GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS.versusSRI BALLABH VYAS

                        [2022] 19 S.C.R. 427                              427


       GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS.                            A
                                  v.
                       SRI BALLABH VYAS
                   (Civil Appeal No. 6827 of 2022)
                       SEPTEMBER 22, 2022                                 B
     [INDIRA BANERJEE AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]
       Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control
Act, 1960: s. 10(2)(i), 10(2)(vi) and 10(3)(a) – Eviction of tenant –
Original owner of the property leased out the property to the
                                                                          C
predecessor in interest of the appellants and they were paying rent
to the owner – Case of the respondent that his father had purchased
the said property vide registered sale deed – Respondent filed petition
for eviction of tenant-appellant no. 2 and 3 and others from shop
on the ground of non-payment/default in payment of rent, tenant’s
denial of the title of the landlord not being bona fide, and landlord’s   D
right to be put in the possession of property for his own business
use – Appellants denied the title of the respondent as also claimed
title over the schedule property contending that they purchased the
same from the original owner – However, the tenant directed to
vacate the schedule property – Said order upheld by the appellate
                                                                          E
authority and the High Court – Interference with – Held: Not called
for – When the respondent, as landlord, claimed eviction on the
ground of tenants’ denial of his title over the petition schedule
property and to establish such denial as not being bonafide
produced its registered sale deed, the appellants and their
predecessors-in-interest could not justify the denial merely by           F
asserting that their predecessor-in-interest, had purchased it for a
valid consideration, without producing any supporting material(s)
admissible in evidence – In respect of the sale of an immovable
property, worth value which makes the sale deed compulsorily
registrable, the genuineness of the denial of title cannot be decided
                                                                          G
based on presumptions and oral assertations ignoring a valid
registered document – Concurrent findings of the courts below that
the title of the respondent was malafidely denied by the appellants
is the rightful conclusion on appreciation of the facts and evidence
obtained in this case – Nothing that would establish non-
consideration of any material or consideration of irrelevant material,    H
                                   427
428            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 19 S.C.R.


A     to arrive at the finding that the requirement to get vacant possession
      of the petition schedule property of the respondent is malafide – In
      view thereof, no reason to hold that such findings are infected with
      perversity or manifest injustice.
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B            HELD: 1.1 When the respondent, as landlord, claimed
      eviction on the ground of tenants’ denial of his title over the
      petition schedule property and to establish such denial as not
      being bonafide produced its registered sale deed, the appellants
      and their predecessors—in-interest could not justify the denial
C     merely by asserting that their predecessor-in-interest, had
      purchased it for a valid consideration of Rs.15,000/- in the year
      1985, without producing any supporting material(s) admissible
      in evidence. This is because in respect of the sale of an
      immovable property, worth value which makes the sale deed
      compulsorily registrable, the genuineness of the denial of title
D     cannot be decided based on presumptions and oral assertations
      ignoring a valid registered document. Section 9 of the Transfer
      of the Property Act states that a transfer of property can be made
      without writing in every case in which writing is not expressly
      required by law. But then, as per Section 54 of the TP Act, the
E     sale of immovable property of a value of Rupees one hundred
      and upwards can be made only under a registered instrument.
      Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 speaks of
      documents of which registration is compulsory. As per Clause
      (b) of sub-Section (1) thereof non-testamentary instruments which
      of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in
F     immovable property, shall be compulsorily registered. [Para 18,
      19][436-E-H; 437-E-F]
             1.2 The oral evidence adduced by the respondent is to the
      effect that his father had purchased the petition schedule property
      vide registered sale deed dated 27.06.1985. Per contra, on behalf
G     of the appellants what is pleaded and argued is that the petition
      schedule property was purchased by their predecessors-in-
      interest, from the very same vendor in the year 1985, for a valid
      consideration of Rs. 15,000/-. It is in this context that the sale
      deed would act as a sure and clear pointer to where the truth
H     lies. The indisputable and undisputed fact is that except the oral
   GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SRI                        429
                 BALLABH VYAS

assertation of purchase of the petition schedule property by B           A
not even a scrap of paper to support the same was produced on
behalf of the appellants, either before the Rent Controller or
before the Appellate Authority. [Para 20 & 22][438-A-B, G-H]
       1.3 The institution and dismissal of the said original suit
brought out in evidence was considered by the Rent Controller            B
Court only to answer the point as to whether the respondent was
malafidely denying the title of the respondent herein/the petitioner
therein. After such consideration based on the oral and
documentary evidence before it, the Rent Controller came to
the conclusion that the respondents therein were denying the
title of the respondent herein malafidely. [Para 22][439-F]              C

       1.4 The Appellate Authority in taking into account the
factum of raising the plea of adverse possession by the appellants
and/or their predecessors-in-interest for the limited purpose of
looking into the question of mala fides in the denial of title of the
respondent herein over the petition schedule property. Indeed,           D
it was so noted to support and sustain the finding of the rent
controller that the tenants were denying the title of the
respondent without bona fides. The concurrent findings of the
courts below on the issue that the title of the respondent was
malafidely denied by the appellants is the rightful conclusion on        E
appreciation of the facts and evidence obtained in this case and
is not infected with perversity. It calls for no interference. Nothing
was brought to the attention that would establish non-consideration
of any material or consideration of irrelevant material, to arrive
at the finding that the requirement to get vacant possession of
the petition schedule property of the respondent is malafide. In         F
short, on a careful scanning of the concurrent findings on all issues,
there is no reason to hold that such findings are infected with
perversity or manifest injustice. [Para 25, 26, 28][441-F-G; 442-
D; 443-F]
                                                                         G
      1.5 Though, the appellants, by virtue of their denial of title
of the respondent do not really deserve grant of time to vacate
the petition schedule property, two months’ time is granted from


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430            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 19 S.C.R.


A     the date of the judgment to the appellants to handover vacant
      possession of the petition schedule property to the respondent,
      in the interest of justice. [Para 29][443-G-H]

            Kurapati Venkata Mallayyaand Anr. v. Thondepu
            Ramaswami And Co. & Anr. AIR 1964 SC 818 : [1963]
B           Suppl. SCR 995; Mohanlal Sohanlal v. Pannalal
            Jankidas AIR 1948 Bom 133; Lachhman Dass v. Ram
            Lal & Anr. (1989) 3 SCC 99 : [1989] 2 SCR 250;
            Narasamma & Ors. v. A. Krishnappa (Dead) Thr. LRs
            (2020) 15 SCC 218 : [2020] 7 SCR 528; C. Abdul
C           Shukoor v. Arji Papa Rao AIR 1963 SC 1150 : [1963]
            Suppl. SCR 55 – referred to.

                                Case Law Reference

      [1963] Suppl. SCR 995             referred to            Para 11
D
      [1989] 2 SCR 250                   referred to           Para 19

      [2020] 7 SCR 528                   referred to           Para 25

      [1963] Suppl. SCR 55              referred to            Para 26
E
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6827
      of 2022.

            From the Judgment and Order dated 10.07.2018 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of
F     Andhra Pradesh in Civil Revision Petition No. 2752 of 2018.

            Abhijit Basu, B. Suyodhan, Ms. Tatini Basu, Advs. for the
      Appellants.

             K. Parameshwar, G. Seshagiri Rao, Ms. A. Sregurupriya, Advs.
G
      for the Respondent.




H
   GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SRI                              431
                 BALLABH VYAS

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                               A
      C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
      1. Leave granted.
        2. In this appeal by Special Leave the appellants assail the
judgment and order dated 10.07.2018 in Civil Revision Petition No. 2752        B
of 2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of
Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh. It arises out of R.C. No.
262 of 2008 brought by the respondent herein under Section 10(2)(i),
10(2)(vi) and 10(3)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent
and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short “the Act”), for the eviction of
appellant Nos. 2 & 3 herein and the other respondents therein, who are         C
all the successors-in-interest of the original tenant Shri Balraj, being his
wife and children, from the petition schedule property. The petition
schedule property is a Mulgi (small shop), admeasuring 29 square yards,
abutting main road of Mangalhat, Hyderabad. They were sought to be
evicted on three-fold grounds viz., non-payment/default in payment of          D
rent, [(S.10(2)(i)], tenant’s denial of the title of the landlord not being
bonafide [(S.10(2)(vi)] and landlord’s right to be put in the possession
of property for his own business use [(S.10(3)(a)].
       3. As per the order in R.C. No.262 of 2008 dated 07.11.2015, it
was allowed and the respondents therein were directed to vacate the            E
petition schedule property and to handover its vacant physical possession
to the petitioner therein (the respondent herein) within 3 months from
the date of the order. The unsuccessful respondents therein took up the
matter before the Appellate Authority, viz., Court of Chief Judge, City
Small Causes Court at Hyderabad, as Rent Appeal No.57 of 2016. The
Appellate Authority considered the grounds of attack and found them            F
meritless and consequently, dismissed the appeal. It is aggrieved by the
same that the stated Civil Revision Petition was filed before the High
Court, which ultimately culminated in the impugned judgment.
       4. As a matter of fact, pending the proceedings before the rent
controller, the wife and two sons of Late Balraj, who were also arrayed        G
as respondents along with the appellant Nos.2 and 3 herein, died. Later,
during the pendency of the present SLP the original petitioner No.1, the
other son of Late Balraj also died and subsequently, his legal heirs were
brought on record as petitioner Nos. 1.1 and 1.2. The proforma
respondents viz., respondents 2 to 4 were deleted from the array of
                                                                               H
432             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 19 S.C.R.


A     parties, at the instance of the appellants, as per order dated 11.10.2015
      passed in I.A. No. 147594 of 2018. Thus, the present proceedings are
      being pressed into and pursued by the original petitioner Nos. 2 & 3 and
      the other petitioner Nos.1.1 and 1.2, who are the legal heirs of original
      petitioner No.1, in the present SLP. Hence, hereinafter, in this appeal
      they would be referred to as ‘the appellants’ and the petitioner in R.C.
B
      No.262 of 2008, who is the respondent in this appeal, would be referred
      to as ‘the respondent’, unless otherwise mentioned specifically.
           5. Succinctly stated the case of the respondent (the petitioner in
      RC No. 262 of 2008) is as follows: -
C            The petition schedule property is a small shop (Mulgi) bearing
      Municipal D. No. 14-1-22 as described hereinbefore. One Smt. Phool
      Kumari was its owner. She was the original landlord and late Shri Bhandari
      Balraj (the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants) was the tenant, of
      the said shop. In the year 1985, the father of the respondent by name
      Vasudev Vyas purchased the petition schedule property from the
D     aforesaid Smt. Phool Kumari in the name of the respondent Ballabh
      Vyas, then a minor aged 10 years, under Ex.P-3 registered sale deed
      dated 27.06.1985. The pre-existing tenancy created between late Sh.
      Balraj and the said original landlord was oral in nature and the rent initially
      fixed was enhanced from time to time. On 27.06.1985 itself Ext. P-1
E     rental deed was executed between Late Sh. Balraj and the respondent,
      represented by his natural father and guardian Vasudev Vyas, on a monthly
      rent of Rs.300/-per month exclusive of municipal property tax and
      electricity charges. It was enhanced from time to time and finally fixed
      at Rs. 2,000/-. The original tenant Shri Balraj died on 15.05.1996 and
      thereafter the tenancy was being continued by his wife and children and
F     the original respondent No.1 was paying rent initially. But, they failed to
      pay rent from May, 2006 to April, 2008. Prior to the filing of R.C. No.262
      of 2008, the respondent issued Ex.P-4 legal notice dated 30.05.2008
      requesting the tenants to pay the arrears of rent and to vacate and
      handover vacant possession of the petition schedule property. It was
G     also stated therein that he is unemployed and requires the petition schedule
      property for running his own business. On its receipt, the respondents
      therein caused Ex. P-5 reply disputing the very title of the petitioner
      therein (respondent herein) over the petition schedule property. It is
      thereafter R.C. No. 262 of 2008 was filed.

H
   GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SRI                              433
         BALLABH VYAS [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

       6. Obviously, the stated R.C. was defended on a number of               A
grounds by the respondents therein viz., appellant Nos. 2 & 3 herein and
the predecessors-in-interest of the other appellants herein, inter alia,
contending that they are the owners of the petition schedule property.
As a matter of fact, they have not only denied the title of the respondent
over it but also claimed its title contending that late Shri Balraj had
                                                                               B
purchased the petition schedule property as per a sale deed executed in
the year 1985. The case put forth on their behalf before the rent controller
was that one Phool Kumari was the original owner of the petition schedule
property (Mulgi) and she had leased it out to Shri Balraj, he had been the
tenant from 1960 to 1985 and then, Phool Kumari offered to sell it to him
and late Shri Balraj purchased the same for a valid consideration in the       C
year 1985.
       7. The further contentions of the respondents in R.C. No. 262 of
2008 viz., the appellant Nos. 2 & 3 herein and the predecessors-in-
interest of the other appellants were as follows: -
      “That late Shri Balraj obtained Rs.15,000/- from Vasudev                 D
      Vyas, the father of the respondent, as loan for paying sale
      consideration to Phool Kumari, that the father of the
      respondent put forth a condition for payment of loan and
      accordingly, on his insistence sale deed was registered in the
      name of the respondent as security, though late Shri Balraj              E
      had subsequently repaid the loan amount of Rs.15,000/- the
      father of the respondent had failed to return the petition
      schedule property to late Shri Balraj, and that in the year
      2003 the said Mulgi was dismantled and it was renovated
      and therefore, in view of Section 32 (b) of the Act its provisions
      are inapplicable. Raising all such contentions the Rent Control          F
      Petition was sought to be dismissed. However, as noticed
      hereinbefore, the Rent Controller allowed R.C.No.262 of
      2008. The appeal preferred before the Court of Chief Judge,
      City Small Causes Court at Hyderabad as Rent Appeal No.57/
      2016 was dismissed and the Revision filed against the same,              G
      viz., Civil Revision Petition No.2752 of 2018 was then,
      dismissed by the High Court as per the impugned judgment.”
      8. On 11.10.2018, this Court issued notice and ordered that the
status quo, as on that date be maintained. As per the order dated
12.1.2022, it was ordered thus:                                                H
434               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 19 S.C.R.


A              “Needless to mention that it will be open to the respondent
               landlord to urge of questions including the dis-entitlement of
               the heirs to claim any tenancy interest in the property in
               question.”
             9. Heard Mr. Abhijit Basu, learned counsel for the appellants and
B     also Mr. K. Parameshwar, learned counsel for the respondent. Virtually,
      the learned counsel for the parties reiterated the contentions raised before
      the Courts below with some additional points. We will refer to the rival
      contentions, a little later after looking into the real scope of consideration
      of the instant appeal.
C            10. There can be no doubt with respect to the scope of an appeal
      under Section 136 of the Constitution of India by special leave against
      the concurrent findings. In such matters, re-appreciation of evidence is
      not the normal rule and the power thereunder would be sparingly exercised
      where the findings are absolutely perverse. A finding can be said to be
      perverse if it is founded on no evidence to support the same or totally
D     against the weight of evidence. So also, it can be said to be perverse if
      material evidence was missed out for consideration or a totally irrelevant
      and immaterial aspect formed the foundation for such a finding.
            11. A four-Judge Bench of this Court considered the scope of
      appeal under Section 136 of the Constitution by special leave, against
E     the concurrent findings in Kurapati Venkata Mallayyaand Anr. v.
      Thondepu Ramaswami And Co. & Anr.1 In paragraph 9 herein it was
      held:
               “9. The first point urged before us by Mr. Ranganadham
               Chetty on behalf of the appellant firm is that the High Court,
F              as well as the Subordinate Judge were in error in holding
               that the bales in question had been purchased by the appellant
               firm from the respondent firm. This, however, is a question of
               fact and since the two courts below have found against the
               appellant firm on this point this Court would not ordinarily
G              interfere with such a finding. Mr. Ranganadham Chetty,
               however, contended on the authority of the decision in
               Bibhabati Devi V. Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy that the
               practice of the court in appeals by special leave is not a cast
               iron one and that it would, therefore, be open to this Court to
      1
H         (AIR 1964 SC 818)
    GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SRI                               435
          BALLABH VYAS [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

       depart from it in an appropriate case. The aforesaid decision             A
       was referred to by this Court in Srinivas Ram Kumar V.
       Mahabir Prasad and it was pointed out that when the courts
       below have given concurrent findings on pure questions of
       fact, this Court would not ordinarily interfere with them and
       review the evidence for the third time unless there are
                                                                                 B
       exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from the
       normal practice.”
      12. We do not find any reason to make a further survey of the
authorities on the said point as the same is the view which is being
followed consistently.
                                                                                 C
       13. Now, we will revert to the case on hand. A scanning of the
rival pleadings would reveal the common contention of the parties. They
would reveal that Smt. Phool Kumari was the original owner of the
petition schedule property (Mulgi) and she had leased it out to late Shri
Balraj, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants. It is also the admitted
case of the appellants that Smt. Phool Kumari was the landlord and late          D
Shri Balraj had been paying rent to her. The diversion in pleadings occurs
thereafter. According to the respondent, his father Vasudev Vyas
purchased the petition schedule property from Smt. Phool Kumari as
per Ext.P3 registered sale deed dated 27.6.1985 in his name when he
was a minor aged 10 years and according to the appellants Shri Balraj,           E
their predecessor-in-interest purchased it from Smt. Phool Kumari for a
valid consideration of Rs.15,000/-, in the year 1985.
       14. Evidently, the respondents in R.C. No. 262 of 2008 viz.,
appellants 2 and 3 and the predecessors-in-interest of the other appellants
not only denied the title of the respondent but also claimed the title over      F
the petition schedule property (Mulgi) contending that the same was
purchased from Smt. Phool Kumari by late Shri Balraj, their predecessor-
in-interest in the year 1985 for a valid consideration. Late Shri Balraj
obtained Rs. 15,000/- from the father of the petitioner therein (the
respondent in this appeal) for effecting payment to Smt. Phool Kumari
and only on the demand of the petitioner’s father, the sale deed in respect      G
of the petition schedule property was got registered by Shri Balraj in the
name of the petitioner therein (respondent in this appeal) as a security.
      15. Based on the rival pleadings the Rent Controller framed the
following points for consideration: -
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436             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 19 S.C.R.


A           1. Whether the respondents malafidely denying the title of the
            petitioner?
            2. Whether this Court lacks inherent jurisdiction?
            3. Whether there is jural relationship?
B           4. Whether the respondents are liable for eviction from the
            petition schedule property?
            5. To what relief?
             16. Obviously, all the points were decided in favour of the petitioner
      therein (the respondent herein) and accordingly, the R.C. No.262 of
C     2008 was allowed. Consequently, the respondents therein were directed
      to vacate the petition schedule property and handover its vacant physical
      possession to the petitioner therein (the respondent herein) within three
      months from the date of the order. It is this order which was confirmed
      concurrently by the Appellate Authority and the High Court.
D            17. We have carefully scanned the order of the Rent Controller
      and the judgments of the Appellate Authority as also the High Court.
      The question is what is the perversity that invites interference with the
      concurrent findings. Since notice and status quo ordered by this Court
      as per order dated 11.10.2018 was followed by the order dated 12.01.2022
      we will consider that question in detail.
E
              18. We have already referred to the pleadings of the parties taken
      up before the Rent Controller. When the petitioner (the respondent herein),
      as landlord, claimed eviction on the ground of tenants’ denial of his title
      over the petition schedule property and to establish such denial as not
      being bonafide produced its registered sale deed, whether the appellants
F
      and their predecessors—in-interest could justify the denial merely by
      asserting that Shri Balraj, their predecessor-in-interest, had purchased it
      for a valid consideration of Rs.15,000/- in the year 1985, without producing
      any supporting material(s) admissible in evidence? Certainly, the answer
      can only be in the negative. This is because in respect of the sale of an
G     immovable property, worth value which makes the sale deed compulsorily
      registrable, the genuineness of the denial of title cannot be decided based
      on presumptions and oral assertations ignoring a valid registered
      document. In the aforesaid context, it is only worthwhile to refer to the
      decision of the Bombay High Court in Mohanlal Sohanlal v. Pannalal
      Jankidas2 and also Sections 9 and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act,
H
      GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SRI                             437
            BALLABH VYAS [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

1882 (hereinafter for short, ‘the TP Act’) and Section 17 of the Indian          A
Registration Act, 1908. In paragraph 17 of the decision in Mohanlal
Sohanlal2 it was held:
         “In my opinion this is a case in which what was said by Lord
         Simonds in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee
         in 49 Bom. L.R. 244 applies with equal force (P.245):                   B
         Upon this apparently simple question oral evidence
         voluminous and bewildering has been given and their
         Lordships find themselves in agreement with Chagla J. who
         in the Appeal Court said: ‘In a case where oral testimony is
         of such an unreliable and untrustworthy character, the safest           C
         policy would be to let the documents speak for themselves.’
         This does not mean that, when the question whether a
         transaction is a sale or a mortgage, form is to be preferred to
         substance. It is an inviolable rule that upon such a question
         the Court must find the substance behind the form. But where
         the oral evidence is unreliable and contradictory the Court             D
         cannot safely depart from the smitten evidence of the
         document.”
       19. Section 9 of the TP Act states that a transfer of property can
be made without writing in every case in which a writing is not expressly
required by law. But then, as per Section 54 of the TP Act, sale of              E
immovable property of a value of Rupees one hundred and upwards can
be made only under a registered instrument. Section 17 of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908 speaks of documents of which registration is
compulsory. As per Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) thereof non-
testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare,            F
assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or future, any right, title or
interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees
and upwards, to or in immovable property, shall be compulsorily registered.
In the decision in Lachhman Dass v. Ram Lal & Anr.3 it was held that
the real purpose of the said Section is to secure that every person dealing
with the property, where such documents require registration, may rely           G
with confidence upon statements contained in the register as a full and
complete account of all transactions by which title may be affected.

2
    AIR 1948 Bom 133
3
    (1989) 3 SCC 99                                                              H
438             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 19 S.C.R.


A            20. In this case the oral evidence adduced by the respondent is to
      the effect that his father had purchased the petition schedule property
      from Smt. Phool Kumari under Ext. P3, registered sale deed dated
      27.06.1985, in his name when he was aged 10 years. Per contra, on
      behalf of the appellants what is pleaded and argued is that the petition
      schedule property was purchased by their predecessors-in-interest, Shri
B
      Balraj from the very same vendor viz., Smt. Phool Kumari in the year
      1985, for a valid consideration of Rs. 15,000/-. It is in this context that
      Ext. P3 would act as a sure and clear pointer to where the truth lies.
              21. Evidently, the respondent herein (the petitioner in R.C. No.
      262 of 2008) brought on record Ext. P3, a registered sale deed executed
C     in his favour in respect of the petition schedule property. While considering
      the question of evidence produced on behalf of the appellants herein in
      the said proceedings it is relevant to refer to the following recital from
      the order of the Rent Controller:
            “On careful perusal of the entire record, this Tribunal could not
D           find any document to show the title of the respondent over the
            petition schedule property. As such this Court has to infer that
            without any valid document, the respondents are denying the
            ownership of the petitioner in spite of that petitioner exhibited
            Ext.P3 in his favour.” Obviously in the above extracted recital the
E           reference ‘the respondents’ was with respect to the appellants 2
            and 3 and the predecessors-in-interest of the other appellants in
            this appeal and the reference “the petitioner” was with reference
            to the respondent herein.
            22. What is the evidence adduced by the respondents in R.C.
F     No.262 of 2008 to deny the title of the petitioner therein (the respondent)?
      Juxtaposed with Ext. P3 sale deed, whether the oral assertation of
      appellants 2 and 3 and the predecessors-in-interest of appellants 1.1 and
      1.2 would be sufficient to outweigh Ext. P3 in the matter of consideration
      of their bonafides behind denial of the title of the respondent? The
      indisputable and undisputed fact is that except the oral assertation of
G     purchase of the petition schedule property by Shri Balraj not even a
      scrap of paper to support the same was produced on behalf of the
      appellants, either before the Rent Controller or before the Appellate
      Authority. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the oral testimony of
      late Bhandari Goverdhan Nath, who was the first respondent in R.C.
H     No.262 of 2008 and the original first petitioner in the SLP from which
    GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SRI                               439
          BALLABH VYAS [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

this appeal arises. During his cross-examination as RW1 he would depose          A
that there was no registered sale deed in favour of his father as relating
to the petition schedule property. Taking note of the amount of
‘consideration’ of the alleged sale, it is evident that transfer/conveyance
of the said immovable property could have been effected legally and
lawfully only through a registered deed of conveyance. Thus, the
                                                                                 B
indisputable position obtained in this case is that the respondent herein/
the petitioner therein, had adduced documentary evidence of outright
purchase of the petition schedule property under Ext. P3 registered sale
deed. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents therein no
admissible evidence to outweigh the same to establish their bonafides
in the denial of title of the respondent herein, was adduced. It is a fact       C
that the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants herein filed O.S.No.1210
of 2008 before the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad and the said
fact and also the factum of its dismissal as per Ext.R3 was brought out
in evidence by RW1 as well, while being in his examination-in-chief. In
fact, the petitioner therein/respondent herein has brought on record the
                                                                                 D
judgment in O.S. No.1210 of 2008, which document was brought on the
side of the appellants also as Ext.R3, and the decree passed thereon as
Exts.P7 and P8. Obviously, RW1 then deposed that as against Ext.R3
an appeal was preferred as A.S. No.123 of 2014 and it is pending on the
files of the Court of Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
It is not inappropriate to state at this juncture that now in the written        E
submission filed on behalf of the appellants it is stated that the said appeal
was also dismissed subsequently and in the second Appeal filed against
it notice before admission was ordered. The institution and dismissal of
the said original suit brought out in evidence was considered by the Rent
Controller Court only to answer the point as to whether the respondent
                                                                                 F
was malafidely denying the title of the respondent herein/the petitioner
therein. After such consideration based on the oral and documentary
evidence before it, the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the
respondents therein were denying the title of the respondent herein
malafidely.
       23. All these aspects were given due consideration by the Appellate       G
Authority as also by the High Court while considering the case of the
appellants herein in their respective jurisdiction. It is to be noted that
even before this Court the appellants got no case that their predecessor-
in-interest Shri Balraj purchased the petition schedule property from Smt.
Phool Kumari as per a registered sale deed. In the light of the indisputable     H
440             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 19 S.C.R.


A     position thus obtained and in view of Ext.P3, which is a registered sale
      deed executed in favour of the respondent herein/the petitioner therein
      by none other than Smt. Phool Kumari on 27.6.1985, the denial of the
      title of the respondent herein over the petition schedule property by the
      respondents in R.C. No.262 of 2008 and now, by the appellants herein
      can only be taken as one sans bonafide. In other words, it is malafide.
B
            Curiously, the respondents in R.C. No.262 of 2008 had also
      canvassed the position that ‘the Act’ is not applicable by virtue of the
      provision under Section 32 (b) thereof, before the stated proceedings. It
      was so raised contending that the petition schedule property (Mulgi)
      was dismantled and in its place a new building was constructed. A careful
C     scanning of the judgment of the Rent Control Court, the Appellate
      Authority and the High Court would reveal that the tenability of the said
      contention was carefully considered and rejected.
             24. It is to be noted that the Rent Controller observed that no
      evidence to establish the factum of dismantling of the petition schedule
D     property was produced and proved before it. That apart, the Appellate
      Authority observed that no document revealing obtainment of necessary
      permission for demolition and construction of the petition schedule
      property was brought on evidence on behalf of the appellants. Obviously,
      the appellants took up a contention that the petition schedule property
E     being a very small shop does not require any such permission. At the
      same time, the fact is that they had not brought out any provision under
      any law in support of the said contention. Explanation 1 to Section 32 (b)
      of the Act would reveal that in order to hold that a building was
      substantially renovated not less than 75 per cent of the premises was to
      be built new in accordance with the criteria prescribed for determining
F     the extent of renovation. No evidence to establish such requirement is
      available on record. According to us, the hollowness of the said contention
      would be revealed if a reference is made to the definition of the term
      “building” given under Section 2 of the Act, which is an inclusive definition.
      Going by its definition it takes in its fold any house or hut or part of a
G     house or hut. For the purposes of the Act when a hut or even part of a
      hut falls within the definition of building, in the absence of any provision
      under any law supporting the said contention of the appellants that the
      petition schedule property being a small shop will not attract the provisions
      of the Act, is only to be rejected. In fact, it was rightly rejected by the
      Courts below.
H
      GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SRI                           441
            BALLABH VYAS [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

        25. Obviously, upon perusing Ext. R3 (Ext. P7) judgment the            A
Appellate Authority has also found that on the side of the appellants
herein adverse possession was also raised in O.S. No.1210 of 2008 to
establish the claim of title. Consequently, the Appellate Authority made
an observation that the claim of the title based on the sale deed and a
contention based on adverse possession could not co-exist, evidently, for
                                                                               B
the purpose of considering the question whether the denial of title of the
respondent herein was made malafidely. In this context it is worthy to
refer to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Narasamma &
Ors. v. A. Krishnappa (Dead) Thr. LRs.4 In the said decision it is held
that independent claim of title and adverse possession simultaneously in
respect of the same property on the same date would amount to taking           C
contradictory pleas. It is also held therein that when a plea of adverse
possession is projected it is inherent in the nature of it that someone else
is the owner of the property and therefore the plea on the title and adverse
possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter can begin to operate
only when the former is renounced. When once it is found that a plea of
                                                                               D
adverse possession in its inherent nature projects that someone, other
than who took up the said contention is the owner of the property
concerned; when it is indisputable that the case of the appellants and
their predecessors-in-interest is that their predecessor-in-interest late
Sh. Balraj had purchased the petition schedule property as per a registered
deed in the year 1985 and when it is proved before the rent controller         E
that the said property was purchased in the name of the petitioner therein
viz., the respondent herein, then aged only 10 years, by his father as per
Ext. P3 registered sale deed dated 27.06.1985 we cannot find fault with
the Appellate Authority in taking into account the factum of raising the
plea of adverse possession by the appellants and/or their predecessors-
                                                                               F
in-interest in O.S. No. 1210 of 2008 for the limited purpose of looking
into the question of malafides in the denial of title of the respondent
herein over the petition schedule property. Indeed, it was so noted to
support and sustain the finding of the rent controller that the respondents
in R.C. No.262 of 2008 were denying the title of the respondent without
bonafides.                                                                     G
      26. A reference to Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act will not
be inapposite in the context of the aforesaid contentions. Though, on
behalf of the appellants herein a consistent case, raised to resist the

4
    (2020) 15 SCC 218                                                          H
442               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 19 S.C.R.


A     case of the respondent herein based on Ext. P3 registered sale deed, is
      that late Shri Balraj purchased the petition schedule property in the year
      1985 for a valid consideration of Rs.15,000/-, no documentary evidence
      was produced before the Rent Control Court, before the Appellate Court
      or even before the High Court. It is to be noted that no such document is
      produced even before this Court. Thus, it is obvious that despite asserting
B
      a specific fact that Shri Balraj had purchased the property as per sale
      deed in the year 1985 the appellants and their predecessors had failed to
      prove the same, though, in the light of Section 101 of the Evidence Act,
      the burden was upon them. The burden of proof is of importance where
      by reason of not discharging the burden which was put upon him, a party
C     must eventually fail. (See the decision in C. Abdul Shukoor v. Arji Papa
      Rao5).
             The long and short of all aforesaid discussions is that the concurrent
      findings of the courts below on the issue that the title of the respondent
      was malafidely denied by the appellants is the rightful conclusion on
D     appreciation of the facts and evidence obtained in this case and is not
      infected with perversity. It calls for no interference.
             27. In the light of the finding on the issue whether the respondents
      in R.C. No.262 of 2008 were malafidely denying the title of the petitioner
      therein over the petition schedule property, Section 109 of the Transfer
E     of Property Act would assume relevance in regard to the right of the
      petitioner in R.C. No.262 of 2008 to seek eviction of the respondents
      therein, from the petition schedule property. Admittedly, the predecessor-
      in-interest of the appellants viz., late Shri Balraj, was the tenant in respect
      of the petition schedule property under its original owner Smt. Phool
      Kumari. A bare perusal of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act
F     would reveal that if a landlord transfers the property leased out or any
      part of it, the transferee, in the absence of any contract to the contrary,
      shall possess all the rights of the landlord. Hence, the impact of Ext.P3,
      in the absence of any contract to the contrary, is that the respondent
      herein has stepped into the shoes of Smt. Phool Kumari. In terms of
G     Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act it is clear that attornment by
      the lessee is not necessary for the transfer of the property leased out to
      him. Thus, the inevitable consequence of transfer of a leased-out property
      by the landlord in accordance with law to a third party, in the absence of
      a contract to the contrary, is that the third party concerned would not
      5
H         AIR 1963 SC 1150
    GOPI @ GOVERDHANNATH (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SRI                               443
          BALLABH VYAS [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

only become its owner having title but also would step into the shoes of         A
the vendor as the landlord in relation to the lease holder at the relevant
point of time. In such circumstances, the findings of the courts below
that there exists jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the
respondent and the appellants can only be held as the correct and lawful
conclusion in the light of the evidence on record based on the legal position.
                                                                                 B
       28. Now, we will move on to consider the next question as to
whether the direction for eviction of the appellants from the petition
schedule property calls for interference on the ground of perversity in
finding. The Rent Controller, the Appellate Authority and the High Court
considered the question whether the requirement of the respondent to
get vacant possession of the petition schedule property is bonafide and          C
acceptable as a ground for eviction. The pleadings and the evidence of
the respondent herein as PW-1 is to the effect that he is unemployed
and requires the petition schedule property for establishing his own
business to eke out his livelihood. Though, the respondent herein was
cross-examined nothing could be elicited to establish that his requirement       D
for personal occupation for the aforesaid purpose is not genuine and that
it is only a ruse for evicting the appellants. So also, nothing could be
elicited to establish that the respondent possesses other vacant premises
of his own to establish his business. RW1, who was the original first
petitioner in the SLP from which this appeal arises, while being examined-
in-chief in R.C. No. 262 of 2008 would say that he did not file any              E
document to show that the petitioner therein viz., the respondent herein
got other non-residential building(s) or mulgies in Feelkhana. Nothing
was brought to our attention that would establish non-consideration of
any material or consideration of irrelevant material, to arrive at the finding
that the requirement to get vacant possession of the petition schedule           F
property of the respondent is malafide. In short, on a careful scanning
of the concurrent findings on all issues, as above, we find no reason to
hold that such findings are infected with perversity or manifest injustice.
In the said case, this appeal must fail. Accordingly, it is dismissed. No
order as to costs.
                                                                                 G
       29. Though, the appellants, by virtue of their denial of title of the
respondent do not really deserve grant of time to vacate the petition
schedule property, we are inclined to grant two months’ time from the
date of the judgment to the appellants to handover vacant possession of
the petition schedule property to the respondent, in the interest of justice.
                                                                                 H
444             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 19 S.C.R.


A     To get the benefit of the extended time thus granted, the appellants shall
      file the usual undertaking before this court within a period of two weeks
      that they would give vacant possession of the petition schedule property
      without any demur to the respondent and also that they would pay Rs.
      3000/- to as monthly rent during the extended period of two months.
B           30. The appeal stands dismissed subject to the above. All pending
      applications are disposed of.

      Nidhi Jain, Anurag Bhaskar and Amarendra Kumar             Appeal dismissed.


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