
    petition u/s.34 not within the period of limitation; Date of the receipt
    of the award; Commencement of limitation for an application for
    setting aside of an award; Application u/s.33 of the Arbitration and
    Conciliation Act, 1996; Starting point for calculation of limitation;
    Date of disposal of application u/s.33; Correction or modification;
    Additional award; Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral
    award; With notice to the other party.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                       1429

            Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav


                           Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10970 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 12.02.2021 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Bombay in AN No. 67 of 2019

                        Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Ms. Sanjana Saddy.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Order

1.   Leave granted.
2.   The respondent although served with the notice issued by this Court
     yet has chosen not to remain present before this Court either in-
     person or through an advocate and oppose this appeal.
3.   This appeal arises from the order passed by the High Court of
     Judicature at Bombay dated 12.02.2021 in Appeal No.67 of 2019 by
     which the appeal filed by the appellant herein under Section 37 of
     the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the “1996 Act”)
     came to be dismissed on the ground that the appellant had not filed
     the arbitration petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act within the
     period of limitation prescribed therein.
4.   Heard Ms. Sanjana Saddy, the learned counsel appearing for the
     appellant.
5.   The learned counsel would submit that the impugned order is in
     direct conflict with the decision of this Court in the M/s. Ved Prakash
     Mithal and Sons v. Union of India reported in (2018) SCC OnLine
     SC 3181. The counsel would argue that in Ved Prakash (supra) this
     Court held that the period of limitation for challenging an award would,
     in terms of Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, commence
     only from the date on which an application filed under Section 33
     of the Act 1996 is disposed of.
6.   She would further argue that High Court committed a serious error in
     holding that the application filed by the appellant herein did not fall
     within the parameters of Section 33 sub-section (1) of the 1996 Act.
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7.   She would also argue that the High Court committed an error in
     holding that the limitation period of three-months would commence
     from the date of receipt of the arbitration award and not the date of
     the order dismissing or disposing the application under Section 33
     sub-section (1) of the 1996 Act, that was filed by the appellant herein.
8.   In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
     that there being merit in her appeal, the same may be allowed and
     the impugned order passed by the High Court be set aside and the
     matter be remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration of the
     Section 34 application.

     RELEVANT PROVISIONS AT PLAY
9.   We must first look into the Section 34 of the Act 1996, more particularly
     sub-section (3) which reads thus: -
           “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.
           (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
           three months have elapsed from the date on which the
           party making that application had received the arbitral
           award or, if a request had been made under section 33,
           from the date on which that request had been disposed
           of by the arbitral tribunal:
           Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
           prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
           within the said period of three months it may entertain the
           application within a further period of thirty days, but not
           thereafter.”
10. Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, prescribes the period of
    limitation within which an application for the setting aside of an arbitral
    award may be filed by a party aggrieved by the award so passed.
11. The 1996 Act being a special law, in view of Section 29 sub-section (2)
    of the Limitation Act, 1963 the special period of limitation prescribed
    under Section 34 sub-section (3) for making an application for setting
    aside the arbitral award as well as for condonation of any delay
    therein as per the proviso thereto shall prevail.
12. A plain reading of Section 34 sub-section (3) reveals that a limitation
    period of three-months has been prescribed under the 1996 Act for
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            Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav


     making such application, however, the manner in which this period
     has to be computed differs slightly. A careful reading of the provision
     makes it clear that the computation of the period of limitation for filing
     such an application is envisaged to operate in two distinct parts or
     scenarios.
13. The first part provides that, for an application for setting aside an
    award in terms of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the period of limitation
    of three-months would be computed from the “date on which the party
    making that application had received the arbitral award”. Whereas,
    the second part of the provision stipulates that where a request
    was made to the arbitral tribunal under Section 33 of the 1996 Act,
    the limitation prescribed under the said provision would commence
    from the date on which such “request had been disposed of by the
    arbitral tribunal”.
14. We shall now look into Section 33 of the 1996 Act which reads thus: -
           “33. Correction and interpretation of award; additional
           award.—
           (1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award,
           unless another period of time has been agreed upon by
           the parties—
                (a) a party, with notice to the other party, may
                request the arbitral tribunal to correct any
                computation errors, any clerical or typographical
                errors or any other errors of a similar nature
                occurring in the award;
                (b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with
                notice to the other party, may request the arbitral
                tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific
                point or part of the award.
           (2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under
           sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall make the correction
           or give the interpretation within thirty days from the receipt
           of the request and the interpretation shall form part of the
           arbitral award.
           (3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error of the type
           referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), on its own
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          initiative, within thirty days from the date of the arbitral
          award.
          (4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party with
          notice to the other party, may request, within thirty days
          from the receipt of the arbitral award, the arbitral tribunal to
          make an additional arbitral award as to claims presented in
          the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award.
          (5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under
          sub-section (4) to be justified, it shall make the additional
          arbitral award within sixty days from the receipt of such
          request.
          (6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period
          of time within which it shall make a correction, give an
          interpretation or make an additional arbitral award under
          sub-section (2) or sub-section (5).
          (7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or interpretation
          of the arbitral award or to an additional arbitral award
          made under this section.”
15. Section 33 deals with requests made to the arbitral tribunal for
    correction and/or interpretation of the award and also for rendering
    an additional award. The period provided under Section 33 of the
    1996 Act for making a request for the purposes indicated above
    is thirty-days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award unless
    another timeframe is agreed upon by the parties. Under sub-section
    (2) of Section 33 of the 1996 Act, the arbitral tribunal is vested with
    the power to consider such request made under sub-section (1)
    of Section 33 of the 1996 Act, and for this purpose, it has been
    accorded thirty-days from the date of receipt of such request. Under
    sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the 1996 Act, the arbitral tribunal has
    also been conferred suo motu powers for correcting errors of the type
    referred to in Section 33 sub-section (1) clause (a) of the 1996 Act
    qua which as well, the timeframe fixed is thirty-days, commencing
    from the date when the arbitral award is rendered.
16. Besides this, as indicated above, the arbitral tribunal under Section
    33 of the 1996 Act is also empowered to render an additional award
    concerning claims presented in arbitral proceedings that were not
    considered in the arbitral award, albeit, at the request of a party
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            Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav


     made within thirty-days of receipt of the arbitral award. However, the
     party interested in the additional award being rendered is required
     to give notice to the opposite party. For the arbitral tribunal to make
     an additional award upon such request, a timeframe of sixty-days
     from the date when such request is made has been prescribed by
     Section 33 sub-section (4), as opposed to the period of thirty-days
     under sub-section (2) that has been prescribed for correction and/
     or interpretation of the award, from the date when such request is
     made. Section 33 sub-section (6) of the 1996 Act gives power to
     the arbitral tribunal to extend, if necessary, the period of time within
     which it shall make a correction, give an interpretation or make an
     additional award under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5) of the said
     provision.
17. We may now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in Ved
    Prakash (supra). In the said decision, this Court observed as under: -
           “3. On 11.03.2016, objections and application objecting
           to the Award was filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration
           and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
           Act’) by the respondent. The only question that arises is
           whether the aforesaid Section 34 application could be said
           to be within the time mentioned in Section 34(3) of the Act.
           4. The learned Additional District Judge, by order dated
           30.05.2017, found that the application was time-barred,
           reasoning that the application should have been made on
           and from the first date as, in fact, there was no correction
           made to the Award.
           5. The respondent preferred an appeal before the High
           Court, whereby the learned Single Judge of the High Court,
           by his judgment dated 10.07.2017, reversed the order of
           the Additional District Judge stating that as the Section
           33 application had been disposed of only on 14.12.2015,
           the period mentioned in Section 34(3) would start running
           only from then, in which case, the Section 34 application
           could be said to be within time.
           6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners
           before us has argued that the expression “disposed” which
           is mentioned in Section 34(3) would have to be read in
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        consonance with and in harmony with Section 33. So read,
        this would only mean where some positive step has, in
        fact, taken place under Section 33 and the Award is either
        corrected or modified. This could not possibly refer to an
        Award which is not ultimately corrected or modified and
        the application under Section 33 is merely dismissed. For
        this, he relies upon the judgment of a Single Judge of the
        Bombay High Court in the case of Amit Suryakant Lunavat
        v. Kotak Securities, Mumbai reported in 2010 (6) Mh.L.J.
        764. The learned Single Judge held:
             “13. There is no justification, as contended, to
             accept the submission in view of the mandate
             of section 34 and considering the scheme and
             purpose of the Arbitration Act that because the
             application under section 33 of the Act was filed
             and it was rejected subsequently, therefore, the
             limitation period commenced afresh from the
             date of such decision of the award. In my view,
             it is contemplated only on a situation where the
             Arbitrator corrects or interprets and/or add or
             decide to add any additional claims and modified
             the award as only in such cases the original award
             looses its originality and therefore an application
             for setting aside the award needs to be filed
             within three months from the date of receipt of
             such corrected or modified award. Therefore,
             the party who received the award after deciding
             the application under section 34(3) of the Act,
             may get the benefit of fresh commencement of
             limitation from the receipt of the modified and/or
             corrected award and not otherwise.”
        7. We are of the view that the judgment of the Bombay
        High Court does not reflect the correct position in law.
        Section 34(3) specifically speaks of the date on which a
        request under Section 33 has been “disposed of” by the
        Arbitral Tribunal.
        8. We are also of the view that a “disposal” of the application
        can be either by allowing it or dismissing it. On this short
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            Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav


           ground, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge of the
           Delhi High Court is correct in law.”
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

18. This Court in Ved Prakash (supra) after examining Section(s) 33
    and 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, held that it is the date of
    disposal of the application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act that
    would earmark the starting point of limitation for filing an application
    for setting aside of an award in terms of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
19. The ratio laid down in Ved Prakash (supra) found favour and was
    reiterated by this Court in USS Alliance v. State of U.P., reported
    in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 778. This Court explained that the reason
    behind saying that the period of limitation for the purpose of Section 34
    sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act commences from the date of disposal
    of the application under Section 33 is that once the arbitral award
    has been amended or corrected it is the corrected award which has
    to be challenged and not the original award as the original award
    stands modified, with only the corrected award being the binding
    award standing between the parties that must be challenged by filing
    objections. The relevant observations read as under: -
           “2. In our opinion, looking at the purpose and object behind
           Section 34 (3) of the Act, which is to enable the parties to
           study, examine and understand the award, thereupon, if
           the party chooses and is advised, draft and file objections
           within the time specified, the starting point for the limitation
           in case of suo moto correction of the award, would be the
           date on which the correction was made and the corrected
           award is received by the party. Once the arbitral award
           has been amended or corrected, it is the corrected award
           which has to be challenged and not the original award. The
           original award stands modified, and the corrected award
           must be challenged by filing objections.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)

     IMPUGNED ORDER
20. The impugned order of the High Court in our opinion does not
    reflect the correct position of law. The plain reading of Section 34
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     sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, referred to above, would indicate
     that the same speaks of the date on which a request under Section
     33 has been “disposed of” by the Arbitral Tribunal.
21. It appears on plain reading of the impugned order passed by the
    High Court that it proceeded on the footing that the application filed
    by the appellant herein was not falling within the parameters of
    Section 33 sub-section (1) of the 1996 Act and, therefore, it is not
    open for the appellant to place reliance on the date of disposal of
    such application for the purpose of computation of limitation in terms
    of Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act.
22. The High Court observed in paras 19, 20, 21 and 22 respectively
    as under: -
          “19. It is not in dispute that the appellant had filed an
          application within 30 days from the date of receipt of the
          copy of the award from the Appellate Bench of the Arbitral
          Tribunal. The question which arose for consideration of
          the learned Single Judge and also before this Court was
          whether the said application dated 8th August, 2016 filed
          by the appellant was within the parameters of Section
          33(1) of the said Act.
          20. In our view, since the said application filed by the
          appellant was seeking review of the impugned award
          rendered by the Appellate Bench of the Arbitral Tribunal
          on merits, it was not within the parameters of Section 33
          (1) of the said Act. Such application under Section 33
          (1) could be made only in the event on there being any
          computation of errors or clerical or typographical errors or
          any other errors of a similar nature occurring in the award.
          The application under Section 33 could be also maintained
          if both the parties would have agreed for making an
          additional arbitral award as to the claims presented in the
          arbitral proceedings but limited in the arbitral award. The
          application filed by the appellant was not for correction of
          any such error specifically prescribed in Section 33 (1) or
          for an additional award under Section 33 (4) by agreement
          of both the parties.
          21. In our view, limitation prescribed under Section 34
          (3) of the said Act prescribing a period of three months
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            Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav


           from the date on which a signed copy of the award was
           received, would apply to the facts of this case. Since
           the application filed by the appellant was not within the
           parameters of Section 33, the period of limitation would not
           commence from the date of disposal of the said application
           purportedly filed by the appellant under Section 33 but
           would commence from the date of service of signed copy
           of the award from the Arbitral Tribunal on 13th July, 2016.
           22. Since the Petition was not filed by the appellant within
           a period of three months from the date of service of signed
           copy of the award dated 13th July, 2016, the learned
           Single Judge was right in rejecting the Arbitration Petition
           and consequently the Chamber Summons on the ground
           that the Arbitration Petition itself was barred by limitation
           under Section 34 (3) of the said Act.”

     INTERPLAY BETWEEN SECTION(S) 33 AND 34(3) OF THE 1996
     ACT RESPECTIVELY
23. A conjoint reading of Section 33 and Section 34 sub-section (3)
    of the 1996 Act respectively makes it abundantly clear that the
    limitation period for preferring an application for setting aside, where
    a request was made by either party under Section 33 of the 1996 Act,
    commences from the date when such request made under Section
    33 was disposed of by the arbitral tribunal.
24. In a case where the arbitral tribunal considers a request under Section
    33 of the 1996 Act, for correction of the award to be justified, the
    tribunal shall make the correction. In such scenario the aggrieved
    party has to pray for setting aside the corrected award and not the
    original award, as the original award stands merged with the corrected
    award, and it is the latter which is binding on all parties. The original
    award ceases to be of any significance, either for enforcement or
    for the purpose of challenging it in appeal.
25. The natural corollary of the aforesaid is that unless and until a decision
    on the request under Section 33 of the 1996 Act is made, which may
    or may not have culminated into any correction or interpretation or
    rendition of an additional award, there can be no effective occasion
    for a party otherwise aggrieved by the said award to apply for the
    setting aside of the same under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
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26. Thus, what is material for the purpose of computation of limitation
    under Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, where a request
    was made in terms of Section 33, is not whether such request fell
    within the purview of the said provision or not, but only the factum that
    such request was made in the manner delineated under Section 33
    i.e., it was made “within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral
    award” and “with notice to the other party”.
27. The aforesaid flows from the reason that once the arbitral award is
    amended / corrected, it is, for all purposes, in the form of an award
    itself under Section 31 of the 1996 Act, distinct from the award that
    was originally passed, prior to the making of such request. It would
    be this award alone, and not the original award passed prior to the
    request under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, which has to be challenged.
28. This Court in Ved Prakash (supra) specifically rejected the
    contention that that the expression “disposed” mentioned in
    Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act would have to be read
    in consonance with and in harmony with Section 33. It held that
    the Section 34 sub-section (3) when read with Section 33 of the
    1996 Act, cannot be possibly understood to mean that only in
    cases where some positive step has, in fact, taken place under
    Section 33 whereby the award is either corrected or modified, that
    limitation would then be computed from the date of disposal of
    the application or request under Section 33 of the 1996 Act. The
    expression “disposed” used in Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996
    Act does not merely refer to an award which is ultimately corrected
    or modified, it refers to all scenarios where after consideration of
    an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, that fulfils the
    twin conditions of having being made “within thirty days from the
    receipt of the arbitral award” and “with notice to the other party”,
    was disposed by the arbitral tribunal, including scenarios where
    such application is merely dismissed.
29. If at all the intention of the legislature was that the date of disposal
    of only those applications under Section 33 of the 1996 Act which
    culminated into a correction or interpretation of the award or rendition
    of an additional award, would be of relevance for the purpose of
    computation of limitation under Section 34 of sub-section (3), then
    it would not have used the word “disposed” therein, and would have
    employed the word “allowed” instead.
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            Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav


30. The aforesaid may be looked at from one another angle. Even if we
    assume for a moment, that where an application under Section 33
    of the 1996 Act, is not entertained for want of maintainability or for
    reason of falling beyond the parameters of the provision, the same,
    in such scenario, would not amount to passing of an award in terms
    of Section(s) 31 read with 33 of the 1996 Act, and thus there would
    be no distinct award in existence from what was originally passed
    by the arbitral tribunal prior to the making of the request under
    Section 33, even then, the interpretation that found favour with the
    High Court in the impugned order, to our minds, cannot be regarded
    to have laid down the correct proposition of law.
31. We say so because, the fundamental cannons of law of limitation
    demands, as a thumb rule, that any period of commencement and end
    of limitation should be determinable and ascertainable in an objective
    parameter. The law of limitation, at least insofar as the computation of
    the prescribed period of limitation is concerned, cannot be read in a
    hyper-technical or subjective manner. The same must in most cases,
    if not always, adorn a formulaic understanding that is comprehendible
    to the litigants. It however, cannot be tied or made contingent to the
    ultimate fate of the application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act.
32. In consonance with this principle, it must be said that the reason
    for dismissal of an application filed under Section 33 of the 1996
    Act cannot form a yardstick for determining when limitation would
    commence. Therefore, as provided in sub-section (3) of Section 34
    of the 1996 Act, in a case where a request or an application is made
    under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, the limitation period to later seek
    the setting aside of the award can only commence from the date
    when the application is disposed of, for whatever reasons.
33. We are conscious of the decision of this Court in State of Arunachal
    Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. reported in (2007) 10 SCC
    742, wherein this Court had purportedly held that where an application
    filed under Section 33 of the 1996 Act does not fall within any of the
    criteria stipulated therein, in other words, as stipulated in clauses (a)
    or (b) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (4), as the case may be,
    such application would be of no significance, for the purpose of
    computation of limitation under Section 34 sub-section (3) of the
    1996 Act. It held that where any application seeks any correction
    or modification of an award, which is beyond the scope of what is
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    contemplated under the said provision, such an application would not
    fall within the purview of Section 33 of the Act, 1996 and even if the
    arbitral tribunal decides and disposes such an application, the date
    of disposal of the same would have no bearing on the computation
    of limitation under Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act. The
    relevant observations read as under: -
         “8. Firstly, the letter had been designed not strictly under
         Section 33 of the Act because under Section 33 of the
         Act a party can seek certain correction in computation of
         errors, or clerical or typographical errors or any other errors
         of a similar nature occurring in the award with notice to
         the other party or if agreed between the parties, a party
         may request the Arbitral Tribunal to give an interpretation
         of a specific point or part of the award. This application
         which was moved by the appellant does not come within
         any of the criteria falling under Section 33(1) of the Act.
         It was designed as if the appellant was seeking review of
         the award. Since the Tribunal had no power of review on
         merit, therefore, the application moved by the appellant
         was wholly misconceived. Secondly, it was prayed whether
         the payment was to be made directly to the respondent or
         through the court or that the respondent might be asked
         to furnish bank guarantee from a nationalised bank as it
         was an interim award, till final verdict was awaited. Both
         these prayers in this case were not within the scope of
         Section 33. Neither review was maintainable nor the prayer
         which had been made in the application had anything to
         do with Section 33 of the Act. The prayer was with regard
         to the mode of payment. When this application does not
         come within the purview of Section 33 of the Act, the
         application was totally misconceived and accordingly the
         arbitrator by communication dated 10-4-2004 replied to
         the following effect:
              “However, for your benefit I may mention here
              that as per the scheme of the Act of 1996, the
              issues/claims that have been adjudicated by
              the interim award dated 12-10-2003 are final
              and the same issues cannot be gone into once
              again at the time of passing the final award.”
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                            1441

            Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav


           9. Therefore, the reply given by the arbitrator does not
           give any fresh cause of action to the appellant so as to
           move an application under Section 34(3) of the Act. In
           fact, when the award dated 12-10-2003 was passed the
           only option with the appellant was either to have moved
           an application under Section 34 within three months as
           required under sub-section (3) of Section 34 or within the
           extended period of another 30 days. But instead of that
           a totally misconceived application was filed and there
           too the prayer was for review and with regard to mode of
           payment. The question of review was totally misconceived
           as there is no such provision in the Act for review of the
           award by the arbitrator and the clarification sought for
           as to the mode of payment is not contemplated under
           Section 33 of the Act. Therefore, in this background, the
           application was totally misconceived and the reply sent by
           the arbitrator does not entitle the appellant a fresh cause
           of action so as to file an application under Section 34(3)
           of the Act, taking it as the starting point of limitation from
           the date of reply given by the arbitrator i.e. 10-4-2004.”
                                                  (Emphasis supplied)

34. However, we are of the considered opinion that the decision of Damani
    Construction (supra) is not applicable and is distinguishable. A
    close reading of the aforesaid decision would reveal that in the said
    case, the appellant therein had never formally moved an application
    under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, but rather had only addressed a
    letter to the arbitrator, requesting it inter-alia, to review the award
    passed by it and seeking ancillary clarifications which did not concern
    the contents of the award so passed. It is in this background that
    this Court in Damani Construction (supra), in the absence of any
    formal application or any prayer contemplated under Section 33 of
    the 1996 Act, refused to treat the letter addressed by the appellant
    therein as an application thereunder. It however, does not mean that
    where a party moves an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act
    within the limitation period prescribed therein and with notice to the
    other party, that the same would nevertheless not be treated as an
    application under the said provision, merely because what is sought
    under the guise of ‘correction’ or ‘modification’ is outside the ambit
1442                                                          [2025] 8 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


    of the Section 33. It would still continue to be an application under
    Section 33 of the 1996 Act for the limited extent of computation of
    the period of limitation under Section 34, as long as it fulfils the two
    conditions prescribed under Section 33, as already discussed by us.

    CONCLUSION
35. We summarize our conclusion as under: -
    (i)    Where an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act has not
           been filed, the legislature was conscious enough to state that
           it would be the date of the receipt of the award which would
           earmark the commencement of limitation for an application for
           setting aside of an award in terms of Section 34 of the 1996
           Act. Whereas, in the case where an application under Section
           33 of the 1996 Act has been filed, the legislature was conscious
           enough to lay down that it would be the date of disposal of
           such request or application, that would be the starting point
           for calculation of limitation.
    (ii)   Where such an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act is
           filed, irrespective of whether the arbitral tribunal upon considering
           such application, either makes or does not make any correction
           or modification or choose to render or to not render an additional
           award in terms of Section 33 of the Act, 1996, the starting point
           for the period of limitation for challenging the same under Section
           34 as per sub-section (3) would be the date of disposal of such
           application under Section 33 by the arbitral tribunal, as long as
           the application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act had been filed
           within the prescribed period of limitation under sub-section (1)
           thereto AND with notice to the other party. Any other interpretation
           to the contrary, would do violence to plain and unambiguous
           language used in Section 34 sub-section (3) of the Act, 1996.
    (iii) In the aforesaid scenario, neither the date of passing of the
          original award or date of receipt of the same by the party nor
          the date of receipt of the corrected award or date of receipt of
          the decision of the arbitrator disposing the application under
          Section 33 of the 1996 Act is of any significance. What is of
          significance, under Section 34 sub-section (3) of the Act, 1996
          is the date on which the application or request under Section
          33 came to be disposed by the arbitral tribunal.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.                                                         1443

               Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav


     (iv) In the same breath, where a request is made under Section 33
          of the 1996 Act, it is immaterial for the purpose of computation
          of limitation under Section 34 sub-section (3) whether such
          request fell within the purview of the said provision or not. What
          is material is only that such request was made in the manner
          delineated under Section 33 i.e., it fulfilled the twin conditions of
          being made; (I) “within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral
          award” and (II) “with notice to the other party” stipulated therein.
36. In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
37. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The
    matter is remanded to the High Court for consideration of the appeal
    on its own merits and in accordance with law.
38. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan