Holding

The appellant cannot be convicted under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 34 due to lack of evidence of common intention, but the conviction under Sec. 307 read with Sec. 34 is upheld, and the conviction under Sec. 394 is set aside.

Summary

The appellant, Giri Ja Shankar, was convicted along with three others for murder (Sec. 302), assault (Sec. 307) and snatching (Sec. 394) IPC, each conviction read with Sec. 34. The trial court and the High Court held that the accused shared a common intention, despite the fact that the fatal shot was fired by another accused (A-1) and there was no evidence that the appellant knew of the gun or intended its use. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution had proved a common intention to kill, which is essential for Sec. 34 to attach to a murder charge. Finding no proof of such common intention, the Court set aside the conviction under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 34, but upheld the conviction under Sec. 307 read with Sec. 34 because the appellant participated in the assault causing serious injuries. The Court also held that the appellant was not involved in the snatching of the gun, and therefore set aside the Sec. 394 conviction. The appeal was partly allowed, confirming the conviction for assault and overturning the murder and robbery convictions.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant shared a common intention with the other accused to commit murder, thereby attracting Sec. 34 IPC in a conviction under Sec. 302.
Whether the appellant can be convicted under Sec. 307 read with Sec. 34 for assault causing grievous hurt.
Whether the appellant participated in the snatching of the gun and other articles, justifying a conviction under Sec. 394 IPC.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 307, s. 34, s. 394

Subjects

common intentionSection 34 IPCmurderassaultSection 307 IPCsnatchingSection 394 IPCjoint liabilityevidence

Judgment

,,

GIRIJA SHANKAR A
v.
STATE OF U.P.

FEBRUARY 4, 2004

[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASA YAT, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860:

Section 302 rlw section 34-Deceased shot dead by one of the accused
other than the appellant-No evidence to show that other accused persons C
were aware that one of them was canying a gun or that he intended to use
it-No role ascribed Lo appellant so far as death of deceased was concerned-
Appellant convicted with other accused for offence under Section 302 read
with Section 34-Held, the evidence on record does not show that the accused
persons shared the common intention to kill the deceased-Neither the trial D
court nor the High Court assigned any reason for applying Section 34-
Appellant cannot be convicted in terms of Section 302 read with Section 34
!PC

Section 34-Applicability of
E
Section 307 read with Section 34-Conviction under-Victim assaulted
by appellant and other accused persons-Injuries attributed to appellant not
ofvery serious nature-Held, appellant has been rightly convicted under Section
307 read with Section 34-To justify a conviction under this Section, it is not
essential that bodily injury capable ofcausing death should have been inflicted.
F
Section 394-Snatching of gun and other articles not attributed to
appellant-Held, conviction of appellant under Section 394 not maintainable.

Deceased along with PWs 1 and 3 was going back to his village after
seeing a fair. On the way when it became dark and started raining, they
decided not to go further to their village; and decided to stay at the house G
of PW5 in another village en route. In the meantime, accused persons saw
them and thinking them to be criminals, shouted that they being notorious,
they should be beaten. The deceased and PWs 1, 3, and 5 replied that they
were innocent villagers and had decided to stay in the house of PW-5
73 H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) 2 S.C.R.

A because of rain. After they had gone few steps, A-1 fired t'wo shots one of
which hit the deceased and other hit PW 3. When PWs 1 and 3 and the
deceased shouted, many villagers came there. Then: was exchange of hot
words and A-2, the appellant, A-3 and A-4 assaulted PW-3. A-3 removed
the gold ring and watch of the deceased. The gun of PW3 was snatched
B away by A-1 and it was deposited next day in the police station. Trial Court
convicted all the four accused persons for the offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 307 IPC read with Section 34; and Section 394 JPC. All
--
'

the four accused persons preferred appeal before the High Court. During
pendency of the appeal, A-3 and A-4 died and the appeal stood abated so
far as they were concerned. High Court dismissed the appeals of A-1 and
C A-2. Hence, the present appeal filed by A-2. S.L.P. filed by A·l before this
Court was already dismissed.

On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that no role had been
ascribed to the appellant so far as death of deceased was concerned; that
it was the prosecution case itself that the appellant, A-3 and A-4 assaulted
D only PW-3 with lathies; that so far as accusations under Section 394 IPC
were concerned there was no evidence that th~ appellant snatched gun of
PW-3 or in any manner faciliated snatching; and that Section 34 had no
application to the case at hand.

Allowing the appeal in part, the Court
E
HELD: 1.1. The appellant cannot be convicted in terms of Section
302 read with Section 34 I PC. The evidence on record does not show that
the accused persons shared common intention to kill the deceased. It is
accepted that the first reaction after questioning the deceased and PWs 1
and 2 was that they were criminals, notorious and should be beaten. No
F
further act is attributed. They even did not chase them. It is also accepted
that after they had gone some distance A-1 fired the gun twice. It appears
from the evidence of PWs 1 and 3 that A-1 was also armed with lathi.
There is no evidence to show that other accusedpersons were aware that
he was also carrying a gun or that he intended to use it. Neither the Trial
G Court nor the High Court assigned any reason for applying Section 34
IPC. On surmises and conjectures, it was observed by the Trial Court that
though there was no direct evidence showing pre-concert or earlier \.._.
meeting of mind, the possibility of it having developed at the spot cannot
be ruled out. For coming to such conclusion, there was neither any direct
no~ circumstantial evidence. (79-E; C, DJ
H
GIRi.iA SHANKAR v. STATE OF U.P. 75
1.2. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in A
the doing of a criminal act. The liability of one person for an offence
committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several
persons arises und.er Sectio,n 34 is such criminal act is done in furtherance
of a common intention of the persons who join in co.mmitting the crime.
Direct proof of common intention is seldom available a11d therefore, such
intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the B
proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. Jn order to bring
home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish
by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or
meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which
they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the C
spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the
crime. The Section does not say "the common intention of all", nor does
it say "any intention to common all". Under the provisions of Section 34
the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common
intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in
furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles D
enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302
read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act
which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done
by him alone. (78-C, D, E; H 79-A)

Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR (1977) SC 109 and Ch. Pu/la
E
Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1993) SC 1899, referred
to.

2. The appellant has been rightly convicted under Section 307 read
with Section 34 IPC. It has been established by the evidence of PW-3, an p
injured witness, and other eyewitnesses that he was assaulted by the
appellant and the other accused persons. PW-3 had sustained 11 injuries.
Though injary no.I was sustained on account of the firing by A-1, there
were two other injuries which were considered to be very serious. To
justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that bodily
injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. What the Court G
has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the
intention of knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section.
Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable
assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such
intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004) 2 S.C.R.

A in some, cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual
wounds. 179-F, G, H; 80-B, Cl

State of Maharashtra. v. Bairam Bama Patil and Ors., 119831 2 SCC
28, referred to.

B CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1034 of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.12.96 of the Allahabad High
Court in Crl. A. No. 540 of 1980.

C P.K. Dey, Santanu Ghosh and Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Appellant.

Sahdev Singh for Jitender Kumar Bhatia for the Respondent

The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. The appellant questions his conviction for
offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34, Section 307 read
with Section 34 and Section 394 of the htdian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'the
JPC').

Trial Court had convicted the appellant and 3 others who faced trial
E with him for the offences refatable to Sections 302 and 307 read with Section
34; and Section 394 IPC. Each was senten.ced to undergo imprisonment for
life for the first offence and for the other two offences 5 years imprisonment
on each count. All the four accused persons preferred appeal before the High
Court. During pendency of the appeal before the High Court two of them,
F namely, Iqbal Sankar and Jungli (A-3 and A-4 respectively) died and the
appeal stood abated so far as they are concerned. The conviction and sentence
were maintained so far as the appellant and A· I Devi Shankar are concerned.
It is pointed out that the SLP filed by A- I Devi Shankar has been dismissed
by this Court.

Prosecution version and the stand taken by the.accused during trial are
G
essentially as follows:

Arun Singh, H.P. Tewari (PWs I, 3 respectively) and the deceased
were coming after seeing the fair at Bhuvreshwar and were going back to
their village. On the way, near the village Bhawalia at about 7.30 p.m. when
H the sun had ~et, they felt the need to ~ome Bedi a_nd went to purchase it. The
GIRIJA SHANKAR v. STATE OF U.P. [PASAYAT, J.] 77
weather was cloudy and there was drizzling. They entered in village and A
purchased the Bedi from a shop and decided not to go fu11her to their village,
as it was dark and rain had started falling, they decided to stay at the house
of Raj Bahadur Singh (PW-5), whom (PW-3) claimed to know.

In the meantime, the accused persons saw them and thought they are
criminals. They shouted that being notorious should be beaten. The deceased B
and PWs 1, 3, and 5 replied that they were innocent villagers and had decided
to stay in the house of PW-5 because of rain. So, saying they proceeded
towards the (PW-5). After they had gone few steps, suddenly A-1 fired two
shots, one of which hit the deceased and other hit PW-3. When PWs 1 and
3 and the deceased shouted, many villagers including PW-5 came there. C
There was exchange of hot words and A-2, A-3 and A-4 assaulted PW-3. A-
3 removed gold ring and watch of the deceased. The gun of Harihar Prasad
Tewari (PW-3) was snatched away by A and it was deposited next day in the
police station.

Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version. Three D
of them i.e. Arun Singh (PW- l), H.P. Tewari (PW-3) and R.B. Singh (PW-
5) claimed to be eyewitnesses. The Trial Court found the evidence of the
eyewitnesses to be credible, cogent and accordingly convicted and sentenced
as noted above. The High Court did not find any infirmity in the conclusions
of the Trial Court to warrant interference.
E
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that no role has been ascribed to the appellant so far as death of deceased is
concerned. It is the prosecution case itself, that appellant and the two accused
persons who have died during appeal before High Court assaulted only PW-
3 with lathies. Devi Shankar fired shots one of which hit the deceased, and F
the other PW-3. So far as accusations relating to Section 394 !PC are
concerned, there is no evidence that the appellant snatched gun of PW-3 or
in any manner facilitated snatching. Even the snatching of the ring is attributed
to somebody else. In any event, Section 34 would have no application to the
case at hand.
G
Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted that. all the four.
accused persons questioned the propriety of the presence of the deceased and
the eyewitnesses in the village in the dark and thinking that they were persons
of ill-repute who had come to the village for the purpose of decoity, they
were assaulted. Therefore, Section 34 was clearly applicable. Similar, was H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R.

A the submission respect of snatching of the gun from PW-3 which was deposited
with the police on 25.9.1978 i.e. the day following the day of occurrence.

It is noticed that neither the Trial Court nor the High Court assigned
any reason for applying Section 34 IPC. On surmises and conjectures, it was
observed by the Trial court that though there was no direct evidence showing .-
B pre-concert or earlier meeting of mind, the possibility of it having developed
at the spot cannot be ruled out. For coming to such conclusion, there was
neither any direct or circumstantial evidence. So far as the High Court is
concerned, it appears that no definite finding has been recorded. The specific
\
I

plea of the accused-appellant before it that Section 34 is not applicable.
c Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the
doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not
create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section is the
element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence
committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several
D persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of
, a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct
proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention
can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts
of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge
E of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether
direct or. circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the
accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the
aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must
necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true concept of Section
is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in
F law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself.
As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab AIR (lcJ77) SC 109, the
existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the
essential element for application of this. Section. It is not necessary that the
acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly
G must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character,
but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order
to attract the provision ..

The Section does not say "the common intention of all", nor does it say
"and intention c9mmon to all". Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence
H of the liability is to be found in the existence ofa common intention animating
~-
GIRIJA SHAN KAR v. STATE OF U.P. [PASA YAT, .I.] 79

the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such A
intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section
34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in
law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the
deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision
is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between B
acts of individual members of a patty who act in furtherance of the common
intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As
was observed in Ch. Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR
(1993) SC 1899, Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused
by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary
to show some overt act on the part of the accused. ·C
The evidence on record does not show that the accused persons shared
the common intention to kill the deceased. It is accepted that the first reaction
after questioning the deceased and PWs I and 2 was that they were criminals,
notorious and should be beaten. No further act is attributed. They even did
not chase them. It is also accepted that after they had gone some distance A- D
I fired the gun twice. It appears from the evidence of PWs I and 3 that A-
l was also armed with lathi. There is no evidence to show that other accused
persons were aware that he was also carrying a gun or that he intended to use
it. The Trial Court having accepted that there was no evidence of any type
to show pre-concert came to a hypothetical conclusion that it may have E
developed at the spot. There is no material to support the conclusion. The
High Court unfortunately did not specifically deal with this aspect. The
inevitable conclusion is that the appellant cannot be convicted in terms of
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

That brings us to the question regarding the legality of conviction under F
Section 307 !PC read with Section 34 IPC. PW-3 has sustained, as noted in
the injury report, serious injuries on different parts of his body. It has been
established by the evidence of PW-3; an injured witness and other eyewitnesses
that he was assaulted by the appellant and the other accused persons. Learned
counsel· for the appellant submitted that the injuries which can be attributed G
to the appellant were not of very serious nature, and the most serious injury
was the one which PW-3 sustained on account of the firing by A-1. We find
that PW-3 had sustained 11 injuries. Though injury no. I was attributed to fire
arm, there were two other injuries which were considered to be very serious.

Section 307, !PC reads : H

~I
,-.
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] 2 S.C.R.

A "Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and
under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he
would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act,
the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such
B punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."

To justify a conviction under this Section, it is not essential that bodily injury
capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of
injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to
C a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be
deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained
without any reference at all to actual wounds. The Section makes a distinction
between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be
attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still
there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this Section.
D It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault
should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the
person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective
of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances
mentioned in the Section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the
E penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled
with some overt act in execution thereof.

This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Bairam Bama
Patil and Ors .. [1983) 2 SCC 28.

F When the factual background is considered in the background of true
ambit of Section 307, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellant has been
rightly convicted under Section 307 read with Section 34 !PC.

Coming to the question whether Section 394 would have any application
to the facts of the case, it is an admitted case of the prosecution that the
G snatching of the gun and the other articles were not attributed to the appellant
and also Section 34 was not pressed into service for the accusations. That
being so, the conviction under Section 394 IPC so far as the appellant is
concerned cannot be maintained. The conviction is accordingly set aside.

In the ultimate, conviction under Sec~ion 307 read with Section 34 !PC
--
H
GIRIJA SHANKAR v. STATE OF U.P. [PASAYAT, J.) 81

. and sentence imposed by Trial Court and affirmed by High Court need no A
interference and are confirmed.

Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.

M.P. Appeal partly allowed.
B

)