Holding

The preference for post‑graduate candidates under Rule 4 is a valid classification and may be applied to the whole class, so the Tribunal’s order is set aside.

Summary

The Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission advertised 60 vacancies for Deputy Executive Engineers and, following Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Engineering Service Rules, gave preference to candidates with post‑graduate qualifications. Graduates who scored higher marks were excluded, leading to challenges in the Administrative Tribunal, which quashed the selection list. The Supreme Court examined whether the rule granting preference to post‑graduates violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and whether the preference should apply only when marks are equal. It held that the rule is a permissible classification based on higher education, that the preference can be applied to the entire class of post‑graduates irrespective of tie‑scores, and that the 1978 memo relates only to promotion, not direct recruitment. Consequently, the Tribunal’s order was set aside, the civil appeals were allowed, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Is the preference for post‑graduate candidates under Rule 4 Note 1 of the Andhra Pradesh Engineering Service Rules constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 16?
Does the preference apply only when post‑graduates and graduates obtain equal marks, or can it be applied irrespective of relative scores?
Do the 1978 government memo provisions pertain to direct recruitment or solely to promotion?
Did the Administrative Tribunal err in quashing the selection list prepared by the PSC?
Is the High Court’s earlier interpretation binding after the enactment of the Central Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?

Legislation cited

Central Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 16, s. Article 309

Subjects

public service recruitmentpreference rulepost‑graduate qualificationArticle 14Article 16equality before lawadministrative service rulesmerit vs qualificationappointment by direct recruitmentjudicial interpretation

Judgment

GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC. ETC. A
v.
P. DILIP KUMAR AND ANR. ETC. ETC.

FEBRUARY 3, 1993

[A.M. AHMADI AND M;M. PUNCHHI, JJ.) B
Andhra Pradesh Engineering Service Rules 1966-Rule-4-fl.ecruitment
to ·various posts in the · cadre of Deputy Executive Engineers in different
.~. services--f'reference to Post Graduates-'Validity of recruitment.

The Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (in short PSC) c
Invited applications for vacancies in the cadre of Deputy Executive En-
gineers in different services, to be filled by direct recruitment. Pursuant to
the said advertisement both graduates and post graduates applied for the
posts and were subjected to a written test and those who secured the
j.... qualifying marks, were called for oral tesl/bltervlew. D
The PSC ou an interpretation of Rule 4 of the A.P. Engineers Service
Rules and following the decision oflhe High Court of A.P. in Writ F•tition
No. 2568 of 1982 decided by Waghrey, J. on March 14, 1986 treated the
Post Graduates as a class and gave them preferential treatment by select·
ing the post-graduates first who secured more than the qualifying marks E
> in the open category and since sufficient number of post-graduates were
available, no graduate was selected. In the case of reserved categories also
post-graduates lo the extent they were available were selected and in the
case of non-availability of post-graduates, graduates were selected for
appointment lo the posts in question.
F
The validity of the recruitment and the procedure followed by the
A.P.P.S.C. were challenged before the Andbra Pradesh Administrative
Tribunal. The Tribunal upon bearing the application, took a view contrary
lo the one taken by the learned single Judge of the High Court in W.P. No.
2568of1982 and quashed the select list. G
In appeal lo this court,

-~. HELD : 1.01. Rule 4 prescribes the qualification for appointment to
certain ·posts including the post of Deputy Executive Engineer by direct
recruitment, promotion or transfer. Note 1 forms part of the said rule. H
435
436 .SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.
A Before the Insertion or the second part to Note 1 by GOMs No~ 180 or 19113,
the instrnctions contained in the Memo or 13tb October, 1978 provided
guidance in the matter or grant or prererence to post-graduates ror entry by
promotion to the post or Deputy Executive Engineer. The subject clause or
the memo undoubtedly rerers to prererence to be granted to post-graduates
B in the matter or promotion and the use or the expression 'seniority' In
paragraph 2 thereoris undoubtedly indicative or the ract that Its application
was limited to laying down guidelines ror application or the prererence clause
round in Note 1 to the rule in the matter or promotion. [446F-H]

1.02. There can be no question or arranging post-graduates accord·
C Ing to seniority where they are seeking appointment by direct recruitmenL
In that case the list would have to be prepared on the basis or merit and_
not seniority. Therefore, the use or the expression 'promotion' in the
subject clause and the expression 'seniority' in paragraph 2 or the memo
is indicative or the ract that the instructions concerned appointment by
D promotion. In paragraph 2 it is said that candidates with post-graduate
qualification will be arranged in the order or their seniority and they shall
be considered first and only after such a list is considered, the ca~e or
ordinary graduates shall be considered and selection made on merit and
ability. Paragraph 3 then says that the expression 'prererence shall be
given' used in Note 1 means that other things being equal, holders or
E post-graduate qualifications will be given preference and after that the
claims or less qualified candidates would be considerel!_!or appointmenL
The use or the word after inboth the paragraphs is significant and is
indicative or the manner in which the prererence clause is to be worked
out. [447C-E]
F
1.03. It is indeed true that under paragraph 2 or the memo it was
directed that 'the list or eligible candidates with post-graduati<>n qualifica-
tion shall be first considered .•.•.and only after such a list is considered';
others will be considered, albeit on the basis or merit and ability. The
language or this paragraph leaves no manner of doubt that the turn or
G ordinary graduates ror consideration came only after the list or eligible
post-grad\lates was settled. The order in which the cases or post-graduates
and ordinary graduates will be considered is made clear in this paragraph.
But paragraph 3 or the Memo says that the expression 'prererence shall
be given' occurring in Note 1 would mean that, other things e.g. passing or
H prescribed tests, maintaining merit, suitability, fitness, etc~ being equal,
GOVf. OF AP. v. DILIP KUMAR 437
prererence shall be given to holders or post-graduate qualifications. The A
latter part or tb\s paragraph adds 'after giving the said prererence', the
claims or less qualified candidates would be considered. This would mean
that after a comparative study is undertaken those post-graduates who are
found entitled to prererence would be first promoted and thereafter cases
or less qualified candidates would be considered. [447H, 448A-Cl
B
1.04. In the present case also the zone of consideration was narrowed
by eliminating candidates who did not succeed In the qualifying test and out
of those who succeeded in the qualifying test and secured the minimum
marks after interview were considered and thereafter in the process of
selection the preference rule was applied by first choosing the post- C
graduates and thereafter the graduates. We have already pointed out above
that classification on the basis or higher educational qualification with a
view to achieving improvement In administrative performance Is not abhor·
rent to Articles 14/16 of the Constitution. We are, thererore, of the opinion
that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court on a true
interpretation ofthe relevant rule in the context orthe historical background D
was a plausible view and should commend acceptance as it would advance
the cause of efficiency.in a highly technical service. [4530-E]

Md. Usman & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971) Supp. SCR 549;
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185; State of J & K v. E
Trilok Nath Koosa, (1974) l SCC 19; Md. Sujat Ali v. Union of India, (1975)
3 SCC 76; Roop Chand v. DDA, (1989) Supp. 1 SCC 116; V. Markandeya
v. State of A.P., (1989) 3 SCC 191; Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University,
(1990) 3 SCC 231 ; G.K Ajjappa v. State of Mysore & Ors., (1969) (1)
Labour & Industrial Cases 364 and Gujarat State Sales Tax Non-Gazetted F
Employees' Association v. The State of Gujarat and another, (1977) 1 SLR
452, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1710 of
1990 etc. etc.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.12.1987 of the Hyderabad
~ High Court in R.P. No. 1551/1986.

K. Madhava Reddy and Guntur Prabhakar for the appellants in C.A.
No. 1710/90. H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.
A H.N. Salve, S.K. Gambhir and Vivek Gambhir for the appellants in
CA. Nos. 1011-1024/92.

M.K. Ramamurthi, M.A. Krishnamoorthy, Ms. C. Ramamurthy,
T.V.S.N. Chari and J.M. Khanna for the respondents in C.A. Nos. 1011-
1024/92.
B
M.K. Ramamurthi, Ms. C. Ramamurthy, M.A. Krishnamoorthy and
M.A. Chinnaswamy for the petitioner in W.P. No. 96/92. )(

H.N. Salve, S.K. Gambhir, Vivek Gambhir and T.V.S.N. Chari for
the respondents in W.P. No. 96/92.
c
H.S. Gururaja Rao and Y.P. Rao for the appellant in C.A. No.
720/88.

A. Sobba Rao, A.D.N. Rao, TVSN Chari and K. Ram Kumar for the ~
respondents in C.A. No. 720/88. ·
D
T.V.S.N. Chari for the appellant in CA. No. 721/88.

j.1,s. Gururaja Rao, A. Sobba Rao and Y.P. Rao for the respondents
in C.A.No. 721/88.

E S. Padmanabhan, Ms. Anjani N. Shridhar and K. Ram Kumar for the
appellants in CA. No. 1260/90.

T.V.S.N. Chari for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
AHMADI, J. By an Advertisement No. 6/88 dated 1st December,
1988 the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission (for short 'PSC')
invited applications for 60 vacancies in the cadre of Deputy Executive
Engineers in different services : (a) R&B Engineering Service, (b) P.H. &
G M. Engineering Service, (c) Engineering Service and (d) Panchayat Raj
Engineering Service in the c0mmoo scale of Rs. 1980-3500 to be filled by
direct recruitment. These vacancies were shown in the advertisement at
Code G-1 under the head Central Recruitment. The educational and other
qualifications for the posts in question were set out to be Bachelor of
Engineering degree (Highways, Civil or Mechanical) of a recognised
H University for (a) and (d) services, a degree in Civil or Mechanical En-
GOVf. OF A.P. v. DILJP KUMAR [AHMADI, J.] 439
gineering of a recognised University for (b) service aod a degree in A
J. Bachelor of Engineering. Civil or Mechanical of a recognised University
for (c) service. Insofar as (b) category is concerned, it was mentioned that
preference shall be given to persons possessing five years experience in
Irrigation or Execution of Water Supply aod Drainage Scheme. In respect
of posts in (a) & (c) categories, it was further mentioned that post-graduate B
qualification of ao Indiao or Foreign University shall be treated as 'an
additional qualification' aod preference shall be given to such candidates.
)( Para 7 of the advertisement stated that the selection will be made on the
basis of written examination to be followed by oral test/interview for the
post in Code G-I. The scheme of examination was detailed in Annexure 6
of the advertisement. Pursuaot to the said advertisement both graduates C
aod post-graduates applied for the posts in question aod were subjected
' to a written test aod those who secured the qualifying marks were called
for oral test/interviews. Some caodidates who did not secure the qualifying
marks aod "'.ere not called for oral testfmterviews filed OA. Nos. 1736 to
1739 of 1990 contending that they ought to have been called aod the total D
number of marks secured both at the written examination aod oral test
should have been taken into consideration for the purpose of determining
the successful caodidates to be empanelled for appointment to the posts
in question .

..>- The PSC on an interpretation of the relevaot rule as placed by the E
High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No. 2568 of 1982 decided
by Wagbray, J. on March 14, 1986 first selected post-graduate engineers
for the available vaocaocies unde.r open competition aod since sufficient
number of post-graduates were available,. no graduate was selected for the
posts in question. In the category of reserved seats for backward classes, F
scheduled castes and scheduled tril]e's, post-graduates to the extent they
~ were available were selected ·aod)ri the case of non-availability of post-
graduates, graduates were selected for appointment to the posts in ques-
tion. It would at this stage be felevant to reproduce the rule in question :
G
'Rule 4 : Qualifications - No person shall be eligible for
appointment to the category aod by the method men-
tioned in columns (1) and (2) of the following table unless
he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the cor-
responding entry in column (3) thereof : H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.
A Category Method of Qualifications
Dy. Executive Direct (i) Must not have completed 28 years of
Engineer Recruitment age on first date of the July of the
year in which the recruitment is made
provided that those possessing post-
B graduate qualifications shall be
allowed age concession to the extent
of 2 years:
(ii) Must possess the B.E. Degree
(Civil or Meehl.) of a University in
India, established or incorporated
c by/or under a Central Act, Provincial
Act, or a State Act, or an institution
recognised by the Central University
Grants commission or an equivalent
qualification.
D Note 1 : Post-Graduate qualification of an Indian or of
Foreign University shall be treated as an additional
qualification and preference shall be given to such can-
didates in the matter of direct recruitment, promotion and
recruitment by transfer to the post of Deputy Executive
E Engineers.

The extent to which a post-graduate has to be given
preference in the matter of promotion to the post of
Deputy Executive Engineer is indicated below :

F 9th vacancy in 9 vacancies intended for appointment
of Assistant Executive Engineers and Compressed
Diploma Holders (DCEs) as Deputy Executive Engineers
shall, however, be earmarked for post-graduate Assistant
Executive Engineers.
G
(A similar rule - Rule 5 - is to be found for the post of Deputy
Executive Engineers in Roads & Buildings Engineering Service Rules,
1987).

Subsequently, the State Government by a Memo dated 13th October,
H 1978 issued instructions to the Chief Engineer in the matter of promotion
GOVf. OF A.P. v. DILIP KUMAR [AHMADI, J.] 441
to the category of Assistant Engineers (Deputy Executive Engineers) from A
the category of Junior Engineers (Assistant Executive Engineers). the said
memo reads as under :

"The attention of the Chief Engineer (General) is invited
to the reference cited and he is informed that under note
(1) of Rule 4 of A.P.E.S. Rules, it is laid down that B
post-graduate qualification of an Indian or Foreign Univ-
ersity shall be treated as an additional qualification and
preference shall be given to each candidate in the matter
of direct recruitment, promotion and recruitment by trans-
fer to the post of Asst!. Engineer. c
2. The above rule is not conditional or limited. Hence,
for any particular year, the list of eligible candidates with
post-graduate qualification shall be first considered in the
order of their seniority and only after such a list is con-
sidered the cases of ordinary graduates shall be con- D
sidered and selection has to be made on the basis of merit
and ability.

3. The expression 'preference shall be given' occurring in
the said rule would mean that, other things such as passing
E
of prescribed tests, maintaining merit, suitability, fitness
etc., being equal preference shall be given, at every selec-
tion or preparation of panel for appointment as Asstt.
Engineers to the holders of post-graduate qualifications,
and after giving the said preference the claims of less
qualified candidates who are also eligible for appointment F
would be considered. Such preference is not conditional
or limited."

On an interpretation of the relevant rule read with the above
memorandum, the PSC following the decision of the High Court in Writ G
Petition No. 2568 of 1982 (supra) treated the post-graduates as a class and
gave them preferential treatment by selecting those post-graduates who
secured more than the qualifying marks in the open category and since they
were available in sufficient number, graduates were kept out of selection.
In the case of reserved categories also post-graduates to the extent they
were available and had secured the qualifying marks for empanelment were H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.
A selected and only where sufficient number of such post-graduates were not
available graduates were selected in accordance with merit and placed
below them in the list. This procedure was followed by the PSC in view of
the guidelines laid down in the judgment of the High Court in the aforesaid
Writ petition. In that case, the learned Single Judge in the High Court held
B as under:

"So far as the interpretation of Rule 4 and its implemen-
tation contained in the note to Rule 4. I am clearly of the
opinion that the post-graduate will have to be preferred
as a· class. This is also supported by the memo of the
c Government and the decision of the Supreme Court and
the High Court. So long as the rule of preference stands.
I do not see any justification for watering down of the said
Rule in the way in which the Commission has done by
reducing it only to the cases where there is equivalence
of marks between a post-graduate and graduate. The very
D object of the preferential treatment is defeated by this
procedure.'

Writ Appeal No. 475 of 1987 was dismissed on August 25, 1987 on the
ground that the Single Judge's order was implemented. The State
E Government's S.L.P. No. 13035 of 1987 was also dismissed on November
26, 1990.

The Supreme Court's decision relied on by the learned Single Judge
is the case of Md. Usman & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971] Supp.
SCR 549. Following the above dictum of the learned Single Judge of the
F High Court when the selections were made pursuant to the Advertisement
No. 6/88, the PSC followed the procedure indicated by the High Court
and prepared the Select List. This was once again put into issue by the
graduates who were left out of selection in several applications filed in the
Al!dhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad. A two-member
G Bench of the Tribunal beard this group of applications and by its judgment
and order dated September 19, 1991 quashed the Select List prepared by
the PSC on the following line of reasoning :

"According to us that rule only meant that other things
being equal and the performance of a candidate possess-
H ing higher qualification and the candidate possessing min-
GOVT. OF AP. v. DILIP KUMAR [AHMADI, J.] 443
imum qualification is equal, a candidate possessing higher A
qualification may claim preference but not in case where
the performance of a candidate possessing minimum
qualification is better than the candidate who possessed
the higher qualification. If the interpretation given by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court is to be followed
B
by the Public Service Commission, the very purpose of
conducting written and oral test to assess the relative merit
and suitability of the candidates for the purpose of prepar-
ing the Select List would be defeated. In this view of the
matter, we differ with the conclusions reached by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court in W.P. No. c
2568/82. Therefore, the Select List prepared by the first
respondent treating the post-graduates as separate class,
irrespective of the marks secured by the post-graduates
and graduates in written and oral tests, is contrary to the
rules and ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution D
of India.'

It will appear from the above facts that the PSC had earlier inter-
preted and applied the ~elevant rule as opined by the Tribunal but the same
was struck down by the· High Court in Writ Petition No. 2568 of 1982
holding that such a procedure would defeat the very object of preferential E
treatment. The learned Single Judge directed that the post-graduates
should be treated as a. preferred class and so long as post-graduates who
bad secured the mininium qualifying marks were available, they were to
given preference to graduates notwithstanding the fact that the latter may
have secured higher percentage of marks in the written as well as oral F
testfmterview. Only when qualified post-graduates are not available could
the names of the graduates be entered in the Select List on the basis of
their inter-se merit. Since this decision of the learned Single Judge of the
High Court was holding the field at the relevant point of time when
selections were made pursuant to the Advertisement No. 6/88, the PSC
followed the procedure outlined by the learned Single Judge and not- G
withstanding the fact that ·certain graduates bad secured higher percentage
of marks than post-graduates, the latter were selected in preference to the
former and only in the re.served category where sufficient number of
post-graduates were not available graduates were empanelled on the basis
of their inter-se merit and placed below the post-graduates. Once again the H
444 SUPREME COURf REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.
A PSO got entangled in litigation and, as pointed out above, the tribunal by
the impugned judgment took a view contrary to the one taken by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court and upset the Select List. So far
as the applicants of OA. Nos. 1736 to 1739 of 1990 were concerned the
tribunal upheld the decision of the PSC not to call them for oral test/in-
terview since they had not secured the qualifying marks in the written test.
B
Their contention that notwithstanding their ha<ing failed to secure the
qualifying marks in the written test, they should have been called for oral
test/Interviews and thereafter the total marks secured both in the written
test and the oral test should have been compared with the total marks
secured by others, did not find favour with the tribunal. The tribuna~
C therefore, dismissed their applications with no order as to costs. They too
have approached this Court in appeal.

It is clear from the above that two views are canvassed on the true
interpretation of the relevant rule. The view urged by the post-graduates ~
D is that in implementing the rule of preference in the matter of direct
recruitment the PSC should first exhaust candidates having post-graduate
qualifications if they have secured the minimum qualifying marks and if
they are not available in sufficient number, then and then only, graduates
should be selected on merits from among those who have secured the
minimum qualifying marks and above. Learned counsel for the post-
E graduates submitted that if the rule is not so implemented the very purpose ~
of granting preference to post-graduates will be lost as it will virtually boil
down to a ridiculously low figure and the object of cadre-strengthening will
not be achieved. This view found favour with the learned Single Judge of
the Higb Court in Writ Pet;tion No. 2568 of 1982 as mentioned earlier. The
F rival view canvassed by the learned counsel for the non-preference can-
didates is that the preference rule can come into play only where two
candid~tes have secured equal marks in which case the candidate possess-
ing post-graduate qualification will be preferred if the other candidate does
not po5Sess that qualification but not otherwise, that is, not if a graduate
has secured higber number of marks than the post-graduate. In other words
G everything being equal between two candidates, the scale will tilt in favour
of a post-graduate if the other candidate is merely a graduate. This view
has found favour with the tribunal which is impugned before us. For us the }..
question is which of the two views is correct. We may at this stage notice
one further contention urged on behalf of the appellants and that is that it
1-f was not legally correct for the Tribunal to have upset the law already
GOVf. OF AP. v. DILIP KUMAR [AHMADI, J.) 445
settled by the High Court which the PSC had applied in finalising the A
selection since it was a decision rendered much before (i) the Central
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, came into force and (ii) the Tribunal
was constituted thereunder. Alternatively it was urged that even if two
views were reasonably possible on the construction of the relevant rule, the
Tribunal should not have upset the selection made on the construction B
earlier placed by the High Court.

Before we come to grips with the question regarding the true mean-
ing and import of the rule, it may be advantageous to analyse the rule on
its plain language. The opening line of the rule says that no person shall
be eligible for appointment to the post in question unless he possesses the C
qualification prescribed therefor. For the post of Deputy Executive En-
gineers for direct recruitment the first requirement is that he mu5t not have
completed 28 years of age as on 1st July of the concerned year of recruit-
ment but in the case of post-graduates a concession to the extent of two
years is allowed. Irisofar as the educational qualification is concerned be D
must possess a B.E. degree (Civil or Mechanical) of an Indian University
or an institution recognised by the Central UGC or an equivalent qualifica-
tion. So the minimum educational qualification prescribed for the post of
Deputy Executive Engineer for direct recruitment is graduation. Thus far
there is no difficulty. We now move on to Note 1. As is evident this note
is in two parts. The first part says that post-graduate qualification shall be E
treated as an additional qualification and preference shall be given to such
candidates. This. part applies to all the three modes of recruitment. The
second part indicates the extent to which a post-graduate is to be given
preference in the matter of promotion to the post of Deputy Executive
Engineer. It earmarks the 9th vacan.cy in 9 vacancies for a post-graduate F
Assistant Executive Engineer (redesignated Junior Engineer). It may be
borne in mind that this second part was added by GOMs No. 180 dated
29th April, 1983 in exercise of powers .conferred by the proviso to Article
309 of the Cm'istitution. It will be see1f from the above that while the first
part of the note requires post-graduate qualification to be treated as an
additional qualifi<:ation and candidates possessing such qualification have G
to be given a preference irrespective of the mode of entry, the second part
qualifies or explains the same insofar as it considers promotion. The second
part, therefore, applies to entry by promotion and does not apply to entry
by direct recruitment or-transfer. This seems to be ihe purport of Note 1
on its plain reading. H
~·

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 1 S.C.R.
A We may now turn to the instructions issued through Memo dated
13th October, 1978 which is in three paragraphs. The first paragraph
merely states the purport of Note 1. The second paragraph states that the ~
list of eligible candidates with post-graduate qualification shall be first
considered in the order of their seniority and only after it is considered,
the cases of ordinary graduates shall be considered. The selection has, of
B
course, to be made on the basis of merit and ability. Then comes the third
paragraph which seeks to explain the phrase 'preference shall be given' to
mean that other things (such as passing of prescribed test, maintaining
merit, suitability, fitness, etc.) being equal, preference shall be given to
holders of post-graduate qualifications, and after giving such preference
c the claim of less qualified candidates would be considered. It may at this stage
be mentioned that the subject clause of the Memo dated 13th October, 1978
has some relevance and may be reproduced :

"Sub: • Public Services · A.P. Engineering Service •
Promotion to the category of Asstt. Engineers from Jr.
D
Engineers category-preference to Post Graduates-Reg."

From the use of the expression 'promotion' in the subject clause and
'seniority' in paragraph 2 of the memo it was argued that the said instruc·
tions applied to cases of promotion only and had no application when it
E came to filling up of the posts by direct recruitment. We will immediately
deal with the said submission.

The Andhra Pradesh Engineering Service Rules, 1966 ('the Rul.es'
hereafter) came to be enacted in exercise of powers conferred by the
F proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Rule 4 · thereof prescribes the
qualification for appointment to certain posts including the post of Deputy
Executive Engineer by direct recruitment, promotion or transfer. Note 1 .,_._
'!(
forms part of the said rule. Before the insertion of the second part to note
1 by GOMs No. 180 of 1983, the instructions contained in the Memo of
13th October, 1978 provided guidance in the matter of grant of preference
G to post-graduate for entry by promotion to the post of Deputy Executive
Engineer. The subject clause of the Memo undoubtedly refers to
preference to be granted to post-graduates in the matter of promotion and
the use of the expression 'seniority' in paragraph 2 thereof is undoubtedly )..
indicative of the fact that its application was limited to laying down
H guidelines for application of the preference clause found in Note 1 to the
'f
GOVf. OF A.P. v. DILIP KUMAR [AHMADI, J.] 447
rule in the matter of promotion. Paragraph 2 thereof while stating that rule A
4 is not conditional or limited proceeds to add that for any particular year,•
~. the list ·of eligible candidates with post-graduate qualification shall be
considered ·in the order of their 'seniority' and only after such list is
considered the cases of ordinary graduates shall be considered and selec-
tion will be made on the ba,is of merit and ability. The question of seniority
B
among post-graduates can arise only in regard to candidates who are in
service and who are to be considered for promotion to the next higher post.
There can be no question of arranging post-graduates according to
>' seniority where they are seeking appointment by direct recruitment. In that
case the list would have to be prepared on the basis of merit and not
seniority. Therefore, the use of the expression 'promotion' in the subject c
clause and the expression 'seniority' in paragraph 2 of the memo is indica-
tive of the fact that the instructions concerned appointment by promotion.
In paragraph 2 it is said that candidates with post-graduate qualification
will be arranged in}.he order of their seniority and they shall be considered
~ first and only after'Such a list is considered, the case of ordinary graduates D
shall be considered and selection made on merit and ability. Paragraph 3
then says that the expression 'preference shall be given' used in Note 1
means that other things being equal, holders of post-graduate qualifications
will be given preference and after that the claims of less qualified can-
didates would be considered for appointment. The use of the word after in
both the paragraphs is significant and is indicative of the manner in which E
)--
the preference clause is to be worked out. After the amendment of Note
1 by the introduction of the second part earmarking the slot of 9th vacancy
for post-graduates, the mode of implementing the preference in the matter
of appointment by promotion underwent a change rendering the memo of
13th October, 1978 otiose. But it can still. be availed of as an aid to F
construction of Note 1 insofar as it concerns grant of preference in the
matter of direct recruitment. Except for this limited use to Which the Memo
can be put, we are agreed that it related to grant of preference at the
promotion stage only and has since become otiose.

It was emphasised on behalf of the post-graduates that the use of the G
expression after in paragraphs 2 and 3 makes it clear beyond any manner
of doubt that the intention of the authorities was to treat post-graduates as
~ a class and to consider them first and only thereafter could ·ordinary
graduates aspire to seek entry into the higher post. It is indeed true that
under paragraph 2 of the memo it was directed that 'the list of eligible H
448 SIJPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) l S.C.R..
A candidates with post-graduation qualification shall be first con-
sidered.........and only after such a list is considered the cases of ordinary
candidates shall be considered'; albeit on the basis of merit and ability. The
langiiage of this paragraph leaves .no manner of doubt that the turn of
ordinary graduates for consideration came only after the list of eligible
B post-graduates was settled. The order in which the cases of post-graduates
and ordinary graduates will be considered is made clear in this paragraph.
But paragraph 3 of the Memo says that the expression 'preference shall be
given' occurring in Note 1 would mean that other things e.g. passiqg of
prescribed tests, maintaining merit, suitllbility, fitness, etc., being equal, •
preference shall be given to holders of post-graduates qualifications. The
C latter part of this paragraph adds 'after giving the said preference', the
claims of less qualified candidates would be considered. This would mean
that after a comparative study is undertaken those post-graduates who are
fo:ind entitled to preference would be first promoted and thereafter cases
of less qualified candidates would be considered. The combined reading
D of paragraphs 2 and 3 gives the impression that cases of post-graduates
found entitled to promotion had to be first considered and only after their
absorption would it be permissible to consider the claims of ordinary
graduates i.e. le5s qualified candidates. This method of grant of preference 1,
;
in the matter of promotion was changed by GOMs No. 180 of 1983
probably because it was causing avoidable hardships. Similar changes were
E introduced in tile rules concerning other engineering services also. By this
amendment instead of granting preference to post-graduates in the matter
of promotion under the aforesaid Memo, the 9th vacancy in 9 vacancies
was earmarked for a post-graduate. We fail to see how such a provision
granting preference to post-graduates on the basis of their higher educa-
F tional <;{~cation be said to conflict with the equality clause when the
post-graduates constitute a separate class. More of it later.

The interpretation on Note t·has to be placed in background of the
said historicaf f/i<:t· It is at the same ~e..J!ecessary to remember that so
G far as the PSC.is concerned it placed'ihllnierpretation now placed by the ·
Tribunal under tj)ejmpugned order till it was disapproved by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petitjon No. 2568/82. In doing so
I
the High Court placed reliance on the del:isioh of this Court in Md.
Usmlln's case (supra). That was a case in which both UDCs and LDCs
were placed in one ~ for the purpose o~tment as Grade .Il
H su.,.:RCgistrars. The rule was, therefore, challenged as violative of Article
GOVT. OF A.P. v. DILIP KUMAR [AHMADI, J.] <149
14 on the ground that. unequals were treated as equals. The second A
question was whether the recruitments were made in. accordance with the
relevant rule. The High Court answered the latter contention in the affirm-
ative but struck down the rule on the first ground. In appeal this Court
reversed the High Court's decision holding that there was no violation of
Article 14 in clubbing UDCs and LDCs for the purpose of recruitment to
B
Grade U - Sub-Registrars . Now the rule that prescribed the qualification
for the said post also provided that preference shall be given to persons
who, in addition to the prescribed qualification; possess a degree in law of
University in the state or ·an equivalent qualification. In that case these,
persons who were entitled to preference were considered separately and
recruited first and only thereafter others were recruited, as in the present C
case. This Court found this method for recruitment by transfer to 'the most
reasonable one'. Those observations support the contention put-forward by
the post-graduates and were relied upon by the learned Single Judge in the
High Court in support of the view taken by him. The Tribunal has referred
to this decision but has not expressed itself on the applicability or otherwise D
of the said view.

The matter may be looked at from another view-point. The word
'preference' as understood in ordinary parlance means to preferring or
choosing as more desirable, favouring or conferring a prior right. What
then is the purpose and object sought to be achieved by the insertion of E
the preference clause in the rule? There is no doubt that' preference was
sought to be granted under Note i to post-graduates in the larger.interest
of the administration. How would the interest. ()f the administration be
served by granting preference to post-graduates? It is obvious that it was
thought that on account of their higher mental equipment the quality of F
performance· that the State will receive from highly qualified engineers
would be better and of a high order. In other words the State considered
it necessary to strengthen the engineering ·service by recruiting post-
graduates to the extent available so that the State may benefit from their
higher educational qualifications and better performance. If this was the
objective s~rely it would not be realised unless post-graduates are treated G
as a class and given preference on block over the graduates. Since sufficient
number of post-graduates may not be available from the feeder channels
and even if available cannot be promoted out of turn without causing heart
burns, it was thought desirable to resort to such large scale recruitment
directly from the open market. The underlying idea of the Memo dated H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.
A 13th October, 1978 was the same but certain difficulties were felt in
resorting to enforcement of the preference clause at the promotion stage
and that is why the second part came to be inserted in Note l but no such
difficulty would be experienced in strengthening the cadre through direct
recruitment. But then it was said what was the need for the PSC to hold
the written test by inviting applications from graduates and subjecting them
B to test? That was for the reason that there was no guarantee that sufficient
number of post-graduates would qualify for selection and appointment. But
if the preference rule were to be implemented as held by the Tribunal it
would apply only where the post-graduate and graduate candidates have
secured the same number of marks. If the rule so implemented is carried
C to its logical end it would ultimately resolve a tie orily at the last rung of
the ladder because ties at higher levels wouN be resolved by a post-
graduate being followed by a graduate in the select list. The question of
elimination would really arise at the last placement in the list and hence
the real purpose of the preference rule would not be served. That is why
D this Court in Md. Usman's case (supra) approved of this method of
recruitment as most reasonable. There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable
in the employer preferring a candidate with higher qualification for service.
It is well settled by a catena of decisions that classification on the basis of
higher educational qualification to achieve higher administrative efficiency
is permissible unc!er our constitutional scheme. See Roshan Lal Tandon v.
E Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 185; State of I & K v. Trilok Nath Koosa,
[1974] 1 SCC 19; Md. Sujat Ali v. Union of India, [1975] 3 SCC 76; Roop
Chand v. DDA, [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 116; V. Markandaya v. State of A.P.,
[1989] 3 SCC 191 and Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University, [1990] 3
SCC 23. We, therefore, do not agree that treating post -graduates as a class
F and giving them preference in this manner is violative of Articles 14/16 of
the Constitution. We also do not see any vice in the relevant rule and in
Note 1 as amended in 1983.

Before we part we may refer to two decisions to which our attention
G was invited. The first is a Division Bench decision of the Mysore High
Court in the case G.K Ajjappa v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1969] 1 Labour
& Industrial cases 364. That was a case in which the PSC had issued a
notification for selecting four persons for the post of Superintendent of
Fisheries and the petitioner had applied for the post in response thereto.
After the interviews were taken, respondents Nos. 3 to 6 were selected for
H appointment. Respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 belonged to the backward
GOVf. OF AP. v. DILIP KUMAR [AHMADI, J.] 451
classes whereas respondent No. 6 belonged to the Scheduled Castes. A
)._ Respondent No. 5 though belonging to the backward classes was selected ·
on the basis of merit. The petitioner contended that he possessed higher
qualification and was, therefore, entitled to preference under the relevant
rule providing for 'preference being given to persons possessing higher
qualification'. The contention was that so far as he was concerned, there B
was no question of interviewing him and in any case since he possessed
higher qualifications he ought to have been preferred in the matter of
}I( selection and appointment to the post in question. Now the method of
recruitment set out in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 of the Mysore Public Service
Commission (Functions) Rules, 1957 was as under :
c
"Consider all applications received and when necessary
interview such candidates as fulfill the prescribed condi-
tions and whom it considers most suitable for appoint-
ment."

D
The High Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the preference rule
could not exclude an interview expressly authorised by Rule 4(3) extracted
above. If the appointment had to be made by seleLtion, and the 'most
suitable' candidate had to be choosen for appointment, someone. had to
make the selection and the PSC was designated for the same and was
;>-- charged with the duty to make the selection of the most suitable candidate E
or candidates and, therefore, a person with higher qualifications could not
elbow out a more suitable person with lower qualifications for appoint-
ment. While conceding that higher academic qualification is generally a
dependable index of superior merit, which endows in its turn suitability in
many spheres, the High Court held that the selection had to be made F
strictly in terms of Rule 4(3) and, therefore, the quest had to be for the
). most suitable candidate and the superior qualification could turn the scale
only if suitability was found in equal measure. It was for this reason that
the High Court concluded that the determining criteria is not the higher
qualification but suitability in the opinion of the PSC, the quest being for
the most suitable. Higher qualification by itself would not earn a selection G
unless it stood reinforced and supplemented by suitability in other respects.
It is, therefore, obvious that the decision turned on the language of Rule
4(3) of the Function Rules.

The second decision to which our attention was invited is a Judgment H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 1 S.C.R.
A of a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat State Sales
Tax Non-Gazetted Employees' Association Iv. The State of Gujarat and
another, (1977) 1 SLR 452. In that case 120 posts of Sales Tax Inspectors
were required to be filled in by direct selection. An advertisement was
issued in the Newspaper and as many as 15,000 candidates applied in
response. thereto. This necessitated screening of the candidates at the
B -thr~d. It was found that more than 1000 applicants were holding first
class degrees in different faculties of recognised U Diversities; 580 of them
were first class Commerce graduates. 101 first class Arts graduates and
about 500 first class Science graduates. Having regard to the number of
vacancies the field of choice was restricted to first class graduates only and
C it was decided not to call for interview a second class or third class
graduate including graduates having commerce degree with Accountancy
as a subject. It was this decision which was put in issue before the learned
Single Judge by candidates who were eliminated at the threshold from
consideration. The relevant rule provided that the appointment to the po~t
of Sales Tax Inspectors shall be made either (a) by direct selection or (b)
D by promotion. Insofar as direct selection was concerned, the educational
qualification required was stated to be a degree of a recognised University.
The proviso· laid down as under :

"Provided that preference shall be given to a candidate
who possesses the degree of B.Com with Accountancy or
E Chartered Accountants, or possesses a qualification
recognised to be equivalent to such examination by the
Govt. of Gujarat."

In the context of this preference rule it was observed in para 7 of the
F Judgment as under :

"To hold that the rule of preference was enacted to give
to Commerce graduates with Accountancy or to can-
didates having other prescribed qualifications an absolute
preference over the graduates of other faculties would be
G to denude the substantive provision of much of its force
and effect and to covert the rule of preference into a rule
of reservation thereby obliterating altogether the right of
other candidates possessing degree of recognised Univer-
sities in various other faculties to be considered for the
H post."
GOVT. OF AP. v. DILIP KUMAR [AHMADI, J.] 453
It is true that notwithstanding the preference rule it is always open to the A
recruiting agency to prescribe a minimum eligibility qualification with a
view to demarcating and narrowing down the field of choice with the
ultimate objective of permitting candidates with higher qualifications to
enter the zone of consideration. It was, therefore, held that screening a
candidate out of conside14tion at the threshold of the process of selection
B
is neither illegal nor unconstitutional if a legitimate field demarcating the
choice by reference to some rationale formula is carved out. Thus the
challenge based on Articles 14/16 of the Constitution was repelled. We are
in agreement with the ratio of this decision and that is enough to negative
the claim of candidates who had preferred OA. Nos. 1736 to 1739of1990
who were not called for interview on their failing to secure the minimum c
qualifying marks in the written test.

1n the present case also the zone of consideration was narrowed by
eliminating candidates who did not succeed in the qualifying test and out
of those who succeeded in the qualifying test and secured the minimum D
marks after interview were considered and thereafter in the process of
selection the preference rule was applied by first choosing the post-
graduates and thereafter the graduates. We have already pointed out above
that classification on the basis of higher educational qualification with a
view to achieving improvement in administrative performance is not abhor~
rent to Articles 14/16 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of the opinion E
that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court on a
true interpretation of the relevant rule in the context of the historical
background was a plausible view and should commend acceptance as it
would advance the cause of efficiency in a highly technical service. We,
therefore, think that even if two views were possible, the Tribunal ought F
not to have unsettled the legal position settled earlier by the High Court
with which even this Court refused to interfere in SLP. For the foregoing
reasons we do not approve of the view subsequently taken by the Tribunal.

Since we have on interpretation of the relevant rule in the context of G
the background provided by the Memo of 13th October, 1978 approved
the learned Single Judge's view, we do not consider it necessary to examine
the contention that since the judgment of the learned Single Judge was
prior to the enactment of the Central Administrative Tribunals Act and the
constitution of the Tribunal, the latter should have felt bound by the High
Court's view. We express no opinion on the said point. H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] l S.C.R.
A In the result Civil Appeals Nos. 720 and 721 of 1988, 1260 and 1710
of 1990 and 1011 to 1024 of 1992 are allowed and the impugned orders of
the Tribunal are set aside. Writ Petition No. 96 of 1992 is dismissed. Any
action taken in pursuance of interim orders of this court during the
pendency of the aforestated cases will be regularised in the light of our
B judgment but if it entails refund of payments already made, the same shall
not be effected and shall be waived. ijaving regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case. We make no order as to costs throughout in all
the matters.

B.V.B.D CA Nos. 720 & 721/88,
1260 & 1710/90 and 1011-
1024/92 allowed.
WP No. 96/92 dismissed.